SolidCraft: an open-source parametric 3D CAD application built in pure Rust. Desktop, web, and automation through MCP.
fix: control port needs a per-launch token; MCP tool annotations tell the whole truth (#205) (#901)
bherbruckfe3717f2e400
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.mdindex fb6123da05..3e2fd37a9a 100644--- a/AGENTS.md+++ b/AGENTS.md@@ -122,7 +122,10 @@ before the draft is verified.## Running and looking at the app- `cargo run --release -p solidcraft -- --sample --control PORT` (sample design + control channel).Pick a free port. Without a display, run it under `Xvfb :99` with `DISPLAY=:99`.-- Drive it with JSON lines on `127.0.0.1:PORT` (see `docs/control-protocol.md`):+- Drive it with JSON lines on `127.0.0.1:PORT` (see `docs/control-protocol.md`). The first+ request on a connection carries the launch's token as `"token"`: read it from+ `~/.local/share/solidcraft/control/PORT.token`, or start the app with+ `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)` and send that.- `{"id":1,"method":"engine.execute","params":{"command":"solid.extrude","params":{"distance":20}}}`- `{"id":2,"method":"ui.start","params":{"command":"sketch.create"}}` then `ui.click {x, y}`- `{"id":3,"method":"ui.screenshot","params":{"path":"/tmp/shot.png"}}` then read the PNG.diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.mdindex b2003eeac3..201b44dc78 100644--- a/CLAUDE.md+++ b/CLAUDE.md@@ -99,7 +99,10 @@ before the draft is verified.## Running and looking at the app- `cargo run --release -p solidcraft -- --sample --control PORT` (sample design + control channel).Pick a free port. Without a display, run it under `Xvfb :99` with `DISPLAY=:99`.-- Drive it with JSON lines on `127.0.0.1:PORT` (see `docs/control-protocol.md`):+- Drive it with JSON lines on `127.0.0.1:PORT` (see `docs/control-protocol.md`). The first+ request on a connection carries the launch's token as `"token"`: read it from+ `~/.local/share/solidcraft/control/PORT.token`, or start the app with+ `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)` and send that.- `{"id":1,"method":"engine.execute","params":{"command":"solid.extrude","params":{"distance":20}}}`- `{"id":2,"method":"ui.start","params":{"command":"sketch.create"}}` then `ui.click {x, y}`- `{"id":3,"method":"ui.screenshot","params":{"path":"/tmp/shot.png"}}` then read the PNG.diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lockindex bfcee2cc75..951c0af219 100644--- a/Cargo.lock+++ b/Cargo.lock@@ -3286,6 +3286,7 @@ dependencies = ["eframe","egui","embed-resource",+ "getrandom 0.3.4","hidapi","log","quick-xml",diff --git a/apps/solidcraft-cli/src/main.rs b/apps/solidcraft-cli/src/main.rsindex de72081bb8..584c45d042 100644--- a/apps/solidcraft-cli/src/main.rs+++ b/apps/solidcraft-cli/src/main.rs@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@//! solidcraft-cli commands the command registry as JSON//! solidcraft-cli recipe <recipe.json> translate an oracle recipe to a script//! solidcraft-cli oracle <case-dir>... replay recipes and compare with expected.json-//! solidcraft-cli mcp [--in design|script] [--connect HOST:PORT] [--allow-path DIR]... [--allow-any-path]+//! solidcraft-cli mcp [--in design|script] [--connect HOST:PORT [--token T]] [--allow-path DIR]... [--allow-any-path]//! MCP server on stdio (docs/mcp.md)//! solidcraft-cli licences SolidCraft's licence and the third-party licences//! solidcraft-cli icon --out F.png|F.ico [--size N] the app icon (packaging; drawn, not a file)@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ const USAGE: &str = "usage:solidcraft-cli recipe <recipe.json>solidcraft-cli oracle <case-dir>... [--json]solidcraft-cli fuzz [--from N] [--count N] [--jobs J] [--timeout S] [--steps N] [--minimise] [--out DIR] [--report FILE]- solidcraft-cli mcp [--in design.solidcraft|script.json] [--connect 127.0.0.1:PORT] [--allow-path DIR]... [--allow-any-path]+ solidcraft-cli mcp [--in design.solidcraft|script.json] [--connect 127.0.0.1:PORT [--token T]] [--allow-path DIR]... [--allow-any-path]solidcraft-cli crashes [list [--json] | show <id> | replay <id> | dir | clear [<id>]]solidcraft-cli licencessolidcraft-cli icon --out icon.png [--size 256] | --out icon.ico@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ fn cmd_mcp(args: &[String]) -> Result<(), String> {}let backend: Box<dyn solidcraft_mcp::Backend> = match (flag(args, "--connect"), flag(args, "--in")) {(Some(_), Some(_)) => return Err("mcp: use either --connect or --in, not both".into()),- (Some(addr), None) => Box::new(solidcraft_mcp::Remote::connect(addr).map_err(|e| {+ (Some(addr), None) => Box::new(solidcraft_mcp::Remote::connect_with_token(addr, flag(args, "--token")).map_err(|e| {let port = addr.rsplit(':').next().filter(|p| p.parse::<u16>().is_ok()).unwrap_or("PORT");format!("cannot connect to {addr}: {e}\nno SolidCraft app is listening there; start it with \diff --git a/apps/solidcraft/Cargo.toml b/apps/solidcraft/Cargo.tomlindex 01cbcc3330..ca1974d7dc 100644--- a/apps/solidcraft/Cargo.toml+++ b/apps/solidcraft/Cargo.toml@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ egui = { workspace = true }serde_json = { workspace = true }log = { workspace = true }rfd = { workspace = true }+getrandom = "0.3"[target.'cfg(any(target_os = "windows", target_os = "linux"))'.dependencies]quick-xml = { workspace = true }diff --git a/apps/solidcraft/src/control_server.rs b/apps/solidcraft/src/control_server.rsindex 792b10b3af..bb670a6f04 100644--- a/apps/solidcraft/src/control_server.rs+++ b/apps/solidcraft/src/control_server.rs@@ -9,18 +9,39 @@ use std::time::Duration;use serde_json::{Value, json};use solidcraft_engine::MAX_LINE;+use solidcraft_engine::control_auth;use solidcraft_ui_egui::ControlRequest;-/// Connections served at once. The channel has no authentication beyond being bound to-/// loopback, so a flood must not be able to spawn threads without end.+/// Connections served at once, so a flood must not be able to spawn threads without end.const MAX_CONNECTIONS: usize = 16;/// Lines that are not JSON before the connection is closed, so garbage cannot loop forever.const MAX_BAD_LINES: usize = 8;static OPEN: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);+/// The token file this launch wrote, removed when the app ends.+static TOKEN_FILE: std::sync::OnceLock<std::path::PathBuf> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();++/// A new random token: 32 bytes from the operating system, as hex.+fn new_token() -> Option<String> {+ let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];+ getrandom::fill(&mut bytes).ok()?;+ Some(bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect())+}++/// Remove this launch's token file (at exit).+pub fn remove_token_file() {+ if let Some(p) = TOKEN_FILE.get() {+ let _ = std::fs::remove_file(p);+ }+}pub fn start(port: u16, ctx: egui::Context) -> Receiver<ControlRequest> {let (tx, rx) = channel::<ControlRequest>();+ // Every connection must show the token before anything runs (docs/control-protocol.md).+ let Some(token) = control_auth::env_token().or_else(new_token) else {+ eprintln!("solidcraft: control server not started: no random token available");+ return rx;+ };let listener = match TcpListener::bind(("127.0.0.1", port)) {Ok(l) => l,Err(e) => {@@ -28,7 +49,23 @@ pub fn start(port: u16, ctx: egui::Context) -> Receiver<ControlRequest> {return rx;}};- eprintln!("solidcraft: control server listening on 127.0.0.1:{port}");+ match control_auth::token_path(port) {+ Some(path) => match control_auth::write_token_file(&path, &token) {+ Ok(()) => {+ eprintln!("solidcraft: control server listening on 127.0.0.1:{port} (token in {})", path.display());+ let _ = TOKEN_FILE.set(path);+ }+ Err(e) => eprintln!(+ "solidcraft: control server listening on 127.0.0.1:{port}, but its token file {} could not be written ({e}); \+ clients need SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN",+ path.display()+ ),+ },+ None => {+ eprintln!("solidcraft: control server listening on 127.0.0.1:{port}; no data folder for its token, clients need SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN")+ }+ }+ let token = std::sync::Arc::new(token);std::thread::spawn(move || {for stream in listener.incoming().flatten() {if OPEN.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) >= MAX_CONNECTIONS {@@ -39,8 +76,9 @@ pub fn start(port: u16, ctx: egui::Context) -> Receiver<ControlRequest> {}let tx = tx.clone();let ctx = ctx.clone();+ let token = token.clone();std::thread::spawn(move || {- serve(stream, tx, ctx);+ serve(stream, &token, tx, ctx);OPEN.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::Relaxed);});}@@ -80,11 +118,17 @@ fn read_line(r: &mut impl BufRead, max: usize) -> std::io::Result<Option<Vec<u8>}}-fn serve(stream: TcpStream, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {+/// The reply to a connection that didn't show the token; the connection is then closed.+fn unauthorized() -> Value {+ json!({"ok": false, "error": "unauthorized: send the control token as \"token\" (see docs/control-protocol.md)"})+}++fn serve(stream: TcpStream, token: &str, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {let Ok(read) = stream.try_clone() else { return };let mut out = stream;let mut reader = BufReader::new(read);let mut bad = 0usize;+ let mut authenticated = false;loop {let line = match read_line(&mut reader, MAX_LINE) {Ok(Some(l)) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&l).into_owned(),@@ -99,6 +143,16 @@ fn serve(stream: TcpStream, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {}let reply = match serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&line) {Ok(msg) => {+ // The first request must carry the token; later ones on the same connection may.+ if !authenticated {+ match msg.get("token").and_then(Value::as_str) {+ Some(t) if control_auth::tokens_match(t, token) => authenticated = true,+ _ => {+ let _ = writeln!(out, "{}", unauthorized());+ break;+ }+ }+ }let id = msg.get("id").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null);let method = msg.get("method").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or("").to_string();let params = msg.get("params").cloned().unwrap_or(json!({}));@@ -113,6 +167,10 @@ fn serve(stream: TcpStream, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {}r}+ Err(_) if !authenticated => {+ let _ = writeln!(out, "{}", unauthorized());+ break;+ }Err(e) => {bad += 1;json!({"ok": false, "error": format!("bad JSON: {e}")})@@ -131,6 +189,62 @@ fn serve(stream: TcpStream, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {mod tests {use super::*;+ /// #205: a connection runs nothing until a request carries the launch's token; a wrong or+ /// missing token, or garbage, is refused and the connection closed. Once shown, the token+ /// need not be repeated on that connection.+ #[test]+ fn requests_run_only_after_the_token() {+ use std::io::Read;+ let token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";+ let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();+ let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();+ let (tx, rx) = channel::<ControlRequest>();+ let ran = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::<String>::new()));+ let seen = ran.clone();+ std::thread::spawn(move || {+ for req in rx {+ seen.lock().unwrap().push(req.method.clone());+ let _ = req.reply.send(json!({"ok": true, "result": null}));+ }+ });+ std::thread::spawn(move || {+ for stream in listener.incoming().flatten() {+ let tx = tx.clone();+ std::thread::spawn(move || serve(stream, token, tx, egui::Context::default()));+ }+ });+ let session = |lines: &[String]| {+ let mut s = TcpStream::connect(addr).unwrap();+ s.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(10))).unwrap();+ for l in lines {+ let _ = writeln!(s, "{l}");+ }+ let _ = s.shutdown(std::net::Shutdown::Write);+ let mut text = String::new();+ let _ = s.read_to_string(&mut text);+ text.lines().map(|l| serde_json::from_str::<Value>(l).unwrap()).collect::<Vec<_>>()+ };+ for first in [+ json!({"id": 1, "method": "app.quit", "params": {"force": true}}).to_string(),+ json!({"id": 1, "method": "app.quit", "token": "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdee"}).to_string(),+ json!({"id": 1, "method": "app.quit", "token": "0123"}).to_string(),+ json!({"id": 1, "method": "app.quit", "token": 7}).to_string(),+ "not json".to_string(),+ ] {+ let replies = session(&[first.clone(), json!({"id": 2, "method": "app.quit", "token": token}).to_string()]);+ assert_eq!(replies.len(), 1, "{first}: closed after refusing: {replies:?}");+ assert!(replies[0]["error"].as_str().is_some_and(|e| e.starts_with("unauthorized")), "{first}: {replies:?}");+ }+ assert!(ran.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "nothing ran without the token");+ let replies = session(&[+ json!({"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "token": token}).to_string(),+ json!({"id": 2, "method": "engine.commands"}).to_string(),+ ]);+ assert_eq!(replies.len(), 2, "{replies:?}");+ assert!(replies.iter().all(|r| r["ok"] == true), "{replies:?}");+ assert_eq!(*ran.lock().unwrap(), ["ui.inspect", "engine.commands"]);+ }+/// A request longer than the cap is refused instead of allocated.#[test]fn lines_past_the_cap_are_refused() {diff --git a/apps/solidcraft/src/main.rs b/apps/solidcraft/src/main.rsindex 8fa1896fa7..78eb0ccbcb 100644--- a/apps/solidcraft/src/main.rs+++ b/apps/solidcraft/src/main.rs@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ fn main() -> eframe::Result {b.with_x11();}));}- eframe::run_native(+ let result = eframe::run_native("SolidCraft",options,Box::new(move |cc| {@@ -344,7 +344,9 @@ fn main() -> eframe::Result {space_mouse,}))}),- )+ );+ control_server::remove_token_file();+ result}/// Whether to run through XWayland rather than native Wayland. winit has no file drag-and-dropdiff --git a/crates/engine/src/control_auth.rs b/crates/engine/src/control_auth.rsnew file mode 100644index 0000000000..0f0af31421--- /dev/null+++ b/crates/engine/src/control_auth.rs@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@+//! The control channel's per-launch token (docs/control-protocol.md). `solidcraft --control PORT`+//! makes a random token, writes it to a file only the user can read+//! ([`token_path`]) and refuses every connection whose first request doesn't carry it, so other+//! users on the same machine (loopback is shared, on Windows across remote-desktop sessions too)+//! can't drive the app. Clients find it with [`client_token`].++use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind, Result, Write};+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};++/// Shortest token accepted from `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` (hex characters).+pub const MIN_TOKEN_LEN: usize = 32;++/// The token file of the app listening on `port`: `<data folder>/control/<port>.token`+/// (`SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR` replaces the folder).+pub fn token_path(port: u16) -> Option<PathBuf> {+ let dir = match solidcraft_geom::env::var_os("CONTROL_DIR").filter(|d| !d.is_empty()) {+ Some(d) => PathBuf::from(d),+ None => crate::recovery::data_dir()?.join("control"),+ };+ Some(dir.join(format!("{port}.token")))+}++/// A token set on purpose with `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` (test harnesses, sandboxed packages+/// whose data folder the client can't see), if it is long enough.+pub fn env_token() -> Option<String> {+ solidcraft_geom::env::var("CONTROL_TOKEN").map(|t| t.trim().to_string()).filter(|t| t.len() >= MIN_TOKEN_LEN)+}++/// The token a client sends to the app on `port`: `explicit` (`--token`), else+/// `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN`, else the app's token file.+pub fn client_token(port: u16, explicit: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {+ if let Some(t) = explicit.map(str::trim).filter(|t| !t.is_empty()) {+ return Some(t.to_string());+ }+ if let Some(t) = env_token() {+ return Some(t);+ }+ // Read directly, not through `vfs`: the app's own file, outside any agent's folders.+ let text = std::fs::read_to_string(token_path(port)?).ok().filter(|t| t.len() <= 4096)?;+ Some(text.trim().to_string()).filter(|t| !t.is_empty())+}++/// `a == b`, taking the same time wherever they differ.+pub fn tokens_match(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {+ let (a, b) = (a.as_bytes(), b.as_bytes());+ a.len() == b.len() && a.iter().zip(b).fold(0u8, |acc, (x, y)| acc | (x ^ y)) == 0+}++/// Write `token` to `path`, readable and writable only by the user: the folder is made `0700`+/// and the file `0600` on Unix; on Windows the file's inherited permissions are replaced by one+/// entry for the user (`icacls`) before the token goes in. A file left by an earlier launch is+/// replaced.+pub fn write_token_file(path: &Path, token: &str) -> Result<()> {+ let dir = path.parent().ok_or_else(|| Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "no folder"))?;+ std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;+ let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);+ let mut opts = std::fs::OpenOptions::new();+ opts.write(true).create_new(true);+ #[cfg(unix)]+ {+ use std::os::unix::fs::{OpenOptionsExt, PermissionsExt};+ std::fs::set_permissions(dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))?;+ opts.mode(0o600);+ }+ let mut f = opts.open(path)?;+ #[cfg(windows)]+ restrict_to_user(path)?;+ f.write_all(token.as_bytes())?;+ f.write_all(b"\n")?;+ f.sync_all()+}++/// Windows: drop inherited entries and grant only the current user full access.+#[cfg(windows)]+fn restrict_to_user(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {+ use std::os::windows::process::CommandExt;+ let user = std::env::var("USERNAME").map_err(|_| Error::other("USERNAME is not set"))?;+ let domain = std::env::var("USERDOMAIN").ok().filter(|d| !d.is_empty());+ let who = domain.map_or(user.clone(), |d| format!("{d}\\{user}"));+ let status = std::process::Command::new("icacls")+ .arg(path)+ .args(["/inheritance:r", "/grant:r", &format!("{who}:F")])+ .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())+ .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())+ .creation_flags(0x0800_0000)+ .status()?;+ if status.success() { Ok(()) } else { Err(Error::other(format!("icacls failed to restrict {}", path.display()))) }+}++/// Removes the token file when the app ends.+pub struct TokenFile(pub PathBuf);++impl Drop for TokenFile {+ fn drop(&mut self) {+ let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&self.0);+ }+}++#[cfg(test)]+mod tests {+ use super::*;++ #[test]+ fn tokens_compare_whole() {+ assert!(tokens_match("abc123", "abc123"));+ assert!(!tokens_match("abc123", "abc124"));+ assert!(!tokens_match("abc123", "abc12"));+ assert!(!tokens_match("", "a"));+ }++ /// The token file is the user's alone, and a client reads it back.+ #[cfg(unix)]+ #[test]+ fn the_token_file_is_private_to_the_user() {+ use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;+ let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("solidcraft-control-auth-{}", std::process::id()));+ let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);+ let path = dir.join("control/7878.token");+ std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("control")).unwrap();+ std::fs::write(&path, "stale").unwrap();+ std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644)).unwrap();+ write_token_file(&path, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef").unwrap();+ let mode = |p: &Path| std::fs::metadata(p).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;+ assert_eq!(mode(&path), 0o600);+ assert_eq!(mode(path.parent().unwrap()), 0o700);+ assert_eq!(std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap().trim(), "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");+ drop(TokenFile(path.clone()));+ assert!(!path.exists());+ let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);+ }+}diff --git a/crates/engine/src/lib.rs b/crates/engine/src/lib.rsindex eb7e297ec2..6a1aa4b933 100644--- a/crates/engine/src/lib.rs+++ b/crates/engine/src/lib.rs@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#![forbid(unsafe_code)]pub mod cmd;+pub mod control_auth;pub mod crash;pub mod frames;pub mod fuzz;diff --git a/crates/engine/src/recovery.rs b/crates/engine/src/recovery.rsindex 55adcdee74..1e5c10ddf6 100644--- a/crates/engine/src/recovery.rs+++ b/crates/engine/src/recovery.rs@@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ pub fn default_dir() -> Option<PathBuf> {Some(dir)}+/// SolidCraft's per-user data folder (the recovery folder's parent unless+/// `SOLIDCRAFT_RECOVERY_DIR` moves that): `%LOCALAPPDATA%\SolidCraft`,+/// `~/Library/Application Support/SolidCraft`, or `$XDG_DATA_HOME/solidcraft`+/// (`~/.local/share/solidcraft`).+pub fn data_dir() -> Option<PathBuf> {+ let env = |k: &str| std::env::var_os(k).filter(|d| !d.is_empty()).map(PathBuf::from);+ if cfg!(windows) {+ Some(env("LOCALAPPDATA")?.join("SolidCraft"))+ } else if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {+ Some(env("HOME")?.join("Library/Application Support/SolidCraft"))+ } else {+ Some(env("XDG_DATA_HOME").or_else(|| env("HOME").map(|h| h.join(".local/share")))?.join("solidcraft"))+ }+}+/// The recovery folder under the per-user data `root`, and the folder earlier releases used./// Windows and macOS name the app's folder in title case, other systems in lower case.fn dirs_under(root: &Path, title_case: bool) -> (PathBuf, PathBuf) {diff --git a/crates/mcp/src/backend.rs b/crates/mcp/src/backend.rsindex aa3559d88a..e3811dba31 100644--- a/crates/mcp/src/backend.rs+++ b/crates/mcp/src/backend.rs@@ -31,11 +31,22 @@ pub struct Remote {addr: String,conn: Option<(BufReader<TcpStream>, TcpStream)>,next_id: u64,+ /// The app's control token, sent with every request (docs/control-protocol.md).+ token: Option<String>,}impl Remote {+ /// Connect to the app at `addr`, with its control token found the usual way+ /// (`SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN`, else the app's token file for that port).pub fn connect(addr: &str) -> std::io::Result<Self> {- let mut r = Self { addr: addr.to_string(), conn: None, next_id: 1 };+ Self::connect_with_token(addr, None)+ }++ /// [`Remote::connect`] with the token given (`--token`); `None` finds it the usual way.+ pub fn connect_with_token(addr: &str, token: Option<&str>) -> std::io::Result<Self> {+ let port = addr.rsplit(':').next().and_then(|p| p.parse::<u16>().ok()).unwrap_or(0);+ let token = solidcraft_engine::control_auth::client_token(port, token);+ let mut r = Self { addr: addr.to_string(), conn: None, next_id: 1, token };r.reconnect()?;Ok(r)}@@ -95,7 +106,11 @@ impl Backend for Remote {if let (Some(scope), Some(o)) = (solidcraft_engine::io::vfs::current_scope(), params.as_object_mut()) {o.insert("allow_paths".into(), json!(scope.roots().iter().map(|r| r.to_string_lossy()).collect::<Vec<_>>()));}- let line = json!({"id": id, "method": method, "params": params}).to_string();+ let mut msg = json!({"id": id, "method": method, "params": params});+ if let Some(t) = &self.token {+ msg["token"] = json!(t);+ }+ let line = msg.to_string();let reply = match self.roundtrip(&line) {Ok(r) => r,// One retry on a fresh connection (the app may have restarted).diff --git a/crates/mcp/src/tests.rs b/crates/mcp/src/tests.rsindex 11d9217d43..6666466949 100644--- a/crates/mcp/src/tests.rs+++ b/crates/mcp/src/tests.rs@@ -544,13 +544,17 @@ fn a_bridged_request_carries_the_agents_folders() {let mut line = String::new();BufReader::new(stream.try_clone().unwrap()).read_line(&mut line).unwrap();let req: Value = serde_json::from_str(&line).unwrap();- writeln!(&stream, "{}", json!({"id": req["id"], "ok": true, "result": req["params"]})).unwrap();+ let mut result = req["params"].clone();+ result["sent_token"] = req["token"].clone();+ writeln!(&stream, "{}", json!({"id": req["id"], "ok": true, "result": result})).unwrap();});- let mut b = crate::Remote::connect(&addr).unwrap();+ // The app's control token goes with the request too (#205).+ let mut b = crate::Remote::connect_with_token(&addr, Some("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")).unwrap();let dir = std::fs::canonicalize(std::env::temp_dir()).unwrap();let got = scoped(Some(PathScope::new([dir.clone()])), || crate::Backend::call(&mut b, "engine.execute", json!({"command": "file.new"}))).unwrap();assert_eq!(got["allow_paths"], json!([dir.to_string_lossy()]), "{got}");assert_eq!(got["command"], "file.new");+ assert_eq!(got["sent_token"], "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");echo.join().unwrap();}@@ -862,3 +866,27 @@ fn instructions_name_only_real_tools() {assert!(tools.iter().any(|t| t == name), "the instructions name `{name}`, which is not a tool");}}++/// Tool annotations never understate what a tool may do (#205): `screenshot` writes a file when+/// given a `path`, and `execute`, `batch`, `save`, `export` and `open` can overwrite or delete+/// files, so none of them is read-only and all are destructive and reach the file system.+#[test]+fn tool_annotations_tell_the_whole_truth() {+ let tools = crate::tool_definitions();+ let hints = |name: &str| {+ let t = tools.iter().find(|t| t["name"] == name).unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("no tool {name}"));+ let a = &t["annotations"];+ (a["readOnlyHint"].as_bool().unwrap(), a["destructiveHint"].as_bool().unwrap(), a["openWorldHint"].as_bool().unwrap())+ };+ for name in ["execute", "batch", "save", "export", "open", "screenshot"] {+ assert_eq!(hints(name), (false, true, true), "{name}");+ }+ for name in ["list_commands", "inspect_design", "measure", "body_topology", "crash_reports"] {+ assert_eq!(hints(name), (true, false, false), "{name}");+ }+ assert_eq!(hints("new_design"), (false, true, false));+ for name in ["set_parameter", "undo", "redo"] {+ assert_eq!(hints(name), (false, false, false), "{name}");+ }+ assert!(tools.iter().all(|t| t["annotations"]["readOnlyHint"].is_boolean()), "every tool is annotated");+}diff --git a/crates/mcp/src/tools.rs b/crates/mcp/src/tools.rsindex 498790caf6..1545e23eec 100644--- a/crates/mcp/src/tools.rs+++ b/crates/mcp/src/tools.rs@@ -23,13 +23,33 @@ fn obj(props: Value, required: &[&str]) -> Value {o}-fn tool(name: &str, title: &str, desc: &str, schema: Value, read_only: bool, destructive: bool) -> Value {+/// What a tool may do, for the client's approval prompts (MCP tool annotations). Clients that+/// auto-approve on these hints must not be told less than the truth (#205).+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]+enum Effect {+ /// Only looks.+ ReadOnly,+ /// Changes the design in memory, undoably.+ Edits,+ /// Replaces the design in memory (unsaved changes are lost).+ Replaces,+ /// May read, write, overwrite or delete files on disk (any command, a file path).+ Files,+}++fn tool(name: &str, title: &str, desc: &str, schema: Value, effect: Effect) -> Value {+ let (read_only, destructive, open_world) = match effect {+ Effect::ReadOnly => (true, false, false),+ Effect::Edits => (false, false, false),+ Effect::Replaces => (false, true, false),+ Effect::Files => (false, true, true),+ };json!({"name": name,"title": title,"description": desc,"inputSchema": schema,- "annotations": {"title": title, "readOnlyHint": read_only, "destructiveHint": destructive, "idempotentHint": read_only, "openWorldHint": false},+ "annotations": {"title": title, "readOnlyHint": read_only, "destructiveHint": destructive, "idempotentHint": read_only, "openWorldHint": open_world},})}@@ -49,8 +69,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {substring `filter` over id, label, tab and panel (not the parameter docs, so a command id \finds that command rather than every command whose docs mention it).",obj(json!({"filter": string("Substring to match, e.g. \"sketch\", \"fillet\", \"pattern\"")}), &[]),- true,- false,+ Effect::ReadOnly,),tool("execute",@@ -73,8 +92,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {}),&["command"],),- false,- false,+ Effect::Files,),tool("batch",@@ -95,8 +113,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {}),&["commands"],),- false,- false,+ Effect::Files,),tool("inspect_design",@@ -112,8 +129,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {}),&[],),- true,- false,+ Effect::ReadOnly,),tool("measure",@@ -121,8 +137,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {"Volume (mm³), surface area (mm²), centre of mass, bounding box and face/edge/vertex counts of one body or all \bodies, with totals.",obj(json!({"body": string("Body name (default: all bodies)")}), &[]),- true,- false,+ Effect::ReadOnly,),tool("body_topology",@@ -130,8 +145,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {"The edges (index, midpoint, length, endpoints) and faces (index, area, centroid, plane normal) of a body. Use \an edge midpoint as the [x,y,z] point that picks the edge for fillet and chamfer.",obj(json!({"body": string("Body name, e.g. \"Body1\"")}), &["body"]),- true,- false,+ Effect::ReadOnly,),tool("set_parameter",@@ -148,8 +162,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {}),&["name", "value"],),- false,- false,+ Effect::Edits,),tool("screenshot",@@ -171,8 +184,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {}),&[],),- true,- false,+ Effect::Files,),tool("export",@@ -187,8 +199,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {}),&["path"],),- false,- false,+ Effect::Files,),tool("crash_reports",@@ -205,18 +216,16 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {}),&[],),- true,- false,+ Effect::ReadOnly,),- tool("undo", "Undo", "Undo the last change to the design.", obj(json!({}), &[]), false, false),- tool("redo", "Redo", "Redo the last undone change.", obj(json!({}), &[]), false, false),+ tool("undo", "Undo", "Undo the last change to the design.", obj(json!({}), &[]), Effect::Edits),+ tool("redo", "Redo", "Redo the last undone change.", obj(json!({}), &[]), Effect::Edits),tool("new_design","New design","Start a new, empty design (unsaved changes to the current one are discarded).",obj(json!({"name": string("Design name (default Untitled)")}), &[]),- false,- true,+ Effect::Replaces,),tool("open",@@ -225,8 +234,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {Import base feature) or a 3MF/STL mesh (.3mf/.stl: mesh bodies). Replaces the current design; insert into it \instead with the file.insert_step (STEP) or file.insert_mesh (3MF/STL) commands.",obj(json!({"path": string("Path to a .solidcraft, .step/.stp, .3mf or .stl file")}), &["path"]),- false,- true,+ Effect::Files,),tool("save",@@ -236,8 +244,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {json!({"path": string("Path to save to (default: the current file)"), "format": {"type": "string", "enum": ["container", "json"], "description": "Design encoding (default: JSON for .json, container otherwise)"}}),&[],),- false,- false,+ Effect::Files,),]}diff --git a/docs/control-protocol.md b/docs/control-protocol.mdindex 0df5ea0d18..12a0b52fc1 100644--- a/docs/control-protocol.md+++ b/docs/control-protocol.md@@ -6,6 +6,42 @@ line `{"id": …, "ok": true, "result": …}` or `{"id": …, "ok": false, "errohandled on the UI thread between frames; pointer and keyboard input is injected as real eguievents, one pointer event per frame.+### Token++Every connection must authenticate. At start the app makes a random 256-bit token for this+launch and writes it, as one line of hex, to a file only the user can read:++| System | Token file |+|---|---|+| Linux | `$XDG_DATA_HOME/solidcraft/control/PORT.token` (`~/.local/share/solidcraft/control/PORT.token`) |+| macOS | `~/Library/Application Support/SolidCraft/control/PORT.token` |+| Windows | `%LOCALAPPDATA%\SolidCraft\control\PORT.token` |++On Unix the folder is `0700` and the file `0600`; on Windows the file's inherited permissions are+replaced by a single entry for the user. `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR` moves the folder. The file is+removed when the app exits, and the next launch writes a new token. The token file's path is+printed to stderr at start-up.++The first request on a connection must carry the token as a top-level `"token"` member+(`{"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "params": {}, "token": "…"}`); later requests on the same+connection may leave it out. A first line without the right token is answered with+`{"ok": false, "error": "unauthorized: …"}` and the connection is closed, without running+anything. Tokens are compared in constant time.++`solidcraft-cli mcp --connect 127.0.0.1:PORT` reads the token file for that port by itself+(`--token T` or `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` give one explicitly). For a test harness, or a+sandboxed package whose data folder the client can't see, start the app with+`SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` set to at least 32 hex characters (for example+`openssl rand -hex 32`) and the app uses that token instead of making one; the file is still+written. A one-line client in Python:++```python+token = (Path.home() / ".local/share/solidcraft/control/7878.token").read_text().strip()+sock.sendall((json.dumps({"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "params": {}, "token": token}) + "\n").encode())+```++### Limits+The channel is untrusted input. A request line may be at most 16 MiB; a longer one is answeredwith `{"ok": false, "error": "request too large"}` and the connection is closed, as areconnections that send eight lines that are not JSON. At most 16 connections are served at once@@ -19,9 +55,9 @@ reads, writes or deletes (command paths such as `file.export`'s `path` or `doc.r`dir`, `ui.render`, `ui.screenshot`) must then lie inside one of those folders after `..` andsymlinks are resolved, or the request fails with `… outside the folders this agent may use …`.The app adds its own recovery folder and, when it lies safely inside the home folder and not in-a hidden folder, the open design's folder (whose hidden files stay out of reach). The bridged MCP server sends its folders this way on every request ([mcp.md](mcp.md)). Without-`allow_paths` file paths are not limited, and the channel itself has no authentication beyond-listening on loopback only.+a hidden folder, the open design's folder (whose hidden files stay out of reach). The bridged+MCP server sends its folders this way on every request ([mcp.md](mcp.md)). Without+`allow_paths` file paths are not limited: a client holding the token can do what the user can.## Enginediff --git a/docs/mcp.md b/docs/mcp.mdindex 4978d7f223..1408c3f707 100644--- a/docs/mcp.md+++ b/docs/mcp.md@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ solidcraft --control 7878 &solidcraft-cli mcp --connect 127.0.0.1:7878```+Bridged, the server finds the app's control token in the token file the app wrote for that port+([control-protocol.md](control-protocol.md#token)); `--token T` or `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` give+it explicitly when the app runs in a sandbox whose data folder the server can't see (prefer the+variable: command-line arguments are visible to other users in the process list).+stdout carries only protocol messages; errors go to stderr. Bridged screenshots are written to atemporary file by the app and read back by the server, so both must run on the same machine.@@ -67,6 +72,15 @@ folder of the design open in it, under the same rules, so give absolute paths: aresolves against the app's working folder, not the server's. The app's ownfile dialogs are never limited.+### Tool annotations++Each tool says what it may do, for clients that ask before running tools (or auto-approve on+these hints). `list_commands`, `inspect_design`, `measure`, `body_topology` and `crash_reports`+are read-only. `set_parameter`, `undo` and `redo` change the design undoably. `new_design`+replaces it (destructive). `execute`, `batch`, `open`, `save`, `export` and `screenshot` (whose+`path` writes a file) can read, write, overwrite or delete files: they are not read-only,+`destructiveHint` and `openWorldHint` are true.+### Client configurationClaude Code (project `.mcp.json`, or `claude mcp add solidcraft -- solidcraft-cli mcp`; a setupdiff --git a/docs/releasing.md b/docs/releasing.mdindex ca097582a2..8fce478e02 100644--- a/docs/releasing.md+++ b/docs/releasing.md@@ -98,6 +98,22 @@ new commits were added. An existing tag or published release is never overwritteversion after publication. Do not push the version tag yourself: publishing the draft createsit at the draft's target commit.+## Notes for the next release++Items to carry into the next release's notes (step 3 below), then remove from here:++- **Security (agents and the control channel, [#205](https://github.com/bherbruck/solidcraft/issues/205)).**+ Upgrading is recommended for anyone who drives SolidCraft from an AI agent or runs it with+ `--control` on a shared machine. MCP tool calls now reach files only in the open design's+ folder (inside home, without its hidden files), SolidCraft's recovery folder and folders+ given with `--allow-path`; `..`, symlinks that lead out and Windows UNC, device, stream and+ short-name paths are refused ([#578](https://github.com/bherbruck/solidcraft/pull/578), thanks+ @kravens). `doc.recovery_discard` deletes only real recovery entries. The control port now+ needs a per-launch token from a file only the user can read, so other local users can't drive+ the app; `solidcraft-cli mcp --connect` finds it by itself, other clients must send it (see+ docs/control-protocol.md). MCP tool annotations no longer understate side effects. Reported by+ @CalvinEthos.+## Verify and publishWhen the task authorizes shipping a release, agents should complete these steps withoutdiff --git a/examples/demo/enclosure_mcp.py b/examples/demo/enclosure_mcp.pyindex d8d6277790..1faa2f0c98 100755--- a/examples/demo/enclosure_mcp.py+++ b/examples/demo/enclosure_mcp.py@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import socketimport subprocessimport sysimport time+from pathlib import PathHERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))@@ -63,10 +64,28 @@ class Mcp:self.p.wait(timeout=10)+def control_token(port):+ """The app's control token: SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN, else the token file the app wrote for+ this port (docs/control-protocol.md)."""+ if os.environ.get("SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN"):+ return os.environ["SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN"].strip()+ if os.environ.get("SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR"):+ folder = Path(os.environ["SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR"])+ elif sys.platform == "win32":+ folder = Path(os.environ["LOCALAPPDATA"]) / "SolidCraft" / "control"+ elif sys.platform == "darwin":+ folder = Path.home() / "Library/Application Support/SolidCraft/control"+ else:+ data = os.environ.get("XDG_DATA_HOME") or str(Path.home() / ".local/share")+ folder = Path(data) / "solidcraft" / "control"+ return (folder / f"{port}.token").read_text().strip()++def control(port, method, params=None):"""One request on the app's control channel (camera moves)."""with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port)) as s:- s.sendall((json.dumps({"id": 1, "method": method, "params": params or {}}) + "\n").encode())+ msg = {"id": 1, "method": method, "params": params or {}, "token": control_token(port)}+ s.sendall((json.dumps(msg) + "\n").encode())buf = b""while not buf.endswith(b"\n"):chunk = s.recv(1 << 16)diff --git a/packaging/linux/flatpak-smoke.py b/packaging/linux/flatpak-smoke.pyindex 71a149623c..7b360f73e9 100644--- a/packaging/linux/flatpak-smoke.py+++ b/packaging/linux/flatpak-smoke.py@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ work=$(mktemp -d)export XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$work/config" XDG_DATA_HOME="$work/data" XDG_CACHE_HOME="$work/cache"mkdir -p "$XDG_CONFIG_HOME" "$XDG_DATA_HOME" "$XDG_CACHE_HOME"unset WGPU_BACKEND WGPU_BACKENDS+# The control channel's token (docs/control-protocol.md), set here so this client knows it.+SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN=$(od -An -N32 -tx1 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n')+export SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKENsolidcraft --control 18837 >"$work/app.log" 2>&1 &app=$!cleanup() {@@ -44,7 +47,7 @@ for ((attempt=0; attempt<300; attempt++)); dosleep .1donetest "$ready" = 1-for request in '{"id":1,"method":"ui.inspect","params":{}}' '{"id":2,"method":"engine.execute","params":{"command":"solid.box","params":{"length":30,"width":20,"height":10}}}' '{"id":3,"method":"document.inspect","params":{"measure":true}}'; do+for request in "{\"id\":1,\"method\":\"ui.inspect\",\"params\":{},\"token\":\"$SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN\"}" '{"id":2,"method":"engine.execute","params":{"command":"solid.box","params":{"length":30,"width":20,"height":10}}}' '{"id":3,"method":"document.inspect","params":{"measure":true}}'; doprintf '%s\n' "$request" >&3IFS= read -r -t 30 reply <&3printf '%s\n' "$reply"diff --git a/packaging/linux/snap-smoke.py b/packaging/linux/snap-smoke.pyindex c910296b04..1e249198ea 100755--- a/packaging/linux/snap-smoke.py+++ b/packaging/linux/snap-smoke.py@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import signalimport socketimport subprocessimport sys+import secretsimport tempfileimport time@@ -26,8 +27,10 @@ flatpak_smoke = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)_spec.loader.exec_module(flatpak_smoke)PORTS = {"x11": 18839, "wayland": 18840}+# The control channel's token (docs/control-protocol.md), given to the app so this client knows it.+TOKEN = secrets.token_hex(32)REQUESTS = [- {"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "params": {}},+ {"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "params": {}, "token": TOKEN},{"id": 2, "method": "engine.execute","params": {"command": "solid.box", "params": {"length": 30, "width": 20, "height": 10}}},{"id": 3, "method": "document.inspect", "params": {"measure": True}},@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ def run_backend(backend, out):runtime = Path(f"/run/user/{os.getuid()}")if not runtime.is_dir():raise RuntimeError(f"{runtime} is missing: snaps expect the login session's runtime directory")- env = dict(os.environ, XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=str(runtime))+ env = dict(os.environ, XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=str(runtime), SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN=TOKEN)for name in ("WAYLAND_DISPLAY", "WAYLAND_SOCKET", "DISPLAY", "SOLIDCRAFT_WAYLAND", "SOLVECRAFT_WAYLAND"):env.pop(name, None)# The snap can write to the (non-hidden) home folder, not to the host's /tmp.