A free open source IT asset/license management system
Block markdown images in emails
snipe836c4a20c745
diff --git a/app/Mail/BlockImagesMarkdownExtension.php b/app/Mail/BlockImagesMarkdownExtension.phpnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..d4db1674e1--- /dev/null+++ b/app/Mail/BlockImagesMarkdownExtension.php@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@+<?php++namespace App\Mail;++use League\CommonMark\Environment\EnvironmentBuilderInterface;+use League\CommonMark\Extension\CommonMark\Node\Inline\Image;+use League\CommonMark\Extension\ExtensionInterface;+use League\CommonMark\Node\Node;+use League\CommonMark\Renderer\ChildNodeRendererInterface;+use League\CommonMark\Renderer\NodeRendererInterface;++/**+ * CommonMark extension that neutralizes markdown image syntax in outbound+ * mail. Registered globally on the Illuminate\Mail\Markdown singleton so+ * every parser instance picks it up. That includes the hardcoded+ * Illuminate\Mail\Markdown::parse calls inside vendor mail views (mail::table,+ * mail::panel, mail::subcopy, mail::footer, mail::layout), which a container+ * subclass would otherwise miss.+ *+ * The image renderer is replaced at priority 100, which beats the priority-0+ * default from CommonMarkCoreExtension. Rather than dropping the content+ * entirely we render the image node's alt text as plain text. A note like+ * `` becomes literal "My photo" in the email instead+ * of vanishing silently.+ *+ * Why this matters. laravel-mail-auto-embed walks outbound emails and, for+ * every <img src> it finds, either file_get_contents()s the path or curl-+ * fetches the URL and attaches the result. Without this extension, any+ * user-controlled string that reaches a markdown mail template can be used+ * to exfiltrate arbitrary server-readable files or issue arbitrary internal+ * HTTP requests. See GHSA advisory for the full attack chain.+ */+class BlockImagesMarkdownExtension implements ExtensionInterface+{+ public function register(EnvironmentBuilderInterface $environment): void+ {+ $environment->addRenderer(Image::class, new class implements NodeRendererInterface+ {+ public function render(Node $node, ChildNodeRendererInterface $childRenderer): string+ {+ return htmlspecialchars(+ $childRenderer->renderNodes($node->children()),+ ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5,+ 'UTF-8'+ );+ }+ }, 100);+ }+}diff --git a/config/mail.php b/config/mail.phpindex 08eaa366be..28639b260d 100755--- a/config/mail.php+++ b/config/mail.php@@ -272,6 +272,17 @@ return ['paths' => [resource_path('views/vendor/mail'),],++ // CommonMark extensions to register on Laravel's mail Markdown parser.+ // BlockImagesMarkdownExtension replaces the default Image renderer+ // with a no-op that emits the alt text as plain text. Without it,+ // user-controlled fields that reach a markdown mail template can+ // produce <img src="/any/path"> tags. laravel-mail-auto-embed then+ // resolves each src via file_get_contents() or curl, exfiltrating+ // arbitrary local files or issuing internal HTTP requests.+ 'extensions' => [+ \App\Mail\BlockImagesMarkdownExtension::class,+ ],],];diff --git a/tests/Feature/CheckoutAcceptances/Ui/AssetAcceptanceTest.php b/tests/Feature/CheckoutAcceptances/Ui/AssetAcceptanceTest.phpindex 6deca9920d..2bdc2ab8e5 100644--- a/tests/Feature/CheckoutAcceptances/Ui/AssetAcceptanceTest.php+++ b/tests/Feature/CheckoutAcceptances/Ui/AssetAcceptanceTest.php@@ -246,6 +246,58 @@ class AssetAcceptanceTest extends TestCase);}+ public function test_acceptance_note_cannot_inject_markdown_image_tag(): void+ {+ // Regression for GHSA (F41 / Adam Nurudini). A low-privilege user+ // could submit an acceptance note like ``,+ // which Blade's HTML escape leaves intact (the chars are not HTML+ // metacharacters). CommonMark then expanded it into a real <img>+ // tag inside the outbound notification, and laravel-mail-auto-embed+ // resolved the src via file_get_contents() or curl, exfiltrating+ // arbitrary local files or issuing SSRF requests. The fix registers+ // a CommonMark extension that overrides the Image renderer so no+ // <img> tag survives markdown parsing.+ Event::fake([CheckoutAccepted::class]);+ Notification::fake();++ $checkoutAcceptance = CheckoutAcceptance::factory()->pending()->create();++ $lfrPayload = '';+ $ssrfPayload = '';+ $filePayload = '';++ $this->actingAs($checkoutAcceptance->assignedTo)+ ->post(route('account.store-acceptance', $checkoutAcceptance), [+ 'asset_acceptance' => 'accepted',+ 'note' => "{$lfrPayload} {$ssrfPayload} {$filePayload}",+ ])+ ->assertRedirectToRoute('account.accept')+ ->assertSessionHas('success');++ Notification::assertSentTo(+ $checkoutAcceptance,+ function (AcceptanceItemAcceptedNotification $notification) {+ $rendered = $notification->toMail()->render();++ // None of the payload targets should survive as an <img src>+ // in the rendered email. laravel-mail-auto-embed resolves any+ // surviving img src via file_get_contents() (LFR) or curl (SSRF).+ // Legitimate header/logo <img> tags with app-controlled src+ // paths are unaffected. This test targets only user-controlled+ // src values that Adam's F41 report demonstrated.+ foreach (['/etc/hostname', '169.254.169.254', '/var/www/html/.env', 'file://'] as $payload) {+ $this->assertStringNotContainsString(+ $payload,+ $rendered,+ "Rendered mail contains attacker-controlled path \"{$payload}\" - CommonMark image markdown was not blocked."+ );+ }++ return true;+ }+ );+ }+public function test_admin_can_complete_sign_in_place_acceptance_and_is_redirected_to_selected_destination(){Event::fake([CheckoutAccepted::class]);