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Harden command registration path handling (#3088)

Manfred Riem902f5431f9f3
diff --git a/src/specify_cli/_utils.py b/src/specify_cli/_utils.py
index 30c59f553..d921e591d 100644
--- a/src/specify_cli/_utils.py
+++ b/src/specify_cli/_utils.py
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import stat
import subprocess
import tempfile
import yaml
-from pathlib import Path
+from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath, PureWindowsPath
from typing import Any
from ._console import console
@@ -17,6 +17,44 @@ CLAUDE_LOCAL_PATH = Path.home() / ".claude" / "local" / "claude"
CLAUDE_NPM_LOCAL_PATH = Path.home() / ".claude" / "local" / "node_modules" / ".bin" / "claude"
+def relative_extension_path_violation(value: Any) -> str | None:
+ """Return why ``value`` is unsafe as an extension-relative ``file`` path.
+
+ Single source of truth for the path-safety policy shared by
+ ``ExtensionManifest._validate()`` (manifest-load validation) and
+ ``CommandRegistrar.register_commands()`` (runtime guard), so the two cannot
+ drift. Returns a human-readable reason string when ``value`` is unsafe, or
+ ``None`` when it is an acceptable relative path within the extension
+ directory.
+
+ Policy: the value must be a non-empty string with no leading/trailing
+ whitespace, no absolute/anchored form, and no ``..`` traversal. The value is
+ evaluated under both POSIX and Windows path semantics because a native
+ ``Path`` is OS-dependent (a ``PurePosixPath`` on POSIX does not interpret
+ Windows drive/UNC forms, and ``C:foo`` is anchored but not ``is_absolute()``
+ yet resolves against the CWD on its drive). Rejecting any non-empty anchor
+ covers POSIX-absolute (``/abs``), Windows drive-relative (``C:foo``), Windows
+ absolute (``C:\\foo``), and UNC/rooted forms.
+ """
+ if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
+ return "must be a non-empty string"
+ if value.strip() != value:
+ return "must not have leading or trailing whitespace"
+ posix_path = PurePosixPath(value)
+ win_path = PureWindowsPath(value)
+ if (
+ posix_path.anchor
+ or win_path.anchor
+ or ".." in posix_path.parts
+ or ".." in win_path.parts
+ ):
+ return (
+ "must be a relative path within the extension directory "
+ "(no absolute paths, drive letters, or '..' segments)"
+ )
+ return None
+
+
def dump_frontmatter(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
"""Serialize skill/command frontmatter to a YAML string.
diff --git a/src/specify_cli/agents.py b/src/specify_cli/agents.py
index be9859bd0..0fd643773 100644
--- a/src/specify_cli/agents.py
+++ b/src/specify_cli/agents.py
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
import yaml
from ._init_options import is_ai_skills_enabled, load_init_options
+from ._utils import relative_extension_path_violation
def _build_agent_configs() -> dict[str, Any]:
@@ -567,17 +568,42 @@ class CommandRegistrar:
registered = []
is_cline_ext = agent_name == "cline" and source_id != "core"
+ source_root = source_dir.resolve()
for cmd_info in commands:
cmd_name = cmd_info["name"]
aliases = cmd_info.get("aliases", [])
cmd_file = cmd_info["file"]
- source_file = source_dir / cmd_file
- if not source_file.exists():
+ # Guard against path traversal using the single shared policy in
+ # relative_extension_path_violation(), so the runtime guard stays
+ # aligned with ExtensionManifest._validate() and the skill/preset
+ # readers. Skip a malformed/unsafe ``file`` (non-string, empty,
+ # whitespace, absolute/anchored, or ``..`` traversal); the
+ # resolve()/relative_to() check below is the final containment
+ # backstop.
+ if relative_extension_path_violation(cmd_file):
+ continue
+ try:
+ source_file = (source_root / cmd_file).resolve()
+ source_file.relative_to(source_root) # raises ValueError if outside
+ except (OSError, ValueError):
+ continue
+
+ if not source_file.is_file():
continue
- content = source_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+ try:
+ content = source_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+ except (OSError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
+ import warnings
+
+ warnings.warn(
+ f"Skipping command '{cmd_name}': could not read source file "
+ f"'{cmd_file}' ({exc.__class__.__name__}: {exc}).",
+ stacklevel=2,
+ )
+ continue
frontmatter, body = self.parse_frontmatter(content)
if frontmatter.get("strategy") == "wrap":
diff --git a/src/specify_cli/extensions.py b/src/specify_cli/extensions.py
index 7efd5b424..72d1e66e9 100644
--- a/src/specify_cli/extensions.py
+++ b/src/specify_cli/extensions.py
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ from packaging.specifiers import InvalidSpecifier, SpecifierSet
from ._init_options import is_ai_skills_enabled
from ._invocation_style import is_slash_skills_agent
-from ._utils import dump_frontmatter
+from ._utils import dump_frontmatter, relative_extension_path_violation
from .catalogs import CatalogEntry as BaseCatalogEntry
from .catalogs import CatalogStackBase
@@ -290,6 +290,18 @@ class ExtensionManifest:
if "name" not in cmd or "file" not in cmd:
raise ValidationError("Command missing 'name' or 'file'")
+ # Validate the 'file' field at manifest-load time using the single
+ # shared policy in relative_extension_path_violation(), so manifest
+ # validation cannot drift from the runtime registrar guard. This is
+ # defense-in-depth: the command/skill/preset readers also contain
+ # the resolved path, but rejecting an unsafe value here surfaces a
+ # clear error instead of silently skipping the command.
+ cmd_file = cmd["file"]
+ reason = relative_extension_path_violation(cmd_file)
+ if reason:
+ label = repr(cmd_file) if isinstance(cmd_file, str) else f"for command '{cmd.get('name')}'"
+ raise ValidationError(f"Invalid command 'file' {label}: {reason}")
+
# Validate command name format
if not EXTENSION_COMMAND_NAME_PATTERN.match(cmd["name"]):
corrected = self._try_correct_command_name(cmd["name"], ext["id"])
diff --git a/tests/test_extensions.py b/tests/test_extensions.py
index e063571b1..9cf0167ce 100644
--- a/tests/test_extensions.py
+++ b/tests/test_extensions.py
@@ -377,6 +377,40 @@ class TestExtensionManifest:
with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="Invalid command name"):
ExtensionManifest(manifest_path)
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "bad_file",
+ ["../../../outside.md", "../escape.md", "a/../../escape.md", "/abs/outside.md", "C:escape.md", "C:\\Windows\\x.md", "..\\..\\escape.md"],
+ )
+ def test_command_file_traversal_rejected(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data, bad_file):
+ """Manifest 'file' field with traversal/absolute path raises ValidationError.
+
+ Defense-in-depth for GHSA-w5fv-7w9x-7fc5.
+ """
+ import yaml
+
+ valid_manifest_data["provides"]["commands"][0]["file"] = bad_file
+
+ manifest_path = temp_dir / "extension.yml"
+ with open(manifest_path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
+ yaml.safe_dump(valid_manifest_data, f)
+
+ with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="Invalid command 'file'"):
+ ExtensionManifest(manifest_path)
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_file", [" commands/hello.md", "commands/hello.md ", "\tcommands/hello.md"])
+ def test_command_file_whitespace_rejected(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data, bad_file):
+ """Manifest 'file' with leading/trailing whitespace raises ValidationError."""
+ import yaml
+
+ valid_manifest_data["provides"]["commands"][0]["file"] = bad_file
+
+ manifest_path = temp_dir / "extension.yml"
+ with open(manifest_path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f:
+ yaml.safe_dump(valid_manifest_data, f)
+
+ with pytest.raises(ValidationError, match="leading or trailing whitespace"):
+ ExtensionManifest(manifest_path)
+
def test_command_name_autocorrect_speckit_prefix(self, temp_dir, valid_manifest_data):
"""Test that 'speckit.command' is auto-corrected to 'speckit.{ext_id}.command'."""
import yaml
diff --git a/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py b/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py
index fc423b405..1f97a98d8 100644
--- a/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py
+++ b/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from specify_cli.agents import CommandRegistrar
+from specify_cli._utils import relative_extension_path_violation
TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS = [
@@ -135,8 +136,185 @@ class TestCopilotPromptTraversal:
_assert_no_stray_files(tmp_path, Path(bad_name).name.replace("/", ""))
-class TestSafeRegistration:
- """Positive regression β€” well-formed names continue to register."""
+ABS_OUTSIDE = "__ABS_OUTSIDE__"
+
+FILE_FIELD_PAYLOADS = [
+ "../outside.txt",
+ "../../outside.txt",
+ "commands/../../outside.txt",
+ "C:outside.txt",
+ ABS_OUTSIDE,
+]
+
+
+def _resolve_payload(bad_file: str, outside_file: Path) -> str:
+ """Map the absolute-path sentinel to the real, existing outside file.
+
+ Using the temp file's own absolute path (instead of ``/etc/passwd``)
+ guarantees the file exists on every platform β€” so the test fails if the
+ absolute-path guard regresses, rather than passing because the target
+ happens not to exist (e.g. on Windows runners).
+ """
+ return str(outside_file) if bad_file == ABS_OUTSIDE else bad_file
+
+
+def _assert_no_marker_leak(project: Path, marker: str) -> None:
+ """Fail if ``marker`` content was written into any file under ``project``."""
+ leaked = [
+ p for p in project.rglob("*")
+ if p.is_file() and marker in p.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
+ ]
+ assert leaked == [], f"Outside file leaked into generated command: {leaked}"
+
+
+class TestCommandFileTraversal:
+ """The manifest ``file`` field must not read files outside source_dir.
+
+ Regression for GHSA-w5fv-7w9x-7fc5: ``register_commands`` read
+ ``source_dir / cmd_file`` with no containment check, so a manifest with
+ a traversal (``file: ../../../outside.txt``) or an absolute path read an
+ arbitrary host file verbatim into the generated agent command.
+ """
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_file", FILE_FIELD_PAYLOADS)
+ def test_claude_skips_traversal_in_file_field(self, tmp_path, bad_file):
+ project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
+ (project / ".claude" / "skills").mkdir(parents=True)
+
+ outside_file = tmp_path / "outside.txt"
+ outside_file.write_text("OUTSIDE-FILE-MARKER", encoding="utf-8")
+
+ registrar = CommandRegistrar()
+ registered = registrar.register_commands(
+ "claude",
+ [{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": _resolve_payload(bad_file, outside_file), "aliases": []}],
+ "myext",
+ ext_dir,
+ project,
+ )
+
+ assert registered == []
+ _assert_no_marker_leak(project, "OUTSIDE-FILE-MARKER")
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_file", FILE_FIELD_PAYLOADS)
+ def test_gemini_skips_traversal_in_file_field(self, tmp_path, bad_file):
+ project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
+ (project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
+
+ outside_file = tmp_path / "outside.txt"
+ outside_file.write_text("OUTSIDE-FILE-MARKER", encoding="utf-8")
+
+ registrar = CommandRegistrar()
+ registered = registrar.register_commands(
+ "gemini",
+ [{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": _resolve_payload(bad_file, outside_file), "aliases": []}],
+ "myext",
+ ext_dir,
+ project,
+ )
+
+ assert registered == []
+ _assert_no_marker_leak(project, "OUTSIDE-FILE-MARKER")
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_value", [None, 123, "", ["x"]])
+ def test_non_string_file_is_skipped(self, tmp_path, bad_value):
+ """A non-string/empty ``file`` must be skipped, not raise TypeError."""
+ project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
+ (project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
+
+ registrar = CommandRegistrar()
+ registered = registrar.register_commands(
+ "gemini",
+ [{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": bad_value, "aliases": []}],
+ "myext",
+ ext_dir,
+ project,
+ )
+
+ assert registered == []
+
+ def test_dotdot_rejected_even_when_target_is_in_bounds(self, tmp_path):
+ """An in-bounds ``..`` payload is rejected by the ``..`` check itself.
+
+ ``commands/../cmd.md`` resolves to ``ext_dir/cmd.md`` β€” inside
+ source_dir β€” so the resolve()/relative_to() containment backstop would
+ allow it. Creating that target file ensures the command is skipped
+ because of the ``..`` rejection, not merely because the file is absent.
+ """
+ project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
+ (project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
+ (ext_dir / "cmd.md").write_text(
+ "---\ndescription: test\n---\n\nbody\n", encoding="utf-8"
+ )
+
+ registrar = CommandRegistrar()
+ registered = registrar.register_commands(
+ "gemini",
+ [{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": "commands/../cmd.md", "aliases": []}],
+ "myext",
+ ext_dir,
+ project,
+ )
+
+ assert registered == []
+
+
+class TestRelativeExtensionPathPolicy:
+ """Unit tests for the shared ``relative_extension_path_violation`` policy."""
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "value",
+ [
+ "commands/hello.md",
+ "hello.md",
+ "a/b/c/hello.md",
+ ],
+ )
+ def test_safe_relative_paths_have_no_violation(self, value):
+ assert relative_extension_path_violation(value) is None
+
+ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+ "value",
+ [
+ None,
+ 123,
+ ["x"],
+ "",
+ " ",
+ " hello.md",
+ "hello.md ",
+ "/abs/outside.md",
+ "/etc/passwd",
+ "C:foo.md",
+ "C:\\Windows\\system32",
+ "\\\\server\\share\\x.md",
+ "../escape.md",
+ "commands/../../escape.md",
+ ],
+ )
+ def test_unsafe_values_report_violation(self, value):
+ assert relative_extension_path_violation(value) is not None
+
+
+class TestReadSkipWarning:
+ """Unregisterable but in-bounds files warn instead of failing silently."""
+
+ def test_unreadable_target_warns_and_skips(self, tmp_path):
+ project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
+ (project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
+ (ext_dir / "cmd.md").write_bytes(b"\xff\xfe\x00\x80bad")
+
+ registrar = CommandRegistrar()
+ with pytest.warns(UserWarning):
+ registered = registrar.register_commands(
+ "gemini",
+ [{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": "cmd.md", "aliases": []}],
+ "myext",
+ ext_dir,
+ project,
+ )
+
+ assert registered == []
def test_symlinked_subdir_under_commands_dir_is_preserved(self, tmp_path):
"""Lexical check must not block legitimately symlinked sub-directories.