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fix(security): denylist loader-hijack env vars in terminal_create (audit_1776853149979)

Reuvenfb256ac596e6
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/terminal-tools.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/terminal-tools.ts
index 97eeee55ee..a3d5749a93 100644
--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/terminal-tools.ts
+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/terminal-tools.ts
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
import { type MCPTool, getProjectCwd } from './types.js';
import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { validateIdentifier, validatePath, validateText } from './validate-input.js';
+import { validateEnv, validateIdentifier, validatePath, validateText } from './validate-input.js';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ export const terminalTools: MCPTool[] = [
},
},
handler: async (input) => {
- // Validate user-provided input (#1425)
+ // Validate user-provided input (#1425, audit_1776853149979)
if (input.name) {
const v = validateText(input.name, 'name', 256);
if (!v.valid) return { success: false, error: v.error };
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ export const terminalTools: MCPTool[] = [
const v = validatePath(input.workingDir, 'workingDir');
if (!v.valid) return { success: false, error: v.error };
}
+ // env is merged into execSync's process env on every command; reject
+ // loader/runtime hijack vars (LD_PRELOAD, NODE_OPTIONS, …) and enforce
+ // POSIX-shaped names + null-byte-free values.
+ const vEnv = validateEnv(input.env, 'env');
+ if (!vEnv.valid) return { success: false, error: vEnv.error };
const store = loadTerminalStore();
const id = `term-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;
@@ -98,7 +103,7 @@ export const terminalTools: MCPTool[] = [
lastActivity: new Date().toISOString(),
workingDir: (input.workingDir as string) || getProjectCwd(),
history: [],
- env: (input.env as Record<string, string>) || {},
+ env: vEnv.sanitized,
};
store.sessions[id] = session;
diff --git a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/validate-input.ts b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/validate-input.ts
index adc690bbd9..3535007354 100644
--- a/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/validate-input.ts
+++ b/v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/validate-input.ts
@@ -117,6 +117,70 @@ export function validateText(value: unknown, label: string, maxLen = 10_000): Va
return { valid: true, sanitized };
}
+/**
+ * Names that let an attacker pivot a child process before any user code runs:
+ * shared-library injection on Linux/macOS, Node hooks, and command resolution.
+ *
+ * audit_1776853149979: terminal_create previously merged caller-supplied env
+ * straight into execSync's environment for every subsequent command in the
+ * session. Setting LD_PRELOAD or NODE_OPTIONS via that path is functionally
+ * equivalent to remote code execution, so the env input needs an allowlist
+ * shape and a denylist on these specific names.
+ */
+const DENYLISTED_ENV_NAMES = new Set([
+ 'LD_PRELOAD',
+ 'LD_LIBRARY_PATH',
+ 'LD_AUDIT',
+ 'DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES',
+ 'DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH',
+ 'DYLD_FALLBACK_LIBRARY_PATH',
+ 'DYLD_FORCE_FLAT_NAMESPACE',
+ 'NODE_OPTIONS',
+ 'NODE_PATH',
+]);
+const ENV_NAME_RE = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]{0,127}$/;
+
+export interface EnvValidationResult {
+ valid: boolean;
+ sanitized: Record<string, string>;
+ error?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate a Record<string,string> of environment variables: enforce POSIX
+ * names, reject hijack-prone names (LD_PRELOAD, NODE_OPTIONS, …), forbid null
+ * bytes in values, and cap value length so a malicious caller can't bloat the
+ * stored session past reasonable bounds.
+ */
+export function validateEnv(value: unknown, label = 'env'): EnvValidationResult {
+ if (value === undefined || value === null) {
+ return { valid: true, sanitized: {} };
+ }
+ if (typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) {
+ return { valid: false, sanitized: {}, error: `${label} must be an object of string→string` };
+ }
+ const out: Record<string, string> = {};
+ for (const [name, rawVal] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {
+ if (!ENV_NAME_RE.test(name)) {
+ return { valid: false, sanitized: {}, error: `${label} key "${name}" is not a valid POSIX env name` };
+ }
+ if (DENYLISTED_ENV_NAMES.has(name)) {
+ return { valid: false, sanitized: {}, error: `${label} key "${name}" is denylisted (loader/runtime hijack)` };
+ }
+ if (typeof rawVal !== 'string') {
+ return { valid: false, sanitized: {}, error: `${label}["${name}"] must be a string` };
+ }
+ if (rawVal.length > 32_768) {
+ return { valid: false, sanitized: {}, error: `${label}["${name}"] exceeds 32768 characters` };
+ }
+ if (rawVal.includes('\0')) {
+ return { valid: false, sanitized: {}, error: `${label}["${name}"] contains a null byte` };
+ }
+ out[name] = rawVal;
+ }
+ return { valid: true, sanitized: out };
+}
+
/**
* Assert validation or throw with a structured error.
*/