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Document account-deletion renaming, member erasure and the audit horizon

Petr Bauch14174b6ab73b
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 75bb09475..28de9e9be 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -186,6 +186,33 @@ version of their own to them without also giving them a release of their own.
client is refused; any other agent gets a new API key that only the new
owner can see, so it has to be reconnected. Chats and room documents are not
transferable.
+- **Workspaces keep messages for a chosen time.** A workspace admin sets a
+ message-retention window on the Workspace page; once an hour, messages older
+ than it are deleted with their attachments, and stored files no message
+ carries any more are swept. Lapsed invitations, settled approval requests
+ and expired install links are deleted 30 days after they end.
+- **A workspace admin can erase a person.** The People list on the Workspace
+ page erases everything a person sent in the workspace, in every room: their
+ messages, the files only those carried, the copies kept for agents, and
+ their name on approval answers. It works for people on a chat platform,
+ people from a chat app that has since been disconnected, and members who
+ wrote from Switch Console. A chat-platform person's identity goes too; a
+ Switch Console member keeps their account and can go on writing. The admin
+ confirms by typing the person's name, and the request and its outcome are
+ recorded in the audit log.
+- **A deleted account's messages read "Former member".** Deleting an account
+ keeps the messages it sent, so conversations stay whole, but takes the
+ person's name off them, off the copies kept for agents and commands, and
+ out of the names of the Switch Console chats they were in. Invitations
+ addressed to their email are deleted in every workspace, whether or not
+ they were still open. Erasing the messages themselves is the workspace
+ admin's erase action above.
+- **A deleted workspace's audit history goes after two years.** It is kept
+ while the workspace exists and for two years after it is deleted, then
+ deleted by the hourly retention pass. The server's own record of the
+ deletion stays. Deleting audit rows needs the schema owner's connection
+ (`DB_OWNER_USER` and `DB_OWNER_PASSWORD`); without it, switch-core logs an
+ error at startup saying the history will not be purged.
- **Workspace admins can delete an empty workspace.** Workspace settings has a
Delete workspace action that asks for the workspace's name
(`DELETE /tenants/{id}`). It is refused, with what is left by kind and count,
diff --git a/docs/design/data-retention.md b/docs/design/data-retention.md
index 46eb9abd7..3ad9ebfe0 100644
--- a/docs/design/data-retention.md
+++ b/docs/design/data-retention.md
@@ -91,8 +91,9 @@ After a 30-day grace period, every pass also deletes:
### What is deliberately not touched
-- **The audit log** (`audit_events`). It is append-only by design, and the
- runtime database role cannot delete from it. See below.
+- **A live workspace's audit log** (`audit_events`). It is append-only by
+ design, and the runtime database role cannot delete from it. Only a deleted
+ workspace's history is purged, two years after the deletion. See below.
- **Usage records** (`tenant_usage`). They are billing and quota data, hold no
message content, and are aggregated per hour.
- **Copies on chat platforms.** A message bridged to Slack, Mattermost, Discord,
@@ -202,6 +203,18 @@ sent deleted, nothing would show a placeholder anyway.
- **Channel room names.** Only direct rooms are named after a person. A
channel's name is the platform's.
+**Members who wrote from Switch Console.** A member chatting from Switch
+Console writes through a member client (`type = 'member'`) of their own,
+whose transport id is `@switch-member-{user id}:{server}`: it embeds the
+account's id, never a name or email. The People list shows these clients
+under "Switch Console", and an erasure request names them by client id
+(`member_client_ids`). Erasing one deletes the messages it sent, their files,
+bridge post mappings and agent event copies, and scrubs its approval answers,
+exactly as for an identity. The client, its memberships and the Switch
+account stay: the member is still a member and can go on writing, and
+removing them is its own action. Once their account is deleted, the client
+is kept under "Former member" (see below) and can still be erased.
+
**People from a disconnected chat app.** Disconnecting an app deletes its
identity and client rows but keeps their messages in the detached rooms. These
former participants are found by their messages instead: every sender whose id
@@ -216,6 +229,37 @@ There is no identity left to delete and no bridge to tell. Listing them scans
the tenant's messages, which is fine for an admin-only page opened rarely; an
index on the sender's shape would be the fix if it is not.
+### Deleting a Switch account (built)
+
+Deleting an account (`accounts/deletion.py`), by its holder or by the server's
+administrator, keeps the messages it sent, so other people's conversations
+stay whole, but takes the person's name off them. The account's name goes
+from every place a copy of it was stored, replaced by "Former member":
+
+- `messages.sender_name`, and the `sender_name` (or, for a command, the
+ `user_name`) inside each message's content, for every row the account's
+ member client sent, in every workspace it held rows in. This runs in
+ batches of 1000 rows, each in its own transaction, before the transaction
+ that removes the membership, which renames whatever was sent meanwhile;
+- the copies stored as events for agents (`agent_events`): the sender's name
+ on a message, the user's on a command, the member's on a join;
+- the member client's `display_name`, and its link to the account, which is
+ cleared. The client and its transport id stay, since the id embeds only the
+ account's id;
+- the account's name in the descriptions of the Switch Console chats the
+ client is in ("Switch Console chat with …").
+
+Invitations addressed to the account's email are deleted in every workspace,
+whether still open, accepted, expired or revoked, matching the address without
+regard to case. Audit rows are not changed: they hold the account's id, not
+its name, and are kept for accountability (see "The audit log").
+
+Not renamed: what other people wrote (quotes, mentions), names in session
+activity lines, which are pruned after 7 days, a chat or room name someone
+chose, copies on chat platforms, and the name a running process still holds
+in memory for the client until it next loads it. Erasing the messages
+altogether is the workspace admin's erase action above.
+
### Data export (not built)
A workspace admin's export of everything held about one person in the workspace,
@@ -230,18 +274,38 @@ A workspace admin can delete a workspace once it has been emptied
(`accounts/workspace_deletion.py`): its own setup goes with it in one
transaction, including its retention policy and erasure requests, and the
deletion is recorded in the server's audit log. The workspace's own audit
-history stays, which the audit-log horizon below would bound.
+history stays for two years, then goes (below).
### The audit log
-The audit log cannot be pruned by the application on purpose: the runtime role
-has `UPDATE` and `DELETE` revoked, so a compromised process cannot erase its
-tracks. Bounding it needs a separate, privileged job, for example a
-`SECURITY DEFINER` function owned by the migration role that deletes events
-older than a fixed horizon. The horizon should be a deployment setting, not a
-workspace one, because the log protects the operator as well as the customer.
-Audit entries hold ids and small details, not message content, so keeping them
-longer than messages is defensible under the accountability principle.
+Audit entries keep the acting account's id, including after the account is
+deleted. The legal basis is accountability (Art. 5(2)): the log is how the
+operator and the customer show who did what. Entries hold ids and small
+details, not message content, so keeping them longer than messages is
+proportionate.
+
+A workspace's audit log is kept for as long as the workspace exists. Once the
+workspace is deleted, its history is kept for `AUDIT_HISTORY_HORIZON`, two
+years, and then deleted by the hourly retention pass
+(`retention/audit_history.py`). The horizon is a constant, not a workspace
+setting, because the log protects the operator as well as the customer.
+
+- **When the workspace was deleted** comes from the server's audit log, which
+ outlives every workspace: the `workspace.deleted` row deleting it wrote. A
+ workspace whose `tenants` row exists is never purged, whatever that log says.
+- **Purged:** the workspace's `audit_events`, every row carrying its tenant id.
+- **Kept:** the server's `workspace.deleted` row, which proves when the
+ workspace went and so why its history did; and the organization's audit log
+ (`organization_audit_events`), which is the organization's history rather
+ than the workspace's and is bounded by the organization's own lifetime.
+
+The runtime role has `UPDATE` and `DELETE` revoked on the audit tables, so a
+compromised process cannot erase its tracks. The purge therefore runs on the
+schema owner's connection (`DB_OWNER_USER` and `DB_OWNER_PASSWORD`). A
+deployment without one runs it on the runtime connection, which works only
+where that role owns the schema; otherwise switch-core logs an error at
+startup saying the history will not be purged, and each pass logs the
+refusal.
### Backups and logs