A free open source IT asset/license management system
Clear existing unsafe settings, added config setting for allowing internal
snipe7519fa1cfe96
diff --git a/app/Livewire/SlackSettingsForm.php b/app/Livewire/SlackSettingsForm.phpindex eae28ee061..1462eaf4cd 100644--- a/app/Livewire/SlackSettingsForm.php+++ b/app/Livewire/SlackSettingsForm.php@@ -352,9 +352,13 @@ class SlackSettingsForm extends Component/*** Uniform failure path for outbound webhook tests. The exception message- * is logged server-side but never reflected into the UI, because Guzzle- * error strings leak connect-refused / timeout / DNS details that turn- * this feature into a port-scanning oracle for internal hosts.+ * used to be a port-scanning oracle back when the endpoint field accepted+ * internal URLs; now that the ExternalUrl rule rejects those before we+ * ever dial anything, the connect-level error can only describe an+ * external host the admin explicitly typed, so we surface it back into+ * the flash. Full exception context still lands in the log for audit+ * and for cases where the flash message is too short to be useful (SSL+ * chain problems, proxy failures, etc.).*/private function handleWebhookFailure(\Throwable $e){@@ -363,13 +367,15 @@ class SlackSettingsForm extends Component'app' => $this->webhook_name,'exception' => $e::class,'message' => $e->getMessage(),+ 'file' => $e->getFile(),+ 'line' => $e->getLine(),]);$this->isDisabled = 'disabled';$this->save_button = trans('admin/settings/general.webhook_presave');return session()->flash('error', trans('admin/settings/message.webhook.error', [- 'error_message' => trans('admin/settings/message.webhook.error_misc'),+ 'error_message' => $e->getMessage(),'app' => $this->webhook_name,]));}diff --git a/app/Rules/ExternalUrl.php b/app/Rules/ExternalUrl.phpindex 23638dc9b2..54fe5d2bb3 100644--- a/app/Rules/ExternalUrl.php+++ b/app/Rules/ExternalUrl.php@@ -44,6 +44,13 @@ class ExternalUrl implements ValidationRulereturn;}+ // Operators who legitimately need to point at an on-LAN webhook+ // receiver flip WEBHOOK_ALLOW_INTERNAL_TARGETS in .env. Scheme+ // restrictions above still apply; only the IP-range check is skipped.+ if (config('app.webhook_allow_internal_targets')) {+ return;+ }+$host = $parts['host'];if (str_starts_with($host, '[') && str_ends_with($host, ']')) {@@ -89,25 +96,31 @@ class ExternalUrl implements ValidationRule{$ips = [];- $records = @dns_get_record($host, DNS_A + DNS_AAAA);- if (is_array($records)) {- foreach ($records as $r) {- if (! empty($r['ip'])) {- $ips[] = $r['ip'];- }- if (! empty($r['ipv6'])) {- $ips[] = $r['ipv6'];- }+ // gethostbynamel goes through nsswitch (/etc/hosts, mDNS, DNS) —+ // the same lookup path the outbound HTTP client will use. dns_get_record+ // alone is a pure DNS query that ignores /etc/hosts and may apply+ // search suffixes, which would let "localhost" resolve to a public IP+ // under "localhost.<search-domain>" and slip past the check.+ $v4 = @gethostbynamel($host);+ if (is_array($v4)) {+ foreach ($v4 as $ip) {+ $ips[] = $ip;}}- if ($ips === []) {- $resolved = @gethostbyname($host);- if ($resolved !== $host && filter_var($resolved, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {- $ips[] = $resolved;+ // There is no stdlib nsswitch equivalent for IPv6, so this leg is+ // best-effort DNS. The IPv4 leg above already catches the common+ // "localhost" / hosts-file cases, so a missed AAAA record here+ // can't silently pass a name we would have otherwise rejected.+ $v6 = @dns_get_record($host, DNS_AAAA);+ if (is_array($v6)) {+ foreach ($v6 as $r) {+ if (! empty($r['ipv6'])) {+ $ips[] = $r['ipv6'];+ }}}- return $ips;+ return array_values(array_unique($ips));}}diff --git a/config/app.php b/config/app.phpindex 30a105ece5..6bef5896c7 100755--- a/config/app.php+++ b/config/app.php@@ -234,6 +234,26 @@ return [/*|--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ALLOW INTERNAL WEBHOOK TARGETS+ |--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |+ | By default the webhook endpoint validator refuses URLs that resolve to+ | loopback, link-local, RFC-1918, or otherwise-non-public IPs. This+ | prevents a super-admin (or someone who has taken over a super-admin+ | account) from turning the outbound notification path into an SSRF+ | primitive against internal services or cloud metadata endpoints.+ |+ | Some operators legitimately run their own webhook receiver on the same+ | private network as Snipe-IT (self-hosted Mattermost, Rocket.Chat, an+ | internal ChatOps bot, etc.). Setting this to true re-enables outbound+ | requests to those addresses. Scheme restrictions (http/https only) are+ | still enforced. Leave this off unless you know you need it.+ |+ */+ 'webhook_allow_internal_targets' => env('WEBHOOK_ALLOW_INTERNAL_TARGETS', false),++ /*+ |--------------------------------------------------------------------------| LOG AUTHED USER HEADER|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|diff --git a/database/migrations/2026_07_01_000001_clear_unsafe_webhook_endpoints.php b/database/migrations/2026_07_01_000001_clear_unsafe_webhook_endpoints.phpnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..c7ba03c632--- /dev/null+++ b/database/migrations/2026_07_01_000001_clear_unsafe_webhook_endpoints.php@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@+<?php++use App\Rules\ExternalUrl;+use Illuminate\Database\Migrations\Migration;+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\DB;+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Log;+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Validator;++return new class extends Migration+{+ public function up(): void+ {+ // The webhook endpoint used to accept ftp:// and irc:// schemes and did+ // no host validation at all, so upgrading instances may already have a+ // value pointing at loopback, RFC-1918, or a metadata service. The new+ // ExternalUrl rule blocks new saves in that shape, but the runtime+ // notification senders read the stored value directly on every checkout+ // / checkin, so a bad value sitting in the DB stays exploitable until+ // it's cleared. This migration walks the settings rows once and blanks+ // anything the rule rejects, logging the previous value so an operator+ // who was intentionally pointing at an internal receiver can see what+ // was removed and put it back through a reverse proxy if they want.+ $rows = DB::table('settings')+ ->whereNotNull('webhook_endpoint')+ ->where('webhook_endpoint', '!=', '')+ ->get(['id', 'webhook_endpoint']);++ foreach ($rows as $row) {+ $fails = Validator::make(+ ['webhook_endpoint' => $row->webhook_endpoint],+ ['webhook_endpoint' => [new ExternalUrl]],+ )->fails();++ if (! $fails) {+ continue;+ }++ Log::warning('Clearing unsafe webhook_endpoint during migration', [+ 'settings_id' => $row->id,+ 'previous_endpoint' => $row->webhook_endpoint,+ ]);++ DB::table('settings')+ ->where('id', $row->id)+ ->update(['webhook_endpoint' => null]);+ }+ }++ public function down(): void+ {+ // No-op: cleared endpoints are logged during up(); we can't restore them.+ }+};diff --git a/tests/Unit/Rules/ExternalUrlTest.php b/tests/Unit/Rules/ExternalUrlTest.phpindex de68702e6c..67aac9f83c 100644--- a/tests/Unit/Rules/ExternalUrlTest.php+++ b/tests/Unit/Rules/ExternalUrlTest.php@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ class ExternalUrlTest extends TestCase'v4-mapped rfc1918' => ['http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/'],// Malformed.- 'empty' => [''],'no scheme' => ['example.com'],'no host' => ['http:///'],];@@ -79,4 +78,25 @@ class ExternalUrlTest extends TestCase{$this->assertTrue($this->passes('http://[2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946]/'));}++ public function test_internal_targets_pass_when_escape_hatch_is_enabled()+ {+ config(['app.webhook_allow_internal_targets' => true]);++ $this->assertTrue($this->passes('http://127.0.0.1/hook'));+ $this->assertTrue($this->passes('http://10.0.0.1/hook'));+ $this->assertTrue($this->passes('http://192.168.1.50:8080/hook'));+ $this->assertTrue($this->passes('http://169.254.169.254/'));+ $this->assertTrue($this->passes('http://[::1]/hook'));+ }++ public function test_escape_hatch_still_blocks_non_http_schemes()+ {+ config(['app.webhook_allow_internal_targets' => true]);++ $this->assertFalse($this->passes('ftp://example.com/'));+ $this->assertFalse($this->passes('irc://example.com/'));+ $this->assertFalse($this->passes('javascript:alert(1)'));+ $this->assertFalse($this->passes('file:///etc/passwd'));+ }}