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Open-source AI penetration testing tool to find and fix your app’s vulnerabilities.

feat: Adding Firebase testing prompt module

Ahmed Allam1eb6023fb66f
diff --git a/strix/prompts/technologies/firebase_firestore.jinja b/strix/prompts/technologies/firebase_firestore.jinja
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+<firebase_firestore_security_guide>
+<title>FIREBASE / FIRESTORE — ADVERSARIAL TESTING AND EXPLOITATION</title>
+
+<critical>Most impactful findings in Firebase apps arise from weak Firestore/Realtime Database rules, Cloud Storage exposure, callable/onRequest Functions trusting client input, incorrect ID token validation, and over-trusted App Check. Treat every client-supplied field and token as untrusted. Bind subject/tenant on the server, not in the client.</critical>
+
+<scope>
+- Firestore (documents/collections, rules, REST/SDK)
+- Realtime Database (JSON tree, rules)
+- Cloud Storage (rules, signed URLs)
+- Auth (ID tokens, custom claims, anonymous/sign-in providers)
+- Cloud Functions (onCall/onRequest, triggers)
+- Hosting rewrites, CDN/caching, CORS
+- App Check (attestation) and its limits
+</scope>
+
+<methodology>
+1. Extract project config from client (apiKey, authDomain, projectId, appId, storageBucket, messagingSenderId). Identify all used Firebase products.
+2. Obtain multiple principals: unauth, anonymous (if enabled), basic user A, user B, and any staff/admin if available. Capture their ID tokens.
+3. Build Resource × Action × Principal matrix across Firestore/Realtime/Storage/Functions. Exercise every action via SDK and raw REST (googleapis) to detect parity gaps.
+4. Start from list/query paths (where allowed) to seed IDs; then swap document paths, tenants, and user IDs across principals and transports.
+</methodology>
+
+<architecture>
+- Firestore REST: https://firestore.googleapis.com/v1/projects/<project>/databases/(default)/documents/<path>
+- Storage REST: https://storage.googleapis.com/storage/v1/b/<bucket>
+- Auth: Google-signed ID tokens (iss accounts.google.com/securetoken.google.com/<project>), aud <project/app-id>; identity is in sub/uid.
+- Rules engines: separate for Firestore, Realtime DB, and Storage; Functions bypass rules when using Admin SDK.
+</architecture>
+
+<auth_and_tokens>
+- ID token verification must enforce issuer, audience (project), signature (Google JWKS), expiration, and optionally App Check binding when used.
+- Custom claims are appended by Admin SDK; client-supplied claims are ignored by Auth but may be trusted by app code if copied into docs.
+- Pitfalls:
+ - Accepting any JWT with valid signature but wrong audience/project.
+ - Trusting uid/account IDs from request body instead of context.auth.uid in Functions.
+ - Mixing session cookies and ID tokens without verifying both paths equivalently.
+- Tests:
+ - Replay tokens across environments/projects; expect strict aud/iss rejection server-side.
+ - Call Functions with and without Authorization; verify identical checks on both onCall and onRequest variants.
+</auth_and_tokens>
+
+<firestore_rules>
+- Rules are not filters: a query must include constraints that make the rule true for all returned documents; otherwise reads fail. Do not rely on client to include where clauses correctly.
+- Prefer ownership derived from request.auth.uid and server data, not from client payload fields.
+- Common gaps:
+ - allow read: if request.auth != null (any user reads all data)
+ - allow write: if request.auth != null (mass write)
+ - Missing per-field validation (adds isAdmin/role/tenantId fields).
+ - Using client-supplied ownerId/orgId instead of enforcing doc.ownerId == request.auth.uid or membership in org.
+ - Over-broad list rules on root collections; per-doc checks exist but list still leaks via queries.
+- Validation patterns:
+ - Restrict writes: request.resource.data.keys().hasOnly([...]) and forbid privilege fields.
+ - Enforce ownership: resource.data.ownerId == request.auth.uid && request.resource.data.ownerId == request.auth.uid
+ - Org membership: exists(/databases/(default)/documents/orgs/$(org)/members/$(request.auth.uid))
+- Tests:
+ - Compare results for users A/B on identical queries; diff counts and IDs.
+ - Attempt cross-tenant reads: where orgId == otherOrg; try queries without org filter to confirm denial.
+ - Write-path: set/patch with foreign ownerId/orgId; attempt to flip privilege flags.
+</firestore_rules>
+
+<firestore_queries>
+- Enumerate via REST to avoid SDK client-side constraints; try structured and REST filters.
+- Probe composite index requirements: UI-driven queries may hide missing rule coverage when indexes are enabled but rules are broad.
+- Explore collection group queries (collectionGroup) that may bypass per-collection rules if not mirrored.
+- Use startAt/endAt/in/array-contains to probe rule edges and pagination cursors for cross-tenant bleed.
+</firestore_queries>
+
+<realtime_database>
+- Misconfigured rules frequently expose entire JSON trees. Probe https://<project>.firebaseio.com/.json with and without auth.
+- Confirm rules for read/write use auth.uid and granular path checks; avoid .read/.write: true or auth != null at high-level nodes.
+- Attempt to write privilege-bearing nodes (roles, org membership) and observe downstream effects (e.g., Cloud Functions triggers).
+</realtime_database>
+
+<cloud_storage>
+- Rules parallel Firestore but apply to object paths. Common issues:
+ - Public reads on sensitive buckets/paths.
+ - Signed URLs with long TTL, no content-disposition controls; replayable across tenants.
+ - List operations exposed: /o?prefix= enumerates object keys.
+- Tests:
+ - GET gs:// paths via https endpoints without auth; verify content-type and Content-Disposition: attachment.
+ - Generate and reuse signed URLs across accounts and paths; try case/URL-encoding variants.
+ - Upload HTML/SVG and verify X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff; check for script execution.
+</cloud_storage>
+
+<cloud_functions>
+- onCall provides context.auth automatically; onRequest must verify ID tokens explicitly. Admin SDK bypasses rules; all ownership/tenant checks must be enforced in code.
+- Common gaps:
+ - Trusting client uid/orgId from request body instead of context.auth.
+ - Missing aud/iss verification when manually parsing tokens.
+ - Over-broad CORS allowing credentialed cross-origin requests; echoing Authorization in responses.
+ - Triggers (onCreate/onWrite) granting roles or issuing signed URLs solely based on document content controlled by the client.
+- Tests:
+ - Call both onCall and equivalent onRequest endpoints with varied tokens and bodies; expect identical decisions.
+ - Create crafted docs to trigger privilege-granting functions; verify that server re-derives subject/tenant before acting.
+ - Attempt internal fetches (SSRF) via Functions to project/metadata endpoints.
+</cloud_functions>
+
+<app_check>
+- App Check is not a substitute for authorization. Many apps enable App Check enforcement on client SDKs but do not verify on custom backends.
+- Bypasses:
+ - Unenforced paths: REST calls directly to googleapis endpoints with ID token succeed regardless of App Check.
+ - Mobile reverse engineering: hook client and reuse ID token flows without attestation.
+- Tests:
+ - Compare SDK vs REST behavior with/without App Check headers; confirm no elevated authorization via App Check alone.
+</app_check>
+
+<tenant_isolation>
+- Apps often implement multi-tenant data models (orgs/<orgId>/...). Bind tenant from server context (membership doc or custom claim), not from client payload.
+- Tests:
+ - Vary org header/subdomain/query while keeping token fixed; verify server denies cross-tenant access.
+ - Export/report Functions: ensure queries execute under caller scope; signed outputs must encode tenant and short TTL.
+</tenant_isolation>
+
+<bypass_techniques>
+- Content-type switching: JSON vs form vs multipart to hit alternate code paths in onRequest Functions.
+- Parameter/field pollution: duplicate JSON keys; last-one-wins in many parsers; attempt to sneak privilege fields.
+- Caching/CDN: Hosting rewrites or proxies that key responses without Authorization or tenant headers.
+- Race windows: write then read before background enforcements (e.g., post-write claim synchronizations) complete.
+</bypass_techniques>
+
+<blind_channels>
+- Firestore: use error shape, document count, and ETag/length to infer existence under partial denial.
+- Storage: length/timing differences on signed URL attempts leak validity.
+- Functions: constant-time comparisons vs variable messages reveal authorization branches.
+</blind_channels>
+
+<tooling_and_automation>
+- SDK + REST: httpie/curl + jq for REST; Firebase emulator and Rules Playground for rapid iteration.
+- Mobile: apktool/objection/frida to extract config and hook SDK calls; inspect network logs for endpoints and tokens.
+- Rules analysis: script rule probes for common patterns (auth != null, missing field validation, list vs get parity).
+- Functions: fuzz onRequest endpoints with varied content-types and missing/forged Authorization; verify CORS and token handling.
+- Storage: enumerate prefixes; test signed URL generation and reuse patterns.
+</tooling_and_automation>
+
+<reviewer_checklist>
+- Do Firestore/Realtime/Storage rules derive subject and tenant from auth, not client fields?
+- Are list/query rules aligned with per-doc checks (no broad list leaks)?
+- Are privilege-bearing fields immutable or server-only (forbidden in writes)?
+- Do Functions verify ID tokens (iss/aud/exp/signature) and re-derive identity before acting?
+- Are Admin SDK operations scoped by server-side checks (ownership/tenant)?
+- Is App Check treated as advisory, not authorization, across all paths?
+- Are Hosting/CDN cache keys bound to Authorization/tenant to prevent leaks?
+</reviewer_checklist>
+
+<validation>
+1. Provide owner vs non-owner Firestore queries showing unauthorized access or metadata leak.
+2. Demonstrate Cloud Storage read/write beyond intended scope (public object, signed URL reuse, or list exposure).
+3. Show a Function accepting forged/foreign identity (wrong aud/iss) or trusting client uid/orgId.
+4. Document minimal reproducible requests with roles/tokens used and observed deltas.
+</validation>
+
+<false_positives>
+- Public collections/objects documented and intended.
+- Rules that correctly enforce per-doc checks with matching query constraints.
+- Functions verifying tokens and ignoring client-supplied identifiers.
+- App Check enforced but not relied upon for authorization.
+</false_positives>
+
+<impact>
+- Cross-account and cross-tenant data exposure.
+- Unauthorized state changes via Functions or direct writes.
+- Exfiltration of PII/PHI and private files from Storage.
+- Durable privilege escalation via misused custom claims or triggers.
+</impact>
+
+<pro_tips>
+1. Treat apiKey as project identifier only; identity must come from verified ID tokens.
+2. Start from rules: read them, then prove gaps with diffed owner/non-owner requests.
+3. Prefer REST for parity checks; SDKs can mask errors via client-side filters.
+4. Hunt privilege fields in docs and forbid them via rules; verify immutability.
+5. Probe collectionGroup queries and list rules; many leaks live there.
+6. Functions are the authority boundary—enforce subject/tenant there even if rules exist.
+7. Keep concise PoCs: one owner vs non-owner request per surface that clearly demonstrates the unauthorized delta.
+</pro_tips>
+
+<remember>Authorization must hold at every layer: rules, Functions, and Storage. Bind subject and tenant from verified tokens and server data, never from client payload or UI assumptions. Any gap becomes a cross-account or cross-tenant vulnerability.</remember>
+</firebase_firestore_security_guide>