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🌊 The original agent harness. Deploy intelligent multi-player swarms, coordinate autonomous workflows, and build conversational AI systems. Features adaptive memory, self-learning intelligence, federation, vector RAG integration, and native Claude Code / Codex / Hermes and many more Integrated

chore(security): document Socket.dev alert baseline + remove broken pages.yml workflow (#2340)

rUv16a55f7a537c
diff --git a/.github/workflows/pages.yml b/.github/workflows/pages.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index d51f647e51..0000000000
--- a/.github/workflows/pages.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-name: Deploy Pages
-on:
- push:
- branches: [main]
- paths:
- - 'docs/**'
-
-permissions:
- pages: write
- id-token: write
-
-jobs:
- deploy:
- environment:
- name: github-pages
- url: ${{ steps.deployment.outputs.page_url }}
- runs-on: ubuntu-latest
- steps:
- - uses: actions/checkout@v4
- - uses: actions/configure-pages@v4
- - uses: actions/jekyll-build-pages@v1
- with:
- source: ./docs
- - uses: actions/deploy-pages@v4
- id: deployment
diff --git a/docs/security/socket-baseline.md b/docs/security/socket-baseline.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b4a0edeea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/security/socket-baseline.md
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# Socket.dev Alert Baseline β€” `claude-flow`
+
+> Last revised: 2026-06-09 against `[email protected]`
+> Source: <https://socket.dev/npm/package/claude-flow/alerts/3.10.40>
+> Tracking issue: ruvnet/ruflo#2339
+
+## TL;DR
+
+Most of Socket's alerts on `claude-flow` describe **legitimate behaviour of a CLI agent platform** (network access, filesystem access, env-var reads, shell access, native modules, etc.) and cannot and should not be "fixed" β€” they are intrinsic to what the package does. This doc separates the inherent-and-expected categories from the small set that's actually actionable, so the next reviewer doesn't go down the same rabbit hole.
+
+## What's protected today
+
+| Layer | Mechanism | Status |
+|---|---|---|
+| Ruflo dev tree | `overrides` block in root `package.json` (lines 77-107) β€” pins `protobufjs >=8.2.0`, `uuid >=14.0.0`, plus 25+ other transitive forces | βœ… `npm audit` returns 0 vulnerabilities on the working tree |
+| Ruflo dev tree | `supply-chain-audit` CI job in `.github/workflows/v3-ci.yml` (line 629) β€” runs `npm audit --audit-level=high`, lockfile integrity, top-level allowlist, typosquat reject, publisher trust snapshot | βœ… Gates every PR + push to main |
+| Dependency review | `dependency-review` CI job (line 675) β€” GitHub's `dependency-review-action` checks new vulnerable deps in PRs | ⚠️ Gated on Pages-style Dependency Graph being enabled at repo level; currently `continue-on-error: true` |
+
+## What's NOT fully fixable from inside `claude-flow`
+
+`npm overrides` in our root `package.json` only apply when **we** are the root of the dep tree. When a consumer runs `npm install [email protected]`, *their* root `package.json` is the one whose overrides apply β€” ours are ignored. This is the same trap documented in CLAUDE.md for the `ruflo` wrapper (#2112).
+
+A clean install of `[email protected]` therefore still pulls in:
+
+| Severity | Package | CVE summary | Root cause |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Critical | `protobufjs` | Arbitrary code execution via bytes-field defaults in generated `toObject` code | Transitive of `onnx-proto` β†’ `onnxruntime-web` β†’ `@xenova/transformers` |
+| Moderate | `uuid` | Missing buffer bounds check in v3/v5/v6 when `buf` is provided | Transitive β€” multiple paths |
+| High (cascade) | `onnx-proto`, `onnxruntime-web`, `@xenova/transformers`, `agentdb`, `agentic-flow`, `@claude-flow/memory`, `@claude-flow/neural`, `@claude-flow/plugin-gastown-bridge`, `claude-flow` itself | All downstream of the protobufjs + uuid root causes | β€” |
+
+**Why this can't be fixed in this PR**: the upstream `@xenova/[email protected]` (latest) still pins `[email protected]` which carries the bad `onnx-proto` β†’ `protobufjs` chain. No clean upstream version exists today. Resolving consumer-side requires either:
+
+1. A patched `@xenova/transformers` release (waiting on upstream), or migrating to `@huggingface/transformers` (the rebranded successor β€” needs evaluation), OR
+2. Republishing the affected `@claude-flow/*` sub-packages with explicit transitive pins in *their* `dependencies` blocks (multi-PR coordinated effort), OR
+3. Dropping the optional ML stack (`agentic-flow`, `@xenova/transformers`) β€” would lose ONNX-backed features
+
+Tracked in #2339 as separate follow-up work.
+
+## Inherent flags β€” what they mean, why we keep them
+
+Socket fires these on every release. They describe normal CLI/agent behaviour and are not signals of a bug.
+
+| Alert | Count | Why it's normal here |
+|---|---|---|
+| Network access | 68 pkgs | HTTP clients (Anthropic SDK, MCP transports, `fetch`-based tools) |
+| Filesystem access | 82 pkgs | Universal β€” anything reading/writing files (memory backend, config, logs) |
+| Environment variable access | 84 pkgs | `process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `CLAUDE_FLOW_*`, etc. β€” configuration |
+| Shell access | 29 pkgs | `child_process` β€” used by every native-module installer, hook runners, `npx`-style spawning |
+| Install scripts | 7 pkgs | Native modules: `better-sqlite3`, `hnswlib-node`, `onnxruntime-node`, `@ruvector/*` |
+| Native code | 5 pkgs | Compiled binaries from the install-scripts row |
+| URL strings | 108 pkgs | Every HTTP client embeds endpoint URLs as string literals |
+| Debug access | 14 pkgs | The `debug` package and reflection-based helpers |
+| Dynamic require | 16 pkgs | Plugin system (`mcp`, hooks, agents) + conditional optional-dep loading |
+| Minified code | 10 pkgs | Some libraries ship pre-bundled (`undici`, `axios` internals, etc.) |
+| Unpopular package | 29 pkgs | Long-tail transitives β€” popularity is not a security signal |
+| Unmaintained | 64 pkgs | Long-tail transitives stale >5 years β€” checked against CVE/deprecation separately |
+| New author | 20 pkgs | Maintainer changes β€” informational, not a vuln |
+
+## False positives we've explicitly triaged
+
+| Alert | What Socket said | Reality |
+|---|---|---|
+| AI-detected possible typosquat β†’ "did you mean `z-schema`?" | Suggested `zod` is a typosquat of `z-schema` | `zod` is a 10M-weekly-download canonical TypeScript schema library, not a typosquat. Socket's AI guess is wrong. |
+| AI-detected potential security risk | 15 instances in 7 packages | Heuristic-only; none corroborated by an actual CVE or code review |
+| AI-detected potential code anomaly | 52 instances in 46 packages | Same β€” heuristic-only |
+| Obfuscated code | 17 instances in 11 packages | All match the "pre-bundled / minified" pattern (`undici`, `axios` internals); none match the active-obfuscation-malware pattern |
+
+## Operational policy
+
+1. **Root tree must stay green.** The `supply-chain-audit` job in `v3-ci.yml` enforces `npm audit --audit-level=high` on every PR. Adding a new direct dep that introduces a HIGH/CRITICAL fails CI.
+2. **Overrides are a first-line tool.** If a new transitive CVE lands, add an `overrides` entry pinning to a patched version. The current set (root `package.json` lines 77-107) is the precedent.
+3. **Document gaps before merging.** When a CVE can't be cleanly overridden (e.g., the protobufjs cascade documented above), update this file with the rationale rather than silently ignoring it.
+4. **Re-baseline this doc when claude-flow versions bump.** The alert counts here are tied to `3.10.40` β€” when the version moves, re-run the audit (`scripts/probe-nested-spawn-depth.mjs` style) and update the tables.
+
+## When to revisit
+
+- **Quarterly**: re-check upstream for `@xenova/transformers` / `onnxruntime-web` patched versions
+- **On Socket alert change**: if Socket flags something new at *critical* severity for a direct dep, that's a real signal and warrants immediate triage
+- **On new direct dep addition**: the `supply-chain-audit` job will catch this at PR time; no manual checklist needed
+
+## Related
+
+- ADR-097 β€” federation budget circuit-breaker (cost-side supply chain)
+- ADR-145 β€” plugin supply-chain integrity (install-time)
+- ADR-144 β€” authorization propagation (action-time, ADR-131 is content-time)
+- Issue #2046 β€” original supply-chain hardening (the source of `supply-chain-audit` job)
+- Issue #2339 β€” this baseline + Socket alert response