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fix(agent): backfill the bootstrap marker, revoke retired-key hashes, and retire instead of delete
Wojciech Wojtyniak46b10cf31a0e
diff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/api/handlers.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/api/handlers.pyindex 19cd9dae9..6069d9511 100644--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/api/handlers.py+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/api/handlers.py@@ -154,7 +154,10 @@ async def _resolve_registration_user_id(try:return await resolve_registration_owner_id(session, protocol.user_store, key)except RuntimeError as exc:- raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(exc)) from exc+ logger.error("Agent-registration bootstrap owner resolution failed: %s", exc)+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=503, detail="Agent registration is temporarily unavailable"+ ) from exc# Registration endpointsdiff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/service.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/service.pyindex e181b5b37..f59876df7 100644--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/service.py+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/service.py@@ -440,7 +440,10 @@ class ProtocolService:"""Resolve a registration token to its owner, then register the agent.Raises PermissionError if the token does not match a stored ApiKey of- a registration type (see ``registration_bootstrap.REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES``).+ a registration type (see ``registration_bootstrap.REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES``),+ or if the bootstrap owner cannot be resolved (misconfigured deployment+ — the detail is logged, not raised, to match the HTTP registration+ path's handling of the same failure).Raises AgentExistsError if the name is taken and ``overwrite`` is False."""token_hash = hashlib.sha256(registration_token.encode()).hexdigest()@@ -448,9 +451,17 @@ class ProtocolService:key = await self.api_key_store.get_by_hash(session, token_hash)if key is None or key.type not in REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES:raise PermissionError("Invalid registration token")- owner_id = await resolve_registration_owner_id(- session, self.user_store, key- )+ try:+ owner_id = await resolve_registration_owner_id(+ session, self.user_store, key+ )+ except RuntimeError as exc:+ logger.error(+ "Agent-registration bootstrap owner resolution failed: %s", exc+ )+ raise PermissionError(+ "Agent registration is temporarily unavailable"+ ) from excreturn await self.register_agent(name=name,diff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.pyindex 2135ce81d..4d3170b4f 100644--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ an OIDC identity provider can also claim it outright by asserting it as alogin email — JIT provisioning always creates a `role="user"` account, so anaccount's mere existence there proves nothing about who put it there. Bothentry points here refuse to adopt an existing account at that address unless-it carries the marker only this module's own creation path sets, and refuse-an admin role on top of that as a second, independent check.+it is provably genuine, and refuse an admin role on top of that as a second,+independent check."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -37,20 +37,37 @@ BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE = "bootstrap"# Every ApiKey type that may stand in for a registration token at the# `POST /agents` family of endpoints. Anything else (in practice, an agent's-# own `"agent"`-type key) must not be replayed to register more agents.+# own `"agent"`-type key, or a `RETIRED_KEY_TYPE` row) must not be replayed+# to register more agents.REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES = ("registration", BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE)+# Assigned to a stale legacy-labeled key at startup instead of deleting it:+# not in REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES, so it stops authenticating exactly as+# deletion would, but the row (and its label, rewritten to say so) stays on+# the gateway's API Keys page for a human to notice and remove — a deleted+# row leaves nothing but a startup log line, and the two cases this can be+# (a stale rotated-out bootstrap key, or an unrelated personal key that+# happened to share the auto-generated label) are not distinguishable at+# seed time, so the evidence needs to survive for a human to tell afterward.+RETIRED_KEY_TYPE = "retired"+# Synthetic account, never logged into (no password), that owns every agent# registered through the deployment-wide bootstrap key. Kept distinct from# the admin user specifically so that key confers no admin authority.BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL = "[email protected]"BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_NAME = "Agent Bootstrap"-# Stamped into the bootstrap owner's metadata only at the moment this module-# creates it. An account found at BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL without this marker-# was put there by something else — a gateway admin, an OIDC login claiming-# the address before this ever ran — and must not be adopted regardless of-# its role.+# Stamped into the bootstrap owner's metadata by this module's own creation+# path. An account found at BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL without this marker was put+# there by something else — a gateway admin, an OIDC login claiming the+# address before this ever ran — *unless* it already carries+# BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY (below): that key is written only by+# this module's own seeding step, so its presence on an unmarked row proves+# the row predates the marker (created by an earlier version of this+# feature) rather than being squatted — a squatter cannot have written a+# value only this code ever writes. Backfilled onto such a row rather than+# refused, so upgrading past the commit that introduced the marker does not+# brick a database this already ran against.BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY = "agent_bootstrap_owner"BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL = "Deployment bootstrap (from AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN)"@@ -81,8 +98,15 @@ BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY = "agent_bootstrap_key_last_hash"BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY = "agent_bootstrap_revoked_hashes"+def _is_genuine(owner: User) -> bool:+ meta = owner.metadata_ or {}+ if meta.get(BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY):+ return True+ return BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY in meta++def _raise_unless_genuine(owner: User) -> None:- if not (owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY):+ if not _is_genuine(owner):raise RuntimeError(f"An account already exists at {BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL} but was ""not created by agent-registration bootstrap seeding, so it "@@ -93,23 +117,29 @@ def _raise_unless_genuine(owner: User) -> None:)if owner.role == "admin":raise RuntimeError(- f"{BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL} is reserved for agent-registration "- "bootstrap and must never be an admin, but the account at that "- "address currently has the admin role. There is no gateway "- "endpoint that changes a user's role: this needs a direct edit "- "to the users table before agent-registration bootstrap can run."+ f"{BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL} must never be an admin, but the "+ "account at that address currently has the admin role. There is "+ "no gateway endpoint that changes a user's role: this needs a "+ "direct edit to the users table before agent-registration "+ "bootstrap can run.")async def ensure_bootstrap_owner(session: AsyncSession, user_store: UserStore) -> User:"""Idempotently create the account bootstrap-registered agents are owned by.- Raises if an account already exists at that address that this function- did not itself create, or that has since been given the admin role.+ Raises if an account already exists at that address that cannot be+ proven genuine (see ``_is_genuine``), or that has since been given the+ admin role. A genuine row created before the marker existed is backfilled+ with one here rather than refused."""owner = await user_store.get_by_email(session, BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL)if owner is not None:_raise_unless_genuine(owner)+ if not (owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY):+ meta = dict(owner.metadata_ or {})+ meta[BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY] = True+ owner.metadata_ = metareturn ownerowner = User(name=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_NAME,@@ -127,8 +157,8 @@ async def resolve_registration_owner_id("""The user new agents should be owned by, given the key used to register them.``key`` must already be validated as one of ``REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES``.- Raises if a bootstrap key resolves to an account this module did not- provision, or one that has since been given the admin role —+ Raises if a bootstrap key resolves to an account that cannot be proven+ genuine, or one that has since been given the admin role —``ensure_bootstrap_owner`` only runs at startup, so this is the checkthat catches either happening afterward."""diff --git a/core/switch_core/main.py b/core/switch_core/main.pyindex d96fc6a8a..2eb819d32 100644--- a/core/switch_core/main.py+++ b/core/switch_core/main.py@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ from switch_core.bridges.agent.registration_bootstrap import (BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY,BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY,LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,+ RETIRED_KEY_TYPE,ensure_bootstrap_owner,)from switch_core.bridges.agent.server_connectors.lifecycle import (@@ -560,52 +561,19 @@ async def _seed_agent_registration_bootstrap_key()bootstrap_key = bootstrap_keys[0] if bootstrap_keys else None- # Every row carrying the legacy label, not just one matching the- # current token: an admin who rotated AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN at or- # before this upgrade leaves the old row's hash stale, so a hash-only- # lookup for the current token would miss it — and a `type:- # "registration"` row at that label is otherwise indistinguishable- # from a live credential that still authenticates as the admin.- legacy_rows = [- row- for row in await api_key_store.get_by_label(- session, LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL- )- if row.type == "registration"- ]- matching_legacy = next(- (row for row in legacy_rows if row.key_hash == token_hash), None- )- if bootstrap_key is None and matching_legacy is not None:- matching_legacy.type = BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE- matching_legacy.label = BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL- matching_legacy.encrypted_key = encrypted_key- bootstrap_key = matching_legacy- logger.info(- "Migrated the legacy admin-owned registration key to a "- "scoped agent-registration bootstrap key"- )- for stale in legacy_rows:- if stale is matching_legacy:- continue- logger.warning(- "Removing a stale admin-owned registration key (id %s, "- "label %r): its value no longer matches "- "AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN, so it predates a token rotation "- "and would otherwise keep registering agents with admin "- "authority indefinitely.",- stale.id,- LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,- )- await api_key_store.delete(session, stale.id)-last_seeded_hash = (bootstrap_owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY)- revoked_hashes: list[str] = list(- (bootstrap_owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY)- or []+ raw_revoked_hashes = (bootstrap_owner.metadata_ or {}).get(+ BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY)+ if raw_revoked_hashes is not None and not isinstance(raw_revoked_hashes, list):+ raise RuntimeError(+ f"{BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY} on the agent-registration "+ "bootstrap owner is not a list; refusing to guess which "+ "hashes are revoked. This needs a direct database fix."+ )+ revoked_hashes: list[str] = list(raw_revoked_hashes or [])meta_dirty = Falseif (@@ -624,6 +592,64 @@ async def _seed_agent_registration_bootstrap_key("if AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN is later set back to it.")+ if bootstrap_key is None:+ # Every row carrying the legacy label, not just one matching the+ # current token: an admin who rotated AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN at+ # or before this upgrade leaves the old row's hash stale, so a+ # hash-only lookup for the current token would miss it — and a+ # `type: "registration"` row at that label is otherwise+ # indistinguishable from a live credential that still+ # authenticates as the admin. Scoped to "no bootstrap key yet":+ # once one exists, any startup that still finds a legacy-labeled+ # row here already retired it on an earlier pass.+ legacy_rows = [+ row+ for row in await api_key_store.get_by_label(+ session, LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL+ )+ if row.type == "registration"+ ]+ matching_legacy = next(+ (row for row in legacy_rows if row.key_hash == token_hash), None+ )+ if matching_legacy is not None:+ matching_legacy.type = BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE+ matching_legacy.label = BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL+ matching_legacy.encrypted_key = encrypted_key+ bootstrap_key = matching_legacy+ logger.info(+ "Migrated the legacy admin-owned registration key to a "+ "scoped agent-registration bootstrap key"+ )+ for stale in legacy_rows:+ if stale is matching_legacy:+ continue+ # Retired, not deleted: every consumer already refuses+ # RETIRED_KEY_TYPE (it is not in REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES), so+ # this stops it authenticating exactly as deletion would —+ # but the row stays on the API Keys page (filtered on type,+ # not existence) with a label that says why, so an operator+ # can tell a stale bootstrap key apart from a personal key+ # that coincidentally shared the label, and delete it+ # themselves once they have. Its hash is also permanently+ # revoked: restoring an old .env or values file must not+ # bring it back to life via the rotation path below.+ stale.type = RETIRED_KEY_TYPE+ stale.label = f"{stale.label} (retired: stale, no longer authenticates)"+ if stale.key_hash not in revoked_hashes:+ revoked_hashes.append(stale.key_hash)+ meta_dirty = True+ logger.warning(+ "Retired a stale admin-owned registration key (id %s, "+ "label %r): its value no longer matches "+ "AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN, so it predates a token "+ "rotation and would otherwise keep registering agents "+ "with admin authority indefinitely. It is now visible "+ "on the API Keys page for a human to review and delete.",+ stale.id,+ LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,+ )+if bootstrap_key is not None:if bootstrap_key.key_hash != token_hash:if token_hash in revoked_hashes:diff --git a/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py b/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.pyindex 95cdd4e75..801a68fff 100644--- a/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py+++ b/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession, async_sessionmakerfrom switch_core.bridges.agent.registration_bootstrap import (BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE,+ BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY,BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY,ensure_bootstrap_owner,@@ -58,22 +59,64 @@ class TestEnsureBootstrapOwner:with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="not created by"):await ensure_bootstrap_owner(session, user_store)- async def test_refuses_an_existing_account_with_the_admin_role(+ async def test_backfills_the_marker_onto_a_row_created_before_it_existed(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None:- """A gateway admin can `POST /users` with this exact email and an- admin role. Adopting that account would silently restore the exact- escalation this module exists to close — caught here as a second,- independent check even though the missing marker already refuses it."""+ """Upgrade path: a bootstrap owner created by an earlier commit of+ this same feature, before the marker existed, has no marker but does+ carry the last-seeded-hash key — a value only this module's own+ seeding step ever writes, so a squatter cannot have it. Must be+ healed in place, not refused, or upgrading past the commit that+ introduced the marker bricks every database that already ran this."""user_store = UserStore()async with session_factory() as session:session.add(- User(name="squatter", email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL, role="admin")+ User(+ name=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ role="user",+ metadata_={BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY: "some-hash"},+ ))await session.commit()async with session_factory() as session:- with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="admin"):+ owner = await ensure_bootstrap_owner(session, user_store)+ await session.commit()++ assert (owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY) is True+ assert (owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY) == (+ "some-hash"+ )++ async with session_factory() as session:+ persisted = await session.get(User, owner.id)+ assert persisted is not None+ assert (persisted.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY) is True++ async def test_refuses_a_marked_account_promoted_to_the_admin_role(+ self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]+ ) -> None:+ """The role check as its own, independently-exercised guard: an+ otherwise-genuine account (it carries the marker) that has been+ given the admin role — e.g. a gateway admin editing it directly —+ must still be refused. Deliberately marked so this hits the role+ check specifically rather than the (already separately tested)+ missing-marker check."""+ user_store = UserStore()+ async with session_factory() as session:+ session.add(+ User(+ name="promoted",+ email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ role="admin",+ metadata_={BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY: True},+ )+ )+ await session.commit()++ async with session_factory() as session:+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="must never be an admin"):await ensure_bootstrap_owner(session, user_store)diff --git a/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py b/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.pyindex 268e2812b..771f32e5b 100644--- a/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py+++ b/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py@@ -17,8 +17,13 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession, async_sessionmakerfrom switch_core.bridges.agent.registration_bootstrap import (BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE,+ BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY,BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY,+ BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_NAME,+ BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY,LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,+ RETIRED_KEY_TYPE,)from switch_core.config import SwitchConfigfrom switch_core.db.models import Agent, ApiKey, Client, User@@ -46,10 +51,14 @@ def _config(token: str, *, admin_email: str = ADMIN_EMAIL) -> SwitchConfig:async def _make_user(- session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession], *, email: str, role: str+ session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession],+ *,+ email: str,+ role: str,+ metadata: dict | None = None,) -> str:async with session_factory() as session:- user = User(name=role, email=email, role=role)+ user = User(name=role, email=email, role=role, metadata_=metadata)session.add(user)await session.commit()return user.id@@ -175,7 +184,11 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:migrate. Left alone, that row keeps authenticating as`type="registration"`, owned by the admin — exactly the escalationthis PR exists to close, and permanently, since a bootstrap key- exists after this run and later runs never look for it again."""+ exists after this run and later runs never look for it again.++ Retired, not deleted: the row must stop authenticating but stay+ visible (and its old value permanently revoked, so restoring an old+ .env or values file can't bring it back either)."""user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()admin_id = await _make_admin(session_factory)@@ -189,19 +202,29 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:)session.add(legacy)await session.commit()+ legacy_id = legacy.idawait _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, _config("new-token"))+ async with session_factory() as session:+ keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)+ by_id = {k.id: k for k in keys}+ bootstrap_keys = [k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]+ assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1+ assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("new-token")+ # Still visible, no longer live: retired, not gone.+ assert legacy_id in by_id+ assert by_id[legacy_id].type == RETIRED_KEY_TYPE+ assert by_id[legacy_id].type not in ("registration", BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE)++ # Restoring the old .env (or a stale values file) must not resurrect+ # it: its hash is permanently revoked, not just retyped away.+ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, _config("old-token"))async with session_factory() as session:keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)bootstrap_keys = [k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("new-token")- # The stale row must not still be live as a registration credential- # under the old value.- assert not any(- k.type == "registration" and k.key_hash == _hash("old-token") for k in keys- )async def test_a_hash_mismatched_legacy_labeled_key_is_retired_and_warned_about(self,@@ -214,9 +237,10 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:label identically (finding 5's contrived scenario). Nothing in theschema distinguishes them once the hash no longer matches, so thisfavours closing the real, silent escalation: retire the row (so it- can no longer register anything) and name it loudly in a warning, so- the rare coincidental case is at least visible and cheap to recover- from (recreate a personal key) rather than a permanent, silent hole."""+ can no longer register anything, but stays visible on the API Keys+ page instead of vanishing) and name it loudly in a warning, so the+ rare coincidental case is at least visible and recoverable rather+ than a permanent, silent hole."""user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()admin_id = await _make_admin(session_factory)config = _config("dev-test-token")@@ -238,7 +262,10 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:async with session_factory() as session:keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)- assert not any(k.id == stale_id for k in keys)+ by_id = {k.id: k for k in keys}+ assert stale_id in by_id, "the retired row must still be visible"+ assert by_id[stale_id].type == RETIRED_KEY_TYPE+ assert "retired" in by_id[stale_id].label.lower()assert len([k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]) == 1warnings = [r.message for r in caplog.records if r.levelname == "WARNING"]assert any(stale_id in w for w in warnings)@@ -390,22 +417,76 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:with pytest.raises(RuntimeError):await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)- async def test_bootstrap_owner_promoted_to_admin_blocks_seeding(+ async def test_malformed_revoked_hashes_fails_loud(+ self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]+ ) -> None:+ """A hand-edited, non-list value must not be silently coerced (`list("a+ string")` iterates its characters) into "nothing is revoked"."""+ user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()+ await _make_admin(session_factory)+ async with session_factory() as session:+ session.add(+ User(+ name=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_NAME,+ email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ role="user",+ metadata_={+ BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY: True,+ BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY: "not-a-list",+ },+ )+ )+ await session.commit()+ config = _config("dev-test-token")++ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="not a list"):+ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)++ async def test_promoted_bootstrap_owner_blocks_seeding(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None:- """Adversarial: a gateway admin has already claimed the bootstrap- owner's reserved address with the admin role via `POST /users`.- Seeding must refuse rather than adopt it — that account would confer- admin authority on every agent registered through the shared token,- exactly the escalation this fix closes."""+ """The role check exercised on its own: an otherwise-genuine account+ (carries the marker) that was given the admin role directly — e.g. a+ gateway admin editing it — must still block seeding. Marked so this+ hits the role check rather than the separately-tested missing-marker+ one."""user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()await _make_admin(session_factory)- await _make_user(session_factory, email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL, role="admin")+ await _make_user(+ session_factory,+ email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ role="admin",+ metadata={BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY: True},+ )config = _config("dev-test-token")- with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="admin"):+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="must never be an admin"):await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)+ async def test_upgrading_past_the_marker_commit_does_not_brick_seeding(+ self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]+ ) -> None:+ """A bootstrap owner created by an earlier commit of this same+ feature (before the marker existed) has no marker but does carry the+ last-seeded-hash key, which only this module's own seeding ever+ writes. Seeding must heal it in place rather than refuse to start."""+ user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()+ await _make_admin(session_factory)+ await _make_user(+ session_factory,+ email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ role="user",+ metadata={BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY: "old-hash"},+ )+ config = _config("dev-test-token")++ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)++ async with session_factory() as session:+ owner = await user_store.get_by_email(session, BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL)+ assert owner is not None+ assert (owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY) is True+async def test_role_user_squatter_at_bootstrap_address_blocks_seeding(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None: