An open-source, privacy-first, self-hosted knowledge workspace where humans and AI agents work together 开源、隐私优先、自托管的知识工作空间,让人与智能体在此协作
TypeScript agentic-aiai-agentknowledge-baselocal-firstmarkdownmcpmindmapnote-takingself-hostedsiyuanworkspace
// SiYuan - https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan
// Copyright (c) 2020-present, b3log.org
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package util
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
)
// TestIsSessionOriginAllowed 验证会话 Cookie 认证的 Origin 校验逻辑
// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-hhm2-g993-p656
func TestIsSessionOriginAllowed(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
origin string
host string
want bool
}{
{name: "no origin header", origin: "", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: true},
{name: "local loopback origin", origin: "http://127.0.0.1:6806", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: true},
{name: "localhost origin", origin: "http://localhost:6806", host: "localhost:6806", want: true},
{name: "cross-site origin", origin: "https://evil.example", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: false},
{name: "remote access with matching host", origin: "http://192.168.1.5:6806", host: "192.168.1.5:6806", want: true},
{name: "remote access with same host different port", origin: "http://192.168.1.5:8080", host: "192.168.1.5:6806", want: false},
{name: "default port normalized", origin: "http://192.168.1.5:80", host: "192.168.1.5", want: true},
{name: "https default port normalized", origin: "https://192.168.1.5:443", host: "192.168.1.5", want: true},
{name: "null origin", origin: "null", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: false},
{name: "malformed origin", origin: "://bad", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: false},
{name: "origin without host header", origin: "http://192.168.1.5:6806", host: "", want: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := IsSessionOriginAllowed(test.origin, test.host); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("IsSessionOriginAllowed(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", test.origin, test.host, got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestIsCrossSiteFetchSite 验证 Sec-Fetch-Site 请求头的跨站判断逻辑
// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-2w6q-wgc8-q743
func TestIsCrossSiteFetchSite(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
site string
want bool
}{
{name: "absent header", site: "", want: false},
{name: "same-origin", site: "same-origin", want: false},
{name: "none", site: "none", want: false},
{name: "same-site", site: "same-site", want: true},
{name: "cross-site", site: "cross-site", want: true},
{name: "unknown value", site: "unknown", want: true},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := IsCrossSiteFetchSite(test.site); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("IsCrossSiteFetchSite(%q) = %v, want %v", test.site, got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestIsSessionOriginAllowedRequest 验证会话认证请求校验:仅允许跨站应用入口导航,
// 其余请求回退到 Origin 校验
// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-2w6q-wgc8-q743
func TestIsSessionOriginAllowedRequest(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
site string
origin string
host string
path string
mode string
dest string
want bool
}{
{name: "cross-site navigation without Origin", site: "cross-site", origin: "", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: false},
{name: "same-site without Origin", site: "same-site", origin: "", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: false},
{name: "same-site app navigation", site: "same-site", host: "note.example.com", path: "/stage/build/desktop/", mode: "navigate", dest: "document", want: true},
{name: "same-site root navigation", site: "same-site", host: "note.example.com", path: "/", mode: "navigate", dest: "document", want: true},
{name: "same-site API navigation denied", site: "same-site", host: "note.example.com", path: "/api/system/exit", mode: "navigate", dest: "document", want: false},
{name: "same-site asset navigation denied", site: "same-site", host: "note.example.com", path: "/assets/file.png", mode: "navigate", dest: "document", want: false},
{name: "same-site app fetch denied", site: "same-site", host: "note.example.com", path: "/stage/build/desktop/", mode: "cors", dest: "empty", want: false},
{name: "same-site app navigation with Origin denied", site: "same-site", origin: "https://home.example.com", host: "note.example.com", path: "/stage/build/desktop/", mode: "navigate", dest: "document", want: false},
{name: "cross-site app navigation", site: "cross-site", host: "note.example.com", path: "/stage/build/desktop/", mode: "navigate", dest: "document", want: true},
{name: "same-origin without Origin", site: "same-origin", origin: "", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: true},
{name: "none without Origin", site: "none", origin: "", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: true},
{name: "absent fetch site with local origin", site: "", origin: "http://127.0.0.1:6806", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: true},
{name: "absent fetch site with cross-site origin", site: "", origin: "https://evil.example", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: false},
{name: "cross-site with matching origin", site: "cross-site", origin: "http://127.0.0.1:6806", host: "127.0.0.1:6806", want: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
path := test.path
if path == "" {
path = "/"
}
request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://"+test.host+path, nil)
request.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", test.site)
request.Header.Set("Origin", test.origin)
request.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Mode", test.mode)
request.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Dest", test.dest)
if got := IsSessionOriginAllowedRequest(request); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("IsSessionOriginAllowedRequest(site=%q, origin=%q, host=%q) = %v, want %v", test.site, test.origin, test.host, got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsSessionOriginAllowedPWANavigation(t *testing.T) {
for _, path := range []string{"/", "/stage/build/app/", "/stage/build/desktop/", "/stage/build/mobile/",
"/stage/build/app/index.html", "/stage/build/desktop/index.html", "/stage/build/mobile/index.html"} {
request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://notes.example"+path+"?r=start", nil)
request.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
request.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Mode", "navigate")
request.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Dest", "document")
if !IsSessionOriginAllowedRequest(request) {
t.Errorf("PWA entry rejected: %s", path)
}
for _, change := range []func(*http.Request){
func(r *http.Request) { r.Method = http.MethodPost },
func(r *http.Request) { r.Header.Set("Origin", "https://external.example") },
func(r *http.Request) { r.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Mode", "cors") },
func(r *http.Request) { r.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Dest", "iframe") },
func(r *http.Request) { r.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "unknown") },
func(r *http.Request) { r.URL.Path = "/api/network/proxy" },
func(r *http.Request) { r.URL.Path = "/assets/image.png" },
func(r *http.Request) { r.URL.Path = path + "extra" },
} {
blocked := request.Clone(request.Context())
change(blocked)
if IsSessionOriginAllowedRequest(blocked) {
t.Errorf("unexpected navigation exception: %s %s %v", blocked.Method, blocked.URL, blocked.Header)
}
}
}
}
// TestIsPrivateIP 验证 isPrivateIP 对私网地址及 IPv6 过渡地址的判断
// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qq8m-8p8v-x4xg
// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-rg26-cg95-gq6p
func TestIsPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
want bool
}{
// IPv4
{name: "IPv4 loopback", ip: "127.0.0.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 private 10/8", ip: "10.0.0.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 private 172.16/12", ip: "172.16.0.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 private 192.168/16", ip: "192.168.1.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 link-local", ip: "169.254.169.254", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 unspecified", ip: "0.0.0.0", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 multicast", ip: "224.0.0.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 public", ip: "8.8.8.8", want: false},
// IPv6
{name: "IPv6 loopback", ip: "::1", want: true},
{name: "IPv6 ULA", ip: "fc00::1", want: true},
{name: "IPv6 link-local", ip: "fe80::1", want: true},
{name: "IPv6 unspecified", ip: "::", want: true},
{name: "IPv6 multicast", ip: "ff02::1", want: true},
{name: "IPv6 IPv4-mapped private", ip: "::ffff:192.168.1.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv6 documentation", ip: "2001:db8::1", want: false},
{name: "IPv6 public", ip: "2606:4700:4700::1111", want: false},
// IPv6 过渡地址
{name: "NAT64 loopback", ip: "64:ff9b::7f00:1", want: true},
{name: "NAT64 link-local", ip: "64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe", want: true},
{name: "NAT64 private", ip: "64:ff9b::c0a8:101", want: true},
{name: "NAT64 public", ip: "64:ff9b::808:808", want: false},
{name: "NAT64 local-use private", ip: "64:ff9b:1::c0a8:101", want: true},
{name: "6to4 private", ip: "2002:c0a8:101::1", want: true},
{name: "6to4 loopback", ip: "2002:7f00:1::1", want: true},
{name: "6to4 public", ip: "2002:808:808::1", want: false},
{name: "Teredo private", ip: "2001:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:3f57:fefe", want: true},
{name: "Teredo link-local", ip: "2001:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:5601:5601", want: true},
{name: "Teredo public", ip: "2001:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:f7f7:f7f7", want: false},
// IPv4 兼容地址(RFC 4291 已废弃 ::/96)
{name: "IPv4-compatible loopback", ip: "::127.0.0.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv4-compatible private", ip: "::c0a8:101", want: true},
{name: "IPv4-compatible public", ip: "::808:808", want: false},
{name: "IPv6 non-transition", ip: "::2", want: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ip := net.ParseIP(test.ip)
if nil == ip {
t.Fatalf("parse IP [%s] failed", test.ip)
}
if got := isPrivateIP(ip); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("isPrivateIP(%q) = %v, want %v", test.ip, got, test.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestCheckHostSSRF 验证 CheckHostSSRF 对私网地址及 IPv6 过渡地址的拦截
// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-rg26-cg95-gq6p
func TestCheckHostSSRF(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
host string
want bool
}{
{name: "IPv4 loopback", host: "127.0.0.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 private", host: "192.168.1.1", want: true},
{name: "IPv4 link-local", host: "169.254.169.254", want: true},
{name: "IPv6 loopback", host: "::1", want: true},
{name: "IPv6 IPv4-mapped loopback", host: "::ffff:127.0.0.1", want: true},
{name: "NAT64 loopback", host: "64:ff9b::7f00:1", want: true},
{name: "NAT64 link-local", host: "64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe", want: true},
{name: "NAT64 private", host: "64:ff9b::c0a8:101", want: true},
{name: "NAT64 local-use private", host: "64:ff9b:1::c0a8:101", want: true},
{name: "6to4 loopback", host: "2002:7f00:1::1", want: true},
{name: "6to4 private", host: "2002:c0a8:101::1", want: true},
{name: "Teredo private", host: "2001:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:3f57:fefe", want: true},
{name: "IPv4-compatible loopback", host: "::127.0.0.1", want: true},
{name: "public IPv4", host: "8.8.8.8", want: false},
{name: "public IPv6", host: "2606:4700:4700::1111", want: false},
{name: "NAT64 public", host: "64:ff9b::808:808", want: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := CheckHostSSRF(test.host)
if test.want != (nil != err) {
t.Fatalf("CheckHostSSRF(%q) error [%v], want blocked [%v]", test.host, err, test.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestSSRFSafeDialerSafeMode 验证安全模式下 SSRFSafeDialer 会阻止对私网及 IPv6 过渡地址的连接
// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qq8m-8p8v-x4xg
func TestSSRFSafeDialerSafeMode(t *testing.T) {
previous := SafeMode
SafeMode = true
defer func() { SafeMode = previous }()
tests := []struct {
name string
address string
blocked bool
}{
{name: "loopback", address: "127.0.0.1:80", blocked: true},
{name: "private", address: "192.168.1.1:80", blocked: true},
{name: "NAT64 loopback", address: "64:ff9b::7f00:1:80", blocked: true},
{name: "NAT64 link-local", address: "64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe:80", blocked: true},
{name: "6to4 private", address: "2002:c0a8:101::1:80", blocked: true},
{name: "Teredo private", address: "2001:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:3f57:fefe:80", blocked: true},
{name: "public", address: "8.8.8.8:80", blocked: false},
}
dialer := SSRFSafeDialer(30)
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := dialer.Control("tcp", test.address, nil)
if test.blocked != (nil != err) {
t.Fatalf("Control(%q) error [%v], want blocked [%v]", test.address, err, test.blocked)
}
})
}
}
// TestSSRFSafeDialContext 验证 ssrfSafeDialContext 在连接阶段无条件拦截私网地址(不依赖 SafeMode),
// 并拒绝解析结果全部为私网的域名,杜绝 DNS 重绑定 TOCTOU。
// https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-x8gv-g2g3-65fj
func TestSSRFSafeDialContext(t *testing.T) {
dialContext := ssrfSafeDialContext(500 * time.Millisecond)
tests := []struct {
name string
address string
blocked bool
}{
{name: "loopback", address: "127.0.0.1:80", blocked: true},
{name: "private", address: "192.168.1.1:80", blocked: true},
{name: "link-local", address: "169.254.169.254:80", blocked: true},
{name: "IPv6 loopback", address: "[::1]:80", blocked: true},
{name: "NAT64 loopback", address: "[64:ff9b::7f00:1]:80", blocked: true},
{name: "localhost 解析结果全为私网", address: "localhost:80", blocked: true},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
conn, err := dialContext(context.Background(), "tcp", test.address)
if conn != nil {
conn.Close()
}
if test.blocked != (nil != err) {
t.Fatalf("dial %q error [%v], want blocked [%v]", test.address, err, test.blocked)
}
})
}
}