Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
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// CSRF protection — double-submit cookie pattern.
//
// Issue a token via GET /api/csrf-token (also returns it via Set-Cookie). Clients
// must echo the same token in the X-CSRF-Token header on state-changing POSTs.
// Tokens are bound to user_id and expire after 1 hour.
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
import { sql } from './db.js';
import { error } from './http.js';
import { authenticateBearer, extractBearer, hasSessionCookie } from './auth.js';
const TTL_SECONDS = 3600;
export async function issueCsrf(userId) {
const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
await sql`
INSERT INTO csrf_tokens (token, user_id, expires_at)
VALUES (${token}, ${userId}, now() + interval '1 hour')
`;
return { token, expiresIn: TTL_SECONDS };
}
// Middleware: returns true on success (handler may proceed), or sends a 403
// and returns false. The CSRF_DISABLED=1 escape hatch is honored ONLY outside
// production — a misconfigured env must not silently disable CSRF platform-wide
// on the live site. Machine-to-machine bearer auth is exempted below regardless.
// A bearer credential cannot ride along on a cross-site request the way a cookie
// does, so a request carrying one needs no CSRF token. The exemption has to be
// tied to the credential that actually authenticated, though: getRequestUser
// prefers the session cookie, so a request with the victim's cookie plus any
// junk "Bearer x" header would otherwise run as the victim with the token check
// skipped. Exempt only when there is no session cookie to ride on, or when the
// bearer itself authenticates as the same account the session does.
async function bearerVouchesFor(req, userId) {
const token = extractBearer(req);
if (!token) return false;
if (!hasSessionCookie(req)) return true;
const bearer = await authenticateBearer(token).catch(() => null);
return Boolean(bearer && userId && String(bearer.userId) === String(userId));
}
const IS_PROD = process.env.VERCEL_ENV === 'production' || process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production';
/**
* Validate (and consume) the request's CSRF token without writing a response.
* Callers with their own error envelope (the v1 agents API) use this; everyone
* else uses requireCsrf below.
* @returns {Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false, code: string, message: string }>}
*/
export async function checkCsrf(req, userId) {
if (!IS_PROD && process.env.CSRF_DISABLED === '1') return { ok: true };
// Bearer-token requests are exempt: the token itself is the proof of intent
// and bearer tokens aren't auto-attached by browsers like cookies are.
if (await bearerVouchesFor(req, userId)) return { ok: true };
const sent =
req.headers['x-csrf-token'] ||
req.headers['X-CSRF-Token'] ||
(typeof req.body === 'object' && req.body?._csrf);
if (!sent || typeof sent !== 'string') {
return { ok: false, code: 'csrf_missing', message: 'X-CSRF-Token header required' };
}
// One-time use, atomically: consume the token in the same statement that
// validates it. A fire-and-forget DELETE after a SELECT lets two concurrent
// requests both observe the token before either delete lands — the
// DELETE … RETURNING makes exactly one request win. The token is valid iff
// an unexpired row bound to this user came back; a wrong-user token is left
// in place for its rightful owner.
const [row] = await sql`
DELETE FROM csrf_tokens
WHERE token = ${sent} AND user_id = ${userId} AND expires_at > now()
RETURNING user_id
`;
if (!row) return { ok: false, code: 'csrf_invalid', message: 'CSRF token invalid or expired' };
return { ok: true };
}
export async function requireCsrf(req, res, userId) {
const verdict = await checkCsrf(req, userId);
if (!verdict.ok) {
error(res, 403, verdict.code, verdict.message);
return false;
}
return true;
}