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Fixed FD-57824 / 2q8x-3vjh - Added dimension cap to prevent raster overflow

snipeed43b8bdcc7e
diff --git a/app/Http/Requests/ImageUploadRequest.php b/app/Http/Requests/ImageUploadRequest.php
index d4f9dc816e..85cb0c2076 100644
--- a/app/Http/Requests/ImageUploadRequest.php
+++ b/app/Http/Requests/ImageUploadRequest.php
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
namespace App\Http\Requests;
+use App\Helpers\Helper;
use App\Http\Traits\ConvertsBase64ToFiles;
use App\Models\SnipeModel;
use enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer;
@@ -34,11 +35,19 @@ class ImageUploadRequest extends Request
*/
public function rules()
{
+ // dimensions caps run via getimagesize() (header-read only, no raster
+ // decode), so they fire before Image::make() gets to allocate a
+ // decompressed pixel buffer. Without them, a tiny solid-color PNG
+ // with large declared dimensions decodes to many hundreds of
+ // megabytes of RGBA before resize() ever runs. SVGs are hard-skipped
+ // by the dimensions validator, which is the behavior we want - they
+ // go through the sanitizer, not GD/ImageMagick.
+ $max_size = Helper::file_upload_max_size();
return [
- 'image' => 'mimes:png,gif,jpg,jpeg,svg,bmp,svg+xml,webp,avif',
- 'avatar' => 'mimes:png,gif,jpg,jpeg,svg,bmp,svg+xml,webp,avif',
- 'favicon' => 'mimes:png,gif,jpg,jpeg,svg,bmp,svg+xml,webp,image/x-icon,image/vnd.microsoft.icon,ico',
+ 'image' => 'mimes:png,gif,jpg,jpeg,svg,bmp,svg+xml,webp,avif|max:'.$max_size.'|dimensions:max_width=10000,max_height=10000',
+ 'avatar' => 'mimes:png,gif,jpg,jpeg,svg,bmp,svg+xml,webp,avif|max:'.$max_size.'|dimensions:max_width=10000,max_height=10000',
+ 'favicon' => 'mimes:png,gif,jpg,jpeg,svg,bmp,svg+xml,webp,image/x-icon,image/vnd.microsoft.icon,ico|max:'.$max_size.'|dimensions:max_width=1024,max_height=1024',
];
}
diff --git a/tests/Feature/Uploads/ImageUploadRequestDimensionsLimitsTest.php b/tests/Feature/Uploads/ImageUploadRequestDimensionsLimitsTest.php
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9d857b850
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Feature/Uploads/ImageUploadRequestDimensionsLimitsTest.php
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+<?php
+
+namespace Tests\Feature\Uploads;
+
+use App\Models\Manufacturer;
+use App\Models\User;
+use Illuminate\Http\UploadedFile;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Storage;
+use Tests\TestCase;
+
+/**
+ * ImageUploadRequest's rules() previously only applied `mimes:`, so an
+ * authenticated user could submit a PNG with large declared dimensions
+ * but a tiny on-disk footprint. Image::make() fully decoded the raster
+ * (width * height * 4 bytes for RGBA) before resize() ran, which is the
+ * attack surface for the compressed-image-to-huge-pixel-buffer amplification.
+ *
+ * The fix adds dimensions:max_width/max_height, which runs via
+ * getimagesize() - header-read only, so the validator itself does not
+ * allocate the pixel buffer. SVGs are hard-skipped by Laravel's dimensions
+ * validator and continue to flow through the sanitizer path.
+ */
+class ImageUploadRequestDimensionsLimitsTest extends TestCase
+{
+ public function test_avatar_with_oversized_declared_dimensions_is_rejected_before_decode(): void
+ {
+ Storage::fake('public');
+
+ $user = User::factory()->create(['avatar' => null]);
+
+ $path = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'png');
+ file_put_contents($path, $this->craftPngWithIhdrDimensions(50000, 50000));
+ $upload = new UploadedFile($path, 'bomb.png', 'image/png', null, true);
+
+ $response = $this->actingAs($user)
+ ->post(route('profile.update'), [
+ 'first_name' => $user->first_name,
+ 'last_name' => $user->last_name,
+ 'avatar' => $upload,
+ ]);
+
+ $response->assertStatus(302);
+ $response->assertSessionHasErrors('avatar');
+
+ $user->refresh();
+ $this->assertNull(
+ $user->avatar,
+ 'A rejected avatar upload must not touch the stored avatar reference.',
+ );
+ }
+
+ public function test_favicon_dimensions_are_capped_tighter_than_image_and_avatar(): void
+ {
+ Storage::fake('public');
+
+ $path = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'png');
+ file_put_contents($path, $this->craftPngWithIhdrDimensions(2048, 2048));
+ $upload = new UploadedFile($path, 'big-favicon.png', 'image/png', null, true);
+
+ $request = new \App\Http\Requests\ImageUploadRequest;
+ $validator = \Illuminate\Support\Facades\Validator::make(
+ ['favicon' => $upload, 'image' => $upload, 'avatar' => $upload],
+ $request->rules(),
+ );
+
+ $errors = $validator->errors();
+ $this->assertTrue($errors->has('favicon'), 'A 2048x2048 image must fail the favicon dimensions cap (1024).');
+ $this->assertFalse($errors->has('image'), 'A 2048x2048 image must pass the image dimensions cap (10000).');
+ $this->assertFalse($errors->has('avatar'), 'A 2048x2048 image must pass the avatar dimensions cap (10000).');
+ }
+
+ public function test_normal_sized_avatar_still_passes_validation(): void
+ {
+ Storage::fake('public');
+
+ $user = User::factory()->create(['avatar' => null]);
+
+ $this->actingAs($user)
+ ->post(route('profile.update'), [
+ 'first_name' => $user->first_name,
+ 'last_name' => $user->last_name,
+ 'avatar' => UploadedFile::fake()->image('normal.png', 400, 400),
+ ])
+ ->assertStatus(302)
+ ->assertSessionHasNoErrors();
+
+ $user->refresh();
+ $this->assertNotNull(
+ $user->avatar,
+ 'A normal-sized avatar must still be accepted and stored.',
+ );
+ }
+
+ public function test_manufacturer_image_with_oversized_declared_dimensions_is_rejected(): void
+ {
+ Storage::fake('public');
+
+ $manufacturer = Manufacturer::factory()->create(['image' => null]);
+
+ $path = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'png');
+ file_put_contents($path, $this->craftPngWithIhdrDimensions(50000, 50000));
+ $upload = new UploadedFile($path, 'bomb.png', 'image/png', null, true);
+
+ $this->actingAs(User::factory()->superuser()->create())
+ ->put(route('manufacturers.update', $manufacturer), [
+ 'name' => $manufacturer->name,
+ 'image' => $upload,
+ ])
+ ->assertStatus(302)
+ ->assertSessionHasErrors('image');
+
+ $manufacturer->refresh();
+ $this->assertNull(
+ $manufacturer->image,
+ 'A rejected image upload must not touch the stored image reference.',
+ );
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Produces a minimal PNG that declares the given dimensions in its IHDR
+ * chunk. getimagesize() reads the header and reports those dimensions
+ * without decoding any raster data, so Laravel's dimensions validator
+ * rejects the file before any image decoder runs. The file itself is
+ * tens of bytes - no pixel buffer is ever allocated in the test.
+ */
+ private function craftPngWithIhdrDimensions(int $width, int $height): string
+ {
+ $signature = "\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n";
+
+ $ihdrData = pack('NNCCCCC', $width, $height, 8, 2, 0, 0, 0);
+ $ihdrChunk = pack('N', 13).'IHDR'.$ihdrData.pack('N', crc32('IHDR'.$ihdrData));
+
+ $iendChunk = pack('N', 0).'IEND'.pack('N', crc32('IEND'));
+
+ return $signature.$ihdrChunk.$iendChunk;
+ }
+}