π The original agent harness. Deploy intelligent multi-player swarms, coordinate autonomous workflows, and build conversational AI systems. Features adaptive memory, self-learning intelligence, federation, vector RAG integration, and native Claude Code / Codex / Hermes and many more Integrated
TypeScript agentic-aiagentic-frameworkagentic-workflowagentsai-agentsai-assistantai-skillsautonomous-agentsclaudecodexdsh-pluginharnessmcp-servermulti-agentmulti-agent-systemsnpmskillsswarmswarm-intelligencetypescript
fix(plugins): review follow-ups for registry trust fail-closed
Dragan Spiridonov5bd949dfde74
diff --git a/scripts/smoke-plugin-registry-signature.mjs b/scripts/smoke-plugin-registry-signature.mjsindex ff996f9e54..b32f1ad6c4 100755--- a/scripts/smoke-plugin-registry-signature.mjs+++ b/scripts/smoke-plugin-registry-signature.mjs@@ -18,13 +18,16 @@** [1/3] STATIC CONTRACT β the source file must:* - import `verifyEd25519Signature` from `transfer/ipfs/client.ts`- * - call it from the `verifyRegistrySignature` private method+ * - call it from the `registrySignatureFailure` private method+ * (formerly `verifyRegistrySignature`; returns the failure+ * reason, or null when the signature verified)* - strip BOTH `registrySignature` AND `registryPublicKey` from* the registry copy before stringifying (canonical form)* - pin to the caller-supplied `expectedPublicKey`, NOT to the* served `registry.registryPublicKey` field* - the call site must `await` the verifier AND fail-closed- * (return demo registry / not just `console.warn`)+ * (`if (failure) return this.fallbackToBuiltIn(...)` β the+ * unverified, trust-stripped fallback; not just `console.warn`)** [2/3] CRYPTO ROUND-TRIP β using the exact same Ed25519 scheme as* `signRegistry()` in@@ -38,8 +41,9 @@* scenario the original report calls out)** [3/3] CALL-SITE BYTE β the call site must contain `requireVerification`- * AND `await this.verifyRegistrySignature` AND a `return` (the- * fail-closed branch). A future regression that drops `await`+ * AND `await this.registrySignatureFailure` AND+ * `if (failure) return this.fallbackToBuiltIn(` (the fail-closed+ * branch). A future regression that drops `await`* or that reverts to plain `console.warn` will be caught here.*/@@ -103,14 +107,14 @@ function extractMethodBody(source, methodSignatureRegex) {const body = extractMethodBody(src,- /private\s+async\s+verifyRegistrySignature\s*\(/,+ /private\s+async\s+registrySignatureFailure\s*\(/,);if (body) {if (/delete\s+\w+\.registrySignature/.test(body) && /delete\s+\w+\.registryPublicKey/.test(body)) {ok('canonicalization strips BOTH registrySignature AND registryPublicKey');} else {fail(- 'verifyRegistrySignature must delete both signature fields before stringify',+ 'registrySignatureFailure must delete both signature fields before stringify','attacker can otherwise re-sign by spreading the served fields back in',);}@@ -118,7 +122,7 @@ if (body) {ok('canonical message is JSON.stringify of stripped registry');} else {fail(- 'verifyRegistrySignature must JSON.stringify the stripped registry',+ 'registrySignatureFailure must JSON.stringify the stripped registry','the signer uses plain JSON.stringify (no whitespace, no sort) β the verifier must match',);}@@ -135,7 +139,7 @@ if (body) {);}} else {- fail('verifyRegistrySignature method not found in async form');+ fail('registrySignatureFailure method not found in async form');}// Old stub pattern must be GONE. A future regression that brings back@@ -282,16 +286,16 @@ const callSiteMatch = src.match();if (callSiteMatch) {const block = callSiteMatch[0];- if (/await\s+this\.verifyRegistrySignature\(/.test(block)) {- ok('call site awaits verifyRegistrySignature');+ if (/await\s+this\.registrySignatureFailure\(/.test(block)) {+ ok('call site awaits registrySignatureFailure');} else {fail('call site does not await the async verifier',- 'without await, the Promise<boolean> is truthy and verification is bypassed',+ 'without await, the Promise is truthy and the verifier result is never read',);}- if (/return\s+this\.createDemoRegistryAsync\(/.test(block) || /return\s+\w+/.test(block)) {- ok('call site fails closed (returns rather than continuing)');+ if (/if\s*\(\s*failure\s*\)\s*\{?\s*return\s+this\.fallbackToBuiltIn\(/.test(block)) {+ ok('call site fails closed (if (failure) return this.fallbackToBuiltIn(...))');} else {fail('call site must return/fall-back on verification failure (not just warn)',diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/__tests__/plugins-registry-trust-fail-closed.test.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/__tests__/plugins-registry-trust-fail-closed.test.tsindex 6c6d2382de..0af1bf841e 100644--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/__tests__/plugins-registry-trust-fail-closed.test.ts+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/__tests__/plugins-registry-trust-fail-closed.test.ts@@ -5,7 +5,10 @@* install run npm lifecycle scripts and skip the permission gate. So:* - an unverified registry (unsigned, bad signature, placeholder pinned key, verification off)* and the built-in fallback list carry no registry trust;- * - a placeholder (all-zero) pinned key is never used to verify β it accepts a forged signature;+ * - a placeholder pinned key (all-zero or any small-order point) is never used to verify, and the+ * Ed25519 verifier runs in RFC 8032 strict mode;+ * - an unverified registry claims no official plugins and no verified authors, and the MCP+ * transfer_plugin-* tools report the registry status;* - CLAUDE_FLOW_STRICT_PLUGINS=true turns the fallback into an error and makes `plugins install`* refuse without --allow-unverified;* - `plugins install` never passes an unverified entry's trust, permissions or checksum on.@@ -40,12 +43,21 @@ import { PluginDiscoveryService } from '../src/plugins/store/discovery.js';import { verifyEd25519Signature } from '../src/transfer/ipfs/client.js';import { isPlaceholderSigningKey, isStrictPluginMode } from '../src/plugins/trust-policy.js';import { pluginsCommand } from '../src/commands/plugins.js';+import transferTools from '../src/mcp-tools/transfer-tools.js';import type { CommandContext } from '../src/types.js';import anchorsFile from '../src/plugins/trust/trust-anchors.json';const ZERO_KEY = '0'.repeat(64);-// R = identity point, S = 0: verifies against any small-order key for every message (ZIP-215).-const FORGED_SIG = '01' + '0'.repeat(126);+// An ordinary Ed25519 public key (not small-order) with no known signer.+const REAL_KEY = 'ea4a6c63e29c520abef5507b132ec5f9954776aebebe7b92421eea691446d22c';+// Small-order points: identity, order 2, order 8.+const SMALL_ORDER_KEYS = [+ '01' + '0'.repeat(62),+ 'ec' + 'ff'.repeat(30) + '7f',+ 'c7176a703d4dd84fba3c0b760d10670f2a2053fa2c39ccc64ec7fd7792ac037a',+];+// Known-bad signature fixture used against small-order keys.+const BAD_SIG = '01' + '0'.repeat(126);function entry(name: string, trustLevel = 'official') {return {@@ -110,25 +122,42 @@ afterEach(() => {});describe('placeholder signing keys', () => {- it('the shipped trust anchor is a placeholder', () => {- expect(anchorsFile.anchors.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);- for (const a of anchorsFile.anchors) expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey(a.publicKey)).toBe(true);+ it('a shipped trust anchor that is a placeholder leaves a registry pinned to it unverified', async () => {+ // Holds whether or not maintainers have replaced the placeholder with a real key.+ for (const a of anchorsFile.anchors) {+ if (!isPlaceholderSigningKey(a.publicKey)) continue;+ ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/a')], { registrySignature: BAD_SIG });+ const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${a.publicKey}`).discoverRegistry();+ expect(result.verified).toBe(false);+ expect(result.unverifiedReason).toMatch(/placeholder/);+ }});- it('rejects missing, malformed and all-zero keys; accepts a real-looking key', () => {+ it('rejects missing, malformed, off-curve, all-zero and small-order keys; accepts an ordinary key', () => {expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey(undefined)).toBe(true);expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey('')).toBe(true);expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey('ed25519:abc')).toBe(true);+ expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey(`ed25519:${'ab'.repeat(32)}`)).toBe(true);expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey(`ed25519:${ZERO_KEY}`)).toBe(true);- expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey(`ed25519:${'ab'.repeat(32)}`)).toBe(false);+ for (const k of SMALL_ORDER_KEYS) expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey(`ed25519:${k}`)).toBe(true);+ expect(isPlaceholderSigningKey(`ed25519:${REAL_KEY}`)).toBe(false);+ });++ it('verifyEd25519Signature rejects the bad-signature fixture for every small-order key (RFC 8032 strict)', async () => {+ for (const k of [ZERO_KEY, ...SMALL_ORDER_KEYS]) {+ expect(await verifyEd25519Signature('any message', BAD_SIG, k)).toBe(false);+ }});- it('the all-zero key really does accept a forged signature (why it must never be verified against)', async () => {- expect(await verifyEd25519Signature('any message at all', FORGED_SIG, ZERO_KEY)).toBe(true);+ it('a small-order pinned key is treated as a placeholder', async () => {+ ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/evil')], { registrySignature: BAD_SIG });+ const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${SMALL_ORDER_KEYS[0]}`).discoverRegistry();+ expect(result.verified).toBe(false);+ expect(result.unverifiedReason).toMatch(/placeholder/);});- it('a placeholder pinned key leaves the registry unverified even with a "valid" forged signature', async () => {- ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/evil')], { registrySignature: FORGED_SIG });+ it('an all-zero pinned key leaves the registry unverified and its entries unlisted', async () => {+ ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/evil')], { registrySignature: BAD_SIG });const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${ZERO_KEY}`).discoverRegistry();expect(result.verified).toBe(false);@@ -141,7 +170,7 @@ describe('placeholder signing keys', () => {describe('discovery: an unverified registry confers no trust', () => {it('an unsigned registry falls back to the built-in list, labelled demo and unverified, with trust stripped', async () => {ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/a')]);- const svc = serviceFor(`ed25519:${'ab'.repeat(32)}`);+ const svc = serviceFor(`ed25519:${REAL_KEY}`);const first = await svc.discoverRegistry();expect(first.success).toBe(true);@@ -157,11 +186,20 @@ describe('discovery: an unverified registry confers no trust', () => {expect(second.registry!.plugins.every((p) => p.trustLevel === 'unverified')).toBe(true);});+ it('an unverified registry lists no official plugins and no verified authors', async () => {+ ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/a')]);+ const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${REAL_KEY}`).discoverRegistry();+ expect(result.verified).toBe(false);+ expect(result.registry!.official).toEqual([]);+ expect(result.registry!.authors.every((a) => !a.verified)).toBe(true);+ expect(result.registry!.plugins.every((p) => !p.author?.verified)).toBe(true);+ });+it('a signature that does not verify is not silently treated as the registry', async () => {const { signed } = await signRegistry(registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/a')]));ipfs.registry = signed;// Pinned key differs from the signer.- const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${'ab'.repeat(32)}`).discoverRegistry();+ const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${REAL_KEY}`).discoverRegistry();expect(result.verified).toBe(false);expect(result.demo).toBe(true);expect(result.unverifiedReason).toMatch(/does not verify/);@@ -169,7 +207,7 @@ describe('discovery: an unverified registry confers no trust', () => {it('with verification disabled the fetched registry is used but every entry is unverified', async () => {ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/a')]);- const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${'ab'.repeat(32)}`, { requireVerification: false }).discoverRegistry();+ const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${REAL_KEY}`, { requireVerification: false }).discoverRegistry();expect(result.success).toBe(true);expect(result.demo).toBeUndefined();expect(result.verified).toBe(false);@@ -190,7 +228,7 @@ describe('discovery: an unverified registry confers no trust', () => {process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_STRICT_PLUGINS = 'true';expect(isStrictPluginMode()).toBe(true);ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/a')]);- const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${'ab'.repeat(32)}`).discoverRegistry();+ const result = await serviceFor(`ed25519:${REAL_KEY}`).discoverRegistry();expect(result.success).toBe(false);expect(result.registry).toBeUndefined();expect(result.verified).toBe(false);@@ -253,3 +291,36 @@ describe('plugins install: unverified registry entries get no registry trust', (}});});++describe('MCP transfer_plugin-* tools report registry status', () => {+ const call = async (name: string, input: Record<string, unknown> = {}) => {+ const tool = transferTools.find((t) => t.name === name)!;+ const res = await tool.handler(input as never);+ return JSON.parse((res.content[0] as { text: string }).text);+ };++ beforeEach(() => {+ // The default registry, served unsigned as the live CID is.+ ipfs.registry = registryWith([entry('@claude-flow/neural')]);+ });++ it('transfer_plugin-official claims nothing as official when the registry is unverified', async () => {+ const out = await call('transfer_plugin-official');+ expect(out.plugins).toEqual([]);+ expect(out.registry.verified).toBe(false);+ expect(out.registry.unverifiedReason).toMatch(/unsigned/);+ });++ it('transfer_plugin-featured, -search and -info carry the status and unverified entries', async () => {+ const featured = await call('transfer_plugin-featured', { limit: 3 });+ expect(featured.registry.verified).toBe(false);+ expect(featured.plugins.every((p: { trustLevel: string }) => p.trustLevel === 'unverified')).toBe(true);++ const search = await call('transfer_plugin-search', { query: 'neural' });+ expect(search.registry.verified).toBe(false);++ const info = await call('transfer_plugin-info', { name: '@claude-flow/neural' });+ expect(info.trustLevel).toBe('unverified');+ expect(info.registry).toEqual(expect.objectContaining({ verified: false }));+ });+});diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/plugins.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/plugins.tsindex f7d94a7b58..0212e55683 100644--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/plugins.ts+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/commands/plugins.ts@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ const listCommand: Command = {if (official) {plugins = getOfficialPlugins(result.registry);title = 'Official Plugins';+ if (result.verified !== true) {+ output.writeln(output.warning('No plugin is shown as official: only a verified registry can say which are.'));+ }} else if (featured) {plugins = getFeaturedPlugins(result.registry);title = 'Featured Plugins';@@ -262,7 +265,9 @@ const installCommand: Command = {type: 'boolean',description:'With CLAUDE_FLOW_STRICT_PLUGINS=true, install from npm even though the plugin registry is not verified. ' +- 'The plugin still gets no registry trust.',+ 'The plugin still gets no registry trust. Strict mode gates on the registry, not the package: while the ' ++ 'registry is unverified every npm install is refused, listed or not; once it verifies, a package it does ' ++ 'not list installs without this flag, but also without registry trust.',default: false,},{ name: 'registry', short: 'r', type: 'string', description: 'Registry to use' },diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/transfer-tools.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/transfer-tools.tsindex 8fccf73c82..e0a56ec7a9 100644--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/transfer-tools.ts+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/transfer-tools.ts@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ export const transferTools: MCPTool[] = [if ((input as Record<string, unknown>).category) { const v = validateIdentifier((input as Record<string, unknown>).category, 'category'); if (!v.valid) return createResult({ error: v.error }, true); }if ((input as Record<string, unknown>).type) { const v = validateIdentifier((input as Record<string, unknown>).type, 'type'); if (!v.valid) return createResult({ error: v.error }, true); }try {- const { createPluginDiscoveryService, searchPlugins } = await import(+ const { createPluginDiscoveryService, searchPlugins, registryStatus } = await import('../plugins/store/index.js');const discovery = createPluginDiscoveryService();@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ export const transferTools: MCPTool[] = [}const opts = input as Parameters<typeof searchPlugins>[1];const searchResult = searchPlugins(result.registry, opts);- return createResult(searchResult);+ return createResult({ ...searchResult, registry: registryStatus(result) });} catch (error) {return createResult({ error: (error as Error).message }, true);}@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ export const transferTools: MCPTool[] = [handler: async (input): Promise<MCPToolResult> => {{ const v = validatePackageName((input as { name: string }).name, 'name'); if (!v.valid) return createResult({ error: v.error }, true); }try {- const { createPluginDiscoveryService } = await import('../plugins/store/index.js');+ const { createPluginDiscoveryService, registryStatus } = await import('../plugins/store/index.js');const discovery = createPluginDiscoveryService();const result = await discovery.discoverRegistry();if (!result.success || !result.registry) {@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ export const transferTools: MCPTool[] = [if (!plugin) {return createResult({ error: 'Plugin not found' }, true);}- return createResult(plugin);+ return createResult({ ...plugin, registry: registryStatus(result) });} catch (error) {return createResult({ error: (error as Error).message }, true);}@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ export const transferTools: MCPTool[] = [},handler: async (input): Promise<MCPToolResult> => {try {- const { createPluginDiscoveryService, getFeaturedPlugins } = await import(+ const { createPluginDiscoveryService, getFeaturedPlugins, registryStatus } = await import('../plugins/store/index.js');const discovery = createPluginDiscoveryService();@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ export const transferTools: MCPTool[] = [}const featured = getFeaturedPlugins(result.registry);const limit = (input as { limit?: number }).limit || 10;- return createResult(featured.slice(0, limit));+ return createResult({ plugins: featured.slice(0, limit), registry: registryStatus(result) });} catch (error) {return createResult({ error: (error as Error).message }, true);}@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ export const transferTools: MCPTool[] = [},handler: async (): Promise<MCPToolResult> => {try {- const { createPluginDiscoveryService, getOfficialPlugins } = await import(+ const { createPluginDiscoveryService, getOfficialPlugins, registryStatus } = await import('../plugins/store/index.js');const discovery = createPluginDiscoveryService();@@ -407,8 +407,9 @@ export const transferTools: MCPTool[] = [if (!result.success || !result.registry) {return createResult({ error: result.error || 'Failed to discover registry' }, true);}+ // Empty when the registry is unverified: an unsigned "official" list proves nothing.const official = getOfficialPlugins(result.registry);- return createResult(official);+ return createResult({ plugins: official, registry: registryStatus(result) });} catch (error) {return createResult({ error: (error as Error).message }, true);}diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/store/discovery.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/store/discovery.tsindex b270172d92..b5574f1c27 100644--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/store/discovery.ts+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/store/discovery.ts@@ -130,13 +130,34 @@ export interface PluginDiscoveryResult {}/**- * Strip registry-asserted trust from a registry that was not verified. Its trust labels are- * just claims made by whoever served (or hardcoded) the list.+ * Strip registry-asserted trust from a registry that was not verified. Its trust labels, its+ * `official` list and its author verification are just claims made by whoever served (or+ * hardcoded) the list.*/function withoutRegistryTrust(registry: PluginRegistry): PluginRegistry {return {...registry,- plugins: registry.plugins.map((p) => ({ ...p, trustLevel: 'unverified' as const, verified: false })),+ plugins: registry.plugins.map((p) => ({+ ...p,+ trustLevel: 'unverified' as const,+ verified: false,+ ...(p.author ? { author: { ...p.author, verified: false } } : {}),+ })),+ official: [],+ authors: (registry.authors ?? []).map((a) => ({ ...a, verified: false })),+ };+}++/** Registry-level verification status, for callers that report registry data. */+export function registryStatus(result: PluginDiscoveryResult): {+ verified: boolean;+ unverifiedReason?: string;+ source?: string;+} {+ return {+ verified: result.verified === true,+ ...(result.verified === true ? {} : { unverifiedReason: result.unverifiedReason ?? 'registry not verified' }),+ ...(result.source ? { source: result.source } : {}),};}diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/store/index.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/store/index.tsindex 48a18123e4..839058b1b1 100644--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/store/index.ts+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/store/index.ts@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ export {PluginDiscoveryService,createPluginDiscoveryService,DEFAULT_PLUGIN_STORE_CONFIG,+ registryStatus,type PluginDiscoveryResult,} from './discovery.js';diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/trust-policy.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/trust-policy.tsindex be69f3c20f..8da27331b0 100644--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/trust-policy.ts+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/trust-policy.ts@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@*/import { createHash } from 'crypto';+import { ExtendedPoint } from '@noble/ed25519';/*** Permissions a plugin may declare and still have its hooks and commands@@ -130,14 +131,19 @@ export function isStrictPluginMode(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): boolea/*** A signing key that cannot vouch for anything: missing, not 32 bytes of hex,- * or all zeros (the placeholder in `trust/trust-anchors.json`). The all-zero- * key is also a small-order Ed25519 point, for which a fixed forged signature- * verifies against every message under ZIP-215 rules, so it must never be+ * not a curve point, or a small-order point β which includes the all-zero+ * placeholder in `trust/trust-anchors.json`. Signatures can be forged against+ * small-order keys under ZIP-215 verification, so such a key must never be* handed to a verifier.*/export function isPlaceholderSigningKey(key: unknown): boolean {if (typeof key !== 'string') return true;const hex = key.trim().replace(/^ed25519:/i, '');if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(hex)) return true;- return /^0+$/.test(hex);+ try {+ // zip215=true decodes every encoding a lenient verifier would accept.+ return ExtendedPoint.fromHex(hex, true).isSmallOrder();+ } catch {+ return true;+ }}diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/transfer/ipfs/client.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/transfer/ipfs/client.tsindex e7300c4ab1..ba4b8dec30 100644--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/transfer/ipfs/client.ts+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/transfer/ipfs/client.ts@@ -334,10 +334,13 @@ export async function verifyEd25519Signature(// Handle prefixed public key (e.g., "ed25519:abc123...")const pubKeyHex = publicKey.replace(/^ed25519:/, '');+ // RFC 8032 strict mode: rejects small-order public keys, against which+ // signatures can be forged under the library's default ZIP-215 rules.const isValid = await ed.verifyAsync(Buffer.from(signature, 'hex'),new TextEncoder().encode(message),- Buffer.from(pubKeyHex, 'hex')+ Buffer.from(pubKeyHex, 'hex'),+ { zip215: false });return isValid;diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/security/__tests__/plugin-integrity-verifier.test.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/security/__tests__/plugin-integrity-verifier.test.tsindex a2c9602f53..84aa4b3c3b 100644--- a/v3/@claude-flow/security/__tests__/plugin-integrity-verifier.test.ts+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/security/__tests__/plugin-integrity-verifier.test.ts@@ -10,9 +10,9 @@* - verify reports `unknown-signer` when the key isn't in trust anchors* - verify reports `pass` on a valid round-trip sign β verify* - verify reports `signature-invalid` on a flipped signature byte- * - the shipped placeholder (all-zero) anchor never vouches, and small-order- * keys are rejected even when anchored (a forged R=identity, S=0 signature- * verifies against them for every message under ZIP-215)+ * - a placeholder (all-zero) anchor, such as the one shipped in+ * trust-anchors.json, never vouches, and small-order keys are rejected even+ * when anchored (ZIP-215 verification would accept forged signatures)*/import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from 'vitest';@@ -207,9 +207,9 @@ describe('PluginIntegrityVerifier.verify', () => {describe('placeholder and small-order signing keys', () => {const ZERO_KEY = '0'.repeat(64);- // y = -1: the order-2 point (0, -1).+ // A small-order point.const ORDER_TWO_KEY = 'ec' + 'ff'.repeat(30) + '7f';- // R = identity, S = 0.+ // Known-bad signature fixture used against small-order keys.const FORGED_SIG = '01' + '0'.repeat(126);function forged(publicKey: string): SignedPluginManifest {@@ -223,21 +223,26 @@ describe('placeholder and small-order signing keys', () => {expect(isPlaceholderKey(ORDER_TWO_KEY)).toBe(false);});- it('the shipped trust-anchors.json placeholder never vouches for a forged manifest', async () => {+ it('a placeholder anchor never vouches for a forged manifest', async () => {+ const r = await new PluginIntegrityVerifier({ trustAnchors: anchorsFor(ZERO_KEY) }).verify(forged(ZERO_KEY));+ expect(r.status).toBe('unknown-signer');+ });++ it('no placeholder anchor shipped in trust-anchors.json vouches for anything', async () => {+ // Holds whether or not maintainers have replaced the placeholder with a real key.const shipped = JSON.parse(readFileSync(new URL('../../cli/src/plugins/trust/trust-anchors.json', import.meta.url), 'utf-8'),) as TrustAnchors;- expect(shipped.anchors.some((a) => a.publicKey === ZERO_KEY)).toBe(true);- expect(findAnchor(shipped.anchors, '@claude-flow/evil', ZERO_KEY, Date.now())).toBeNull();-- const r = await new PluginIntegrityVerifier({ trustAnchors: shipped }).verify(forged(ZERO_KEY));- expect(r.status).not.toBe('pass');- expect(r.status).toBe('unknown-signer');+ for (const a of shipped.anchors.filter((x) => isPlaceholderKey(x.publicKey))) {+ expect(findAnchor(shipped.anchors, '@claude-flow/evil', a.publicKey, Date.now())).toBeNull();+ const r = await new PluginIntegrityVerifier({ trustAnchors: shipped }).verify(forged(a.publicKey));+ expect(r.status).not.toBe('pass');+ }});it('rejects a forged signature even when a small-order key is anchored', async () => {if (!ed) { console.warn('@noble/ed25519 unavailable β skipping'); return; }- // Sanity: noble's default (ZIP-215) verify accepts the forgery against this key.+ // Precondition: the default (lenient) verify mode accepts this fixture for this key.const m = forged(ORDER_TWO_KEY);expect(await ed.verifyAsync(hexBytes(FORGED_SIG), hexBytes(m.manifestHash), hexBytes(ORDER_TWO_KEY))).toBe(true);