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🌊 The original agent harness. Deploy intelligent multi-player swarms, coordinate autonomous workflows, and build conversational AI systems. Features adaptive memory, self-learning intelligence, federation, vector RAG integration, and native Claude Code / Codex / Hermes and many more Integrated

fix(federation): a policy denial of a consequential inbound message is final in legacy and observe mode (#4511)

rUvcb9d030fc168
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation/__tests__/unit/inbound-dispatcher.test.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation/__tests__/unit/inbound-dispatcher.test.ts
index 63efaa9a31..ddf1e88e35 100644
--- a/v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation/__tests__/unit/inbound-dispatcher.test.ts
+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation/__tests__/unit/inbound-dispatcher.test.ts
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ describe('dispatchInbound — happy path', () => {
signatureVersion: 'jcs-v1',
},
});
- await dispatchInbound('a', jcs('task-assignment'), deps);
+ await dispatchInbound('a', jcs('task-assignment'), { ...deps, authorizationMode: 'legacy' });
await dispatchInbound('a', jcs('memory-query'), deps);
await dispatchInbound('a', jcs('context-share'), deps);
expect(events.map((e) => e.event)).toEqual([
@@ -402,11 +402,38 @@ describe('dispatchInbound — inbound authorization', () => {
expect(events).toEqual([]);
});
- it('observe evaluates and reports denial without blocking', async () => {
+ it.each(['legacy', 'observe'] as const)('%s still refuses a denied task-assignment, agent-spawn or memory-query', async (mode) => {
+ for (const type of ['task-assignment', 'agent-spawn', 'memory-query', 'trust-change', 'claim-event']) {
+ const peer = mkPeer('alpha');
+ const { deps, events } = withVerifier([peer], () => true);
+ const result = await dispatchInbound('a', jcsMessage(type), {
+ ...deps,
+ authorizationMode: mode,
+ authorizeInbound: () => ({ allowed: false, reason: 'untrusted peer' }),
+ });
+ expect(result, type).toEqual({ accepted: false, reason: 'AUTHORIZATION_DENIED' });
+ expect(events, type).toHaveLength(0);
+ }
+ });
+
+ it('legacy and observe refuse a consequential message when the evaluator throws', async () => {
+ for (const mode of ['legacy', 'observe'] as const) {
+ const { deps, events } = withVerifier([mkPeer('alpha')], () => true);
+ const result = await dispatchInbound('a', jcsMessage('agent-spawn'), {
+ ...deps,
+ authorizationMode: mode,
+ authorizeInbound: () => { throw new Error('boom'); },
+ });
+ expect(result).toEqual({ accepted: false, reason: 'AUTHORIZATION_ERROR' });
+ expect(events).toHaveLength(0);
+ }
+ });
+
+ it('observe evaluates and reports denial without blocking a low-risk message', async () => {
const peer = mkPeer('alpha');
const { deps, events } = withVerifier([peer], () => true);
const authorizeInbound = vi.fn(() => ({ allowed: false, reason: 'would deny' }));
- const result = await dispatchInbound('a', jcsMessage(), {
+ const result = await dispatchInbound('a', jcsMessage('status-broadcast'), {
...deps,
authorizationMode: 'observe',
authorizeInbound,
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation/src/application/inbound-dispatcher.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation/src/application/inbound-dispatcher.ts
index 0a0cc71bfa..b732da79a5 100644
--- a/v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation/src/application/inbound-dispatcher.ts
+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/plugin-agent-federation/src/application/inbound-dispatcher.ts
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ import type { FederationNode } from '../domain/entities/federation-node.js';
import { FederationNodeState } from '../domain/value-objects/federation-node-state.js';
/** What gets emitted on the event bus per messageType. */
+/** Message types whose policy denial is enforced even outside enforce mode. */
+const CONSEQUENTIAL_MESSAGE_TYPES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+ 'task-assignment', 'memory-query', 'context-share', 'trust-change',
+ 'topology-change', 'agent-spawn', 'claim-event', 'agent-handoff',
+]);
+
export const FEDERATION_INBOUND_EVENT_PREFIX = 'federation:inbound';
/** Reasons we reject an inbound message — constant strings, no oracle leak. */
@@ -379,6 +385,10 @@ export async function dispatchInbound(
}
const authorizationMode = deps.authorizationMode ?? 'legacy';
+ // Message types that start work, read memory or change who is trusted. A denial
+ // for one of these is final in every mode: legacy/observe only soften claim
+ // checks for the rest, they never deliver what the policy engine refused.
+ const consequential = CONSEQUENTIAL_MESSAGE_TYPES.has(message.type);
if (
authorizationMode !== 'legacy' &&
authorizationMode !== 'observe' &&
@@ -408,7 +418,7 @@ export async function dispatchInbound(
}
authorizationDecision = decision;
} catch {
- if (authorizationMode === 'enforce') {
+ if (authorizationMode === 'enforce' || consequential) {
await deps.audit.log('message_rejected', {
sourceNodeId,
metadata: { address, reason: 'AUTHORIZATION_ERROR', messageType: message.type },
@@ -430,7 +440,7 @@ export async function dispatchInbound(
}
if (authorizationDecision && !authorizationDecision.allowed) {
- if (authorizationMode === 'enforce') {
+ if (authorizationMode === 'enforce' || consequential) {
await deps.audit.log('message_rejected', {
sourceNodeId,
metadata: {