SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for object storage (S3), file systems, Iceberg table buckets, and Lance vector buckets, designed to handle billions of files with O(1) disk access and effortless horizontal scaling.
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SECURITY.md: require working repro and trust-boundary impact (#9990)
Chris Lub58e9ac3c456
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.mdindex 9437b564d4..cc3dcbce52 100644--- a/SECURITY.md+++ b/SECURITY.md@@ -1,24 +1,78 @@# Security Policy-## Reporting a Vulnerability+## Supported versions-If you find a security issue in SeaweedFS, please report it privately:+Security fixes land in the latest release. Please reproduce against a recent+release or `master` before reporting; issues that only reproduce on old,+unsupported versions are not eligible for a fix or an advisory.-- Email: [email protected]-- Do not open a public GitHub issue+## Reporting a vulnerability-Please include:-- A clear description of the issue-- Steps to reproduce (if possible)-- Affected versions+Report privately through GitHub private vulnerability reporting (the "Report a+vulnerability" button under the repository's Security tab). This keeps the+report, the fix, and any CVE in one place. Do not open a public issue.-## Response+### What a report must include-- We will respond as soon as possible (usually within 1 business day)-- We will investigate and work on a fix-- We may coordinate disclosure with you+We can only act on reports that show real impact. Please include:-## Notes+- Affected version (a release tag or `master` commit you reproduced on)+- The exact deployment and configuration: which components are running+ (master, volume, filer, S3, admin), which ports are reachable by the+ attacker, and what authentication is enabled+- The attacker's starting position: unauthenticated, a valid S3 user, an admin,+ or someone with access to the internal cluster network+- The trust boundary that is crossed (e.g. an unauthenticated client reading+ another tenant's data, an S3 user escalating to admin)+- A minimal, working reproduction or proof of concept+- Expected vs. actual behavior-- Please allow time for a fix before public disclosure-- If you’re unsure whether something is a security issue, feel free to reach out+A report without a working reproduction and a clear trust boundary is a+hardening suggestion, not a vulnerability. We are glad to receive those, but+they are handled on the normal issue tracker, not as security advisories.++### Automated and AI-assisted reports++Output from static analysis, dependency scanners, fuzzers, or LLMs is welcome+only when you have manually validated it and can supply a working reproduction+against a supported version, per the requirements above. Raw tool output,+speculative findings, or generated reports without a demonstrated exploit will+be closed as hardening suggestions.++## Trust model++SeaweedFS is built to run with its cluster components (master, volume servers,+and the raw filer API) on a trusted network. Those internal APIs are not an+authentication boundary unless you explicitly enable a control (for example+volume JWT or filer authentication) and that control is bypassed. Exposing an+internal port directly to untrusted clients is a deployment mistake, not a+vulnerability in SeaweedFS.++Reports are in scope when they cross a boundary SeaweedFS is meant to enforce,+for example:++- Unauthenticated access to data or operations that require authentication+- One S3 identity reading, writing, or deleting another identity's data+- Privilege escalation from a normal S3 user to administrative capability+- Bypass of Object Lock / retention where it is configured+- Remotely triggered data corruption or loss++Reports are generally out of scope when they require:++- Direct access to an internal cluster port that is meant to be private+- Full master, filer, or volume server access (already a full compromise)+- An insecure example configuration rather than a documented secure setup+- Local-only impact on a host the attacker already controls++## CVE assignment++When a report is confirmed, we publish an advisory and request the CVE through+GitHub. CVEs assigned by third parties without coordinating with us, or for+issues that do not cross a boundary described above, may be disputed.++## Response and disclosure++- We aim to acknowledge a valid report within a few business days.+- We will investigate, work on a fix, and coordinate a disclosure timeline+ with you.+- Please allow time for a fix before any public disclosure.