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Speakr is a personal, self-hosted web application designed for transcribing audio recordings

Python

Set baseline security headers and a Content-Security-Policy at the app level, and vendor Chart.js locally so the admin dashboard no longer loads it from a third-party CDN

Murtaza Nasir2948059bc73f
diff --git a/scripts/download_offline_deps.py b/scripts/download_offline_deps.py
index 67c81cdd..80f7f187 100644
--- a/scripts/download_offline_deps.py
+++ b/scripts/download_offline_deps.py
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ DEPENDENCIES = {
"marked.min.js": "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/marked/marked.min.js",
"easymde.min.js": "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/easymde/dist/easymde.min.js",
"axios.min.js": "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/axios/dist/axios.min.js",
+ "chart.umd.min.js": "https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/chart.umd.min.js",
}
}
diff --git a/src/app.py b/src/app.py
index 4211ccf3..d9620b09 100644
--- a/src/app.py
+++ b/src/app.py
@@ -428,6 +428,44 @@ app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = (
)
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True # Still protect against XSS
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = 'Lax' # CSRF protection
+
+# --- Security response headers ---
+# Set at the app level so a deployment WITHOUT a hardening reverse proxy is
+# still protected (previously the app set only X-Robots-Tag, leaving direct /
+# plain-proxy deployments with no clickjacking, MIME-sniffing, or CSP defense).
+# All are `setdefault`-applied in add_security_headers so an operator's proxy
+# can still override them.
+#
+# CSP note: the frontend loads Vue's full build (in-DOM template compiler, so
+# script execution needs 'unsafe-eval') and bootstraps from inline <script>
+# blocks in every template ('unsafe-inline'), so the script-src cannot be
+# locked down without a frontend build step that precompiles templates and
+# adds per-response nonces. The policy still meaningfully constrains object-src,
+# base-uri, form-action, frame-ancestors, and the connect/img/media/font
+# origins. Override the whole policy via CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY, or disable
+# the block with SECURITY_HEADERS_ENABLED=false.
+SECURITY_HEADERS_ENABLED = os.environ.get('SECURITY_HEADERS_ENABLED', 'true').lower() == 'true'
+_DEFAULT_CSP = (
+ "default-src 'self'; "
+ "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; "
+ "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
+ "img-src 'self' data: blob:; "
+ "media-src 'self' blob: data:; "
+ "font-src 'self' data:; "
+ "connect-src 'self'; "
+ "worker-src 'self' blob:; "
+ "manifest-src 'self'; "
+ "object-src 'none'; "
+ "base-uri 'self'; "
+ "form-action 'self'; "
+ "frame-ancestors 'self'"
+)
+CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY = os.environ.get('CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY', _DEFAULT_CSP).strip()
+# HSTS is only meaningful (and only emitted) over HTTPS. Configurable so
+# operators terminating TLS elsewhere can tune or disable it.
+HSTS_HEADER_VALUE = os.environ.get(
+ 'HSTS_HEADER', 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains'
+).strip()
if app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE']:
app.logger.info("Session cookies marked Secure (HTTPS-only)")
else:
@@ -780,6 +818,30 @@ def add_no_crawl_headers(response):
response.headers['X-Robots-Tag'] = 'noindex, nofollow, noarchive, nosnippet, noimageindex'
return response
+
+def add_security_headers(response):
+ """Set baseline security headers so the app is safe even without a
+ hardening reverse proxy. Uses setdefault so a proxy that already sets a
+ header wins (no duplicates). See the SECURITY_HEADERS config block above.
+ """
+ if not SECURITY_HEADERS_ENABLED:
+ return response
+ response.headers.setdefault('X-Frame-Options', 'SAMEORIGIN')
+ response.headers.setdefault('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff')
+ response.headers.setdefault('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin')
+ # Deny sensors the app never uses; allow mic + screen capture (recording).
+ response.headers.setdefault(
+ 'Permissions-Policy',
+ 'geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=(self), display-capture=(self), interest-cohort=()'
+ )
+ if CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY:
+ response.headers.setdefault('Content-Security-Policy', CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY)
+ # HSTS only over HTTPS (request.is_secure reflects X-Forwarded-Proto via ProxyFix).
+ if HSTS_HEADER_VALUE and request.is_secure:
+ response.headers.setdefault('Strict-Transport-Security', HSTS_HEADER_VALUE)
+ return response
+
# --- No-Crawl System: Serve robots.txt ---
@app.route('/robots.txt')
def robots_txt():
diff --git a/templates/admin.html b/templates/admin.html
index 2aa7a4c1..2e46853d 100644
--- a/templates/admin.html
+++ b/templates/admin.html
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
<script src="{{ url_for('static', filename='vendor/js/tailwind.min.js') }}"></script>
<!-- All dependencies bundled locally for offline support -->
<script src="{{ url_for('static', filename='vendor/js/vue.global.js') }}"></script>
-<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/chart.umd.min.js"></script>
+<script src="{{ url_for('static', filename='vendor/js/chart.umd.min.js') }}"></script>
<!-- All dependencies bundled locally for offline support -->
<link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ url_for('static', filename='vendor/css/fontawesome.min.css') }}">
<link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ url_for('static', filename='css/styles.css') }}">
diff --git a/tests/test_security_headers.py b/tests/test_security_headers.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..32b7bda0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_security_headers.py
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+"""The app must set baseline security headers itself, so deployments without
+a hardening reverse proxy are still protected. Previously only X-Robots-Tag
+was set, leaving direct/plain-proxy installs with no clickjacking, MIME-sniff,
+or CSP defense.
+"""
+
+import os
+import sys
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
+
+from src.app import app
+
+
+def _headers(path='/login', secure=False):
+ client = app.test_client()
+ env = {'HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO': 'https'} if secure else {}
+ return client.get(path, environ_overrides=env).headers
+
+
+def test_clickjacking_and_mime_headers_present():
+ h = _headers()
+ assert h.get('X-Frame-Options') == 'SAMEORIGIN'
+ assert h.get('X-Content-Type-Options') == 'nosniff'
+ assert h.get('Referrer-Policy') == 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin'
+ assert 'Permissions-Policy' in h
+
+
+def test_csp_present_and_locks_dangerous_directives():
+ csp = _headers().get('Content-Security-Policy', '')
+ assert csp, 'CSP header missing'
+ # These are the directives that add value even with the unavoidable
+ # 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval' on scripts (Vue runtime compiler).
+ assert "object-src 'none'" in csp
+ assert "base-uri 'self'" in csp
+ assert "form-action 'self'" in csp
+ assert "frame-ancestors 'self'" in csp
+ assert "default-src 'self'" in csp
+
+
+def test_hsts_only_over_https():
+ assert 'Strict-Transport-Security' not in _headers(secure=False)
+ assert 'Strict-Transport-Security' in _headers(secure=True)
+
+
+def test_permissions_policy_allows_mic_denies_geolocation():
+ pp = _headers().get('Permissions-Policy', '')
+ assert 'microphone=(self)' in pp
+ assert 'geolocation=()' in pp