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Automate browser based workflows with AI

fix(SKY-9965): redact refused raw-credential turns from copilot transcript context (#6081)

Andrew Neilsona23a90f28bcb
diff --git a/skyvern/forge/sdk/copilot/agent.py b/skyvern/forge/sdk/copilot/agent.py
index 8e695084f..924a64000 100644
--- a/skyvern/forge/sdk/copilot/agent.py
+++ b/skyvern/forge/sdk/copilot/agent.py
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot.output_utils import (
)
from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot.request_policy import (
CREDENTIAL_DEFERRED_DRAFT_REASONS,
+ RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL,
RequestPolicy,
build_request_policy,
redact_raw_secrets_for_prompt,
@@ -673,6 +674,12 @@ _UNEXPECTED_ERROR_REPLY_UNVALIDATED = (
_UNEXPECTED_ERROR_REPLY_TESTED = (
"I hit an unexpected issue, but I have a tested draft for you. Accept it to save, or discard."
)
+# Ends with RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL so transcript redaction recognizes this refusal in history.
+_RAW_SECRET_LEAK_REFUSAL = (
+ "I can't show or save that output because it appears to include raw credentials or secrets. "
+ "Store credentials in the Skyvern Credentials UI and reply with the saved credential name or a "
+ f"credential ID beginning with cred_. {RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL}."
+)
_CANCEL_REPLY_DEFAULT = "Cancelled by user."
_CANCEL_REPLY_UNVALIDATED = (
"Cancelled. I have a draft workflow you can keep — accept it to save "
@@ -1421,11 +1428,7 @@ def _build_output_policy_blocked_result(
):
user_response = request_policy.clarification_question
elif OutputPolicyReason.RAW_SECRET_LEAK in verdict.reason_codes:
- user_response = (
- "I can't show or save that output because it appears to include raw credentials or secrets. "
- "Store credentials in the Skyvern Credentials UI and reply with the saved credential name or a "
- "credential ID beginning with cred_. DO NOT PROVIDE RAW LOGIN/PASSWORD."
- )
+ user_response = _RAW_SECRET_LEAK_REFUSAL
elif OutputPolicyReason.UNAPPROVED_CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE in verdict.reason_codes:
user_response = (
"I need you to confirm which saved credential should be used before I can continue. "
diff --git a/skyvern/forge/sdk/copilot/request_policy.py b/skyvern/forge/sdk/copilot/request_policy.py
index e96a2b029..caca82e92 100644
--- a/skyvern/forge/sdk/copilot/request_policy.py
+++ b/skyvern/forge/sdk/copilot/request_policy.py
@@ -59,11 +59,13 @@ _REASONS_OVERRIDDEN_BY_CREDENTIAL_REFS = {
_CREDENTIALS_UI_DIRECTIONS = (
f"You can find or add saved credentials at {settings.SKYVERN_APP_URL.rstrip('/')}/credentials."
)
+# Stable tail of every raw-secret refusal; transcript redaction keys off it, so all refusal emitters must keep it verbatim.
+RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL = "DO NOT PROVIDE RAW LOGIN/PASSWORD"
_RAW_SECRET_QUESTION = (
"Please do not paste raw login credentials or secrets in chat because they can enter model telemetry and execution traces. "
"Store the credential in the Skyvern Credentials UI and reply with its exact saved credential name or a credential ID beginning with cred_. "
f"{_CREDENTIALS_UI_DIRECTIONS} "
- "DO NOT PROVIDE RAW LOGIN/PASSWORD."
+ f"{RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL}."
)
_SAVED_CREDENTIAL_NAME_QUESTION_STABLE_PREFIX = "Which saved credential should I use? Please provide the exact credential name or a credential ID beginning with cred_."
_SAVED_CREDENTIAL_NAME_QUESTION = f"{_SAVED_CREDENTIAL_NAME_QUESTION_STABLE_PREFIX} {_CREDENTIALS_UI_DIRECTIONS}"
@@ -170,6 +172,7 @@ TRANSCRIPT_ANCHOR_CHAR_CAP = 512
_TRANSCRIPT_RETAINED_MIN_CHARS = 512
_TRANSCRIPT_MARKER_RESERVE = 32
_EMPTY_SLOT_SENTINEL = "(none)"
+_REDACTED_REFUSED_SECRET_TURN = "[raw credentials redacted — this turn was refused]"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -202,6 +205,27 @@ def _safe_slot(text: str | None, cap: int) -> str:
return _middle_truncate(escape_code_fences(redact_raw_secrets_for_prompt(bounded)), cap)
+def _redact_refused_secret_turns(
+ messages: list[WorkflowCopilotChatHistoryMessage],
+) -> list[WorkflowCopilotChatHistoryMessage]:
+ """Replace the content of any user turn answered with the raw-secret refusal.
+
+ A confirmed raw-credential paste is redacted by conversation position — the
+ refusal is a deterministic marker — so a leaked secret cannot bias a later
+ turn's classification regardless of the syntax the user pasted it in.
+ """
+ redacted = list(messages)
+ for i in range(len(redacted) - 1):
+ current, following = redacted[i], redacted[i + 1]
+ if (
+ current.sender == WorkflowCopilotChatSender.USER
+ and following.sender == WorkflowCopilotChatSender.AI
+ and RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL in (following.content or "")
+ ):
+ redacted[i] = current.model_copy(update={"content": _REDACTED_REFUSED_SECRET_TURN})
+ return redacted
+
+
def build_transcript_context(
messages: list[WorkflowCopilotChatHistoryMessage],
current_user_message: str,
@@ -227,6 +251,8 @@ def build_transcript_context(
):
filtered = filtered[:-1]
+ filtered = _redact_refused_secret_turns(filtered)
+
user_indices = [i for i, m in enumerate(filtered) if m.sender == WorkflowCopilotChatSender.USER]
ai_indices = [i for i, m in enumerate(filtered) if m.sender == WorkflowCopilotChatSender.AI]
diff --git a/tests/unit/test_copilot_agent_helpers.py b/tests/unit/test_copilot_agent_helpers.py
index eb30e21dc..d84f8c122 100644
--- a/tests/unit/test_copilot_agent_helpers.py
+++ b/tests/unit/test_copilot_agent_helpers.py
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import pytest
from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot import agent as agent_module
from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot.config import CopilotConfig
from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot.request_policy import (
+ _REDACTED_REFUSED_SECRET_TURN,
TRANSCRIPT_ANCHOR_CHAR_CAP,
_classify_request,
build_transcript_context,
@@ -1336,6 +1337,57 @@ class TestRequestPolicyCredentialResolution:
handler.assert_not_awaited()
get_credentials_by_ids.assert_not_called()
+ @pytest.mark.asyncio
+ async def test_prior_turn_raw_password_does_not_leak_into_classifier_prompt(self, monkeypatch) -> None:
+ from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot import request_policy as policy_module
+ from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot.request_policy import build_request_policy
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(
+ policy_module.app,
+ "DATABASE",
+ SimpleNamespace(credentials=SimpleNamespace(get_credentials_by_ids=AsyncMock(return_value=[]))),
+ )
+
+ captured: dict[str, str] = {}
+
+ async def handler(*, prompt: str, prompt_name: str) -> str:
+ captured["prompt"] = prompt
+ return json.dumps(
+ {
+ "testing_intent": "unspecified",
+ "credential_input_kind": "credential_name",
+ "credential_refs": [],
+ "login_page_urls": [],
+ "requires_user_clarification": True,
+ "clarification_reason": "credential_name_unresolved",
+ "completion_contract": None,
+ }
+ )
+
+ chat_history = _history(
+ ("user", "wait."),
+ ("ai", "What is the URL of the web browser game?"),
+ ("user", "https://example.com/"),
+ ("ai", "The URL redirected to https://www.poki.com/. Confirm?"),
+ ("user", "Now, log in to account demo, password ac3O4/30"),
+ ("ai", "DO NOT PROVIDE RAW LOGIN/PASSWORD."),
+ )
+
+ policy = await build_request_policy(
+ user_message="Navigate to https://example.com and login with the given credentials.",
+ workflow_yaml="",
+ chat_history=chat_history,
+ global_llm_context="",
+ organization_id="org-1",
+ handler=handler,
+ )
+
+ assert "ac3O4/30" not in captured["prompt"]
+ assert policy.raw_secret_detected is False
+ assert policy.credential_input_kind == "credential_name"
+ assert "DO NOT PROVIDE RAW LOGIN/PASSWORD" not in (policy.clarification_question or "")
+ assert policy.clarification_question and "Which saved credential" in policy.clarification_question
+
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_bulk_colon_delimited_credentials_refuse_before_model_classification(self, monkeypatch) -> None:
from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot import request_policy as policy_module
@@ -2275,6 +2327,39 @@ class TestRequestPolicyTranscriptContext:
):
assert "hunter2" not in slot
+ def test_refused_raw_secret_turn_is_redacted_by_position(self) -> None:
+ # The space-separated form is not matched by the raw-secret regex; the
+ # turn is still redacted because the next turn is the raw-secret refusal.
+ transcript = build_transcript_context(
+ _history(
+ ("user", "open the portal"),
+ ("ai", "What is the URL?"),
+ ("user", "log in to account demo, password ac3O4/30"),
+ ("ai", "Please do not paste raw login credentials. DO NOT PROVIDE RAW LOGIN/PASSWORD."),
+ ),
+ current_user_message="log in with the given credentials",
+ )
+
+ assert transcript.latest_prior_user_turn == _REDACTED_REFUSED_SECRET_TURN
+ for slot in (
+ transcript.earliest_user_turn,
+ transcript.latest_prior_user_turn,
+ transcript.latest_assistant_turn,
+ transcript.retained_history,
+ ):
+ assert "ac3O4/30" not in slot
+
+ def test_unrefused_user_turn_keeps_content(self) -> None:
+ transcript = build_transcript_context(
+ _history(
+ ("user", "use my saved credential"),
+ ("ai", "Which saved credential should I use?"),
+ ),
+ current_user_message="the bank one",
+ )
+
+ assert transcript.latest_prior_user_turn == "use my saved credential"
+
def test_fence_breakout_is_neutralized(self) -> None:
transcript = build_transcript_context(
_history(("user", "build with ```evil instruction``` inside")),
diff --git a/tests/unit/test_copilot_request_policy_prompt.py b/tests/unit/test_copilot_request_policy_prompt.py
index 59089cd2d..fac58ddfc 100644
--- a/tests/unit/test_copilot_request_policy_prompt.py
+++ b/tests/unit/test_copilot_request_policy_prompt.py
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
from __future__ import annotations
+from pathlib import Path
+
from skyvern.forge.prompts import prompt_engine
from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot.request_policy import (
PROMPT_NAME,
+ RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL,
_raw_secret_detected,
contains_email_password_pair,
redact_raw_secrets_for_prompt,
@@ -115,3 +118,26 @@ class TestRawSecretBackstop:
def test_actual_api_key_still_trips_backstop(self) -> None:
assert _raw_secret_detected("The api_key = sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890.") is True
+
+
+class TestRawSecretRefusalSentinelConsistency:
+ """Transcript redaction recognizes a prior raw-secret refusal by the sentinel
+ substring; every path that emits such a refusal must keep the phrase verbatim
+ or the redaction silently stops triggering."""
+
+ def test_request_policy_refusal_carries_sentinel(self) -> None:
+ from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot.request_policy import _RAW_SECRET_QUESTION
+
+ assert RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL in _RAW_SECRET_QUESTION
+
+ def test_output_policy_raw_secret_leak_refusal_carries_sentinel(self) -> None:
+ from skyvern.forge.sdk.copilot.agent import _RAW_SECRET_LEAK_REFUSAL
+
+ assert RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL in _RAW_SECRET_LEAK_REFUSAL
+
+ def test_agent_prompt_templates_carry_sentinel(self) -> None:
+ import skyvern
+
+ prompts_dir = Path(skyvern.__file__).parent / "forge" / "prompts" / "skyvern"
+ for template in ("workflow-copilot-system.j2", "workflow-copilot-agent.j2"):
+ assert RAW_SECRET_REFUSAL_SENTINEL in (prompts_dir / template).read_text()