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<?php

namespace Tests\Feature\Authentication;

use App\Models\Setting;
use App\Models\User;
use Tests\TestCase;

/**
 * Regression coverage for the REMOTE_USER-header spoofing vulnerability
 * reported by Brayden Arnold. `LoginController::loginViaRemoteUser` read
 * `$request->server($header_name)` where `$header_name` was any string
 * an admin configured. PHP populates `$_SERVER[HTTP_*]` directly from
 * inbound HTTP headers, so configuring an HTTP_-prefixed value let any
 * unauthenticated client send the matching request header and get
 * logged in as any active user, including superuser (pre-auth
 * takeover).
 *
 * Fix is two layers:
 *
 *   1. Settings-side validation rejects HTTP_-prefixed values at save
 *      time (StoreSecuritySettings::rules), so admins can't configure
 *      the dangerous shape on new installs.
 *   2. Runtime guard in `loginViaRemoteUser` refuses to honor an
 *      HTTP_-prefixed header name even when one is already persisted
 *      (covers upgrade paths from a pre-fix install).
 */
class RemoteUserHeaderSpoofingTest extends TestCase
{
    public function test_settings_save_rejects_http_prefixed_header_name(): void
    {
        $superuser = User::factory()->superuser()->create();

        $this->actingAs($superuser)
            ->post(route('settings.security.save'), [
                'pwd_secure_min' => 10,
                'login_remote_user_enabled' => 1,
                'login_remote_user_header_name' => 'HTTP_X_AUTH_USER',
            ])
            ->assertSessionHasErrors('login_remote_user_header_name');

        $this->assertNotSame(
            'HTTP_X_AUTH_USER',
            Setting::getSettings()->fresh()->login_remote_user_header_name,
            'HTTP_-prefixed header name must not persist.',
        );
    }

    public function test_settings_save_rejects_lowercase_http_prefix_too(): void
    {
        // Case-insensitive match catches "http_" too. PHP wouldn't
        // actually populate $_SERVER['http_x_auth_user'] from an
        // inbound header (keys are canonical uppercase), but blocking
        // it anyway heads off confused admins who think a lowercase
        // variant is somehow safer.
        $superuser = User::factory()->superuser()->create();

        $this->actingAs($superuser)
            ->post(route('settings.security.save'), [
                'pwd_secure_min' => 10,
                'login_remote_user_enabled' => 1,
                'login_remote_user_header_name' => 'http_x_auth_user',
            ])
            ->assertSessionHasErrors('login_remote_user_header_name');
    }

    public function test_settings_save_allows_remote_user_default(): void
    {
        $superuser = User::factory()->superuser()->create();

        $this->actingAs($superuser)
            ->post(route('settings.security.save'), [
                'pwd_secure_min' => 10,
                'login_remote_user_enabled' => 1,
                'login_remote_user_header_name' => 'REMOTE_USER',
            ])
            ->assertSessionDoesntHaveErrors('login_remote_user_header_name');
    }

    public function test_runtime_refuses_http_prefixed_header_even_when_already_persisted(): void
    {
        // Simulate an upgrade path from a pre-fix install where the
        // dangerous value was saved before the validation rule landed.
        // Settings persisted via query builder so the new validation
        // can't block it. The runtime guard inside loginViaRemoteUser
        // must still refuse to honor the value.
        $victim = User::factory()->superuser()->create(['username' => 'super']);

        \DB::table('settings')->update([
            'login_remote_user_enabled' => 1,
            'login_remote_user_header_name' => 'HTTP_X_AUTH_USER',
        ]);
        Setting::$_cache = null;

        $this->withServerVariables(['HTTP_X_AUTH_USER' => 'super'])
            ->get('/login')
            ->assertOk();

        $this->assertGuest(
            null,
            'HTTP_-prefixed header name must not auto-login the user even when persisted pre-fix.',
        );
        $this->assertNotSame($victim->id, auth()->id(), 'No session should have been created from the spoofed header.');
    }

    public function test_legitimate_remote_user_login_still_works(): void
    {
        // Baseline: the fix must not break REMOTE_USER-based auth for
        // installs using Apache mod_auth_* or similar upstreams that
        // set REMOTE_USER server-side. The server variable is set
        // directly (not from an inbound header) via withServerVariables,
        // which mirrors what a legitimate upstream would do.
        $user = User::factory()->create(['username' => 'alice']);

        \DB::table('settings')->update([
            'login_remote_user_enabled' => 1,
            'login_remote_user_header_name' => 'REMOTE_USER',
        ]);
        Setting::$_cache = null;

        $this->withServerVariables(['REMOTE_USER' => 'alice'])
            ->get('/login')
            ->assertRedirect('/');

        $this->assertAuthenticatedAs($user);
    }
}