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fix(agent): close a live-key orphan on rotated-before-upgrade legacy keys and other bootstrap-seeding gaps
Wojciech Wojtyniakacbd2bd593a8
diff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/api/handlers.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/api/handlers.pyindex a05bb1f17..19cd9dae9 100644--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/api/handlers.py+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/api/handlers.py@@ -151,7 +151,10 @@ async def _resolve_registration_user_id(key = await api_key_store.get_by_hash(session, token_hash)if key is None or key.type not in REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES:raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid registration token")- return await resolve_registration_owner_id(session, protocol.user_store, key)+ try:+ return await resolve_registration_owner_id(session, protocol.user_store, key)+ except RuntimeError as exc:+ raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(exc)) from exc# Registration endpointsdiff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.pyindex 50babe65e..2135ce81d 100644--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/registration_bootstrap.py@@ -15,11 +15,15 @@ register agents that inherit the admin's authority over every room andresource in the deployment, not just their own.That guarantee only holds if the account at :data:`BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL` is-never an admin. Nothing in this codebase reserves that address — a gateway-admin can `POST /users` with it and an admin role, and an OIDC identity-provider can assert it as someone's login email — so both entry points here-verify the resolved account's role and refuse rather than silently adopting-an admin.+the one this module itself provisioned. Nothing in this codebase reserves+that address, and an admin role is not the only way to end up controlling+it: a gateway admin can `POST /users` with that email and an admin role, but+an OIDC identity provider can also claim it outright by asserting it as a+login email — JIT provisioning always creates a `role="user"` account, so an+account's mere existence there proves nothing about who put it there. Both+entry points here refuse to adopt an existing account at that address unless+it carries the marker only this module's own creation path sets, and refuse+an admin role on top of that as a second, independent check."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -42,6 +46,13 @@ REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES = ("registration", BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE)BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL = "[email protected]"BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_NAME = "Agent Bootstrap"+# Stamped into the bootstrap owner's metadata only at the moment this module+# creates it. An account found at BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL without this marker+# was put there by something else — a gateway admin, an OIDC login claiming+# the address before this ever ran — and must not be adopted regardless of+# its role.+BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY = "agent_bootstrap_owner"+BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL = "Deployment bootstrap (from AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN)"# Label of the key this replaces, from before agent-registration bootstrap@@ -51,38 +62,61 @@ BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL = "Deployment bootstrap (from AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN)"# leaving it live alongside a new one.LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL = "Default (from AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN)"-# Persisted on the bootstrap owner's own metadata (never on the admin's): the-# admin a deployment resolves to is a mutable config value (`GATEWAY_ADMIN_EMAIL`),-# so a marker filed there stops meaning what it says the moment that value-# changes. The bootstrap owner's email is a fixed constant, so this survives-# an admin-email change intact. It records the hash of the token last seeded-# rather than a bare boolean so a revoked key stays revoked only for the-# value it was revoked at: rotating AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN to a new value-# re-establishes bootstrap registration without touching the database by-# hand, while restarting with the same, already-revoked value does not.+# Both persisted on the bootstrap owner's own metadata, never on the admin's:+# the admin a deployment resolves to is a mutable config value+# (`GATEWAY_ADMIN_EMAIL`), so a marker filed there stops meaning what it says+# the moment that value changes. The bootstrap owner's email is a fixed+# constant, so these survive an admin-email change intact.+#+# `..._LAST_HASH...` is the hash of the bootstrap key as of the last seed+# call, used only to notice that a key present last time is now gone (i.e. it+# was just revoked) so its hash can be recorded below.+#+# `..._REVOKED_HASHES...` is every hash ever revoked this way. A hash on this+# list is refused forever, even if the currently active key or the+# configured token later returns to it — recording only the single+# most-recently-revoked value would let one rotation forward and one back+# silently reinstate a value the operator deliberately killed.BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY = "agent_bootstrap_key_last_hash"+BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY = "agent_bootstrap_revoked_hashes"-def _raise_if_admin(owner: User) -> None:+def _raise_unless_genuine(owner: User) -> None:+ if not (owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY):+ raise RuntimeError(+ f"An account already exists at {BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL} but was "+ "not created by agent-registration bootstrap seeding, so it "+ "cannot be trusted to carry no admin authority now or later. "+ "There is no gateway endpoint that removes or renames a user: "+ "this needs a direct edit to the users table before "+ "agent-registration bootstrap can run."+ )if owner.role == "admin":raise RuntimeError(f"{BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL} is reserved for agent-registration ""bootstrap and must never be an admin, but the account at that "- "address currently has the admin role. Demote or remove it "- "before agent-registration bootstrap can run."+ "address currently has the admin role. There is no gateway "+ "endpoint that changes a user's role: this needs a direct edit "+ "to the users table before agent-registration bootstrap can run.")async def ensure_bootstrap_owner(session: AsyncSession, user_store: UserStore) -> User:"""Idempotently create the account bootstrap-registered agents are owned by.- Raises if an account already exists at that address with the admin role.+ Raises if an account already exists at that address that this function+ did not itself create, or that has since been given the admin role."""owner = await user_store.get_by_email(session, BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL)if owner is not None:- _raise_if_admin(owner)+ _raise_unless_genuine(owner)return owner- owner = User(name=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_NAME, email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL, role="user")+ owner = User(+ name=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_NAME,+ email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ role="user",+ metadata_={BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY: True},+ )await user_store.create(session, owner)return owner@@ -93,9 +127,10 @@ async def resolve_registration_owner_id("""The user new agents should be owned by, given the key used to register them.``key`` must already be validated as one of ``REGISTRATION_KEY_TYPES``.- Raises if a bootstrap key resolves to an account that has since been- promoted to admin — ``ensure_bootstrap_owner`` only runs at startup, so- this is the check that catches a later promotion.+ Raises if a bootstrap key resolves to an account this module did not+ provision, or one that has since been given the admin role —+ ``ensure_bootstrap_owner`` only runs at startup, so this is the check+ that catches either happening afterward."""if key.type != BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE:return key.user_id@@ -105,5 +140,5 @@ async def resolve_registration_owner_id(f"Agent-registration bootstrap owner ({BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL}) is ""missing; restart the server to reseed it.")- _raise_if_admin(owner)+ _raise_unless_genuine(owner)return owner.iddiff --git a/core/switch_core/db/stores/api_key_store.py b/core/switch_core/db/stores/api_key_store.pyindex 649ad9c21..8f59d7849 100644--- a/core/switch_core/db/stores/api_key_store.py+++ b/core/switch_core/db/stores/api_key_store.py@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@ class ApiKeyStore:result = await session.execute(select(ApiKey).where(ApiKey.type == key_type))return list(result.scalars().all())+ async def get_by_label(self, session: AsyncSession, label: str) -> list[ApiKey]:+ """Every key carrying a given label, regardless of type or owner.++ Labels are free text, so this is a discovery aid, not an identity+ lookup — a caller matching against a known auto-generated label+ (never one a user is expected to type) still has to check the type+ and, ideally, the hash, before treating a match as authoritative.+ """+ result = await session.execute(select(ApiKey).where(ApiKey.label == label))+ return list(result.scalars().all())+async def delete(self, session: AsyncSession, key_id: str) -> None:key = await session.get(ApiKey, key_id)if key:diff --git a/core/switch_core/main.py b/core/switch_core/main.pyindex e06e89618..d96fc6a8a 100644--- a/core/switch_core/main.py+++ b/core/switch_core/main.py@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ from switch_core.bridges.agent.registration_bootstrap import (BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE,BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY,+ BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY,LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,ensure_bootstrap_owner,)@@ -552,40 +553,98 @@ async def _seed_agent_registration_bootstrap_key()bootstrap_keys = await api_key_store.get_by_type(session, BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE)+ if len(bootstrap_keys) > 1:+ raise RuntimeError(+ f"Found {len(bootstrap_keys)} agent-registration bootstrap "+ "keys; expected at most one. This needs a direct database fix."+ )bootstrap_key = bootstrap_keys[0] if bootstrap_keys else None- if bootstrap_key is None:- legacy_candidate = await api_key_store.get_by_hash(session, token_hash)- if (- legacy_candidate is not None- and legacy_candidate.type == "registration"- and legacy_candidate.label == LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL- ):- legacy_candidate.type = BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE- legacy_candidate.label = BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL- bootstrap_key = legacy_candidate- logger.info(- "Migrated the legacy admin-owned registration key to a "- "scoped agent-registration bootstrap key"- )+ # Every row carrying the legacy label, not just one matching the+ # current token: an admin who rotated AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN at or+ # before this upgrade leaves the old row's hash stale, so a hash-only+ # lookup for the current token would miss it — and a `type:+ # "registration"` row at that label is otherwise indistinguishable+ # from a live credential that still authenticates as the admin.+ legacy_rows = [+ row+ for row in await api_key_store.get_by_label(+ session, LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL+ )+ if row.type == "registration"+ ]+ matching_legacy = next(+ (row for row in legacy_rows if row.key_hash == token_hash), None+ )+ if bootstrap_key is None and matching_legacy is not None:+ matching_legacy.type = BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE+ matching_legacy.label = BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL+ matching_legacy.encrypted_key = encrypted_key+ bootstrap_key = matching_legacy+ logger.info(+ "Migrated the legacy admin-owned registration key to a "+ "scoped agent-registration bootstrap key"+ )+ for stale in legacy_rows:+ if stale is matching_legacy:+ continue+ logger.warning(+ "Removing a stale admin-owned registration key (id %s, "+ "label %r): its value no longer matches "+ "AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN, so it predates a token rotation "+ "and would otherwise keep registering agents with admin "+ "authority indefinitely.",+ stale.id,+ LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,+ )+ await api_key_store.delete(session, stale.id)last_seeded_hash = (bootstrap_owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY)+ revoked_hashes: list[str] = list(+ (bootstrap_owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY)+ or []+ )+ meta_dirty = False++ if (+ bootstrap_key is None+ and last_seeded_hash is not None+ and last_seeded_hash not in revoked_hashes+ ):+ # A key was active as of the last seed call and is gone now: it+ # was deleted (revoked) since then. Remember its value forever,+ # not just until the next rotation — see the constant's docstring.+ revoked_hashes.append(last_seeded_hash)+ meta_dirty = True+ logger.warning(+ "Agent-registration bootstrap key was deleted since the "+ "last restart; its value is now permanently refused, even "+ "if AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN is later set back to it."+ )if bootstrap_key is not None:if bootstrap_key.key_hash != token_hash:- bootstrap_key.key_hash = token_hash- bootstrap_key.encrypted_key = encrypted_key- logger.info(- "Rotated the agent-registration bootstrap key from "- "AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN"- )- elif last_seeded_hash == token_hash:+ if token_hash in revoked_hashes:+ logger.warning(+ "AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN matches a previously "+ "revoked agent-registration bootstrap key; refusing "+ "to rotate onto it. Set a new, never-used value to "+ "change the active key."+ )+ else:+ bootstrap_key.key_hash = token_hash+ bootstrap_key.encrypted_key = encrypted_key+ logger.info(+ "Rotated the agent-registration bootstrap key from "+ "AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN"+ )+ elif token_hash in revoked_hashes:logger.warning("Agent-registration bootstrap key was revoked; not "- "reseeding it from AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN. Rotate the "- "token to a new value to re-enable deployment-wide bootstrap "+ "reseeding it from AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN. Set a new, "+ "never-used value to re-enable deployment-wide bootstrap ""registration, or mint per-user registration keys from the ""gateway's API Keys page instead.")@@ -603,9 +662,14 @@ async def _seed_agent_registration_bootstrap_key("AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN")- if bootstrap_key is not None and last_seeded_hash != token_hash:+ new_last_seeded_hash = bootstrap_key.key_hash if bootstrap_key else None+ if new_last_seeded_hash != last_seeded_hash:+ meta_dirty = True++ if meta_dirty:meta = dict(bootstrap_owner.metadata_ or {})- meta[BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY] = token_hash+ meta[BOOTSTRAP_LAST_SEEDED_HASH_META_KEY] = new_last_seeded_hash+ meta[BOOTSTRAP_REVOKED_HASHES_META_KEY] = revoked_hashesbootstrap_owner.metadata_ = metaawait session.commit()diff --git a/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py b/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.pyindex d663dd993..95cdd4e75 100644--- a/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py+++ b/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/agent/test_registration_bootstrap.py@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession, async_sessionmakerfrom switch_core.bridges.agent.registration_bootstrap import (BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE,BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL,+ BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY,ensure_bootstrap_owner,resolve_registration_owner_id,)@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ async def _make_user(class TestEnsureBootstrapOwner:- async def test_creates_a_non_admin_user_once(+ async def test_creates_a_marked_non_admin_user_once(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None:user_store = UserStore()@@ -33,19 +34,37 @@ class TestEnsureBootstrapOwner:await session.commit()assert owner.email == BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAILassert owner.role != "admin"+ assert (owner.metadata_ or {}).get(BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_MARKER_META_KEY) is Trueasync with session_factory() as session:again = await ensure_bootstrap_owner(session, user_store)await session.commit()assert again.id == owner.id+ async def test_refuses_a_role_user_account_squatting_the_address(+ self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]+ ) -> None:+ """The realistic squatter: an identity claimed this address — via+ OIDC JIT provisioning, or any other path — before bootstrap seeding+ ever ran. JIT provisioning always creates `role="user"`, so a role+ check alone would silently adopt it; only the creation marker this+ module stamps distinguishes a genuine bootstrap owner from one."""+ user_store = UserStore()+ async with session_factory() as session:+ session.add(User(name="squatter", email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL, role="user"))+ await session.commit()++ async with session_factory() as session:+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="not created by"):+ await ensure_bootstrap_owner(session, user_store)+async def test_refuses_an_existing_account_with_the_admin_role(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None:- """Nothing reserves this address: a gateway admin can `POST /users`- with it and an admin role, or an OIDC provider can hand it to any- identity that asserts it. Adopting that account would silently- restore the exact escalation this module exists to close."""+ """A gateway admin can `POST /users` with this exact email and an+ admin role. Adopting that account would silently restore the exact+ escalation this module exists to close — caught here as a second,+ independent check even though the missing marker already refuses it."""user_store = UserStore()async with session_factory() as session:session.add(@@ -142,3 +161,26 @@ class TestResolveRegistrationOwnerId:async with session_factory() as session:with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="admin"):await resolve_registration_owner_id(session, user_store, key)++ async def test_role_user_squatter_at_the_bootstrap_address_fails_loud(+ self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]+ ) -> None:+ """Registration-time counterpart of the squatter case above: even+ without ever having run `ensure_bootstrap_owner`, a bootstrap-type+ key must not resolve to an unmarked account at that address."""+ user_store = UserStore()+ admin_id = await _make_user(session_factory, role="admin")+ async with session_factory() as session:+ session.add(User(name="squatter", email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL, role="user"))+ await session.commit()++ key = ApiKey(+ user_id=admin_id,+ key_hash="h",+ encrypted_key="e",+ label="deployment bootstrap",+ type=BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE,+ )+ async with session_factory() as session:+ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="not created by"):+ await resolve_registration_owner_id(session, user_store, key)diff --git a/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py b/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.pyindex b445c3714..268e2812b 100644--- a/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py+++ b/core/tests/switch_core/test_main.py@@ -166,35 +166,82 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:assert bootstrap_keys[0].label == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABELassert not any(k.type == "registration" for k in keys)- async def test_a_personal_key_sharing_the_legacy_label_but_not_the_hash_is_untouched(+ async def test_a_legacy_key_rotated_before_the_upgrade_is_retired_not_left_live(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None:- """A label is free text an admin could reuse by coincidence; only a- matching hash proves a row really is the historical bootstrap key."""+ """An operator who rotates AGENT_REGISTRATION_TOKEN at or before the+ upgrade (ordinary practice) leaves the legacy row's hash stale, so a+ hash-only lookup for the *current* token would never find it to+ migrate. Left alone, that row keeps authenticating as+ `type="registration"`, owned by the admin — exactly the escalation+ this PR exists to close, and permanently, since a bootstrap key+ exists after this run and later runs never look for it again."""+ user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()+ admin_id = await _make_admin(session_factory)++ async with session_factory() as session:+ legacy = ApiKey(+ user_id=admin_id,+ key_hash=_hash("old-token"),+ encrypted_key="irrelevant",+ label=LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,+ type="registration",+ )+ session.add(legacy)+ await session.commit()++ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, _config("new-token"))++ async with session_factory() as session:+ keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)+ bootstrap_keys = [k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]+ assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1+ assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("new-token")+ # The stale row must not still be live as a registration credential+ # under the old value.+ assert not any(+ k.type == "registration" and k.key_hash == _hash("old-token") for k in keys+ )++ async def test_a_hash_mismatched_legacy_labeled_key_is_retired_and_warned_about(+ self,+ session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession],+ caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,+ ) -> None:+ """The label alone cannot tell a stale, rotated-out bootstrap key+ (finding 1: dangerous — admin-owned, still registers agents with+ admin authority) apart from a personal key an admin happened to+ label identically (finding 5's contrived scenario). Nothing in the+ schema distinguishes them once the hash no longer matches, so this+ favours closing the real, silent escalation: retire the row (so it+ can no longer register anything) and name it loudly in a warning, so+ the rare coincidental case is at least visible and cheap to recover+ from (recreate a personal key) rather than a permanent, silent hole."""user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()admin_id = await _make_admin(session_factory)config = _config("dev-test-token")async with session_factory() as session:- personal = ApiKey(+ stale = ApiKey(user_id=admin_id,- key_hash=_hash("some-unrelated-personal-secret"),+ key_hash=_hash("some-other-value"),encrypted_key="irrelevant",label=LEGACY_BOOTSTRAP_KEY_LABEL,type="registration",)- session.add(personal)+ session.add(stale)await session.commit()- personal_id = personal.id+ stale_id = stale.id- await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)+ with caplog.at_level("WARNING", logger="switch_core.main"):+ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)async with session_factory() as session:keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)- by_id = {k.id: k for k in keys}- assert by_id[personal_id].type == "registration"- assert by_id[personal_id].key_hash == _hash("some-unrelated-personal-secret")+ assert not any(k.id == stale_id for k in keys)assert len([k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]) == 1+ warnings = [r.message for r in caplog.records if r.levelname == "WARNING"]+ assert any(stale_id in w for w in warnings)async def test_revoking_a_migrated_legacy_key_survives_a_restart(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]@@ -301,6 +348,39 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("new-token")+ async def test_rotating_back_to_a_revoked_value_does_not_reinstate_it(+ self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]+ ) -> None:+ """Revoke X, rotate to Y and restart, rotate back to X and restart:+ the deployment must keep serving Y (or nothing), never X again — a+ revoked value is refused forever, not just until the next rotation."""+ user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()+ admin_id = await _make_admin(session_factory)++ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, _config("x-token"))+ async with session_factory() as session:+ keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)+ (bootstrap_key,) = [k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]+ await api_key_store.delete(session, bootstrap_key.id)+ await session.commit()++ # Rotate forward to Y: re-enabled at the new value.+ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, _config("y-token"))+ async with session_factory() as session:+ keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)+ bootstrap_keys = [k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]+ assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1+ assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("y-token")++ # Rotate back to X: must not reinstate the revoked value. Y stays active.+ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, _config("x-token"))+ async with session_factory() as session:+ keys = await api_key_store.get_by_user(session, admin_id)+ bootstrap_keys = [k for k in keys if k.type == BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE]+ assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1+ assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("y-token")+ assert not any(k.key_hash == _hash("x-token") for k in keys)+async def test_missing_admin_user_fails_loud(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None:@@ -313,9 +393,8 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:async def test_bootstrap_owner_promoted_to_admin_blocks_seeding(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]) -> None:- """Adversarial: something (a gateway admin via POST /users, or an- OIDC identity provider on an upgrading deployment) has already- claimed the bootstrap owner's reserved address with the admin role.+ """Adversarial: a gateway admin has already claimed the bootstrap+ owner's reserved address with the admin role via `POST /users`.Seeding must refuse rather than adopt it — that account would conferadmin authority on every agent registered through the shared token,exactly the escalation this fix closes."""@@ -327,6 +406,22 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="admin"):await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)+ async def test_role_user_squatter_at_bootstrap_address_blocks_seeding(+ self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]+ ) -> None:+ """The realistic squatter: an identity claimed the bootstrap owner's+ address (e.g. an OIDC login, which always provisions `role="user"`)+ before agent-registration bootstrap ever ran. A role check alone+ would silently adopt this account; only the creation marker this+ module stamps on its own account catches it."""+ user_store, api_key_store = UserStore(), ApiKeyStore()+ await _make_admin(session_factory)+ await _make_user(session_factory, email=BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_EMAIL, role="user")+ config = _config("dev-test-token")++ with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="not created by"):+ await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, config)+async def test_admin_owned_agents_are_logged_as_a_warning(self,session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession],@@ -367,10 +462,11 @@ class TestSeedAgentRegistrationBootstrapKey:await _seed(session_factory, user_store, api_key_store, new_config)async with session_factory() as session:- all_keys_by_hash = await api_key_store.get_by_hash(- session, _hash("dev-test-token")+ bootstrap_keys = await api_key_store.get_by_type(+ session, BOOTSTRAP_KEY_TYPE)- assert all_keys_by_hash is not None+ assert len(bootstrap_keys) == 1+ assert bootstrap_keys[0].key_hash == _hash("dev-test-token")async def test_changing_the_admin_email_after_revocation_does_not_resurrect_it(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]