A free open source IT asset/license management system
Added sameOriginUrl helper
snipe283a59cb1d42
diff --git a/app/Helpers/Helper.php b/app/Helpers/Helper.phpindex ce919d7116..7ee4a30482 100644--- a/app/Helpers/Helper.php+++ b/app/Helpers/Helper.php@@ -1720,6 +1720,47 @@ class Helper]) ? 'rtl' : 'ltr';}+ /**+ * Return $url if it points at the same origin as config('app.url'),+ * otherwise null. Callers should coalesce with a safe default:+ *+ * $target = Helper::sameOriginUrl($input) ?? route('home');+ *+ * Any user-controllable redirect target (hidden form field, Referer+ * header, SAML RelayState, url.intended session value, etc.) MUST+ * pass through this before reaching redirect(...) or we hand attackers+ * an open-redirect / phishing hand-off primitive. Relative URLs are+ * treated as same-origin; javascript:/data: and other non-http(s)+ * schemes are rejected. CR/LF are stripped to prevent response-splitting+ * via a crafted Location header.+ */+ public static function sameOriginUrl(?string $url): ?string+ {+ if (! $url) {+ return null;+ }++ $url = str_replace(["\r", "\n"], '', $url);++ $parts = parse_url($url);+ if ($parts === false) {+ return null;+ }++ if (isset($parts['scheme']) && ! in_array(strtolower($parts['scheme']), ['http', 'https'], true)) {+ return null;+ }++ $host = $parts['host'] ?? null;+ $appHost = parse_url(config('app.url'), PHP_URL_HOST);++ if ($host !== null && strcasecmp($host, (string) $appHost) !== 0) {+ return null;+ }++ return $url;+ }+public static function getRedirectOption($request, $id, $table, $item_id = null): RedirectResponse{@@ -1727,17 +1768,12 @@ class Helper$checkout_to_type = session('checkout_to_type') ?? null;$checkedInFrom = session('checkedInFrom');$other_redirect = session('other_redirect');- $backUrl = str_replace(["\r", "\n"], '', session()->pull('url.intended', 'home'));- // Reject any stored back-URL that points off-site. redirect()->intended() performs- // no host validation, and url.intended can be written from the SAML RelayState POST- // parameter (SamlController), which an attacker-controlled IdP could set to an- // off-site URL.- $backHost = parse_url($backUrl, PHP_URL_HOST);- $appHost = parse_url(config('app.url'), PHP_URL_HOST);- if ($backHost && $backHost !== $appHost) {- $backUrl = route('home');- }+ // Same-origin gate: redirect()->intended() performs no host+ // validation, and url.intended can be written from the SAML+ // RelayState POST parameter (SamlController), which an+ // attacker-controlled IdP could set to an off-site URL.+ $backUrl = self::sameOriginUrl(session()->pull('url.intended', 'home')) ?? route('home');// return to previous pageif ($redirect_option == 'back') {@@ -1753,6 +1789,7 @@ class Helper'Accessories' => route('accessories.index'),'Components' => route('components.index'),'Consumables' => route('consumables.index'),+ 'Maintenances' => route('maintenances.index'),};// #15214: preserve query-string filters when the user came