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fix(agent): pin the constraint-free revocation case and stop misreporting a config fault as a bad token

Wojciech Wojtyniak9631a2a0b22c
diff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/service.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/service.py
index f59876df7..8e5390d33 100644
--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/service.py
+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/service.py
@@ -204,6 +204,17 @@ class AgentExistsError(Exception):
caller did not opt into re-registration via ``overwrite=True``."""
+class BootstrapOwnerMisconfiguredError(Exception):
+ """Raised when the deployment-wide bootstrap key's owner account cannot
+ be resolved or trusted (see ``registration_bootstrap.py``).
+
+ Deliberately not a ``PermissionError``: the presented token is valid, so
+ this is a deployment misconfiguration, not a bad credential. A caller
+ that catches ``PermissionError`` to mean "bad token" must not also catch
+ this and report the same thing.
+ """
+
+
def _describe_room(room: Room) -> RoomDescriptor:
return RoomDescriptor(
id=room.id,
@@ -440,10 +451,13 @@ class ProtocolService:
"""Resolve a registration token to its owner, then register the agent.
Raises PermissionError if the token does not match a stored ApiKey of
- a registration type (see ``registration_bootstrap.REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES``),
- or if the bootstrap owner cannot be resolved (misconfigured deployment
- — the detail is logged, not raised, to match the HTTP registration
- path's handling of the same failure).
+ a registration type (see ``registration_bootstrap.REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES``).
+ Raises BootstrapOwnerMisconfiguredError if the token is valid but its
+ bootstrap owner cannot be resolved or trusted — a deployment fault,
+ not a bad credential, so callers must not conflate it with the
+ PermissionError above (the detail is logged here, not in the
+ exception, to match the HTTP registration path's handling of the
+ same failure).
Raises AgentExistsError if the name is taken and ``overwrite`` is False.
"""
token_hash = hashlib.sha256(registration_token.encode()).hexdigest()
@@ -459,7 +473,7 @@ class ProtocolService:
logger.error(
"Agent-registration bootstrap owner resolution failed: %s", exc
)
- raise PermissionError(
+ raise BootstrapOwnerMisconfiguredError(
"Agent registration is temporarily unavailable"
) from exc
diff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py
index 4d3170b4f..03969a9cd 100644
--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py
+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py
@@ -108,10 +108,15 @@ def _is_genuine(owner: User) -> bool:
def _raise_unless_genuine(owner: User) -> None:
if not _is_genuine(owner):
raise RuntimeError(
- f"An account already exists at {BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL} but was "
- "not created by agent-registration bootstrap seeding, so it "
- "cannot be trusted to carry no admin authority now or later. "
- "There is no gateway endpoint that removes or renames a user: "
+ f"An account already exists at {BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL} but "
+ "cannot be proven to have been created by agent-registration "
+ "bootstrap seeding, so it cannot be trusted to carry no admin "
+ "authority now or later. Two things produce this: something "
+ "else claimed the address (a gateway admin, an OIDC login), or "
+ "it was created by an earlier revision of this feature that "
+ "recorded its own state on the admin's account instead of here "
+ "and so left no evidence on this row to check. Either way, "
+ "there is no gateway endpoint that removes or renames a user: "
"this needs a direct edit to the users table before "
"agent-registration bootstrap can run."
)
diff --git a/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py b/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py
index 801a68fff..92b2c3648 100644
--- a/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py
+++ b/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ class TestEnsureBootstrapOwner:
await session.commit()
async with session_factory() as session:
- with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="not created by"):
+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="cannot be proven"):
await ensure_bootstrap_owner(session, user_store)
async def test_backfills_the_marker_onto_a_row_created_before_it_existed(
@@ -225,5 +225,5 @@ class TestResolveRegistrationOwnerId:
type=BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE,
)
async with session_factory() as session:
- with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="not created by"):
+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="cannot be proven"):
await resolve_registration_owner_id(session, user_store, key)
diff --git a/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py b/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py
index 771f32e5b..5a2721df8 100644
--- a/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py
+++ b/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py
@@ -226,6 +226,52 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:
assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1
assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("new-token")
+ async def test_deleting_the_retired_row_then_restoring_the_old_token_stays_blocked(
+ self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]
+ ) -> None:
+ """The case with no constraint to fall back on. Above, restoring the
+ old token while the retired row is still present is blocked twice
+ over: the revoked-hashes check, and (if that ever failed) the unique
+ constraint on key_hash, since the retired row still holds the old
+ value. Once an operator deletes that retired row from the API Keys
+ page — exactly what the warning invites them to do — that row is
+ gone and the constraint can no longer save a bug here. Only the
+ revoked-hashes list, recorded at retirement time, stands between the
+ old token and reinstating admin-authority registration."""
+ user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()
+ admin_id = await _make_admin(session_factory)
+
+ async with session_factory() as session:
+ legacy = ApiKey(
+ user_id=admin_id,
+ key_hash=_hash("old-token"),
+ encrypted_key="irrelevant",
+ label=LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,
+ type="registration",
+ )
+ session.add(legacy)
+ await session.commit()
+
+ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, _config("new-token"))
+
+ async with session_factory() as session:
+ keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)
+ (retired,) = [k for k in keys if k.type == RETIRED_KEY_TYPE]
+ await api_key_store.delete(session, retired.id)
+ await session.commit()
+
+ # No row anywhere holds H(old-token) now. If this were still guarded
+ # only by the unique constraint, this call would succeed and rotate
+ # the active key back onto the revoked value.
+ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, _config("old-token"))
+
+ async with session_factory() as session:
+ keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)
+ bootstrap_keys = [k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]
+ assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1
+ assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("new-token")
+ assert not any(k.key_hash == _hash("old-token") for k in keys)
+
async def test_a_hash_mismatched_legacy_labeled_key_is_retired_and_warned_about(
self,
session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession],
@@ -500,7 +546,7 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:
await _make_user(session_factory, email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL, role="user")
config = _config("dev-test-token")
- with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="not created by"):
+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="cannot be proven"):
await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)
async def test_admin_owned_agents_are_logged_as_a_warning(