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feat: Adding Firebase testing prompt module
Ahmed Allam1eb6023fb66f
diff --git a/strix/prompts/technologies/firebase_firestore.jinja b/strix/prompts/technologies/firebase_firestore.jinjanew file mode 100644index 00000000..664d7875--- /dev/null+++ b/strix/prompts/technologies/firebase_firestore.jinja@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@+<firebase_firestore_security_guide>+<title>FIREBASE / FIRESTORE — ADVERSARIAL TESTING AND EXPLOITATION</title>++<critical>Most impactful findings in Firebase apps arise from weak Firestore/Realtime Database rules, Cloud Storage exposure, callable/onRequest Functions trusting client input, incorrect ID token validation, and over-trusted App Check. Treat every client-supplied field and token as untrusted. Bind subject/tenant on the server, not in the client.</critical>++<scope>+- Firestore (documents/collections, rules, REST/SDK)+- Realtime Database (JSON tree, rules)+- Cloud Storage (rules, signed URLs)+- Auth (ID tokens, custom claims, anonymous/sign-in providers)+- Cloud Functions (onCall/onRequest, triggers)+- Hosting rewrites, CDN/caching, CORS+- App Check (attestation) and its limits+</scope>++<methodology>+1. Extract project config from client (apiKey, authDomain, projectId, appId, storageBucket, messagingSenderId). Identify all used Firebase products.+2. Obtain multiple principals: unauth, anonymous (if enabled), basic user A, user B, and any staff/admin if available. Capture their ID tokens.+3. Build Resource × Action × Principal matrix across Firestore/Realtime/Storage/Functions. Exercise every action via SDK and raw REST (googleapis) to detect parity gaps.+4. Start from list/query paths (where allowed) to seed IDs; then swap document paths, tenants, and user IDs across principals and transports.+</methodology>++<architecture>+- Firestore REST: https://firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/<project>/databases/(default)/documents/<path>+- Storage REST: https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<bucket>+- Auth: Google-signed ID tokens (iss accounts.google.com/securetoken.google.com/<project>), aud <project/app-id>; identity is in sub/uid.+- Rules engines: separate for Firestore, Realtime DB, and Storage; Functions bypass rules when using Admin SDK.+</architecture>++<auth_and_tokens>+- ID token verification must enforce issuer, audience (project), signature (Google JWKS), expiration, and optionally App Check binding when used.+- Custom claims are appended by Admin SDK; client-supplied claims are ignored by Auth but may be trusted by app code if copied into docs.+- Pitfalls:+ - Accepting any JWT with valid signature but wrong audience/project.+ - Trusting uid/account IDs from request body instead of context.auth.uid in Functions.+ - Mixing session cookies and ID tokens without verifying both paths equivalently.+- Tests:+ - Replay tokens across environments/projects; expect strict aud/iss rejection server-side.+ - Call Functions with and without Authorization; verify identical checks on both onCall and onRequest variants.+</auth_and_tokens>++<firestore_rules>+- Rules are not filters: a query must include constraints that make the rule true for all returned documents; otherwise reads fail. Do not rely on client to include where clauses correctly.+- Prefer ownership derived from request.auth.uid and server data, not from client payload fields.+- Common gaps:+ - allow read: if request.auth != null (any user reads all data)+ - allow write: if request.auth != null (mass write)+ - Missing per-field validation (adds isAdmin/role/tenantId fields).+ - Using client-supplied ownerId/orgId instead of enforcing doc.ownerId == request.auth.uid or membership in org.+ - Over-broad list rules on root collections; per-doc checks exist but list still leaks via queries.+- Validation patterns:+ - Restrict writes: request.resource.data.keys().hasOnly([...]) and forbid privilege fields.+ - Enforce ownership: resource.data.ownerId == request.auth.uid && request.resource.data.ownerId == request.auth.uid+ - Org membership: exists(/databases/(default)/documents/orgs/$(org)/members/$(request.auth.uid))+- Tests:+ - Compare results for users A/B on identical queries; diff counts and IDs.+ - Attempt cross-tenant reads: where orgId == otherOrg; try queries without org filter to confirm denial.+ - Write-path: set/patch with foreign ownerId/orgId; attempt to flip privilege flags.+</firestore_rules>++<firestore_queries>+- Enumerate via REST to avoid SDK client-side constraints; try structured and REST filters.+- Probe composite index requirements: UI-driven queries may hide missing rule coverage when indexes are enabled but rules are broad.+- Explore collection group queries (collectionGroup) that may bypass per-collection rules if not mirrored.+- Use startAt/endAt/in/array-contains to probe rule edges and pagination cursors for cross-tenant bleed.+</firestore_queries>++<realtime_database>+- Misconfigured rules frequently expose entire JSON trees. Probe https://<project>.firebaseio.com/.json with and without auth.+- Confirm rules for read/write use auth.uid and granular path checks; avoid .read/.write: true or auth != null at high-level nodes.+- Attempt to write privilege-bearing nodes (roles, org membership) and observe downstream effects (e.g., Cloud Functions triggers).+</realtime_database>++<cloud_storage>+- Rules parallel Firestore but apply to object paths. Common issues:+ - Public reads on sensitive buckets/paths.+ - Signed URLs with long TTL, no content-disposition controls; replayable across tenants.+ - List operations exposed: /o?prefix= enumerates object keys.+- Tests:+ - GET gs:// paths via https endpoints without auth; verify content-type and Content-Disposition: attachment.+ - Generate and reuse signed URLs across accounts and paths; try case/URL-encoding variants.+ - Upload HTML/SVG and verify X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff; check for script execution.+</cloud_storage>++<cloud_functions>+- onCall provides context.auth automatically; onRequest must verify ID tokens explicitly. Admin SDK bypasses rules; all ownership/tenant checks must be enforced in code.+- Common gaps:+ - Trusting client uid/orgId from request body instead of context.auth.+ - Missing aud/iss verification when manually parsing tokens.+ - Over-broad CORS allowing credentialed cross-origin requests; echoing Authorization in responses.+ - Triggers (onCreate/onWrite) granting roles or issuing signed URLs solely based on document content controlled by the client.+- Tests:+ - Call both onCall and equivalent onRequest endpoints with varied tokens and bodies; expect identical decisions.+ - Create crafted docs to trigger privilege-granting functions; verify that server re-derives subject/tenant before acting.+ - Attempt internal fetches (SSRF) via Functions to project/metadata endpoints.+</cloud_functions>++<app_check>+- App Check is not a substitute for authorization. Many apps enable App Check enforcement on client SDKs but do not verify on custom backends.+- Bypasses:+ - Unenforced paths: REST calls directly to googleapis endpoints with ID token succeed regardless of App Check.+ - Mobile reverse engineering: hook client and reuse ID token flows without attestation.+- Tests:+ - Compare SDK vs REST behavior with/without App Check headers; confirm no elevated authorization via App Check alone.+</app_check>++<tenant_isolation>+- Apps often implement multi-tenant data models (orgs/<orgId>/...). Bind tenant from server context (membership doc or custom claim), not from client payload.+- Tests:+ - Vary org header/subdomain/query while keeping token fixed; verify server denies cross-tenant access.+ - Export/report Functions: ensure queries execute under caller scope; signed outputs must encode tenant and short TTL.+</tenant_isolation>++<bypass_techniques>+- Content-type switching: JSON vs form vs multipart to hit alternate code paths in onRequest Functions.+- Parameter/field pollution: duplicate JSON keys; last-one-wins in many parsers; attempt to sneak privilege fields.+- Caching/CDN: Hosting rewrites or proxies that key responses without Authorization or tenant headers.+- Race windows: write then read before background enforcements (e.g., post-write claim synchronizations) complete.+</bypass_techniques>++<blind_channels>+- Firestore: use error shape, document count, and ETag/length to infer existence under partial denial.+- Storage: length/timing differences on signed URL attempts leak validity.+- Functions: constant-time comparisons vs variable messages reveal authorization branches.+</blind_channels>++<tooling_and_automation>+- SDK + REST: httpie/curl + jq for REST; Firebase emulator and Rules Playground for rapid iteration.+- Mobile: apktool/objection/frida to extract config and hook SDK calls; inspect network logs for endpoints and tokens.+- Rules analysis: script rule probes for common patterns (auth != null, missing field validation, list vs get parity).+- Functions: fuzz onRequest endpoints with varied content-types and missing/forged Authorization; verify CORS and token handling.+- Storage: enumerate prefixes; test signed URL generation and reuse patterns.+</tooling_and_automation>++<reviewer_checklist>+- Do Firestore/Realtime/Storage rules derive subject and tenant from auth, not client fields?+- Are list/query rules aligned with per-doc checks (no broad list leaks)?+- Are privilege-bearing fields immutable or server-only (forbidden in writes)?+- Do Functions verify ID tokens (iss/aud/exp/signature) and re-derive identity before acting?+- Are Admin SDK operations scoped by server-side checks (ownership/tenant)?+- Is App Check treated as advisory, not authorization, across all paths?+- Are Hosting/CDN cache keys bound to Authorization/tenant to prevent leaks?+</reviewer_checklist>++<validation>+1. Provide owner vs non-owner Firestore queries showing unauthorized access or metadata leak.+2. Demonstrate Cloud Storage read/write beyond intended scope (public object, signed URL reuse, or list exposure).+3. Show a Function accepting forged/foreign identity (wrong aud/iss) or trusting client uid/orgId.+4. Document minimal reproducible requests with roles/tokens used and observed deltas.+</validation>++<false_positives>+- Public collections/objects documented and intended.+- Rules that correctly enforce per-doc checks with matching query constraints.+- Functions verifying tokens and ignoring client-supplied identifiers.+- App Check enforced but not relied upon for authorization.+</false_positives>++<impact>+- Cross-account and cross-tenant data exposure.+- Unauthorized state changes via Functions or direct writes.+- Exfiltration of PII/PHI and private files from Storage.+- Durable privilege escalation via misused custom claims or triggers.+</impact>++<pro_tips>+1. Treat apiKey as project identifier only; identity must come from verified ID tokens.+2. Start from rules: read them, then prove gaps with diffed owner/non-owner requests.+3. Prefer REST for parity checks; SDKs can mask errors via client-side filters.+4. Hunt privilege fields in docs and forbid them via rules; verify immutability.+5. Probe collectionGroup queries and list rules; many leaks live there.+6. Functions are the authority boundary—enforce subject/tenant there even if rules exist.+7. Keep concise PoCs: one owner vs non-owner request per surface that clearly demonstrates the unauthorized delta.+</pro_tips>++<remember>Authorization must hold at every layer: rules, Functions, and Storage. Bind subject and tenant from verified tokens and server data, never from client payload or UI assumptions. Any gap becomes a cross-account or cross-tenant vulnerability.</remember>+</firebase_firestore_security_guide>