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private projects rate limits
Blue Moused75c6b5e07e3
diff --git a/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/analytics-read.guard.ts b/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/analytics-read.guard.tsindex ba671db91..dd760bc8b 100644--- a/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/analytics-read.guard.ts+++ b/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/analytics-read.guard.ts@@ -11,32 +11,13 @@ import { checkRateLimit, getIPDetails } from '../../common/utils'import { AppLoggerService } from '../../logger/logger.service'import { getTrustworthyIp, getSinglePid } from './analytics-read.util'-// Per-IP read rate limit. OPT-IN: unset env => disabled. This guard runs BEHIND-// the SSR proxy, so a careless per-IP limit keys on the proxy's IP and lumps-// every dashboard user into one bucket β which is exactly what 429'd everyone.-// So it's off by default (the front-end nginx already rate-limits per real IP),-// and even when on it only fires for PUBLIC projects with a resolved REAL client-// IP (see getTrustworthyIp, which returns '' rather than a proxy IP). Turn on-// only once the real client IP is confirmed to reach the API (realip /-// TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS), e.g. ANALYTICS_READ_RATE_LIMIT=120.-const READ_RATE_LIMIT = process.env.ANALYTICS_READ_RATE_LIMIT- ? Number(process.env.ANALYTICS_READ_RATE_LIMIT)- : null-const READ_RATE_WINDOW = Number(process.env.ANALYTICS_READ_RATE_WINDOW) || 60 // seconds+const READ_RATE_LIMIT = 300 // requests per rate window+const AUTHED_READ_RATE_LIMIT = 3000 // requests per rate window+const READ_RATE_WINDOW = 60 // secondsconst BLOCK_DATACENTER_READS =process.env.ANALYTICS_BLOCK_DATACENTER_READS === 'true'-/**- * Guards the read (GET) surface of the analytics controller.- *- * Scope: PUBLIC projects only (e.g. /demo) β the unauthenticated, expensive-to-- * serve endpoints an attacker can hit for free. Private dashboard reads (the- * bulk of legitimate traffic) are returned untouched before any limiting, so- * this guard can never throttle a logged-in user's own dashboard.- *- * Every check fails OPEN: a protection bug must never take analytics down.- */@Injectable()export class AnalyticsReadGuard implements CanActivate {constructor(@@ -47,18 +28,30 @@ export class AnalyticsReadGuard implements CanActivate {async canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): Promise<boolean> {const req = context.switchToHttp().getRequest()- // Only police read (GET) traffic. Ingestion has its own defenses.+ // Only police read (GET) trafficif (req.method !== 'GET') {return true}- // API-key requests are metered separately, per plan β never touch them here.+ // API-key requests are metered separately, per planif (req.headers['x-api-key']) {return true}- // Resolve the project first. Anything that isn't a single PUBLIC project β- // including every private dashboard read β leaves the guard immediately.+ // Logged-in requests - limiting by userId on a more generous limit+ const uid = req.user?.sub || req.user?.id || null+ if (uid) {+ if (AUTHED_READ_RATE_LIMIT > 0) {+ await checkRateLimit(+ String(uid),+ 'analytics-read-user',+ AUTHED_READ_RATE_LIMIT,+ READ_RATE_WINDOW,+ )+ }+ return true+ }+let isPublicProject = falsetry {const pid = getSinglePid(req.query || {})@@ -80,7 +73,7 @@ export class AnalyticsReadGuard implements CanActivate {// --- Public-project protections only below this line ---- // Bot user-agents never legitimately view a public dashboard.+ // Bot user-agents never legitimately view a public dashboardconst userAgent = String(req.headers['user-agent'] || '')if (userAgent && isbot(userAgent)) {throw new ForbiddenException(@@ -89,7 +82,7 @@ export class AnalyticsReadGuard implements CanActivate {}// The real visitor IP, or '' when only a proxy IP is visible (so we never- // rate-limit or geo-check the shared proxy address).+ // rate-limit or geo-check the shared proxy address)const ip = getTrustworthyIp(req)if (BLOCK_DATACENTER_READS && ip) {diff --git a/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/analytics-read.util.ts b/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/analytics-read.util.tsindex 9564ea7f8..2b3fe7f0d 100644--- a/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/analytics-read.util.ts+++ b/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/analytics-read.util.ts@@ -2,19 +2,6 @@ import _isString from 'lodash/isString'import { getIPFromHeaders } from '../../common/utils'-// IPs of our OWN reverse proxies / SSR front-end (e.g. the web app egress IP).-// Comma-separated, e.g. TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=167.235.69.100,167.235.69.101.-//-// Why this matters: the web app's SSR loaders call this API on behalf of end-// users, so without this every proxied request looks like it comes from the-// single web-app IP β and a per-IP limit then lumps the whole dashboard (plus-// any attack proxied through it) into ONE bucket and 429s everyone. When a-// request arrives FROM a trusted proxy, the real visitor IP is in-// X-Client-IP-Address (set by web/app/api/api.server.ts), so we key on that.-//-// Trusting the header ONLY from these IPs is what makes it safe: a direct-// attacker hitting the API cannot spoof X-Client-IP-Address to dodge limits,-// because their connection IP isn't in this set.const TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS = new Set((process.env.TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS || '').split(',')@@ -36,16 +23,8 @@ export const getTrustworthyIp = (req: {headers: Record<string, unknown>ip?: string}): string => {- // The real TCP peer as nginx sees it (proxy.conf sets X-Real-IP = $remote_addr).- // If nginx realip is configured this is already the real visitor; if not, it's- // the proxy hop for proxied traffic.const connectionIp = firstHeaderValue(req.headers['x-real-ip'])- // Behind a trusted proxy: the real visitor IP is in X-Client-IP-Address (the- // app-level equivalent of nginx realip; works even when realip isn't set up).- // If it's missing, return '' β NEVER fall back to the proxy IP, or a per-IP- // limit would key on the shared proxy address and lump every user into one- // bucket. An empty result tells callers "real client unknown β don't limit".if (connectionIp && TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS.has(connectionIp)) {return firstHeaderValue(req.headers['x-client-ip-address'])}diff --git a/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/public-project-cache.interceptor.ts b/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/public-project-cache.interceptor.tsindex 2f657220b..d15f9bd5a 100644--- a/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/public-project-cache.interceptor.ts+++ b/backend/apps/cloud/src/analytics/protection/public-project-cache.interceptor.ts@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ const CACHE_TTL = Number(process.env.PUBLIC_PROJECT_CACHE_TTL) || 10 // secondsconst CACHE_PREFIX = 'arc' // analytics read cacheconst CACHEABLE_ROUTES = new Set([- '', // getData β dashboard overview+ '', // getData - dashboard overview'chart','birdseye','performance',