🐸 Rybbit - open-source and privacy-friendly alternative to Google Analytics that is 10x more intuitive.
import { mcp } from "@better-auth/mcp";
import { getOAuthProviderApi } from "@better-auth/oauth-provider";
import { createAuthEndpoint, createAuthMiddleware } from "better-auth/api";
import { jwt } from "better-auth/plugins";
import { z } from "zod";
import { ALL_SCOPE_STRINGS, OIDC_STANDARD_SCOPES } from "./scopes.js";
export function getAuthBaseUrl(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string {
return (env.BASE_URL || env.BETTER_AUTH_URL || "http://localhost:3002")
.trim()
.replace(/\/+$/, "")
.replace(/\/api\/auth$/, "");
}
function hasNonHttpsRedirectUri(redirectUris: unknown): boolean {
if (!Array.isArray(redirectUris)) return false;
return redirectUris.some(uri => {
// Parse like the provider does, so the scheme seen here is the one it
// validates. Unparseable entries are left for the provider to reject.
try {
return typeof uri === "string" && new URL(uri).protocol !== "https:";
} catch {
return false;
}
});
}
export function createOAuthPlugins(baseUrl: string) {
const resource = `${baseUrl}/api/mcp`;
const url = new URL(baseUrl);
const supportsOAuth =
url.protocol === "https:" ||
(url.protocol === "http:" &&
(url.hostname === "localhost" || url.hostname === "[::1]" || /^127\./.test(url.hostname)));
const options = {
loginPage: `${baseUrl}/login`,
consentPage: `${baseUrl}/auth/consent`,
resource,
resources: [resource],
// Separate stores let the migration preserve 1.6 tokens and consent for
// rollback without ever accepting them through the 1.7 verifier.
schema: {
oauthAccessToken: { modelName: "oauthAccessTokenV2" },
oauthConsent: { modelName: "oauthConsentV2" },
},
scopes: [...OIDC_STANDARD_SCOPES, ...ALL_SCOPE_STRINGS],
grantTypes: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"] as ("authorization_code" | "refresh_token")[],
// Existing MCP clients use DCR. Keep it explicitly enabled after 1.7.
allowDynamicClientRegistration: true,
allowUnauthenticatedClientRegistration: true,
// There is one public resource. Imported 1.6 clients have no resource
// join rows; issued tokens are still bound to this resource and verified.
enforcePerClientResources: false,
};
return [
// Non-TLS LAN self-hosting still supports password sessions and API keys.
// Better Auth 1.7 requires HTTPS (or loopback) for an OAuth resource.
// The JWT plugin is here for OAuth token signing and JWKS only. Without
// disableSettingJwtHeader it also signs a session JWT into a set-auth-jwt
// header on every getSession, including the server-side lookups behind
// each authenticated request, and nothing reads that header.
...(supportsOAuth ? [jwt({ disableSettingJwtHeader: true }), mcp(options)] : []),
{
id: "rybbit-oauth",
hooks: {
before: [
{
matcher: (ctx: { path?: string }) => ctx.path === "/oauth2/register",
// The provider defaults an omitted application_type to "web",
// which forbids http://localhost callbacks. Most MCP clients
// register a loopback callback and never send the field, so infer
// "native" for them. Native validation still vets every URI.
handler: createAuthMiddleware(async ctx => {
const body = ctx.body as { application_type?: unknown; redirect_uris?: unknown } | undefined;
if (!body || body.application_type !== undefined || !hasNonHttpsRedirectUri(body.redirect_uris)) return;
return { context: { body: { ...body, application_type: "native" } } };
}),
},
],
},
endpoints: {
// Keep verification inside a Better Auth endpoint context so the
// provider checks signatures, expiry, linked sessions and client state.
// JWTs have no per-token revocation check; see the rollout notes.
// This capability is never exposed as an HTTP route.
verifyRybbitOAuthToken: createAuthEndpoint(
"/rybbit/verify-oauth",
{
method: "POST",
body: z.object({ token: z.string() }),
metadata: { SERVER_ONLY: true },
},
async ctx => {
if (!supportsOAuth) return null;
const token = await getOAuthProviderApi(ctx, options).requireActiveAccessToken(ctx.body.token);
const audiences = Array.isArray(token.aud) ? token.aud : [token.aud];
// These routes accept Bearer only. A bound token must never bypass
// proof validation by being presented as an ordinary bearer token.
if (!token.sub || !token.exp || token.cnf || !audiences.includes(resource)) return null;
return {
userId: token.sub,
accessTokenExpiresAt: new Date(token.exp * 1000),
scopes: typeof token.scope === "string" ? token.scope : "",
};
}
),
},
},
];
}