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Fix: a read-only agent reached three guards written for people
Damian Legawiec99611ef6f91e
diff --git a/spree/api/app/controllers/concerns/spree/api/v3/scoped_authorization.rb b/spree/api/app/controllers/concerns/spree/api/v3/scoped_authorization.rbindex abe192f2ef..d087974e33 100644--- a/spree/api/app/controllers/concerns/spree/api/v3/scoped_authorization.rb+++ b/spree/api/app/controllers/concerns/spree/api/v3/scoped_authorization.rb@@ -98,7 +98,17 @@ module Spree# A `jwt_only` skip exempts the JWT/publishable principal we now know# this is (no secret key resolved) — shell data the dashboard reads# without a specific scope.- return if scope_check_skipped_for_action? && self.class._scope_check_skip_jwt_only+ #+ # Not a delegated credential, though. The exemption exists because+ # a signed-in staff member is already bounded by their role, and an+ # OAuth grant is bounded by something narrower that this would skip+ # — it carries no API key, so it was taking the human's exemption+ # and reading settings its scopes never covered.+ if scope_check_skipped_for_action? && self.class._scope_check_skip_jwt_only+ return if current_oauth_token.blank?++ return authorize_staff_permission!+ end# JWT staff pass through the same key gate as secret keys: their# roles' catalog keys play the role scopes play for keys, so bothdiff --git a/spree/api/app/controllers/spree/api/v3/admin/me_controller.rb b/spree/api/app/controllers/spree/api/v3/admin/me_controller.rbindex aff7e6ff52..dab44bcc30 100644--- a/spree/api/app/controllers/spree/api/v3/admin/me_controller.rb+++ b/spree/api/app/controllers/spree/api/v3/admin/me_controller.rb@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ module Spree# *other* users. `avatar_signed_id` takes a signed id from# POST /files to set the photo, or `null` to remove it.def update+ return refuse_delegated_write if current_oauth_token.present?+if current_user.update(permitted_params)render json: me_responseelse@@ -54,6 +56,20 @@ module Spreeprivate+ # A grant acts *for* a staff member, not *as* one. This action is+ # unguarded because it was only ever the person at the keyboard+ # editing their own profile — but a delegated credential reaches it+ # too, and the name it could rewrite is the one audit trails show+ # as the actor. There is no catalog permission for "edit my own+ # profile", so the answer is that an agent has no business here.+ def refuse_delegated_write+ render_error(+ code: Spree::Api::V3::ErrorHandler::ERROR_CODES[:access_denied],+ message: 'A connected agent cannot change the profile of the person who connected it.',+ status: :forbidden+ )+ end+# A request authenticated by a secret API key has no Spree user to# describe/update, so it gets a 404 pointing at the key endpoint# rather than a 500 from a nil user — mirroring ApiKeysController#current.@@ -82,11 +98,15 @@ module Spreeparams.permit(*declared_permitted_attributes)end+ # What this credential may do, which is not always what its owner+ # may do: a grant narrows the approver's role, so reporting the+ # role would both disclose more than was handed over and mislead a+ # client that reads /me to decide what to attempt.def me_response{user: admin_user_serializer.new(current_user, params: serializer_params).to_h,permissions: serialize_permissions(current_ability),- permission_keys: serialize_permission_keys(current_ability)+ permission_keys: staff_permission_keys}enddiff --git a/spree/api/app/controllers/spree/api/v3/admin/tags_controller.rb b/spree/api/app/controllers/spree/api/v3/admin/tags_controller.rbindex 0abbc68177..66d6c0bb1e 100644--- a/spree/api/app/controllers/spree/api/v3/admin/tags_controller.rb+++ b/spree/api/app/controllers/spree/api/v3/admin/tags_controller.rb@@ -82,18 +82,21 @@ module Spreeend# Per-type scope check for API-key principals: a key listing product- # tags needs `read_products`, order tags `read_orders`, etc. JWT- # admins are gated by store membership + CanCanCan, not scopes.+ # tags needs `read_products`, order tags `read_orders`, etc.+ #+ # Asked of the credential, not of its kind: an OAuth grant carries+ # no API key, so a check that began `return unless current_api_key`+ # skipped itself entirely and handed an agent every order and+ # customer tag the approver could see.def authorize_taggable_scope!- return unless current_api_keyreturn unless taggable_typerequired = self.class.scope_for_taggable_type.fetch(taggable_type, 'read_all')- return if current_api_key.has_scope?(required)+ return if holds_permission?(required)render_error(code: Spree::Api::V3::ErrorHandler::ERROR_CODES[:access_denied],- message: "API key lacks scope: #{required}",+ message: "Missing permission: #{required}",status: :forbidden,details: { required_scope: required })diff --git a/spree/api/spec/requests/spree/api/v3/admin/oauth_access_spec.rb b/spree/api/spec/requests/spree/api/v3/admin/oauth_access_spec.rbindex 041f233ac8..d84bfac6c6 100644--- a/spree/api/spec/requests/spree/api/v3/admin/oauth_access_spec.rb+++ b/spree/api/spec/requests/spree/api/v3/admin/oauth_access_spec.rb@@ -156,6 +156,61 @@ RSpec.describe 'Admin API OAuth access', type: :request do# RFC 8707: a token names the resources it may be used against. A client# that asked for one endpoint must not receive a credential good across the# rest of the API.+ # A grant authenticates AS the staff member who approved it, so every+ # guard written for "a human at the dashboard" now answers for an agent+ # too. These three asked what kind of credential had arrived instead of+ # what it held, and a read-only grant walked through all of them.+ describe 'a guard that was written before delegated credentials existed' do+ let(:read_only) { token_for('read_products', resource: '/api/v3/admin') }++ it 'refuses to let an agent rewrite the profile of the person who connected it' do+ patch '/api/v3/admin/me',+ params: { first_name: 'PWNED' }.to_json,+ headers: { 'Authorization' => "Bearer #{read_only}", 'CONTENT_TYPE' => 'application/json' }++ expect(response).to have_http_status(:forbidden)+ expect(admin.reload.first_name).not_to eq('PWNED')+ end++ # The tag list is per taggable type, and its check began+ # `return unless current_api_key` — which an OAuth request never has.+ it 'refuses order tags to a grant that holds no read_orders' do+ get_with(read_only, '/api/v3/admin/tags?taggable_type=order')++ expect(response).to have_http_status(:forbidden)+ end++ it 'allows them to a grant that does' do+ get_with(token_for('read_orders', resource: '/api/v3/admin'),+ '/api/v3/admin/tags?taggable_type=order')++ expect(response).to have_http_status(:ok)+ end++ # `jwt_only` exempts a signed-in staff member from the scope gate because+ # their role already bounds them. A grant is bounded by something+ # narrower, and was taking the exemption.+ it 'refuses store settings to a grant that holds no read_settings' do+ get_with(read_only, '/api/v3/admin/store')++ expect(response).to have_http_status(:forbidden)+ end++ it 'allows them to a grant that does' do+ get_with(token_for('read_settings', resource: '/api/v3/admin'), '/api/v3/admin/store')++ expect(response).to have_http_status(:ok)+ end++ # /me is what a client reads to decide what to attempt, so reporting the+ # approver's whole role both oversells the grant and discloses the role.+ it 'reports what the credential holds rather than what its owner does' do+ get_with(read_only, '/api/v3/admin/me')++ expect(json_response['permission_keys']).to eq(['read_products'])+ end+ end+describe 'a token issued for another resource' doit 'is refused' doget_with(token_for('read_products', resource: '/api/v3/admin/mcp'),