Speakr is a personal, self-hosted web application designed for transcribing audio recordings
Python
Make password-reset tokens single-use by binding verification to the stored token, invalidate outstanding reset links on password change, and drop the dead secondary signing-key fallback
Murtaza Nasir8e90f5892930
diff --git a/src/api/auth.py b/src/api/auth.pyindex 42ac1059..9e60329a 100644--- a/src/api/auth.py+++ b/src/api/auth.py@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ This blueprint handles user registration, login, logout, account management,and password changes."""+import hmacimport osimport reimport mimetypes@@ -526,6 +527,16 @@ def reset_password(token):flash('User not found.', 'danger')return redirect(url_for('auth.forgot_password'))+ # Single-use enforcement: the itsdangerous token is only signature+expiry+ # checked, so on its own it stays replayable for the whole TTL even after+ # it has been used or superseded. Bind it to the token currently stored on+ # the user: a used token (cleared on reset) or one superseded by a newer+ # reset request no longer matches and is rejected immediately.+ stored_token = user.password_reset_token or ''+ if not stored_token or not hmac.compare_digest(stored_token, token):+ flash('The password reset link is invalid or has expired.', 'danger')+ return redirect(url_for('auth.forgot_password'))+if request.method == 'POST':password = request.form.get('password')confirm_password = request.form.get('confirm_password')@@ -870,6 +881,10 @@ def change_password():# Update passwordhashed_password = bcrypt.generate_password_hash(new_password).decode('utf-8')current_user.password = hashed_password+ # Invalidate any outstanding password-reset link: a deliberate change must+ # not leave an emailed reset token able to overwrite the new password.+ current_user.password_reset_token = None+ current_user.password_reset_sent_at = Nonedb.session.commit()flash('Your password has been updated!', 'success')diff --git a/src/services/email.py b/src/services/email.pyindex a5f84d0d..e1e6d410 100644--- a/src/services/email.py+++ b/src/services/email.py@@ -57,9 +57,13 @@ def is_smtp_configured() -> bool:def get_serializer(salt: str) -> URLSafeTimedSerializer:- """Get a URL-safe timed serializer for token generation."""- secret_key = current_app.config.get('SECRET_KEY', 'default-dev-key')- return URLSafeTimedSerializer(secret_key, salt=salt)+ """Get a URL-safe timed serializer for token generation.++ SECRET_KEY is guaranteed set (and never the insecure default) by the+ startup guard in src/app.py, so no fallback is needed here — a fallback+ would only reintroduce a weak, forgeable signing key.+ """+ return URLSafeTimedSerializer(current_app.config['SECRET_KEY'], salt=salt)def generate_verification_token(user_id: int) -> str:diff --git a/tests/test_password_reset_single_use.py b/tests/test_password_reset_single_use.pynew file mode 100644index 00000000..1cf8ac5f--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/test_password_reset_single_use.py@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@+"""Password-reset tokens must be single-use and invalidated on supersede /+password change. Previously the itsdangerous token was only signature+expiry+checked, so a leaked link kept working for the full 1h TTL even after it had+been used or the password had already been changed.+"""++import os+import sys+import uuid++sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))++from src.app import app, db, bcrypt+from src.models import User+from src.services.email import generate_password_reset_token++app.config['WTF_CSRF_ENABLED'] = False+++def _make_user():+ suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]+ u = User(username=f'reset_{suffix}', email=f'reset_{suffix}@local.test',+ password=bcrypt.generate_password_hash('OldPassw0rd!').decode())+ db.session.add(u)+ db.session.commit()+ return u+++def _issue_token(user):+ token = generate_password_reset_token(user.id)+ user.password_reset_token = token+ db.session.commit()+ return token+++def test_valid_token_resets_password_once():+ with app.app_context():+ user = _make_user()+ token = _issue_token(user)+ client = app.test_client()++ r = client.post(f'/reset-password/{token}',+ data={'password': 'NewPassw0rd!', 'confirm_password': 'NewPassw0rd!'},+ follow_redirects=False)+ assert r.status_code in (200, 302)+ db.session.refresh(user)+ assert bcrypt.check_password_hash(user.password, 'NewPassw0rd!')+ assert user.password_reset_token is None # cleared on use++ # Reuse of the same token must now fail (password unchanged).+ r2 = client.post(f'/reset-password/{token}',+ data={'password': 'Attacker1!', 'confirm_password': 'Attacker1!'},+ follow_redirects=False)+ db.session.refresh(user)+ assert not bcrypt.check_password_hash(user.password, 'Attacker1!')+ assert bcrypt.check_password_hash(user.password, 'NewPassw0rd!')++ db.session.delete(user)+ db.session.commit()+++def test_superseded_token_is_rejected():+ # A validly-signed older token that no longer matches the token currently+ # stored on the user (a newer reset request replaced it) must be rejected.+ # itsdangerous emits identical tokens within the same second, so we model+ # the supersede by storing a distinct current token directly rather than+ # racing the clock.+ with app.app_context():+ user = _make_user()+ old_token = generate_password_reset_token(user.id) # validly signed+ user.password_reset_token = old_token + 'SUPERSEDED' # newer stored token differs+ db.session.commit()+ client = app.test_client()++ r = client.post(f'/reset-password/{old_token}',+ data={'password': 'ViaOld1!', 'confirm_password': 'ViaOld1!'},+ follow_redirects=False)+ db.session.refresh(user)+ assert not bcrypt.check_password_hash(user.password, 'ViaOld1!')++ db.session.delete(user)+ db.session.commit()+++def test_token_with_no_stored_counterpart_is_rejected():+ with app.app_context():+ user = _make_user()+ # A validly-signed token, but nothing stored on the user (never+ # requested, or already cleared).+ token = generate_password_reset_token(user.id)+ user.password_reset_token = None+ db.session.commit()+ client = app.test_client()++ r = client.post(f'/reset-password/{token}',+ data={'password': 'NoStore1!', 'confirm_password': 'NoStore1!'},+ follow_redirects=False)+ db.session.refresh(user)+ assert not bcrypt.check_password_hash(user.password, 'NoStore1!')++ db.session.delete(user)+ db.session.commit()