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An open-source, privacy-first, self-hosted knowledge workspace where humans and AI agents work together 开源、隐私优先、自托管的知识工作空间,让人与智能体在此协作

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// SiYuan - https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan
// Copyright (c) 2020-present, b3log.org
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later

package util

import (
	"bytes"
	"crypto/aes"
	"crypto/cipher"
	"crypto/rand"
	"testing"
)

// TestArgon2KDFConsistency 验证同一 password+salt+params 多次派生结果一致。
func TestArgon2KDFConsistency(t *testing.T) {
	params := Argon2Params{Memory: 64 * 1024, Iterations: 3, Parallelism: 1, KeyLength: 32}
	salt := []byte("0123456789abcdef")
	k1 := DeriveKey("password", salt, params)
	k2 := DeriveKey("password", salt, params)
	if !bytes.Equal(k1, k2) {
		t.Fatalf("Argon2id derived keys differ for same inputs")
	}
	if len(k1) != 32 {
		t.Fatalf("expected 32-byte key, got %d", len(k1))
	}
}

// TestArgon2KDFDifferentPasswords 验证不同密码派生出不同密钥。
func TestArgon2KDFDifferentPasswords(t *testing.T) {
	params := Argon2Params{Memory: 64 * 1024, Iterations: 3, Parallelism: 1, KeyLength: 32}
	salt := []byte("0123456789abcdef")
	k1 := DeriveKey("password1", salt, params)
	k2 := DeriveKey("password2", salt, params)
	if bytes.Equal(k1, k2) {
		t.Fatalf("different passwords derived the same key")
	}
}

// TestArgon2KDFMissingKeyLengthRejected 验证缺少密钥长度的配置不会套用隐式默认值。
func TestArgon2KDFMissingKeyLengthRejected(t *testing.T) {
	params := DefaultArgon2Params()
	params.KeyLength = 0
	if _, err := ValidateArgon2Params(params); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("Argon2id parameters without KeyLength should be rejected")
	}
}

// TestAESGCMRoundTrip 验证加密→解密还原原文。
func TestAESGCMRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
	key, err := GenerateDEK()
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("GenerateDEK failed: %v", err)
	}
	plaintext := []byte("hello 思源加密笔记本")
	ct, err := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Encrypt failed: %v", err)
	}
	pt, err := Decrypt(key, ct)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Decrypt failed: %v", err)
	}
	if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, pt) {
		t.Fatalf("round-trip mismatch: got %q want %q", pt, plaintext)
	}
	if !bytes.Equal(ct[:len(encryptionMagic)], encryptionMagic[:]) {
		t.Fatalf("ciphertext is missing the encryption envelope magic")
	}
	if ct[len(encryptionMagic)] != EncryptionSpec {
		t.Fatalf("ciphertext spec mismatch: got %d want %d", ct[len(encryptionMagic)], EncryptionSpec)
	}
	nonce, nonceErr := EncryptionNonce(ct)
	if nonceErr != nil || len(nonce) != 12 {
		t.Fatalf("extract envelope nonce failed: nonce=%d err=%v", len(nonce), nonceErr)
	}
}

// TestAESGCMSamePlaintextDifferentCiphertext 验证同一明文多次加密结果不同(随机 nonce)。
func TestAESGCMSamePlaintextDifferentCiphertext(t *testing.T) {
	key, _ := GenerateDEK()
	plaintext := []byte("same content")
	ct1, _ := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
	ct2, _ := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
	if bytes.Equal(ct1, ct2) {
		t.Fatalf("same plaintext produced identical ciphertext (nonce not random?)")
	}
	// 但两者都应能正确解密
	if pt, err := Decrypt(key, ct1); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(pt, plaintext) {
		t.Fatalf("ct1 decrypt failed")
	}
	if pt, err := Decrypt(key, ct2); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(pt, plaintext) {
		t.Fatalf("ct2 decrypt failed")
	}
}

// TestAESGCMWrongKey 验证错误密钥解密失败。
func TestAESGCMWrongKey(t *testing.T) {
	key1, _ := GenerateDEK()
	key2, _ := GenerateDEK()
	plaintext := []byte("secret")
	ct, _ := Encrypt(key1, plaintext)
	if _, err := Decrypt(key2, ct); err == nil {
		t.Fatalf("Decrypt with wrong key should fail")
	}
}

// TestAESGCMTamperedCiphertext 验证篡改密文后解密失败(GCM 完整性校验)。
func TestAESGCMTamperedCiphertext(t *testing.T) {
	key, _ := GenerateDEK()
	plaintext := []byte("integrity check")
	ct, _ := Encrypt(key, plaintext)
	// 翻转最后一个字节(落在 GCM tag 区域)
	ct[len(ct)-1] ^= 0xff
	if _, err := Decrypt(key, ct); err == nil {
		t.Fatalf("Decrypt of tampered ciphertext should fail")
	}
}

// TestAESGCMEnvelopeHeaderTampering 验证信封头参与认证,篡改后不能被当作有效密文读取。
func TestAESGCMEnvelopeHeaderTampering(t *testing.T) {
	key, _ := GenerateDEK()
	ct, _ := Encrypt(key, []byte("header integrity"))
	ct[len(encryptionMagic)] ^= 0x01
	if _, err := Decrypt(key, ct); err == nil {
		t.Fatalf("Decrypt of ciphertext with tampered envelope header should fail")
	}
}

// TestAESGCMInvalidKeyLength 验证非 32 字节密钥被拒绝。
func TestAESGCMInvalidKeyLength(t *testing.T) {
	shortKey := []byte("too-short")
	if _, err := Encrypt(shortKey, []byte("x")); err == nil {
		t.Fatalf("Encrypt with short key should fail")
	}
}

// TestAESGCMHeaderlessCiphertextRejected 验证缺少信封头的密文被拒绝。
func TestAESGCMHeaderlessCiphertextRejected(t *testing.T) {
	key, _ := GenerateDEK()
	ciphertext, err := encryptHeaderlessForTest(key, []byte("encrypted notebook data"), nil)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("create headerless ciphertext failed: %v", err)
	}
	if _, err = Decrypt(key, ciphertext); err == nil {
		t.Fatalf("Decrypt should reject ciphertext without an envelope")
	}
}

// TestAESGCMHeaderlessCiphertextWithAADRejected 验证带 AAD 但缺少信封头的密文被拒绝。
func TestAESGCMHeaderlessCiphertextWithAADRejected(t *testing.T) {
	key, _ := GenerateDEK()
	aad := []byte("siyuan:test:object")
	ciphertext, err := encryptHeaderlessForTest(key, []byte("encrypted data"), aad)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("create headerless ciphertext failed: %v", err)
	}
	if _, err = DecryptWithAAD(key, ciphertext, aad); err == nil {
		t.Fatalf("DecryptWithAAD should reject ciphertext without an envelope")
	}
}

func encryptHeaderlessForTest(key, plaintext, aad []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())
	if _, err = rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	return gcm.Seal(nonce, nonce, plaintext, aad), nil
}

// TestGenerateSaltUnique 验证生成的 salt 足够随机(两次调用结果不同)。
func TestGenerateSaltUnique(t *testing.T) {
	s1, err := GenerateSalt()
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("GenerateSalt failed: %v", err)
	}
	if len(s1) != 16 {
		t.Fatalf("expected 16-byte salt, got %d", len(s1))
	}
	s2, _ := GenerateSalt()
	if bytes.Equal(s1, s2) {
		t.Fatalf("two salts should differ")
	}
}