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Better escape attribute-context in advanced search pills

snipe08a689ee5cc2
diff --git a/resources/views/partials/bootstrap-table.blade.php b/resources/views/partials/bootstrap-table.blade.php
index 5306d85279..2e1259f165 100644
--- a/resources/views/partials/bootstrap-table.blade.php
+++ b/resources/views/partials/bootstrap-table.blade.php
@@ -123,6 +123,20 @@
return $('<div/>').text(value == null ? '' : value).html();
};
+ // Attribute-context escape. Distinct from escapeAdvancedSearchValue
+ // (text-context) because the text-serializer does NOT encode `"`,
+ // so a value with a raw quote breaks out of `attr="..."` even after
+ // .text().html() "escaping". Any concat like `data-field="' + val + '"`
+ // MUST route through this, not escapeAdvancedSearchValue.
+ var escapeAdvancedSearchAttr = function (value) {
+ return String(value == null ? '' : value)
+ .replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
+ .replace(/"/g, '&quot;')
+ .replace(/'/g, '&#39;')
+ .replace(/</g, '&lt;')
+ .replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
+ };
+
// Safely decode HTML entities in a string WITHOUT parsing it as HTML.
// `<textarea>` innerHTML is RCDATA — the parser decodes entity
// references like `&lt;` but does not interpret `<tag>` as an
@@ -275,9 +289,19 @@
advancedSearchOperatorLabel + ': ' + (op === 'or' ? advancedSearchOrText : advancedSearchAndText) + '</span>';
Object.keys(filters).forEach(f => {
+ // The filter name comes from the URL (deeplink hydration in
+ // the block below), so it is attacker-controllable. Both
+ // insertion points have to encode: the visible label needs
+ // text-context encoding, the data-field attribute needs
+ // attribute-context encoding (which additionally encodes
+ // the double-quote so a crafted name cannot close the
+ // attribute early and inject arbitrary HTML that
+ // jQuery.html() would then parse and execute).
+ var safeLabel = escapeAdvancedSearchValue(colMap[f] || f);
+ var safeField = escapeAdvancedSearchAttr(f);
html += '<span class="label label-primary" style="font-size: 11px; margin-right:6px;display:inline-block;margin-bottom:6px;"><b>' +
- (colMap[f] || f).replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '') + ':</b> ' + escapeAdvancedSearchValue(filters[f]) +
- ' <a href="javascript:void(0)" class="snipe-advanced-search-tag-remove" data-field="' + f +
+ safeLabel + ':</b> ' + escapeAdvancedSearchValue(filters[f]) +
+ ' <a href="javascript:void(0)" class="snipe-advanced-search-tag-remove" data-field="' + safeField +
'" style="color:#fff;margin-left:6px;text-decoration:none;">&times;</a></span>';
});
@@ -388,19 +412,26 @@
// — the label, name, and placeholder all get untrusted content.
var title = decodeHtmlEntitiesSafely(column.title).trim();
var value = filterColumnsPartial[column.field] || '';
- var safeTitle = escapeAdvancedSearchValue(title);
- var safeField = escapeAdvancedSearchValue(column.field);
+ // Label goes inside <label>...</label> (text context) so
+ // .text().html() suffices. name / placeholder / value
+ // all land inside attribute quotes, and the value comes
+ // from filterColumnsPartial (URL-sourced), so they need
+ // the attribute-safe encoder that also encodes `"`.
+ var safeLabelText = escapeAdvancedSearchValue(title);
+ var safeTitleAttr = escapeAdvancedSearchAttr(title);
+ var safeFieldAttr = escapeAdvancedSearchAttr(column.field);
+ var safeValueAttr = escapeAdvancedSearchAttr(value);
html.push(`
<div class="form-group row">
- <label class="col-sm-4 control-label">${safeTitle}</label>
+ <label class="col-sm-4 control-label">${safeLabelText}</label>
<div class="col-sm-6">
<input
type="text"
class="form-control ${this.constants.classes.input}"
- name="${safeField}"
- placeholder="${safeTitle}"
- value="${escapeAdvancedSearchValue(value)}"
+ name="${safeFieldAttr}"
+ placeholder="${safeTitleAttr}"
+ value="${safeValueAttr}"
>
</div>
</div>