Open-source AI teammates in Slack, Teams, Discord, Telegram and Mattermost. Self-host it, with any agent harness and any model.
Python agent-orchestrationaiai-agentschatopsdiscordlangchainmcpmicrosoft-teamsmulti-agentopen-sourceopenaiself-hostedslack
Fix Switch Trust guardrails: remove private hoot links, fix alert/error notices
Timo Bozsolik-Torresff17d1f00980
diff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/agent_core.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/agent_core.pyindex 8b83ef216..0e7b32a5b 100644--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/agent_core.py+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/agent/protocol/agent_core.py@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ from switch_core.trust.client import (GuardrailBlockedError,NullTrustClient,TrustClient,+ TrustOutcome,check_message,trust_annotation,)@@ -1211,10 +1212,15 @@ class AgentCore:content: str,thread_root_id: str | None,client: AgentActor,- ) -> str:+ ) -> tuple[str, tuple[str, TrustOutcome] | None]:"""Check agent-authored content against Switch Trust before it is- sent. Returns the content to actually send — unchanged, redacted, or- carrying a short non-blocking annotation. Raises+ sent. Returns the content to actually send — unchanged or redacted —+ and, on an ALERTED/ERRORED verdict, an (annotation, outcome) pair for+ the caller to post as a notice once the real content has actually been+ sent (`_post_trust_alert_notice`, threaded under that send's own+ event_id rather than under this call's pre-send `thread_root_id`, so+ the notice reads as a reply to the flagged message, not to whatever+ thread the agent happened to be posting in). Raises`GuardrailBlockedError` on a BLOCKED verdict, or on a REDACTED verdictSwitch Trust gave us nothing to redact with — sending the originalcontent then would be indistinguishable from not checking at all —@@ -1234,9 +1240,8 @@ class AgentCore:if check.redacted_content is not None:content = check.redacted_contentannotation = trust_annotation(check)- if annotation is not None:- content = f"{content}\n\n{annotation}"- return content+ pending_alert = (annotation, check.outcome) if annotation is not None else None+ return content, pending_alertasync def _post_trust_blocked_notice(self, room: RoomDescriptor, thread_root_id: str | None, client: AgentActor@@ -1267,6 +1272,48 @@ class AgentCore:exc_info=True,)+ async def _post_trust_alert_notice(+ self,+ room: RoomDescriptor,+ reply_to_event_id: str,+ annotation: str,+ outcome: TrustOutcome,+ ) -> None:+ """Tell the room a response was flagged (or could not be fully+ checked), as its own notice threaded under the flagged reply's own+ event id — not the pre-send thread the agent happened to be posting+ in — rather than appended to the reply itself. Mirrors how+ `CollaborationCore._post_trust_notice` threads an ALERTED/ERRORED+ human-authored message under the message that triggered it."""+ admin = next(+ (+ c+ for c in self.client_lifecycle.get_by_type("admin", require_tenant_id())+ if isinstance(c, SystemActor)+ ),+ None,+ )+ if admin is None:+ return+ message_type = (+ AdminMessageType.TRUST_ALERTED+ if outcome == "alerted"+ else AdminMessageType.TRUST_ERRORED+ )+ try:+ await admin.send_admin(+ room.transport_room_id,+ annotation,+ message_type=message_type,+ thread_root_id=reply_to_event_id,+ )+ except Exception:+ logger.warning(+ "Could not post a Switch Trust alert notice in %s",+ room.id,+ exc_info=True,+ )+async def _post_role_change_notice(self, agent_id: str, transport_room_id: str, action: str) -> None:@@ -1328,7 +1375,9 @@ class AgentCore:thread_root_id = await self._resolve_thread_root(client, room.transport_room_id, thread_id)- content = await self._enforce_trust(room, content, thread_root_id, client)+ content, pending_alert = await self._enforce_trust(+ room, content, thread_root_id, client+ )event_id = await client.send_message(room.transport_room_id,content,@@ -1343,6 +1392,9 @@ class AgentCore:event_id,room.transport_room_id,)+ if pending_alert is not None:+ annotation, outcome = pending_alert+ await self._post_trust_alert_notice(room, event_id, annotation, outcome)# The agent has replied, so clear any typing indicator raised when the# inbound message arrived. The message itself is already delivered, so a# failure here is degraded-but-functional, not a reason to fail the send.@@ -1797,10 +1849,13 @@ class AgentCore:client = self.client_lifecycle.get_by_agent_id(agent_id)if client is None:raise ValueError("Agent client not running")- detail = await self._enforce_trust(room, detail, None, client)- await client.send_message(+ detail, pending_alert = await self._enforce_trust(room, detail, None, client)+ event_id = await client.send_message(room.transport_room_id, f"*{detail}*", format="markdown", metered=True)+ if pending_alert is not None and event_id is not None:+ annotation, outcome = pending_alert+ await self._post_trust_alert_notice(room, event_id, annotation, outcome)async def set_runtime_state(self,@@ -2526,7 +2581,9 @@ class AgentCore:client = self.client_lifecycle.get_by_agent_id(agent_id)if client and client.transport:- outcome = await self._enforce_trust(room, outcome, None, client)+ outcome, pending_alert = await self._enforce_trust(+ room, outcome, None, client+ )await client.send_event(room.transport_room_id,"com.switch.task.finalise",@@ -2537,9 +2594,14 @@ class AgentCore:"outcome": outcome,},)- await client.send_message(+ event_id = await client.send_message(room.transport_room_id, outcome, format="markdown", metered=True)+ if pending_alert is not None and event_id is not None:+ annotation, trust_outcome = pending_alert+ await self._post_trust_alert_notice(+ room, event_id, annotation, trust_outcome+ )async def cancel_task(self, agent_id: str, task_id: str, reason: str) -> None:"""Cancel a task (requester only)."""diff --git a/core/switch_core/bridges/collaboration/collaboration_core.py b/core/switch_core/bridges/collaboration/collaboration_core.pyindex 13fe69aa5..d1b5445e2 100644--- a/core/switch_core/bridges/collaboration/collaboration_core.py+++ b/core/switch_core/bridges/collaboration/collaboration_core.py@@ -991,6 +991,16 @@ class CollaborationCore:annotation = trust_annotation(check)if annotation is not None:content = f"{content}\n\n{annotation}"+ # The room itself never relays a human-authored event back out+ # to a platform (see handle_outbound_message's human-sender+ # skip), so without this the sender would never see the+ # annotation their own client just appended to their message.+ notice_type = (+ AdminMessageType.TRUST_ALERTED+ if check.outcome == "alerted"+ else AdminMessageType.TRUST_ERRORED+ )+ await self._post_trust_notice(msg, annotation, notice_type)event_id = await human_actor.send_message(transport_room_id,content,@@ -1068,9 +1078,10 @@ class CollaborationCore:async def _post_trust_notice(self, msg: InboundMessage, body: str, message_type: AdminMessageType) -> None:- """Tell the sender's platform a message was blocked or redacted.- Never lets a failed notice take the inbound message down with it —- mirrors `AgentCore._post_trust_blocked_notice`."""+ """Tell the sender's platform what Switch Trust did with their message+ — blocked, redacted, alerted, or errored. Never lets a failed notice+ take the inbound message down with it — mirrors+ `AgentCore._post_trust_blocked_notice`."""try:await self._adapter.admin_message(msg.channel_id,diff --git a/core/switch_core/clients/admin_messages.py b/core/switch_core/clients/admin_messages.pyindex 34ba85d61..125ea3736 100644--- a/core/switch_core/clients/admin_messages.py+++ b/core/switch_core/clients/admin_messages.py@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ class AdminMessageType(StrEnum):RUN_NOTICE = "run_notice"TRUST_BLOCKED = "trust_blocked"TRUST_REDACTED = "trust_redacted"+ TRUST_ALERTED = "trust_alerted"+ TRUST_ERRORED = "trust_errored"def admin_extra_content(message_type: AdminMessageType | None) -> dict[str, object]:diff --git a/core/switch_core/trust/client.py b/core/switch_core/trust/client.pyindex 70ec0d344..4af8e3f9c 100644--- a/core/switch_core/trust/client.py+++ b/core/switch_core/trust/client.py@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@"""Switch Trust: a guardrails service checked before a message is sent.-Calls the check-only endpoint added in-https://github.com/sandbox-quantum/hoot/pull/2397 — a provider-agnostic-`messages` array in, a block/allow verdict out, no LLM provider in the loop.-`NullTrustClient` is what runs when the feature is off (`SwitchConfig.-trust_enabled` is False): a client that always allows, so no call site has to-ask whether the feature is on — the same shape as `telemetry/sink.py`'s-`NullSink`.+Calls the guardrails external processor's check-only endpoint — a+provider-agnostic `messages` array in, a block/allow verdict out, no LLM+provider in the loop. `NullTrustClient` is what runs when the feature is off+(`SwitchConfig.trust_enabled` is False): a client that always allows, so no+call site has to ask whether the feature is on — the same shape as+`telemetry/sink.py`'s `NullSink`."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ _AGENT_NAME = "Switch Rooms Agents"# confirmed for OK and BLOCKED in the endpoint's README; REDACTED/ALERTED/# ERRORED are inferred from the same naming and the documented severity order# (Blocked > Redacted > Alerted > Errored > OK) — worth confirming once-# sandbox-quantum/hoot#2397 lands.+# the external processor's REDACTED/ALERTED/ERRORED outcomes ship.TrustOutcome = Literal["ok", "blocked", "redacted", "alerted", "errored"]_OUTCOME_BY_WIRE_VALUE: dict[str, TrustOutcome] = {@@ -296,7 +295,7 @@ def trust_annotation(result: TrustCheckResult) -> str | None:if result.outcome == "alerted":categories = ", ".join(sorted({f.category for f in result.findings}))detail = categories or "policy alert"- return f"⚠️ _Switch Trust: {detail} (not blocked)_"+ return f"⚠️ _Switch Trust flagged this message (not blocked - {detail})._"if result.outcome == "errored":return "⚠️ _Switch Trust could not fully check this message_"return Nonediff --git a/core/tests/integration/test_switch_trust_agent_e2e.py b/core/tests/integration/test_switch_trust_agent_e2e.pyindex cd0b0d7d9..4bf3d746d 100644--- a/core/tests/integration/test_switch_trust_agent_e2e.py+++ b/core/tests/integration/test_switch_trust_agent_e2e.py@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@over the real transport (docs/design/switch-trust-guardrails-v1.md).Drives the genuine path: `AgentCore.send_message` → `_enforce_trust` →-(blocked: `SystemActor.send_admin` / allowed-or-degraded: the real send) — and-reads the outcome back out of the `messages` table, so nothing is inferred-from in-process state.+(blocked: `SystemActor.send_admin` in place of the reply / alerted or errored:+the real send plus a separate `SystemActor.send_admin` notice / allowed: the+real send alone) — and reads the outcome back out of the `messages` table, so+nothing is inferred from in-process state."""from __future__ import annotations@@ -234,18 +235,56 @@ async def test_redacted_agent_message_is_sent_with_content_swapped(assert not any("[email protected]" in row.content.get("body", "") for row in rows)-async def test_trust_check_failure_fails_open_and_annotates_instead_of_blocking(+async def test_alerted_agent_message_is_sent_with_a_separate_notice(harness: Harness, session_env: SessionEnv) -> None:agent_id, room_id = await _setup_room(- harness, session_env, "e2e-trust-failopen", with_admin=False+ harness, session_env, "e2e-trust-alerted", with_admin=True+ )+ harness.protocol.trust_client = _FixedTrustClient(+ TrustCheckResult(+ outcome="alerted",+ policy_id="policy-1",+ policy_name="default",+ findings=(+ TrustFinding(+ category="pii/email", detector_name="email", severity="low"+ ),+ ),+ )+ )++ await harness.protocol.send_message(+ agent_id, room_id, "my email is [email protected]"+ )++ rows = await _timeline_messages(harness, session_env, room_id)+ sent = [row for row in rows if row.content.get("body") == "my email is [email protected]"]+ assert len(sent) == 1+ admin_rows = [row for row in rows if "com.switch.admin" in row.content]+ assert len(admin_rows) == 1+ assert admin_rows[0].content["com.switch.admin"]["type"] == "trust_alerted"+ assert "Switch Trust flagged this message" in admin_rows[0].content["body"]+ # Threaded under the flagged reply itself, not under whatever thread (if+ # any) the agent happened to be posting in.+ assert admin_rows[0].thread_root_event_id == sent[0].transport_event_id+++async def test_trust_check_failure_fails_open_and_notifies_instead_of_blocking(+ harness: Harness, session_env: SessionEnv+) -> None:+ agent_id, room_id = await _setup_room(+ harness, session_env, "e2e-trust-failopen", with_admin=True)harness.protocol.trust_client = _FailingTrustClient()await harness.protocol.send_message(agent_id, room_id, "hello there")rows = await _timeline_messages(harness, session_env, room_id)- sent = [row for row in rows if "hello there" in row.content.get("body", "")]+ sent = [row for row in rows if row.content.get("body") == "hello there"]assert len(sent) == 1- assert "Switch Trust could not fully check" in sent[0].content["body"]- assert not any("com.switch.admin" in row.content for row in rows)+ admin_rows = [row for row in rows if "com.switch.admin" in row.content]+ assert len(admin_rows) == 1+ assert admin_rows[0].content["com.switch.admin"]["type"] == "trust_errored"+ assert "Switch Trust could not fully check" in admin_rows[0].content["body"]+ assert admin_rows[0].thread_root_event_id == sent[0].transport_event_iddiff --git a/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/collaboration/test_bridge_inbound_trust.py b/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/collaboration/test_bridge_inbound_trust.pyindex 07c18980f..a5a605d59 100644--- a/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/collaboration/test_bridge_inbound_trust.py+++ b/core/tests/switch_core/bridges/collaboration/test_bridge_inbound_trust.py@@ -244,6 +244,37 @@ async def test_allowed_message_is_relayed_unaffected() -> None:assert trust_client.room_ids == ["room-uuid"]+async def test_alerted_message_reaches_the_room_and_sender_is_notified() -> None:+ human_actor = _FakeHumanActor()+ adapter = _FakeAdapter()+ result = TrustCheckResult(+ outcome="alerted",+ policy_id="policy-1",+ policy_name="default",+ findings=(+ TrustFinding(category="pii/email", detector_name="email", severity="low"),+ ),+ )+ bridge = _bridge(human_actor, adapter, _FixedTrustClient(result))++ await CollaborationCore._handle_inbound_message(+ bridge, _message("my email is [email protected]")+ )++ assert len(human_actor.sent) == 1+ _, content = human_actor.sent[0]+ assert content.startswith("my email is [email protected]")+ assert "Switch Trust flagged this message" in content+ # The room content doesn't relay back to the sender's platform, so the+ # annotation needs its own notice there too.+ assert len(adapter.admin_messages) == 1+ channel_id, body, root_or_ref, message_type = adapter.admin_messages[0]+ assert channel_id == "chan-1"+ assert "Switch Trust flagged this message" in body+ assert root_or_ref == "mm-post-1"+ assert message_type == AdminMessageType.TRUST_ALERTED.value++async def test_trust_check_failure_fails_open_and_annotates_instead_of_blocking() -> (None):@@ -257,5 +288,9 @@ async def test_trust_check_failure_fails_open_and_annotates_instead_of_blocking(_, content = human_actor.sent[0]assert content.startswith("hello there")assert "Switch Trust could not fully check" in content- # A degraded check is disclosed inline, not via a separate notice.- assert adapter.admin_messages == []+ # Same as an alert: the room content alone never reaches the sender's+ # platform, so the degraded-check notice needs its own call too.+ assert len(adapter.admin_messages) == 1+ _, body, _, message_type = adapter.admin_messages[0]+ assert "Switch Trust could not fully check" in body+ assert message_type == AdminMessageType.TRUST_ERRORED.valuediff --git a/docs/design/switch-trust-guardrails-v1.md b/docs/design/switch-trust-guardrails-v1.mdindex 01f435201..98c7f8f38 100644--- a/docs/design/switch-trust-guardrails-v1.md+++ b/docs/design/switch-trust-guardrails-v1.md@@ -2,12 +2,10 @@Integrates Switch with **Switch Trust**, a guardrails service that evaluates amessage against a policy and returns a block/allow verdict. The service-exposes a `/guardrails/check` endpoint (see-[hoot#2397](https://github.com/sandbox-quantum/hoot/pull/2397) and its-[README](https://github.com/sandbox-quantum/hoot/blob/300cece9ec3625a5327a06aea66681c444c53139/services/aispm/guardrails/common/externalprocessor/README.md))-that takes a provider-agnostic `messages` array and returns an `outcome` plus-findings. This doc covers v1: a global, env-configured gate in front of every-message Switch sends, blocking on a `BLOCKED` outcome.+exposes a `/guardrails/check` endpoint on its external processor (server+side) that takes a provider-agnostic `messages` array and returns an+`outcome` plus findings. This doc covers v1: a global, env-configured gate in+front of every message Switch sends, blocking on a `BLOCKED` outcome.## Scope@@ -51,14 +49,14 @@ interception point further down the stack.## Enforcement flow-1. Map the outgoing message to the hoot request shape:+1. Map the outgoing message to the external processor's request shape:```json{"messages": [{"role": "<mapped>", "content": "<body>"}]}```Role mapping: `agent` → `assistant`, `human`/`bridge` → `user`.2. `POST {switch_trust_endpoint}/guardrails/check` — the check-only endpoint- added in [hoot#2397](https://github.com/sandbox-quantum/hoot/pull/2397) —- with headers `x-guardrails-policy-id`, `x-flintai-api-key`, and three+ on the guardrails external processor (server side) — with headers+ `x-guardrails-policy-id`, `x-flintai-api-key`, and threealways-set identity headers Switch Trust uses to group checks:- `x-agent-name`: a constant, `Switch Rooms Agents` — Switch has no single agentto attribute a check to (a room can hold several, and a human-authored@@ -117,9 +115,9 @@ on `TrustCheckResult.outcome`:accidentally end up in a log line or a notice the way it could if findingscarried it around. The caller swaps in `redacted_content` before sending ifit's set. (The endpoint's own response doesn't carry a pre-sanitized- message — hoot's "SanitizedMessages" is dashboard-ingestion-only state, not- part of the `/guardrails/check` JSON body — so this redaction is Switch's- own, built from the findings' detected text.) **Human-authored**: the+ message — the processor's "SanitizedMessages" is dashboard-ingestion-only+ state, not part of the `/guardrails/check` JSON body — so this redaction is+ Switch's own, built from the findings' detected text.) **Human-authored**: theredacted content is what reaches the room, but the sender would otherwisenever know their own words were altered — `CollaborationCore` also callsthe adapter's `admin_message(...)` back to the originating channel (a new@@ -221,9 +219,9 @@ bootstrap stopgap, never a real deployment's config, and are gone: seesplit across messages). Needs a role-mapping strategy for Switch'smulti-party rooms (which don't have a strict two-party turn structure) and adecision on including/excluding system/admin notices.-- **Tool calls / tool results**: the hoot endpoint supports `tool_calls` and- `tool_result` message fields; Switch doesn't yet have an obvious mapping- from its agent-protocol tool use onto that shape.+- **Tool calls / tool results**: the external processor's endpoint supports+ `tool_calls` and `tool_result` message fields; Switch doesn't yet have an+ obvious mapping from its agent-protocol tool use onto that shape.- **Per-tenant / per-workspace policy**: today it's one global policy for thewhole deployment. Multiple tenants wanting different policies needs a DBtable, migration, and an admin API — a materially bigger lift than the env