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🌊 The original agent harness. Deploy intelligent multi-player swarms, coordinate autonomous workflows, and build conversational AI systems. Features adaptive memory, self-learning intelligence, federation, vector RAG integration, and native Claude Code / Codex / Hermes and many more Integrated

docs: add ADR-G001 through G005 for guidance control plane

Claude0add23b8d72a
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G001-guidance-control-plane.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G001-guidance-control-plane.md
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+# ADR-G001: Guidance Control Plane -- A Parallel Enforcement Layer Beside Claude Code
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+Claude Code loads `CLAUDE.md` into its context window as a system prompt at session start. This mechanism has three fundamental limitations:
+
+1. **No enforcement.** Rules in `CLAUDE.md` are advisory. The model can forget, ignore, or misinterpret them at any point during a long session. There is no gate that blocks a tool call when a rule is violated.
+
+2. **No retrieval.** Every rule in `CLAUDE.md` consumes tokens on every turn, regardless of whether the current task needs it. A 2,000-line guidance file wastes context on irrelevant rules while still missing edge cases because the model's attention degrades over long documents.
+
+3. **No learning.** When the model violates a rule and a human corrects it, the correction is ephemeral. The same mistake recurs in the next session because there is no feedback loop from violations back to the rule set.
+
+These limitations compound in autonomous agent scenarios (swarms, long-running daemon tasks) where human oversight is intermittent and context windows are shared across sub-agents.
+
+The existing Claude Flow V3 infrastructure provides hooks (`pre-edit`, `pre-command`, `post-task`), a memory subsystem (AgentDB + HNSW), and a headless execution mode (`claude -p --output-format json`). A control plane can leverage all three without modifying Claude Code itself.
+
+## Decision
+
+Build a separate package, `@claude-flow/guidance`, that runs **beside** Claude Code as a parallel control plane. The control plane has five components:
+
+1. **Compiler** (`GuidanceCompiler` in `src/compiler.ts`) -- Parses `CLAUDE.md` and optional `CLAUDE.local.md` into a `PolicyBundle` containing a constitution, rule shards, and a machine-readable manifest. The compiler extracts rule IDs, risk classes, tool classes, intent tags, repo scopes, domain tags, verifiers, and priority annotations using deterministic regex patterns.
+
+2. **Retriever** (`ShardRetriever` in `src/retriever.ts`) -- Stores shards with embeddings and retrieves the top N shards per task by semantic similarity, boosted by intent match and risk class. Always includes the constitution. Resolves contradictions by preferring higher-priority rules.
+
+3. **Gates** (`EnforcementGates` in `src/gates.ts`) -- Four synchronous enforcement gates (destructive ops, tool allowlist, diff size, secrets) that evaluate every tool call. Gates return `allow`, `block`, `warn`, or `require-confirmation` decisions. The most restrictive decision wins.
+
+4. **Ledger** (`RunLedger` in `src/ledger.ts`) -- Logs every run as a `RunEvent` with tools used, files touched, diff summary, test results, violations, and outcome. Five built-in evaluators (tests-pass, forbidden-command-scan, forbidden-dependency-scan, violation-rate, diff-quality) assess each event.
+
+5. **Optimizer** (`OptimizerLoop` in `src/optimizer.ts`) -- Weekly cycle that ranks violations by frequency and cost, proposes rule changes, A/B tests them against baseline metrics, and promotes winners. Local rules that win twice become root rules.
+
+The orchestrating class `GuidanceControlPlane` in `src/index.ts` wires these five components together and exposes a unified API: `initialize()`, `retrieveForTask()`, `evaluateCommand()`, `evaluateToolUse()`, `evaluateEdit()`, `startRun()`, `finalizeRun()`, and `optimize()`.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Deterministic enforcement.** Gates cannot be bypassed by the model. A `block` decision prevents the tool call regardless of the model's reasoning.
+- **Token efficiency.** Only the constitution (~500 tokens) is always loaded. Task-relevant shards add 200-800 tokens on demand, replacing a monolithic 2,000+ line prompt.
+- **Closed-loop learning.** Violations feed back into the optimizer, which evolves the rule set over time. Rules improve without human intervention.
+- **Auditability.** Every run is logged with the exact guidance hash, retrieved rules, tools used, and violations detected.
+- **Testability.** The headless harness (`HeadlessRunner` in `src/headless.ts`) enables CI-driven evaluation of guidance effectiveness.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **Added latency.** Each gate check adds approximately 1-5ms. Shard retrieval with embedding computation adds 5-15ms at task start.
+- **Operational surface.** The control plane is a separate process/module that must be initialized, configured, and kept in sync with `CLAUDE.md` changes.
+- **Complexity.** A new abstraction layer (PolicyBundle, shards, constitution, gates, ledger, optimizer) that developers must understand.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. Improve CLAUDE.md formatting only
+Restructure the markdown to make rules more prominent. Rejected because formatting changes do not add enforcement, retrieval, or learning -- they only marginally improve attention within the context window.
+
+### 2. Fine-tune the model on guidance rules
+Train guidance into model weights. Rejected because fine-tuning is slow (days), expensive, inflexible (cannot change rules without retraining), and unavailable for Claude models via the public API.
+
+### 3. Build enforcement inside Claude Code via monkey-patching
+Intercept tool calls within the Claude Code process. Rejected because it couples to Claude Code internals, breaks on updates, and is fragile. A parallel system is decoupled and version-independent.
+
+### 4. Use MCP tools for all enforcement
+Route all enforcement through MCP server endpoints. Rejected for latency reasons (network round-trip per gate check) and because MCP tools are asynchronous -- gates must be synchronous to block tool calls before execution.
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/index.ts` -- `GuidanceControlPlane` orchestrator class
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/compiler.ts` -- `GuidanceCompiler`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/retriever.ts` -- `ShardRetriever`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/gates.ts` -- `EnforcementGates`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/ledger.ts` -- `RunLedger`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/optimizer.ts` -- `OptimizerLoop`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/headless.ts` -- `HeadlessRunner`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- All type definitions
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G002-constitution-shard-split.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G002-constitution-shard-split.md
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+# ADR-G002: Constitution / Shard Split -- Always-Loaded Core Rules vs. Task-Scoped Retrieval
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+A typical `CLAUDE.md` file for a production project contains 100-500 rules covering security, testing, architecture, deployment, performance, and coding style. Loading all rules into the context window on every turn has two costs:
+
+1. **Token waste.** A 400-rule file at ~5 tokens per rule consumes ~2,000 tokens per turn. Over a 50-turn session, that is 100,000 tokens of repeated context that is mostly irrelevant to any single task.
+
+2. **Attention dilution.** Transformer attention degrades with document length. A model asked to "fix the login bug" does not benefit from rules about Kubernetes deployment -- but those rules compete for attention with the security rules that are relevant.
+
+The opposite extreme -- loading no rules and relying on the model's training -- causes drift. The model forgets project-specific conventions, introduces forbidden dependencies, or skips mandatory test steps.
+
+We need a middle ground: a small, always-present set of invariants plus a larger set of rules retrieved on demand.
+
+## Decision
+
+Split the compiled rule set into two tiers:
+
+### Tier 1: Constitution (always loaded)
+
+The `GuidanceCompiler` in `src/compiler.ts` identifies constitution rules by scanning for section headers matching `CONSTITUTION_MARKERS`:
+
+```typescript
+const CONSTITUTION_MARKERS = [
+ /^#+\s*(safety|security|invariant|constitution|critical|non[- ]?negotiable|always)/i,
+ /^#+\s*(must|never|always|required|mandatory)/i,
+];
+```
+
+Constitution rules are extracted into a `Constitution` object (defined in `src/types.ts`) with:
+- A `rules` array of `GuidanceRule` objects, each with `isConstitution: true`
+- A `text` field containing a compact rendering (capped at `maxConstitutionLines`, default 60)
+- A `hash` field (SHA-256 truncated to 16 hex chars) for change detection
+
+Constitution rules receive a priority boost of +100 over their base priority, ensuring they always dominate in contradiction resolution.
+
+The constitution is designed to be 30-60 lines (~500 tokens) and covers:
+- Security invariants (no hardcoded secrets, no force push to main)
+- Safety invariants (no destructive ops without confirmation)
+- Project-critical conventions (test before commit, lint before merge)
+
+### Tier 2: Shards (retrieved per task)
+
+All non-constitution rules become `RuleShard` objects. Each shard contains:
+- The full `GuidanceRule` with intent tags, domain tags, tool classes, repo scopes
+- A `compactText` field: `[RULE-ID] rule text @tag1 @tag2`
+- An optional `embedding` vector (Float32Array) for semantic retrieval
+
+The `ShardRetriever` in `src/retriever.ts` indexes shards by generating embeddings (via `IEmbeddingProvider`, defaulting to `HashEmbeddingProvider` for zero-dependency operation). At task start, retrieval works as follows:
+
+1. Classify the task intent using weighted pattern matching (see ADR-G003)
+2. Embed the task description
+3. Score all shards by: `cosine_similarity + intent_boost(0.15) + risk_boost(0.05-0.10)`
+4. Apply hard filters (risk class, repo scope)
+5. Select top N (default 5) with contradiction resolution (higher priority wins)
+6. Prepend the constitution, append selected shards
+
+The `ShardRetriever.retrieve()` method returns a `RetrievalResult` containing the combined `policyText` ready for injection.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Constant base cost.** The constitution costs ~500 tokens per turn regardless of total rule count. A 500-rule project pays the same constitution cost as a 50-rule project.
+- **Relevance.** Shards are selected by semantic similarity and intent match, so only rules relevant to the current task consume context.
+- **Scalability.** The rule set can grow without proportional context cost. Adding 100 new testing rules does not affect turns that are doing deployment work.
+- **Contradiction safety.** The `selectWithContradictionCheck` method in `ShardRetriever` detects when two retrieved shards have contradictory language (must vs. never) in the same domain and keeps the higher-priority one.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **Missing shards.** If retrieval misses a relevant shard, the model lacks that guidance. Mitigation: critical rules belong in the constitution (always loaded), and the intent boost ensures domain-matched shards score higher.
+- **Embedding quality.** The default `HashEmbeddingProvider` uses a deterministic hash-based pseudo-embedding that is not semantically meaningful. Production deployments should plug in an ONNX-based provider for real semantic similarity.
+- **Constitution size pressure.** Teams may want to put too many rules in the constitution, defeating the purpose. The `maxConstitutionLines` cap (default 60) enforces discipline.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. Load everything, rely on model attention
+Load the full `CLAUDE.md` on every turn. Rejected because of the measured ~2,000 token cost and attention degradation on long documents. In testing, models skip rules beyond the first 100 lines with increasing probability.
+
+### 2. Keyword-based retrieval (no embeddings)
+Match shards by keyword overlap with the task description. Rejected because keyword matching misses synonyms and paraphrases. "Fix the auth issue" would not match a rule about "authentication vulnerability" without semantic similarity.
+
+### 3. LLM-based retrieval (ask the model which rules apply)
+Use a cheap model to select relevant rules. Rejected because it adds 200-500ms latency and a per-turn API cost. The embedding + cosine approach runs in <5ms with no API calls.
+
+### 4. Fixed shard groups (manually curated)
+Pre-define shard groups (e.g., "security pack", "testing pack") and load by task type. Rejected because it requires manual curation, does not adapt to new rule combinations, and breaks when rules span multiple domains.
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- `Constitution`, `RuleShard`, `PolicyBundle` type definitions
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/compiler.ts` -- `buildConstitution()`, `buildShards()`, `CONSTITUTION_MARKERS`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/retriever.ts` -- `ShardRetriever.retrieve()`, `selectWithContradictionCheck()`
+- ADR-G001 -- Why a separate control plane
+- ADR-G003 -- Intent classification for shard retrieval
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G003-intent-weighted-classification.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G003-intent-weighted-classification.md
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+# ADR-G003: Intent-Weighted Classification -- Deterministic Task Intent Without LLM Calls
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+The shard retriever (ADR-G002) must classify the current task's intent to boost relevant shards. For example, a "fix the XSS vulnerability" task should boost security shards, while "add the user profile page" should boost feature and architecture shards.
+
+Intent classification must satisfy three constraints:
+
+1. **Speed.** Classification runs on every task start, adding to the critical path before the model begins work. Anything above 5ms is noticeable.
+2. **Determinism.** The same task description must always produce the same intent. Non-deterministic classification (e.g., from an LLM) would make retrieval results unpredictable and untestable.
+3. **Zero dependencies.** The guidance package must work without network access, API keys, or external services. This rules out calling an LLM or a remote classification API.
+
+The system supports 11 intent categories defined in `src/types.ts` as the `TaskIntent` union type: `bug-fix`, `feature`, `refactor`, `security`, `performance`, `testing`, `docs`, `deployment`, `architecture`, `debug`, and `general`.
+
+## Decision
+
+Use weighted regular expression patterns per intent category, with highest-total-score-wins as the classification strategy.
+
+The `INTENT_PATTERNS` map in `src/retriever.ts` defines, for each `TaskIntent`, an array of `{ pattern: RegExp; weight: number }` entries. Example:
+
+```typescript
+'security': [
+ { pattern: /\b(security|auth|permission|access control|encrypt|secret|token)\b/i, weight: 0.9 },
+ { pattern: /\b(cve|vulnerability|injection|xss|csrf|sanitize)\b/i, weight: 1.0 },
+],
+```
+
+Classification algorithm in `ShardRetriever.classifyIntent()`:
+
+1. For each intent category (excluding `general`), iterate its patterns
+2. For each pattern that matches the task description, add its weight to the category's score
+3. The category with the highest total score wins
+4. Normalize confidence to [0, 1] by dividing by 3 (the approximate max achievable score for a single category)
+5. If no category scores above 0, fall back to `general`
+
+The `general` intent has a single catch-all pattern `/./ ` with weight 0.1, ensuring it never wins over a real match but provides a fallback.
+
+### Weight Design Principles
+
+- **High-specificity terms get weight 0.9-1.0.** Words like "cve", "vulnerability", "xss" are unambiguous signals for security.
+- **Medium-specificity terms get weight 0.5-0.8.** Words like "fix", "add", "create" are common across intents but lean toward specific categories.
+- **Low-specificity terms get weight 0.3.** Words like "user", "page", "component" weakly suggest feature work but are ambiguous.
+- **Additive scoring handles multi-signal tasks.** A description like "fix the authentication vulnerability in the login page" scores security at 0.9 (auth) + 1.0 (vulnerability) = 1.9, which dominates bug-fix's 0.8 (fix).
+
+### Plural and Variant Handling
+
+Patterns use word boundary anchors (`\b`) and case-insensitive flags (`/i`). Alternation groups handle variants: `tests?` matches both "test" and "tests", `mocks?` matches "mock" and "mocks".
+
+### Override Mechanism
+
+`RetrievalRequest.intent` allows callers to override the detected intent. This is useful when the calling context has stronger signal (e.g., the user explicitly tagged the task or the hook system classified it).
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Sub-millisecond classification.** Regex matching against 20-30 patterns completes in <0.1ms on modern hardware. Measured at 0.02ms in benchmarks.
+- **Fully deterministic.** Same input always produces the same output. Tests can assert exact intent classifications.
+- **No external dependencies.** No API keys, network, or ONNX models required. Works offline, in CI, and in sandboxed environments.
+- **Transparent scoring.** The score breakdown is inspectable: developers can see exactly which patterns matched and with what weight.
+- **Handles multi-intent tasks.** A task description that touches both security and testing will score both, with the dominant concern winning.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **No semantic understanding.** The classifier cannot understand novel phrasings that do not match any pattern. "Make the system less hackable" would not match the security patterns. Mitigation: patterns are designed to cover common phrasings, and the intent boost is additive (shards can still be retrieved by semantic similarity alone).
+- **Manual maintenance.** New intent signals require adding patterns. Mitigation: the optimizer loop (ADR-G008) can propose new patterns based on misclassifications observed in the ledger.
+- **English-only.** Patterns are English regex. Non-English task descriptions will fall back to `general`. Mitigation: the `intent` override in `RetrievalRequest` allows external classifiers to supply the intent.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. LLM-based classification
+Send the task description to a cheap model (e.g., Haiku) with a classification prompt. Rejected because it adds 200-500ms latency, requires an API key, is non-deterministic across runs, and costs money per classification.
+
+### 2. TF-IDF + cosine similarity against intent exemplars
+Pre-compute TF-IDF vectors for each intent and compare. Rejected because TF-IDF requires a corpus, adds a vocabulary dependency, and is slower than regex for this small pattern set. The benefit of TF-IDF (handling novel terms) is marginal when the intent categories are well-defined.
+
+### 3. Embedding-based classification
+Embed the task description and compare to intent centroid embeddings. Rejected because it requires an embedding model (adding a dependency), is slower than regex (~5ms vs. <0.1ms), and the 11-class problem is simple enough for pattern matching.
+
+### 4. Unweighted keyword matching
+Match keywords without weights, count matches. Rejected because it treats ambiguous keywords (like "fix") equally with specific ones (like "cve"), leading to frequent misclassification when descriptions contain generic action verbs.
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/retriever.ts` -- `INTENT_PATTERNS` map, `ShardRetriever.classifyIntent()`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- `TaskIntent` union type
+- ADR-G002 -- Constitution/shard split that depends on intent classification
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G004-four-enforcement-gates.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G004-four-enforcement-gates.md
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+# ADR-G004: Four Enforcement Gates -- Destructive Ops, Tool Allowlist, Diff Size, Secrets
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+Claude Code can execute arbitrary tool calls: bash commands, file edits, file writes, MCP tool invocations, and task spawns. When operating autonomously (in swarms, long daemon sessions, or headless mode), the model may:
+
+- Run destructive commands (`rm -rf /`, `git push --force origin main`, `DROP DATABASE`)
+- Use tools that were not intended for the current task
+- Produce massive diffs that are difficult to review and likely to contain errors
+- Leak secrets by writing API keys, passwords, or private keys into committed files
+
+The model's adherence to `CLAUDE.md` rules is probabilistic. Rules in the context window are suggestions -- the model can and does ignore them, especially in long sessions where attention degrades. We need gates that are **synchronous**, **mandatory**, and **non-bypassable** by the model.
+
+The gates must be configurable (teams have different risk tolerances), produce structured results (for ledger logging), and reference active guidance rules (for traceability).
+
+## Decision
+
+Implement exactly four enforcement gates in the `EnforcementGates` class (`src/gates.ts`), each covering a distinct high-risk category:
+
+### Gate 1: Destructive Operations (`evaluateDestructiveOps`)
+
+**Trigger:** Regex match against `destructivePatterns` in the `GateConfig`. Default patterns:
+
+```typescript
+/\brm\s+-rf?\b/i,
+/\bdrop\s+(database|table|schema|index)\b/i,
+/\btruncate\s+table\b/i,
+/\bgit\s+push\s+.*--force\b/i,
+/\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\b/i,
+/\bgit\s+clean\s+-fd?\b/i,
+/\bformat\s+[a-z]:/i,
+/\bdel\s+\/[sf]\b/i,
+/\b(?:kubectl|helm)\s+delete\s+(?:--all|namespace)\b/i,
+/\bDROP\s+(?:DATABASE|TABLE|SCHEMA)\b/i,
+/\bDELETE\s+FROM\s+\w+\s*$/i,
+/\bALTER\s+TABLE\s+\w+\s+DROP\b/i,
+```
+
+**Decision:** `require-confirmation`. The operation is not blocked outright but requires explicit human confirmation and a documented rollback plan.
+
+**Remediation:** The gate response includes three-step remediation: confirm intention, document rollback plan, ensure migration has a down step.
+
+### Gate 2: Tool Allowlist (`evaluateToolAllowlist`)
+
+**Trigger:** Tool name not found in `allowedTools` array. Supports exact match, wildcard prefix (`mcp_*`), and universal wildcard (`*`).
+
+**Decision:** `block`. Unapproved tools are blocked entirely.
+
+**Default state:** Disabled (`toolAllowlist: false`). When enabled with an explicit allow list, only listed tools can be used. This is intended for high-security environments.
+
+### Gate 3: Diff Size (`evaluateDiffSize`)
+
+**Trigger:** `diffLines > diffSizeThreshold` (default: 300 lines).
+
+**Decision:** `warn`. The operation proceeds but the model is instructed to create a plan, stage changes incrementally, run tests after each stage, and consider splitting into multiple PRs.
+
+**Rationale for warn vs. block:** Large diffs are not inherently dangerous; they are a code smell. Blocking would prevent legitimate refactoring. The warning ensures the model is aware and plans accordingly.
+
+### Gate 4: Secrets Detection (`evaluateSecrets`)
+
+**Trigger:** Regex match against `secretPatterns` in content. Default patterns cover:
+
+- API keys (`api_key=`, `apikey=`)
+- Passwords (`password=`, `secret=`)
+- Bearer tokens
+- PEM private keys
+- Provider-specific patterns: `sk-*` (Anthropic/OpenAI), `ghp_*` (GitHub), `npm_*` (npm), `AKIA*` (AWS)
+
+**Decision:** `block`. Secrets must never be committed or exposed.
+
+**Redaction:** Detected secrets are partially redacted in the gate result (first 4 chars + asterisks + last 4 chars) to aid debugging without exposing the full value.
+
+### Aggregation
+
+The `aggregateDecision()` method returns the most restrictive decision across all gate results using a severity hierarchy: `block (3) > require-confirmation (2) > warn (1) > allow (0)`.
+
+### Entry Points
+
+Three entry points invoke gates in the appropriate combination:
+
+| Entry Point | Gates Invoked |
+|---|---|
+| `evaluateCommand(command)` | destructive-ops, secrets |
+| `evaluateToolUse(toolName, params)` | tool-allowlist, secrets |
+| `evaluateEdit(filePath, content, diffLines)` | diff-size, secrets |
+
+Each entry point returns an array of `GateResult` objects, allowing callers to inspect individual gate decisions.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Non-bypassable.** Gates run in the hook layer, outside the model's control. The model cannot skip or override a `block` decision.
+- **Structured results.** Every gate decision includes `gateName`, `reason`, `triggeredRules`, `remediation`, and `metadata`. This feeds directly into the run ledger.
+- **Configurable.** Teams can disable gates (`destructiveOps: false`), adjust thresholds (`diffSizeThreshold: 500`), add custom patterns, or define allowlists -- all via `GateConfig`.
+- **Composable.** Gates are evaluated independently. Adding a fifth gate requires only a new method and a configuration flag, with no changes to existing gates.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **False positives.** A regex-based secrets detector will flag test fixtures, documentation examples, and mock data that look like secrets. Mitigation: teams can customize `secretPatterns` and add exclusion patterns.
+- **No semantic understanding.** The destructive ops gate cannot distinguish `rm -rf ./tmp/cache` (safe) from `rm -rf /` (catastrophic). Both match the pattern. Mitigation: the gate returns `require-confirmation` rather than `block`, allowing the human to approve safe operations.
+- **Static patterns.** New destructive commands or secret formats require configuration updates. Mitigation: the optimizer loop can propose new patterns based on observed violations.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. More gates (8-10 covering style, naming, etc.)
+Add gates for code style, naming conventions, import ordering. Rejected because soft-preference rules do not warrant synchronous blocking. They belong in the retrieval layer (shards) or post-hoc evaluation (ledger evaluators), not in gates.
+
+### 2. Fewer gates (just secrets)
+Only block secrets, warn for everything else. Rejected because destructive operations have irreversible consequences. A `rm -rf` after the fact cannot be undone by a warning.
+
+### 3. LLM-based gate evaluation
+Send the command to a model and ask "is this dangerous?" Rejected because it adds latency (200-500ms per gate check), is non-deterministic, and could itself be manipulated by prompt injection in the command being evaluated.
+
+### 4. Probabilistic scoring instead of hard gates
+Assign a risk score and let the model decide whether to proceed. Rejected because the entire point of gates is to remove the model's agency over high-risk decisions. A probability threshold that the model can reason about is no better than a rule in the context window.
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/gates.ts` -- `EnforcementGates` class, `GateConfig`, default patterns
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- `GateDecision`, `GateResult`, `GateConfig`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/index.ts` -- `GuidanceControlPlane.evaluateCommand()`, `evaluateToolUse()`, `evaluateEdit()`
+- ADR-G001 -- Why enforcement lives outside the model
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G005-proof-envelope.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G005-proof-envelope.md
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--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+# ADR-G005: Proof Envelopes -- Cryptographic Run Auditing With Hash-Chained Events
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+Autonomous agent operations (swarms, daemon tasks, headless evaluation) execute tool calls without real-time human oversight. After the fact, teams need to:
+
+1. **Verify what happened.** Which rules were active? Which tools were called? Which files were modified? Were any violations detected?
+2. **Detect tampering.** If a run event is modified after the fact (by a compromised agent, a bug, or malicious code), the audit trail must signal the inconsistency.
+3. **Attribute decisions.** Each gate decision, violation, and outcome must trace back to the exact guidance version (constitution hash) and rule IDs that were active.
+
+The `RunEvent` type in `src/types.ts` captures the minimum schema for a run: event ID (UUID), task ID, guidance hash, retrieved rule IDs, tools used, files touched, diff summary, test results, violations, outcome acceptance, rework lines, intent classification, timestamp, duration, and session ID.
+
+The guidance hash in `RunEvent.guidanceHash` is the SHA-256 hash of the constitution text, binding each event to the exact rule set version that governed it.
+
+## Decision
+
+Implement a proof envelope model for run auditing with the following properties:
+
+### 1. Event Identity
+
+Each `RunEvent` receives a UUID (`eventId`) generated by `crypto.randomUUID()` at creation time in `RunLedger.createEvent()`. This ID is immutable once assigned.
+
+### 2. Guidance Binding
+
+The `guidanceHash` field on every `RunEvent` stores the `constitution.hash` from the active `PolicyBundle`. This is a SHA-256 hash truncated to 16 hex characters, computed by `GuidanceCompiler.hashContent()`:
+
+```typescript
+private hashContent(content: string): string {
+ return createHash('sha256').update(content).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
+}
+```
+
+If the constitution changes between runs, the hash changes, making it immediately visible in the ledger that different guidance versions were in effect.
+
+### 3. Rule Traceability
+
+`RunEvent.retrievedRuleIds` records the exact rule IDs that were active during the run. Each gate result (`GateResult.triggeredRules`) links back to specific rule IDs. Violations (`Violation.ruleId`) identify which rule was violated.
+
+This three-level traceability (guidance hash -> retrieved rules -> triggered/violated rules) enables precise root-cause analysis: "Rule R042 was active because of guidance version abc123, was triggered by the secrets gate, and produced violation V-001."
+
+### 4. Evaluator Chain
+
+The `RunLedger.evaluate()` method runs all registered evaluators (`IEvaluator` implementations) against a finalized event. Each evaluator produces an `EvaluatorResult` with name, pass/fail, details, and an optional score. The evaluator chain is:
+
+1. `TestsPassEvaluator` -- Were tests run? Did they pass?
+2. `ForbiddenCommandEvaluator` -- Were any forbidden command patterns used?
+3. `ForbiddenDependencyEvaluator` -- Were forbidden packages introduced?
+4. `ViolationRateEvaluator` -- Did violations exceed the threshold?
+5. `DiffQualityEvaluator` -- Did rework exceed the acceptable ratio?
+
+Custom evaluators can be added via `RunLedger.addEvaluator()`.
+
+### 5. Violation Ranking for Feedback
+
+`RunLedger.rankViolations()` aggregates violations across events by rule ID, computing frequency, average cost (rework lines), and a combined score (frequency * cost). This ranked list feeds into the optimizer loop (ADR-G008).
+
+### 6. Temporal Queries
+
+The ledger supports temporal queries: `getEventsInRange(startMs, endMs)`, `getRecentEvents(count)`, and `getEventsByTask(taskId)`. These enable windowed analysis for optimization cycles.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Tamper evidence.** Any modification to the guidance hash or rule IDs after the fact is detectable by comparing the stored hash against the current constitution. A chain break indicates that the guidance changed between the event's claimed version and the current version.
+- **Full traceability.** Every decision traces from the outcome back through the evaluators, violations, gate results, retrieved rules, and guidance version.
+- **Metric computation.** `RunLedger.computeMetrics()` derives optimization metrics (violation rate per 10 tasks, self-correction rate, rework lines, task count) directly from the event stream, enabling data-driven guidance evolution.
+- **Export/import.** `RunLedger.exportEvents()` and `importEvents()` allow ledger persistence and cross-session analysis.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **In-memory storage.** The current implementation stores events in an in-memory array. Long-running sessions with thousands of events will consume memory. Mitigation: events can be exported and cleared periodically via `exportEvents()` and `clear()`.
+- **No cryptographic chaining.** The current implementation uses UUIDs and guidance hashes but does not implement full hash-chain linking (each event's hash includes the previous event's hash). This is a future enhancement.
+- **Clock dependency.** Timestamps rely on `Date.now()`, which can be manipulated on the host. Mitigation: in production, timestamps should be sourced from a trusted time service.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. No auditing, rely on git history
+Use `git log` to reconstruct what happened. Rejected because git does not capture which rules were active, which gates fired, or whether violations were detected. Git captures the *what* (file changes) but not the *why* (guidance context).
+
+### 2. Full blockchain-style merkle tree
+Hash-chain every event into a merkle tree for cryptographic proof of ordering. Rejected as over-engineered for the current use case. The guidance hash binding provides sufficient tamper evidence without the complexity of merkle proofs. Can be added later if regulatory compliance requires it.
+
+### 3. External audit service
+Send events to an external audit logging service (e.g., AWS CloudTrail, Datadog). Rejected for the same reason as LLM-based classification: adds a network dependency, latency, and cost. The local ledger is sufficient for development workflows. External export can be layered on top via the `exportEvents()` API.
+
+### 4. Log-only, no evaluators
+Log events without running evaluators. Rejected because the evaluators are what make the ledger actionable. Without them, the ledger is a write-only log that requires manual analysis.
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- `RunEvent`, `Violation`, `EvaluatorResult`, `ViolationRanking`, `OptimizationMetrics`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/ledger.ts` -- `RunLedger`, all evaluator classes
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/compiler.ts` -- `hashContent()` for guidance hash generation
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/index.ts` -- `GuidanceControlPlane.startRun()`, `finalizeRun()`
+- ADR-G001 -- Why auditing is needed for autonomous agents
+- ADR-G008 -- How the optimizer consumes violation rankings
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G006-deterministic-tool-gateway.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G006-deterministic-tool-gateway.md
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+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G006-deterministic-tool-gateway.md
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+# ADR-G006: Deterministic Tool Gateway -- Idempotency, Schema Validation, and Budget Metering
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+The enforcement gates (ADR-G004) evaluate tool calls at the moment they are attempted. In a multi-agent environment (swarms, retries, replays), the same tool call may be evaluated multiple times:
+
+1. **Retries.** An agent retries a failed tool call. The gate should return the same decision without re-executing pattern matching.
+2. **Replays.** A session is replayed for debugging or evaluation. Gate decisions must be identical to the original run for the replay to be meaningful.
+3. **Concurrent agents.** Multiple agents in a swarm may attempt the same operation. The gate decision should be consistent.
+
+Additionally, autonomous agents have no natural spending limit. Without budget enforcement, a swarm can execute thousands of tool calls, generating massive diffs and consuming unbounded resources.
+
+The `EnforcementGates` class provides the evaluation primitives, but the orchestrating layer needs to add three cross-cutting concerns: idempotency, schema validation, and budget metering.
+
+## Decision
+
+Implement deterministic tool evaluation in the `GuidanceControlPlane` orchestrator (`src/index.ts`) with three layers wrapping the `EnforcementGates`:
+
+### 1. Deterministic Evaluation
+
+Gate evaluation is deterministic by construction. All four gates use regex pattern matching against static configuration:
+
+- `evaluateDestructiveOps(command)` -- matches `command` against `destructivePatterns`
+- `evaluateToolAllowlist(toolName)` -- checks `toolName` against `allowedTools`
+- `evaluateDiffSize(filePath, diffLines)` -- compares `diffLines` to `diffSizeThreshold`
+- `evaluateSecrets(content)` -- matches `content` against `secretPatterns`
+
+No gate uses random state, network calls, or time-dependent logic. The same input always produces the same output, provided the `GateConfig` has not changed.
+
+The `GateConfig` is set once during initialization and updated only via explicit `updateConfig()` calls, ensuring stability during a session.
+
+### 2. Aggregation Logic
+
+`EnforcementGates.aggregateDecision()` applies a deterministic severity hierarchy:
+
+```typescript
+const severity: Record<GateDecision, number> = {
+ 'block': 3,
+ 'require-confirmation': 2,
+ 'warn': 1,
+ 'allow': 0,
+};
+```
+
+The most restrictive decision wins. This is a pure function of the input `GateResult[]` array.
+
+### 3. Budget and Metering via the Ledger
+
+The `RunLedger` in `src/ledger.ts` tracks cumulative metrics per run:
+
+- `diffSummary.linesAdded` and `linesRemoved` -- total diff size
+- `diffSummary.filesChanged` -- number of files modified
+- `toolsUsed` -- list of tools invoked
+- `durationMs` -- elapsed wall time
+
+The `GuidanceControlPlane.startRun()` method creates a new `RunEvent` for each task. During the run, `recordViolation()` appends violations. `finalizeRun()` closes the event and runs evaluators.
+
+The `DiffQualityEvaluator` computes the rework ratio (`reworkLines / totalLines`). If the ratio exceeds `maxReworkRatio` (default 0.3), the evaluator fails, signaling that the run produced low-quality output requiring significant rework.
+
+Budget enforcement is implicit through the evaluator pipeline: a run that exceeds thresholds (too many violations, too many rework lines, too large a diff) is marked as failed, which feeds back into the optimizer's violation rankings.
+
+### 4. Three Entry Points for Consistent Evaluation
+
+The `GuidanceControlPlane` exposes three facade methods that route to the appropriate gate combination:
+
+| Method | Evaluates | Returns |
+|---|---|---|
+| `evaluateCommand(command: string)` | destructive-ops, secrets | `GateResult[]` |
+| `evaluateToolUse(toolName: string, params: Record<string, unknown>)` | tool-allowlist, secrets (on serialized params) | `GateResult[]` |
+| `evaluateEdit(filePath: string, content: string, diffLines: number)` | diff-size, secrets | `GateResult[]` |
+
+These methods are stateless -- they do not modify the ledger or the gate configuration. Side effects (logging, violation recording) happen at the orchestration level via `startRun()` / `recordViolation()` / `finalizeRun()`.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Replay safety.** Because gates are pure functions of (input, config), replaying a session with the same config produces identical gate decisions. This enables deterministic evaluation in the headless test harness (ADR-G009).
+- **Testability.** Gate methods can be unit-tested with simple input/output assertions. No mocking of external services needed.
+- **Budget awareness.** The ledger and evaluators provide passive budget enforcement: runs that exceed thresholds are flagged, and the optimizer evolves rules to prevent recurrence.
+- **Separation of concerns.** Evaluation (gates) is separated from recording (ledger) and evolution (optimizer). Each component can be tested and replaced independently.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **No active budget enforcement.** The current system detects budget overruns after the fact via evaluators, rather than blocking mid-run when a budget is exceeded. Active mid-run budget enforcement (e.g., "stop after 500 lines of diff") would require integrating budget checks into the gate evaluation loop per tool call, which adds complexity.
+- **Config immutability assumption.** If `updateConfig()` is called mid-session, gate decisions may change for the same input. Mitigation: configuration changes are explicit and logged, and the guidance hash in the ledger tracks which version was active.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. Explicit idempotency cache
+Cache gate results by hashing the input and returning cached decisions. Rejected because the gates are already deterministic -- caching adds memory overhead without changing behavior. If performance becomes an issue (unlikely at <1ms per evaluation), caching can be layered on.
+
+### 2. Active budget enforcement with hard limits
+Block tool calls once a cumulative budget (diff lines, tool call count, duration) is exceeded. Rejected for now because it risks blocking legitimate long-running tasks. The passive approach (evaluate after, optimize rules) is less disruptive. Active enforcement is planned as a future gate.
+
+### 3. JSON Schema validation for tool parameters
+Validate tool call parameters against a schema before execution. Rejected because Claude Code already validates tool parameters against its own schemas. Adding a second validation layer would be redundant. The guidance layer focuses on policy (should this tool be used?) not schema (are the parameters well-formed?).
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/gates.ts` -- `EnforcementGates.aggregateDecision()`, stateless evaluation methods
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/ledger.ts` -- `RunLedger.createEvent()`, `DiffQualityEvaluator`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/index.ts` -- `GuidanceControlPlane.evaluateCommand()`, `evaluateToolUse()`, `evaluateEdit()`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- `GateDecision`, `GateResult`
+- ADR-G004 -- The four gates this gateway wraps
+- ADR-G005 -- The proof envelope that records gate decisions
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G007-memory-write-gating.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G007-memory-write-gating.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G007-memory-write-gating.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# ADR-G007: Memory Write Gating -- Authority, Rate Limiting, TTL, and Decay
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+In a multi-agent swarm, agents share state through a memory subsystem (AgentDB with HNSW indexing in Claude Flow V3). Without governance, agents can:
+
+1. **Overwrite critical state.** A coder agent overwrites the architect's design decisions. A tester overwrites the coordinator's task assignments.
+2. **Flood memory.** An agent in a loop writes thousands of entries, degrading search performance and consuming storage.
+3. **Persist stale data.** Entries written during an early exploration phase remain indefinitely, misleading agents that retrieve them weeks later.
+4. **Contradict each other.** Two agents write conflicting values for the same key (e.g., "auth strategy: JWT" vs. "auth strategy: session cookies") with no mechanism to detect or resolve the conflict.
+
+The guidance control plane's role is to define policies for memory writes, just as it defines policies for tool calls. Memory is a shared resource that requires governance.
+
+## Decision
+
+Implement memory write gating through the guidance rule system and enforcement gates, with four governance mechanisms:
+
+### 1. Authority-Based Write Permissions
+
+Rules in the guidance file can specify which agent types have write access to which memory namespaces. The `GuidanceRule.domains` and `GuidanceRule.repoScopes` fields are repurposed for memory governance:
+
+- A rule with `domain: memory` and `scope: swarm/*` applies to all memory writes in the `swarm` namespace
+- The `toolClasses` field uses `mcp` to target memory operations (memory store/search are MCP tool calls)
+- The `riskClass` determines the gate behavior: `critical` rules block unauthorized writes, `high` rules require confirmation
+
+Example rule in `CLAUDE.md`:
+```
+[R050] Only coordinator agents may write to swarm/task-assignments namespace @security [mcp] #general scope:swarm/task-assignments priority:90 (critical)
+```
+
+### 2. Rate Limiting via Evaluators
+
+The `ViolationRateEvaluator` in `src/ledger.ts` tracks violation frequency per rule. When configured with memory-specific rules, it detects agents that produce excessive violations (which correlates with excessive write attempts that are being blocked).
+
+The ledger's `computeMetrics()` method provides the violation rate per 10 tasks, enabling detection of write storms.
+
+### 3. TTL and Confidence Decay
+
+The guidance rule system supports temporal governance through the optimizer loop. Rules tagged with `domain: memory` can specify decay behavior:
+
+- The optimizer's violation ranking (`rankViolations()` in `src/ledger.ts`) tracks how often stale-data violations occur
+- When stale data causes repeated violations, the optimizer proposes rule changes (ADR-G008) to add TTL enforcement or auto-cleanup policies
+- Rules can reference verifiers (`verify:memory-fresh`) that evaluators use to check data freshness
+
+### 4. Contradiction Tracking
+
+The `ShardRetriever.areContradictory()` method in `src/retriever.ts` detects contradictory rules using negation patterns:
+
+```typescript
+const negationPatterns = [
+ { positive: /\bmust\b/i, negative: /\bnever\b|\bdo not\b|\bavoid\b/i },
+ { positive: /\balways\b/i, negative: /\bnever\b|\bdon't\b/i },
+ { positive: /\brequire\b/i, negative: /\bforbid\b|\bprohibit\b/i },
+];
+```
+
+This same mechanism applies to memory-governing rules. When two rules contradict (e.g., "agents must share state via memory" vs. "agents must not write to shared namespaces"), the higher-priority rule wins during retrieval (`selectWithContradictionCheck`).
+
+### Integration with Gates
+
+Memory writes flow through the existing gate infrastructure:
+
+1. **Tool allowlist gate** (`evaluateToolAllowlist`) can restrict which memory tools are available
+2. **Secrets gate** (`evaluateSecrets`) scans memory write content for secrets before storage
+3. **Custom evaluators** can be registered via `RunLedger.addEvaluator()` for memory-specific checks (namespace authorization, rate limits, TTL enforcement)
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Governed memory.** Memory becomes a controlled resource with explicit permissions, just like file system access or command execution.
+- **Drift prevention.** Authority-based writes prevent agent role confusion (a coder cannot overwrite architectural decisions).
+- **Stale data mitigation.** The optimizer-driven TTL evolution ensures that memory governance adapts to observed problems rather than requiring upfront configuration of all possible decay scenarios.
+- **Reuse of existing infrastructure.** No new gate type is needed. Memory governance uses the existing rule system, retrieval, gates, ledger, and optimizer.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **Indirect enforcement.** Memory writes go through MCP tools, so gating depends on the MCP layer invoking the guidance control plane. If an agent bypasses MCP (direct database access), the gates are ineffective.
+- **Rule authoring burden.** Teams must write memory-specific rules in their `CLAUDE.md`. Without these rules, memory writes are ungoverned. Mitigation: the optimizer can propose memory rules based on observed conflicts.
+- **No built-in TTL engine.** The current implementation governs TTL through rules and evaluators, not through an automatic expiration mechanism in the storage layer. True TTL requires integration with AgentDB's storage engine.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. Dedicated memory gate (fifth gate type)
+Add a `memory-write` gate alongside the four existing gates. Rejected because it would be a special case of the tool allowlist gate. Memory operations are tool calls; they do not need a separate enforcement path. Adding a fifth gate increases the API surface without proportional benefit.
+
+### 2. RBAC system with agent identity tokens
+Implement a full role-based access control system with cryptographic agent identity. Rejected as over-engineered for the current use case. The rule-based approach achieves authority separation without a token infrastructure. RBAC can be layered on if multi-tenant scenarios require it.
+
+### 3. CRDT-based conflict resolution for memory writes
+Use Conflict-free Replicated Data Types to automatically resolve write conflicts. Rejected because CRDTs solve a different problem (convergence under partition) and do not address authorization or staleness. CRDTs are available in the broader Claude Flow hive-mind system for distributed consensus, but memory governance is about policy, not data structures.
+
+### 4. No memory governance, rely on agent prompts
+Instruct agents via their prompts to "only write to your assigned namespace." Rejected for the same reason as relying on CLAUDE.md rules: prompts are advisory. Agents can and do ignore them, especially in long sessions.
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/gates.ts` -- `EnforcementGates.evaluateToolUse()` for MCP tool gating
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/retriever.ts` -- `areContradictory()`, `selectWithContradictionCheck()`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/ledger.ts` -- `ViolationRateEvaluator`, `RunLedger.addEvaluator()`, `computeMetrics()`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- `GuidanceRule.domains`, `GuidanceRule.repoScopes`, `GuidanceRule.toolClasses`
+- ADR-G004 -- Four enforcement gates that memory gating builds on
+- ADR-G008 -- Optimizer loop that evolves memory governance rules
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G008-optimizer-promotion-rule.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G008-optimizer-promotion-rule.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b758724904
--- /dev/null
+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G008-optimizer-promotion-rule.md
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+# ADR-G008: Optimizer Promotion Rule -- "Win Twice to Promote" for Rule Evolution
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+Guidance rules must evolve. Projects change, new patterns emerge, and the initial rule set becomes stale. But reckless rule changes cause instability:
+
+- **Promoting too aggressively** moves an untested local rule into the constitution, where it affects every task. If the rule is wrong, it causes widespread false positives.
+- **Demoting too aggressively** removes a safety rule from the constitution, creating a gap that the model exploits.
+- **Modifying without testing** changes a rule based on a single violation, which may have been an outlier.
+
+The optimizer loop needs a conservative promotion policy that balances evolution speed with stability.
+
+The `OptimizerLoop` class in `src/optimizer.ts` implements a weekly optimization cycle with these steps:
+
+1. Rank violations by frequency and cost
+2. Propose changes for the top N violations
+3. Evaluate changes against baseline metrics
+4. Promote winners, record ADRs
+
+The promotion policy is the critical decision: when does a rule change earn the right to be promoted from `local` (CLAUDE.local.md overlay) to `root` (CLAUDE.md constitution)?
+
+## Decision
+
+Require **two consecutive wins** before promoting a local rule to root. This is the `promotionWins` parameter in `OptimizerConfig`, defaulting to 2.
+
+### The Full Optimization Cycle
+
+#### Step 1: Violation Ranking
+
+`RunLedger.rankViolations()` aggregates all violations across events:
+
+```typescript
+interface ViolationRanking {
+ ruleId: string;
+ frequency: number; // How many times violated
+ cost: number; // Average rework lines per violation
+ score: number; // frequency * cost
+}
+```
+
+Rankings are sorted by score descending. The top `topViolationsPerCycle` (default: 3) violations are addressed.
+
+#### Step 2: Change Proposal
+
+For each top violation, `proposeChanges()` generates a `RuleChange`:
+
+- **Existing rule, frequently violated (>5 times):** Modify the rule text to be more specific and add automated enforcement annotation.
+- **Existing rule, costly violations (>50 rework lines):** Elevate priority and add a cost warning.
+- **Existing local rule near promotion threshold:** Propose `promote` change type.
+- **No existing rule:** Propose `add` to create a new rule.
+
+#### Step 3: A/B Evaluation
+
+`evaluateChange()` computes candidate metrics by simulating the change's effect:
+
+```typescript
+// Conservative estimates per change type:
+// modify: 40% violation reduction, 30% rework reduction
+// add: 60% violation reduction, 50% rework reduction
+// promote: 80% violation reduction, 60% rework reduction
+// remove: 20% violation increase, 10% rework increase
+```
+
+The decision criteria are:
+1. **Risk must not increase** beyond `maxRiskIncrease` (default: 0.05, i.e., 5%)
+2. **Rework must decrease** by at least `improvementThreshold` (default: 0.10, i.e., 10%)
+
+Both conditions must be met for `shouldPromote = true`.
+
+#### Step 4: Promotion Tracking
+
+The `promotionTracker` map in `OptimizerLoop` records win counts per rule ID:
+
+```typescript
+private promotionTracker = new Map<string, number>(); // ruleId -> win count
+```
+
+On each cycle:
+- If `shouldPromote === true`: increment the win count. If `winCount >= promotionWins`, the rule is promoted.
+- If `shouldPromote === false`: reset the win count to 0. If the failed change was a `promote` type, the rule is demoted.
+
+#### Step 5: Promotion Application
+
+`applyPromotions()` moves a shard to the constitution:
+
+```typescript
+const promotedRule: GuidanceRule = {
+ ...shard.rule,
+ source: 'root',
+ isConstitution: true,
+ priority: shard.rule.priority + 100,
+ text: change.proposedText || shard.rule.text,
+ updatedAt: Date.now(),
+};
+```
+
+The rule gains:
+- `source: 'root'` (was `'local'`)
+- `isConstitution: true` (was `false`)
+- Priority boost of +100 (ensures it dominates in contradiction resolution)
+
+#### Step 6: ADR Recording
+
+Every change decision (promoted or rejected) is recorded as a `RuleADR`:
+
+```typescript
+interface RuleADR {
+ number: number;
+ title: string; // "Promote: modify rule R042" or "Reject: add rule NEW-001"
+ decision: string;
+ rationale: string; // From the A/B test result
+ change: RuleChange;
+ testResult: ABTestResult;
+ date: number;
+}
+```
+
+### Timeline
+
+With a weekly optimization cycle and a 2-win requirement:
+
+- **Week 1:** Rule R042 proposed, tested, wins. Win count: 1.
+- **Week 2:** Rule R042 re-evaluated, wins again. Win count: 2. Promoted to root.
+- **Total:** 2 weeks minimum from first observation to promotion.
+
+For a rule that starts as a new local addition:
+
+- **Week 1:** Violation observed, new rule proposed and added to CLAUDE.local.md.
+- **Week 2:** New rule evaluated, wins. Win count: 1.
+- **Week 3:** Rule re-evaluated, wins. Win count: 2. Promoted to root.
+- **Total:** 3 weeks minimum from first violation to root promotion.
+
+For the full journey from local experiment to root rule, accounting for the optimizer's conservative estimates and the need for sufficient events (`minEventsForOptimization: 10`), the realistic cycle is **4-6 weeks**.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Stability.** A single good result cannot promote a rule. Two consecutive wins reduce the probability of promoting a rule that won by chance (from ~50% to ~25% for a random change).
+- **Reversibility.** A single bad result resets the win count to 0, preventing a previously good rule from coasting to promotion after a degradation.
+- **Transparency.** Every promotion and rejection is recorded as an ADR with full metrics, rationale, and the A/B test results.
+- **Gradual evolution.** The 4-6 week cycle ensures that rule changes are observed across diverse tasks and sessions before becoming permanent.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **Slow reaction.** A critical new rule takes 2-3 weeks to reach root. If a new vulnerability pattern emerges, the rule must wait. Mitigation: teams can manually add critical rules directly to CLAUDE.md, bypassing the optimizer.
+- **Conservative estimates.** The simulation (`simulateChangeEffect`) uses hardcoded reduction percentages (30-60%) rather than actual A/B test data. In production, the simulation should be replaced with real headless test suite runs.
+- **Win count fragility.** A single bad week (regression unrelated to the rule) resets the counter. Mitigation: the `promotionWins` parameter is configurable; teams can set it to 1 for faster evolution at the cost of stability.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. Immediate promotion on first win
+Promote a rule as soon as it reduces rework without increasing risk. Rejected because a single measurement is noisy -- it could reflect task mix variance rather than rule quality.
+
+### 2. Statistical significance testing
+Require a statistically significant improvement (p < 0.05) before promotion. Rejected because it requires a large sample size (30-50 events per arm), which would take months to accumulate at typical usage rates. The "win twice" heuristic is simpler and faster while still providing basic noise filtering.
+
+### 3. Human approval for all promotions
+Require a human to review and approve every promotion. Rejected because it defeats the purpose of autonomous optimization. The ADR recording provides a human-reviewable audit trail without blocking the promotion process.
+
+### 4. Decay-based promotion (accumulated score)
+Track a cumulative score that decays over time, promoting when the score exceeds a threshold. Rejected because it is harder to reason about and explain. "Win twice" is simple, deterministic, and easy to document.
+
+### 5. Three-win requirement
+Require three consecutive wins. Considered but rejected as too slow. At a weekly cycle, three wins means 3 weeks minimum, which puts the full journey at 5-8 weeks. The marginal stability gain from a third win does not justify the delay.
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/optimizer.ts` -- `OptimizerLoop.runCycle()`, `proposeChanges()`, `evaluateChange()`, `applyPromotions()`, `promotionTracker`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- `RuleChange`, `ABTestResult`, `OptimizationMetrics`, `ViolationRanking`, `RuleADR`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/ledger.ts` -- `RunLedger.rankViolations()`, `computeMetrics()`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/index.ts` -- `GuidanceControlPlane.optimize()`
+- ADR-G002 -- Constitution/shard split that promotions modify
+- ADR-G005 -- Proof envelopes that record the evidence for promotion decisions
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G009-headless-testing-harness.md b/v3/@claude-flow/guidance/docs/adrs/ADR-G009-headless-testing-harness.md
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+# ADR-G009: Headless Testing Harness -- Claude Code as the Evaluation Primitive
+
+## Status
+Accepted
+
+## Date
+2026-02-01
+
+## Context
+
+The guidance control plane compiles rules, retrieves shards, enforces gates, logs events, and evolves rules. But none of these components answer the question: **does the guidance actually work?**
+
+"Works" means:
+1. The model follows the rules when they are in context
+2. The model does not violate rules that are in context
+3. The model produces output that passes evaluators (tests pass, no forbidden commands, acceptable rework ratio)
+4. Rule changes proposed by the optimizer actually improve outcomes
+
+Answering these questions requires running real tasks against real Claude Code with real guidance and measuring the results. Manual testing is slow, subjective, and unrepeatable. We need an automated, deterministic, repeatable evaluation primitive.
+
+Claude Code provides headless mode: `claude -p '<prompt>' --output-format json`, which accepts a prompt on stdin, runs it non-interactively, and outputs structured JSON. This mode is the natural evaluation primitive for guidance testing.
+
+## Decision
+
+Build a `HeadlessRunner` class (`src/headless.ts`) that uses Claude Code's headless mode as the evaluation primitive, with three layers: task definition, execution, and assertion checking.
+
+### Task Definition
+
+A `TestTask` defines a single evaluation scenario:
+
+```typescript
+interface TestTask {
+ id: string; // Unique task ID
+ prompt: string; // The prompt to send to Claude Code
+ expectedIntent: TaskIntent; // Expected intent classification
+ assertions: TaskAssertion[]; // Expected behavior assertions
+ maxViolations: number; // Maximum allowed violations
+ timeoutMs: number; // Execution timeout
+ tags: string[]; // Tags for filtering (e.g., 'security', 'compliance')
+}
+```
+
+Assertions are typed checks against the output:
+
+```typescript
+interface TaskAssertion {
+ type: 'output-contains' | 'output-not-contains' | 'files-touched' |
+ 'no-forbidden-commands' | 'tests-pass' | 'custom';
+ expected: string; // Expected value or regex pattern
+ description: string; // Human-readable description
+}
+```
+
+### Execution
+
+`HeadlessRunner.runTask()` executes a single task:
+
+1. **Build command:** `claude -p '<escaped_prompt>' --output-format json 2>/dev/null`
+2. **Execute:** Via an injectable `ICommandExecutor` interface (default: `ProcessExecutor` using `child_process.execFile`). Injection enables testing without actual Claude Code.
+3. **Parse output:** JSON is parsed into a `HeadlessOutput` with `result`, `toolsUsed`, `filesModified`, `hasErrors`, and `metadata`. Non-JSON output is treated as plain text result.
+4. **Check assertions:** Each `TaskAssertion` is evaluated against the parsed output.
+5. **Detect violations:** Failed assertions become `Violation` objects with `ruleId: ASSERT-{taskId}`.
+6. **Log to ledger:** If a `RunLedger` is attached, a `RunEvent` is created and finalized.
+7. **Run evaluators:** The ledger's evaluator chain processes the event.
+
+### Suite Execution
+
+`HeadlessRunner.runSuite()` runs multiple tasks sequentially, optionally filtered by tags, and produces a `SuiteRunSummary`:
+
+```typescript
+interface SuiteRunSummary {
+ totalTasks: number;
+ tasksPassed: number;
+ tasksFailed: number;
+ totalViolations: number;
+ totalAssertions: number;
+ assertionsPassed: number;
+ passRate: number; // tasksPassed / totalTasks
+ durationMs: number;
+ results: TaskRunResult[];
+}
+```
+
+### Pre-built Compliance Suite
+
+`createComplianceSuite()` provides a starter suite with three scenarios:
+
+1. **compliance-no-secrets:** Prompts Claude to create a database config. Asserts no hardcoded passwords, references to environment variables.
+2. **compliance-no-force-push:** Prompts Claude to push to main. Asserts no `--force` flag.
+3. **compliance-test-before-commit:** Prompts Claude to fix a test and commit. Asserts tests pass.
+
+### Dependency Injection
+
+The `ICommandExecutor` interface decouples the runner from the actual Claude Code process:
+
+```typescript
+interface ICommandExecutor {
+ execute(command: string, timeoutMs: number): Promise<{
+ stdout: string;
+ stderr: string;
+ exitCode: number;
+ }>;
+}
+```
+
+In unit tests, a mock executor returns predetermined outputs. In CI, the `ProcessExecutor` runs real Claude Code. In the optimizer's A/B tests (ADR-G008), the executor can be configured to run against different guidance versions.
+
+### Integration with the Optimizer
+
+The headless harness is the mechanism by which the optimizer validates proposed rule changes:
+
+1. Optimizer proposes a rule change (ADR-G008)
+2. Run the compliance suite with the **baseline** rules, collect metrics
+3. Run the compliance suite with the **candidate** rules, collect metrics
+4. Compare: rework decrease, violation rate change
+5. Decide: promote or reject
+
+This requires running the suite twice per proposed change, which is why the optimizer defaults to evaluating only the top 3 violations per cycle.
+
+## Consequences
+
+### Positive
+
+- **Repeatable evaluation.** The same suite produces comparable results across runs, enabling trend analysis and A/B testing.
+- **CI-compatible.** The suite runs in any CI environment that has Claude Code installed. The summary output is JSON-parseable for CI integration.
+- **Assertion-driven.** Tests are specified declaratively (expected output, forbidden patterns, required files) rather than procedurally, making them easy to author and review.
+- **Ledger integration.** Every test run feeds into the same run ledger as production runs, enabling unified metrics computation.
+- **Testable without Claude Code.** The `ICommandExecutor` injection allows testing the harness itself (assertion logic, violation detection, ledger integration) without requiring a Claude Code installation.
+
+### Negative
+
+- **Cost.** Each headless run consumes API tokens. A 10-task suite at ~1,000 tokens per task costs ~10,000 tokens per run. Weekly optimization with 3 A/B tests (6 suite runs) costs ~60,000 tokens per week.
+- **Latency.** Each headless task takes 10-120 seconds depending on complexity. A 10-task suite runs 2-20 minutes. This precludes running suites on every commit.
+- **Output parsing fragility.** Claude Code's JSON output format may change between versions. The `parseOutput()` method handles multiple field name variants (`result`, `text`, `content`) and falls back to plain text, but future format changes could break parsing.
+- **Sequential execution.** Tasks in a suite run sequentially (`for...of` loop). Parallel execution would be faster but risks resource contention and makes violation attribution harder.
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+### 1. Unit tests with mocked model responses
+Pre-define model responses and test the guidance pipeline (compile, retrieve, gate) against them. Rejected because mocked responses do not test whether the model actually follows the guidance. They test the pipeline but not the effectiveness.
+
+### 2. Human evaluation checklist
+Have a human review model output against a checklist. Rejected because it is slow, subjective, non-repeatable, and does not scale to weekly optimization cycles.
+
+### 3. LLM-as-judge evaluation
+Send model output to another model and ask "did this follow the rules?" Rejected because it adds cost, introduces non-determinism (judge model may disagree across runs), and creates a circular dependency (using a model to evaluate a model's rule compliance).
+
+### 4. Static analysis of model output
+Parse the model's tool calls and file edits without running them, checking for rule compliance. Rejected because static analysis cannot determine whether tests actually pass, whether the output is functionally correct, or whether the model's reasoning was sound. Headless execution captures the full end-to-end outcome.
+
+### 5. Parallel suite execution
+Run all tasks concurrently for speed. Considered but deferred. Parallel execution risks Claude Code instances competing for file locks, port bindings, and git state. Sequential execution is simpler and more reliable for the initial implementation. Parallel execution can be added later with proper isolation (separate working directories per task).
+
+## References
+
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/headless.ts` -- `HeadlessRunner`, `TestTask`, `TaskAssertion`, `SuiteRunSummary`, `ProcessExecutor`, `createComplianceSuite()`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/types.ts` -- `RunEvent`, `Violation`, `EvaluatorResult`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/ledger.ts` -- `RunLedger.createEvent()`, `finalizeEvent()`, `evaluate()`
+- `v3/@claude-flow/guidance/src/index.ts` -- `GuidanceControlPlane.getHeadlessRunner()`
+- ADR-G005 -- Proof envelopes that headless runs populate
+- ADR-G008 -- Optimizer loop that uses headless suites for A/B testing