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Plugin Store Security Review
Overview
This document reviews the security mechanisms implemented in the IPFS-based Plugin Store for RuFlo V3.
Security Mechanisms Implemented
1. Trust Levels (4-Tier System)
type TrustLevel = 'official' | 'verified' | 'community' | 'unverified';
| Level | Description | Requirements |
|---|---|---|
| Official | Claude Flow team maintained | Core team, security audit passed |
| Verified | Audited by trusted parties | Third-party security audit |
| Community | Community contributed | Author identity verified |
| Unverified | Unknown origin | None (use with caution) |
2. Content Integrity (IPFS CID)
- All plugins stored with Content IDentifiers (CID)
- CID is cryptographic hash of content
- Any modification changes the CID
- Checksum verification on download
interface PluginEntry {
cid: string; // IPFS content identifier
checksum: string; // SHA-256 hash
signature?: string; // Ed25519 signature
publicKey?: string; // Author's public key
}
3. Permission System
Plugins must declare required permissions:
type PluginPermission =
| 'network' // Network access
| 'filesystem' // File system access
| 'execute' // Execute external commands
| 'memory' // Access memory system
| 'agents' // Spawn/manage agents
| 'credentials' // Access credentials (⚠️ High Risk)
| 'config' // Modify configuration
| 'hooks' // Register hooks
| 'privileged'; // Full system access (⚠️ Critical)
High-Risk Permissions: credentials, execute, privileged
4. Security Audit Tracking
interface SecurityAudit {
auditor: string; // Who audited
auditDate: string; // When
auditVersion: string; // Which version
passed: boolean; // Result
issues: SecurityIssue[];
reportCid?: string; // Full audit report on IPFS
}
interface SecurityIssue {
severity: 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';
description: string;
resolved: boolean;
resolvedVersion?: string;
}
5. Store Configuration Security
interface PluginStoreConfig {
// Security settings
requireVerification: boolean; // Require signature verification
requireSecurityAudit: boolean; // Only install audited plugins
minTrustLevel: TrustLevel; // Minimum trust level
trustedAuthors: string[]; // Whitelist
blockedPlugins: string[]; // Blacklist
allowedPermissions: PluginPermission[]; // Allowed permissions
requirePermissionPrompt: boolean; // Prompt before installing
}
Default secure settings:
{
requireVerification: true,
requireSecurityAudit: false,
minTrustLevel: 'community',
allowedPermissions: ['network', 'filesystem', 'memory', 'hooks'],
requirePermissionPrompt: true,
}
6. Registry Signature Verification
Registry itself is signed:
interface PluginRegistry {
registrySignature?: string;
registryPublicKey?: string;
}
Security Recommendations
For Users
- Always verify trust level before installing
- Review permissions - avoid
credentials,execute,privileged - Prefer official/verified plugins when available
- Check security audits for sensitive workloads
- Use blocklist for known malicious plugins
For Plugin Authors
- Request minimum permissions needed
- Get security audited for sensitive operations
- Sign your plugins with Ed25519
- Document all permissions clearly
- No hardcoded secrets in plugin code
Known Limitations (Demo Mode)
In the current demo implementation:
- IPNS resolution returns null (uses local demo data)
- Signatures are not cryptographically verified
- Downloads don't actually fetch from IPFS gateway
Production requirements:
- Implement actual IPNS resolution via ipfs-http-client
- Implement Ed25519 signature verification
- Connect to real IPFS gateway
- Add rate limiting and abuse prevention
Threat Model
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Malicious plugin | Trust levels, security audits, permission system |
| Tampered plugin | CID integrity, checksum verification, signatures |
| Registry compromise | Registry signing, multiple bootstrap nodes |
| MITM attack | IPFS content addressing (CID is hash) |
| Supply chain attack | Verified author IDs, audit trail |
| Privilege escalation | Permission whitelist, prompt on install |
Compliance Checklist
- Plugin declares all required permissions
- Plugin has valid CID and checksum
- Plugin author is identifiable
- Security audit for high-risk operations
- No known vulnerabilities (CVE check)
- Dependencies are audited
Version
Security Review Version: 1.0.0 Last Updated: 2026-01-08 Reviewed By: Claude Flow Security Team