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🌊 The original agent harness. Deploy intelligent multi-player swarms, coordinate autonomous workflows, and build conversational AI systems. Features adaptive memory, self-learning intelligence, federation, vector RAG integration, and native Claude Code / Codex / Hermes and many more Integrated

fix(mods): secret screen judges values, not names — fewer false positives, vendor keys, URL credentials, env assignments, 200 KB scan (ADR-445)

ruv0b5eb1c109e8
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-adr/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-adr/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-adr/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-adr/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-agent/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-agent/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-agent/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-agent/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/README.md b/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/README.md
index 27cc37ec2c..7d1de9f8bd 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/README.md
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/README.md
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ A function-hook mod ships beside the skills. Needs a Claude Code with mods (2.1.
| Piece | Default | What it does |
|---|---|---|
-| **Secret guard** | on | Refuses a memory write (`agentdb_hierarchical-store`, `agentdb_pattern-store`, `agentdb_batch`, `agentdb_causal-edge`, `memory_store`, `hooks_remember`) that holds a private key, cloud/GitHub/Slack token, bearer token, JWT or key-like assignment. The secret is never echoed. |
+| **Secret guard** | on | Refuses a memory write (`agentdb_hierarchical-store`, `agentdb_pattern-store`, `agentdb_batch`, `agentdb_causal-edge`, `memory_store`, `hooks_remember`) that holds a private key, cloud/GitHub/Slack token, bearer token, JWT or key-like assignment. The secret is never echoed. The shared screen (`hooks/screen.ts`, copied to every mod by `scripts/sync-mod-screen.mjs`) judges an assignment by its value: calls, env references, identifier paths, placeholders, UUIDs, secret-manager paths and hyphenated names are not secrets; a literal needs two character classes (one a digit or symbol) and at least 2.5 bits of entropy per character. Vendor keys (Stripe, npm, HuggingFace, SendGrid, Twilio, Slack webhooks) and `scheme://user:pass@host` URLs are matched by shape; input is scanned in one pass up to 200 KB (head and tail beyond that). |
| **Recall into prompts** | **off** | Attaches the best 1–5 memories to each prompt as framed, per-prompt context (the prompt cache is not disturbed). Read through the already-connected AgentDB (or ruvector) tool: no CLI, no network. Skipped for slash commands, `!` lines and short prompts; gives up after `recallDeadlineMs` (800); cached 10 minutes. |
| **Untrusted memory** | always | A retrieved memory with a secret or an instruction-to-the-model phrase is dropped; the rest are control-character-stripped, capped (5 items, 400 chars each, 1500 total) and framed as data. |
| **`/agentdb-mod`** | — | `status`, `recall <text>`, `scan <text>`, `recent`; answered locally, no model call. |
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ A function-hook mod ships beside the skills. Needs a Claude Code with mods (2.1.
Options (`userConfig`): `recall` off|on, `recallLimit` 1–5, `recallDeadlineMs` 200–3000, `guard` on|off, `source` auto|agentdb|ruvector|none.
```bash
-claude plugin test plugins/ruflo-agentdb # 26 tests: screening, recall, reader fallback, guard, /agentdb-mod, deadline, cache
+claude plugin test plugins/ruflo-agentdb # 66 tests: screening (incl. secret-screen quality), recall, reader fallback, guard, /agentdb-mod, deadline, cache
node plugins/ruflo-agentdb/scripts/bench.mjs # per-call cost of the pure paths (tens of µs)
```
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/hooks/screen.ts
index f75f792820..170d85f804 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -16,10 +16,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -35,11 +42,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/scripts/bench.mjs b/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/scripts/bench.mjs
index b05cc9374d..b5d2c33f65 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/scripts/bench.mjs
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/scripts/bench.mjs
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ function time(name, fn, n) {
const rows = [
time('scan 2 KB text', () => m.scan(note.repeat(16)), 20000),
time('scan 20 KB adversarial (ReDoS probe)', () => m.scan('ignore all previous curl wget Bearer secret= '.repeat(450)), 300),
+ time('scan 20 KB of assignments + URLs (screen-quality probe)', () => m.scan('token= password: a://b:c@h api_key = "x1" Bearer secret_key=Ab1 '.repeat(330)), 300),
+ time('scan 200 KB clean text (cap, one pass)', () => m.scan(note.repeat(1600)), 20),
time('guard verdict (memory write, clean)', () => m.verdict('mcp__x__agentdb_hierarchical-store', write), 20000),
time('guard verdict (other tool, skipped)', () => m.verdict('Bash', { command: 'ls -la' }), 200000),
time('parse + screen + frame (5 results)', () => m.frame(m.screen(m.parse(result, 'agentdb', Date.now()), 3).items), 10000),
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/tests/screen.test.ts b/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/tests/screen.test.ts
index c8caf88b55..72e2c665b7 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/tests/screen.test.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-agentdb/tests/screen.test.ts
@@ -40,6 +40,105 @@ describe('screen', () => {
})
})
+// Secret-shaped values are assembled at run time so no literal sits in the source.
+const rnd = (n: number, seed = 'q7Zk3Xp9Lm2Vb8Nc4Rt6Yw1Hs5Df0Jg') => seed.repeat(Math.ceil(n / seed.length)).slice(0, n)
+const hex = (n: number) => '3fa9c01be7d4852c6a1f'.repeat(4).slice(0, n)
+
+describe('screen quality: false positives', () => {
+ const clean = [
+ 'const token = getTokenFromHeader(request)',
+ 'token=getAuthenticationTokenFromRequestHeaders()',
+ 'const key = process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY_FOR_THIS_SERVICE',
+ 'apiKey = process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY',
+ 'secret: my-k8s-secret-name-for-database',
+ 'token: <uuid>',
+ 'token: 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000',
+ 'Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_GOES_HERE_PLACEHOLDER',
+ 'use sk-learn-pipeline-stage-preprocessing-step-one for the preprocessing stage',
+ 'password: stored-in-1password-vault-item',
+ 'secret: projects/p/secrets/s/versions/1',
+ 'password: ${DB_PASSWORD}',
+ 'token: opts.token,',
+ 'password: "required"',
+ 'DATABASE_PASSWORD=$DB_PASSWORD',
+ 'postgres://user:password@localhost:5432/app',
+ 'postgres://app:${DB_PASSWORD}@db/app',
+ 'mysql://root:<password>@localhost/test',
+ 'Run the tests, then update the token handling docs.',
+ ]
+ for (const text of clean) {
+ test('does not flag: ' + text, () => {
+ expect(scan(text).secrets).toEqual([])
+ })
+ }
+})
+
+describe('screen quality: false negatives', () => {
+ const pw = 'Tr0ub4dor&3xKcd9876'
+ const found: readonly (readonly [string, string, string])[] = [
+ ['password with & in quotes', 'password: "' + pw + '"', 'key assignment'],
+ ['password with @ ! #', "const password = 'p@ss!w0rd#2024xY'", 'key assignment'],
+ ['JSON secret', '{"client_secret": "' + rnd(32) + '"}', 'key assignment'],
+ ['AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY', 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=' + rnd(40, 'wJalrXUtnFEMI7K7MDENGbPxRfiCY'), 'key assignment'],
+ ['GITHUB_TOKEN env', 'GITHUB_TOKEN=' + rnd(30), 'key assignment'],
+ ['DATABASE_PASSWORD env', 'DATABASE_PASSWORD=' + 'hunter2hunter2', 'key assignment'],
+ ['URL query token', 'GET /v1/items?access_token=' + rnd(24) + '&page=2', 'key assignment'],
+ ['stripe live key', 'sk_' + 'live_' + rnd(24), 'stripe key'],
+ ['stripe restricted key', 'rk_' + 'live_' + rnd(24), 'stripe key'],
+ ['npm token', 'npm_' + rnd(36), 'npm token'],
+ ['huggingface token', 'hf_' + rnd(34), 'huggingface token'],
+ ['sendgrid key', 'SG.' + rnd(22) + '.' + rnd(43, 'aB3dE5gH7jK9mN1pQ'), 'sendgrid key'],
+ ['twilio key', 'SK' + hex(32), 'twilio key'],
+ ['slack webhook', 'https://hooks.slack.com/services/T0' + 'ABCDEFGH/B0' + 'ABCDEFGH/' + rnd(24), 'slack webhook'],
+ ['db url with credentials', 'postgres://app_user:' + 's3cr3tPw' + '[email protected]:5432/app', 'database url with credentials'],
+ ['bearer token', 'Authorization: Bearer ' + rnd(40), 'bearer token'],
+ ['openai style key', 'sk-' + rnd(48, 'aB3dE5gH7jK9mN1pQ2'), 'anthropic or openai key'],
+ ]
+ for (const [label, text, rule] of found) {
+ test('flags ' + label, () => {
+ const f = scan(text)
+ expect(f.secrets).toContain(rule)
+ expect(JSON.stringify(f)).not.toContain(rnd(24))
+ })
+ }
+
+ test('a secret far past the old 20k cap is still found, in one long string', () => {
+ const filler = 'lorem ipsum dolor sit amet '.repeat(5000)
+ expect(filler.length).toBeGreaterThan(100_000)
+ expect(hasSecret(filler.slice(0, 60_000) + 'password=' + pw + ' ' + filler.slice(0, 60_000))).toBe(true)
+ expect(hasSecret(filler.slice(0, 60_000) + ' ' + filler.slice(0, 60_000))).toBe(false)
+ })
+
+ test('input beyond the scan cap keeps head and tail', () => {
+ const big = 'a '.repeat(150_000)
+ expect(hasSecret('npm_' + rnd(36) + ' ' + big)).toBe(true)
+ expect(hasSecret(big + ' npm_' + rnd(36))).toBe(true)
+ })
+})
+
+describe('screen quality: cost', () => {
+ const adversarial = (n: number) => 'ignore all previous curl wget Bearer secret= token: password=a://b:c@ '.repeat(n)
+
+ test('stays linear: 10x the input costs about 10x, not 100x', () => {
+ const time = (text: string) => {
+ scan(text)
+ const t = performance.now()
+ for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) scan(text)
+ return performance.now() - t
+ }
+ const small = time(adversarial(300))
+ const large = time(adversarial(3000))
+ expect(large / Math.max(small, 1)).toBeLessThan(40)
+ })
+
+ test('a 20 KB adversarial input finishes well inside a prompt budget', () => {
+ const text = adversarial(280).slice(0, 20_000)
+ const t = performance.now()
+ scan(text)
+ expect(performance.now() - t).toBeLessThan(50)
+ })
+})
+
describe('recall', () => {
test('worthRecalling skips slash, shell and short prompts', () => {
expect(worthRecalling('/clear')).toBe(false)
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-agntcy/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-agntcy/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-agntcy/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-agntcy/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-ai-team/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-ai-team/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-ai-team/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-ai-team/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-aidefence/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-aidefence/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-aidefence/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-aidefence/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-arena/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-arena/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-arena/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-arena/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-autopilot/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-autopilot/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-autopilot/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-autopilot/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-bbs-federation/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-bbs-federation/hooks/screen.ts
index 2eb643ec3a..aa16d4f4f4 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-bbs-federation/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-bbs-federation/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
+
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-browser/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-browser/hooks/screen.ts
index d56a5160a1..82577449c9 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-browser/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-browser/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
+
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-business-pods/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-business-pods/hooks/screen.ts
index 7a00619578..53d058fc1e 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-business-pods/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-business-pods/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
+
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-chatgpt-federation/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-chatgpt-federation/hooks/screen.ts
index 97d3b30dae..daae6df822 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-chatgpt-federation/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-chatgpt-federation/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
+
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-daa/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-daa/hooks/screen.ts
index c7122184d6..2f07bcdbed 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-daa/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-daa/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-ddd/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-ddd/hooks/screen.ts
index c7122184d6..2f07bcdbed 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-ddd/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-ddd/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-deepseek-harness/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-deepseek-harness/hooks/screen.ts
index c7122184d6..2f07bcdbed 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-deepseek-harness/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-deepseek-harness/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-docs/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-docs/hooks/screen.ts
index c7122184d6..2f07bcdbed 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-docs/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-docs/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-federation/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-federation/hooks/screen.ts
index c7122184d6..2f07bcdbed 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-federation/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-federation/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-goals/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-goals/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-goals/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-goals/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-graph-intelligence/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-intelligence/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-intelligence/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-intelligence/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-intelligence/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-iot-cognitum/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-iot-cognitum/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-iot-cognitum/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-iot-cognitum/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-jujutsu/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-jujutsu/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-jujutsu/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-jujutsu/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-knowledge-graph/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-knowledge-graph/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-knowledge-graph/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-knowledge-graph/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-loop-workers/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-loop-workers/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-loop-workers/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-loop-workers/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-market-data/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-market-data/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-market-data/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-market-data/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/hooks/screen.ts
index 44d44964a2..daa743e23c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-metaharness/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-migrations/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-migrations/hooks/screen.ts
index ac5c8585fa..d18268021b 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-migrations/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-migrations/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-music/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-music/hooks/screen.ts
index 708ff4af27..d2ee44e167 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-music/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-music/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-neural-trader/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-neural-trader/hooks/screen.ts
index 26363d951e..f543dfb133 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-neural-trader/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-neural-trader/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-observability/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-observability/hooks/screen.ts
index 7e29007f11..cee50e7951 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-observability/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-observability/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-rag-memory/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-rag-memory/hooks/screen.ts
index 23355464bc..1662eed60c 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-rag-memory/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-rag-memory/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-ruvector/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-ruvector/hooks/screen.ts
index aba3641659..a862aa3811 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-ruvector/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-ruvector/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-ruvllm/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-ruvllm/hooks/screen.ts
index 270241a1ca..f8a0cbba85 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-ruvllm/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-ruvllm/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-rvf/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-rvf/hooks/screen.ts
index b34f61d860..5be98c0c10 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-rvf/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-rvf/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-security-audit/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-security-audit/hooks/screen.ts
index fac26a9fbc..87f8461382 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-security-audit/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-security-audit/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-sparc/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-sparc/hooks/screen.ts
index d36ced2b33..fca7544d2d 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-sparc/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-sparc/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-workflows/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-workflows/hooks/screen.ts
index 9cccc515c7..d3d01c6d14 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-workflows/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-workflows/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }
diff --git a/plugins/ruflo-x-gateway/hooks/screen.ts b/plugins/ruflo-x-gateway/hooks/screen.ts
index 734858376d..e8471fa2d4 100644
--- a/plugins/ruflo-x-gateway/hooks/screen.ts
+++ b/plugins/ruflo-x-gateway/hooks/screen.ts
@@ -12,10 +12,17 @@ export const COMMON_SECRETS: Rules = [
['aws access key', /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/],
['github token', /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{40,})\b/],
['slack token', /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/],
+ ['slack webhook', /\bhooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/B[A-Z0-9]{6,}\/[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
['google api key', /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/],
- ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:ant-|proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{24,}/],
+ ['anthropic or openai key', /\bsk-(?:(?:ant|proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|(?=[A-Za-z]{0,40}\d)[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})/],
+ ['stripe key', /\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}/],
+ ['npm token', /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/],
+ ['huggingface token', /\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b/],
+ ['sendgrid key', /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}/],
+ ['twilio key', /\bSK[0-9a-f]{32}\b/],
['jwt', /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}/],
- ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,}/],
+ ['bearer token', /\bBearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{24,})/],
+ ['database url with credentials', /\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{1,20}:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:[^\s@/]{3,}@[^\s/]+/i],
]
export const INJECTION: Rules = [
@@ -31,11 +38,90 @@ export const INJECTION: Rules = [
// C0/C1 controls (keeping tab and newline), DEL, zero-width and bidi override characters; built with escapes, never raw.
const INVISIBLE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u0008\\u000b-\\u001f\\u007f-\\u009f\\u200b-\\u200f\\u2028-\\u202e\\u2060-\\u2064\\ufeff]', 'g')
-/** Input capped at 20k characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
-export const bare = (text: string) => (text.length > 20_000 ? text.slice(0, 20_000) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+/** Longest input scanned in one pass; a longer one keeps its head and tail halves. One regex pass per rule, so cost stays linear. */
+const MAX_SCAN = 200_000
-/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already `bare`d). */
-export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([, re]) => re.test(text)).map(([name]) => name)
+/** Input bounded to MAX_SCAN characters with invisible characters removed, so none can hide a secret or a phrase. */
+export const bare = (text: string) =>
+ (text.length > MAX_SCAN ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN / 2) + '\n' + text.slice(-MAX_SCAN / 2) : text).replace(INVISIBLE, '')
+
+// A value is a secret CANDIDATE only when it is not a reference (env var, call, identifier path, placeholder, secret-manager path) and its
+// shape is random enough: at least two character classes, one of them a digit or symbol, and Shannon entropy of at least 2.5 bits per character.
+const PLACEHOLDER = /placeholder|your[-_ ]|example|changeme|change[-_]?me|redacted|dummy|replace[-_]?me|insert[-_]|\*{3,}|x{5,}|\.{3}|^(?:none|null|undefined|true|false)$/i
+const REFERENCE =
+ /^(?:\$(?:\{[^}]*\}|\(|[A-Za-z_]\w*$)|%[^%]*%$|<[^>]*>$|\{\{|process\.env|os\.environ|env[.[]|import\.meta|System\.getenv|secrets?\.|vault:|op:\/\/|ref\+|arn:|projects\/[^/]+\/secrets\/|gcp:|kms:|aws:|file:)/i
+const CALL = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)*\(|^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*\[/
+const IDENT_PATH = /^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*(?:\.[A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)+$/
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-(?:[0-9a-f]{4}-){3}[0-9a-f]{12}$/i
+const NAME_LIKE = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:[-_./][a-z0-9]+){2,}$/
+
+function entropy(v: string): number {
+ const counts = new Map<string, number>()
+ for (const ch of v) counts.set(ch, (counts.get(ch) ?? 0) + 1)
+ let h = 0
+ for (const n of counts.values()) h -= (n / v.length) * Math.log2(n / v.length)
+ return h
+}
+
+/** True when `v` is a name, call, path or placeholder rather than a literal credential. */
+function isReference(v: string): boolean {
+ if (PLACEHOLDER.test(v) || REFERENCE.test(v) || CALL.test(v) || IDENT_PATH.test(v)) return true
+ return NAME_LIKE.test(v) && v.replace(/\D/g, '').length / v.length < 0.15
+}
+
+export function plausibleSecret(v: string): boolean {
+ if (v.length < 8 || v.length > 256 || /\s/.test(v) || UUID.test(v) || isReference(v)) return false
+ const symbol = /[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(v)
+ const digit = /\d/.test(v)
+ const classes = [/[a-z]/.test(v), /[A-Z]/.test(v), digit, symbol].filter(Boolean).length
+ return classes >= 2 && (digit || symbol) && entropy(v) >= 2.5
+}
+
+const KEY_NAME = /(?:api[_-]?key|secret|token|passw(?:or)?d|passwd|pwd|credential|private[_-]?key)s?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,40}["']?\s*[:=]\s*/gi
+const QUOTED = /(["'\x60])((?:(?!\1)[^\n]){1,256})\1/y
+const BARE_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;]{1,256}/y
+const QUERY_VALUE = /[^\s"'\x60,;&]{1,256}/y
+
+/** A secret-named key assigned a literal value: env style, JSON, YAML, code. Values that are calls, references or placeholders do not count. */
+function assignmentSecret(text: string): boolean {
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(KEY_NAME)) {
+ const at = m.index + m[0].length
+ let back = m.index
+ while (back > 0 && m.index - back < 64 && /[A-Za-z0-9_.-]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1))) back--
+ const re = /["'\x60]/.test(text.charAt(at)) ? QUOTED : /[?&]/.test(text.charAt(back - 1)) ? QUERY_VALUE : BARE_VALUE
+ re.lastIndex = at
+ const hit = re.exec(text)
+ if (hit && plausibleSecret(hit[2] ?? hit[0])) return true
+ }
+ return false
+}
+
+/** A password in a URL's userinfo that is not a placeholder such as user:password or ${DB_PASSWORD}. */
+function urlCredential(url: string): boolean {
+ const pass = /^[^:]+:\/\/[^\s:@/]+:([^\s@/]+)@/.exec(url)?.[1]
+ if (!pass || /\$\{|\{\{|%\(|%s/.test(pass)) return false
+ return !/^(?:password|passwd|pass|pwd|secret|changeme|dbpassword|db_password|\$\w*|<.*>|\{.*\}|\*+|x+)$/i.test(pass) && !PLACEHOLDER.test(pass)
+}
+
+const CHECKS: Readonly<Record<string, (m: RegExpMatchArray) => boolean>> = {
+ 'bearer token': m => !isReference(m[1] ?? ''),
+ 'database url with credentials': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+ 'database url with password': m => urlCredential(m[0]),
+}
+const globals = new WeakMap<RegExp, RegExp>()
+
+function matches(name: string, re: RegExp, text: string): boolean {
+ if (name === 'key assignment') return assignmentSecret(text)
+ const check = CHECKS[name]
+ if (!check) return re.test(text)
+ let g = globals.get(re)
+ if (!g) globals.set(re, (g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g')))
+ for (const m of text.matchAll(g)) if (check(m)) return true
+ return false
+}
+
+/** Names of the rules that match `text` (already bare'd). A rule named 'key assignment' is judged by assignmentSecret, whatever its regex. */
+export const names = (rules: Rules, text: string) => rules.filter(([name, re]) => matches(name, re, text)).map(([name]) => name)
export type Findings = { readonly secrets: readonly string[]; readonly injection: readonly string[] }