Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
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// SIWS (Sign-In with Solana) endpoints — dispatched by req.query.action.
// GET /api/auth/siws/nonce → handleNonce
// POST /api/auth/siws/verify → handleVerify
import { z } from 'zod';
import { sql } from '../../_lib/db.js';
import { createSession, sessionCookie, destroySession } from '../../_lib/auth.js';
import { cors, json, method, readJson, wrap, error, rateLimited } from '../../_lib/http.js';
import { limits, clientIp } from '../../_lib/rate-limit.js';
import { env } from '../../_lib/env.js';
import { parse } from '../../_lib/validate.js';
import { randomToken, hmacSha256, sha256, constantTimeEquals } from '../../_lib/crypto.js';
import { parseSiwsMessage, verifySiwsSignature } from '../../_lib/siws.js';
import { seedDefaultAgent } from '../../_lib/seed-default-agent.js';
import { tosAcceptanceFromBody, recordTosAcceptance } from '../../_lib/legal.js';
const NONCE_TTL_SEC = 5 * 60;
const CSRF_COOKIE = '__Host-csrf-siws';
const ALLOWED_CHAIN_IDS = new Set(['mainnet', 'devnet', 'testnet']);
// Localhost is a development-only escape hatch, so it is gated on THIS
// deployment actually being a local one. See handleVerify.
const LOCAL_ORIGIN = /^https?:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?$/;
const verifyBody = z.object({
message: z.string().min(32).max(4000),
// base58 (Phantom) or base64 (other wallets) encoded 64-byte ed25519 signature
signature: z.string().min(1).max(256),
});
export default wrap(async (req, res) => {
const action = req.query?.action ?? new URL(req.url, 'http://x').pathname.split('/').filter(Boolean).pop();
if (action === 'nonce') return handleNonce(req, res);
if (action === 'verify') return handleVerify(req, res);
return error(res, 404, 'not_found', 'unknown siws action');
});
// ── Nonce ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Issue a one-time nonce for Sign-In with Solana (CAIP-122 / SIP-0).
// Mirrors /api/auth/siwe/nonce.js — same burn-on-verify replay protection.
async function handleNonce(req, res) {
if (cors(req, res, { methods: 'GET,OPTIONS', credentials: true })) return;
if (!method(req, res, ['GET'])) return;
const ip = clientIp(req);
const rl = await limits.authIp(ip);
if (!rl.success) return rateLimited(res, rl, 'too many nonce requests');
// 22 alphanumeric chars ≈ 131 bits of entropy.
let nonce = '';
while (nonce.length < 22) {
nonce += randomToken(24).replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9]/g, '');
}
nonce = nonce.slice(0, 22);
await sql`
insert into siws_nonces (nonce, expires_at)
values (${nonce}, now() + ${`${NONCE_TTL_SEC} seconds`}::interval)
`;
const csrfRaw = randomToken(32);
const csrf = await hmacSha256(env.JWT_SECRET, `csrf-siws:${csrfRaw}`);
res.setHeader(
'set-cookie',
`${CSRF_COOKIE}=${csrfRaw}; Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=${NONCE_TTL_SEC}`,
);
const issuedAt = new Date().toISOString();
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + NONCE_TTL_SEC * 1000).toISOString();
// Tell the client the canonical domain/uri to sign against. Lets dev
// frontends (Codespaces tunnels, preview deploys, etc.) proxy /api/* to
// this upstream and still produce SIWS messages that pass the domain
// check in handleVerify.
const appOrigin = env.APP_ORIGIN;
const domain = new URL(appOrigin).host;
return json(res, 200, {
nonce,
issuedAt,
expiresAt,
csrf,
ttl: NONCE_TTL_SEC,
domain,
uri: appOrigin,
});
}
// ── Verify ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Verify a Sign-In with Solana (CAIP-122 / SIP-0) message + ed25519 signature.
// On success: create or link a user, issue a browser session cookie.
// Mirrors /api/auth/siwe/verify.js — same session/user logic, different sig check.
async function handleVerify(req, res) {
if (cors(req, res, { methods: 'POST,OPTIONS', credentials: true })) return;
if (!method(req, res, ['POST'])) return;
// CSRF check.
const csrfHeader = req.headers['x-csrf-token'];
if (!csrfHeader) return error(res, 403, 'invalid_request', 'CSRF check failed');
const cookie = req.headers.cookie || '';
const csrfMatch = cookie.match(/(?:^|;\s*)__Host-csrf-siws=([^;]+)/);
const csrfCookie = csrfMatch ? decodeURIComponent(csrfMatch[1]) : null;
if (!csrfCookie) return error(res, 403, 'invalid_request', 'CSRF check failed');
const expectedCsrf = await hmacSha256(env.JWT_SECRET, `csrf-siws:${csrfCookie}`);
if (!constantTimeEquals(expectedCsrf, String(csrfHeader))) {
return error(res, 403, 'invalid_request', 'CSRF check failed');
}
const ip = clientIp(req);
const rl = await limits.authIp(ip);
if (!rl.success) return rateLimited(res, rl, 'too many attempts');
const raw = await readJson(req);
const body = parse(verifyBody, raw);
// 1. Parse SIWS message.
const fields = parseSiwsMessage(body.message);
if (!fields) return error(res, 400, 'invalid_message', 'malformed SIWS message');
// 2. Domain + URI must match this deployment.
const appOrigin = env.APP_ORIGIN;
const appHost = new URL(appOrigin).host;
const vercelHost = process.env.VERCEL_URL || null;
// Gated on this deployment's own APP_ORIGIN, not on VERCEL_ENV. Cloud Run
// never sets VERCEL_ENV, so the old check read "not production" on the live
// site and a message signed for localhost cleared the domain binding there.
// See the matching note in api/auth/siwe/[action].js.
const isLocalDev = !env.isProduction && LOCAL_ORIGIN.test(appOrigin);
const allowedHosts = new Set([appHost, vercelHost].filter(Boolean));
const domainOk =
allowedHosts.has(fields.domain) || (isLocalDev && /^localhost(:\d+)?$/.test(fields.domain));
if (!domainOk) return error(res, 400, 'invalid_domain', `domain must be ${appHost}`);
try {
const u = new URL(fields.uri);
const allowedOrigins = new Set(
[appOrigin, vercelHost ? `https://${vercelHost}` : null].filter(Boolean),
);
const originOk =
allowedOrigins.has(u.origin) ||
(isLocalDev && /^https?:\/\/localhost(:\d+)?$/.test(u.origin));
if (!originOk) return error(res, 400, 'invalid_uri', 'uri origin mismatch');
} catch {
return error(res, 400, 'invalid_uri', 'uri not a valid URL');
}
// 3. Chain ID must be a known Solana network.
if (fields.chainId && !ALLOWED_CHAIN_IDS.has(fields.chainId)) {
return error(res, 400, 'invalid_chain', 'unknown Solana chain ID');
}
// 4. Temporal checks.
const now = Date.now();
if (fields.expirationTime && Date.parse(fields.expirationTime) < now) {
return error(res, 400, 'expired', 'message expired');
}
if (fields.notBefore && Date.parse(fields.notBefore) > now) {
return error(res, 400, 'not_yet_valid', 'message not yet valid');
}
// 5. Nonce must exist, be unconsumed, and not expired.
const [nonceRow] = await sql`
select nonce, expires_at, consumed_at
from siws_nonces
where nonce = ${fields.nonce}
limit 1
`;
if (!nonceRow) return error(res, 400, 'invalid_nonce', 'unknown nonce');
if (nonceRow.consumed_at) return error(res, 400, 'nonce_reused', 'nonce already used');
if (new Date(nonceRow.expires_at) < new Date()) {
return error(res, 400, 'nonce_expired', 'nonce expired');
}
// 6. Verify ed25519 signature.
let valid;
try {
valid = verifySiwsSignature(body.message, body.signature, fields.address);
} catch {
return error(res, 401, 'invalid_signature', 'signature verification failed');
}
if (!valid) return error(res, 401, 'invalid_signature', 'signer does not match address');
// Burn the nonce (race-safe via consumed_at guard).
const burned = await sql`
update siws_nonces
set consumed_at = now(), address = ${fields.address}
where nonce = ${fields.nonce} and consumed_at is null
returning nonce
`;
if (!burned[0]) return error(res, 400, 'nonce_reused', 'nonce already used');
// 7. Find or create user. Solana address is stored as-is (base58, no lowercasing needed).
const addr = fields.address;
let [wallet] = await sql`
select user_id from user_wallets where address = ${addr} limit 1
`;
let userId;
if (wallet) {
userId = wallet.user_id;
await sql`
update user_wallets
set last_used_at = now()
where address = ${addr}
`;
} else {
// Hash of the FULL address — a truncated-prefix scheme would collapse two
// addresses sharing a prefix into one account. Existing users are unaffected:
// returning wallets are matched by address in user_wallets above, never by
// this synthetic email (which is only used to create brand-new rows).
const addrHash = await sha256(addr);
let placeholderEmail = `sol-${addrHash.slice(0, 16)}@wallet.local`;
let [existingUser] = await sql`
select id, deleted_at, password_hash from users
where email = ${placeholderEmail}
limit 1
`;
// A row at this address that carries a password was not made by wallet
// sign-in (which never sets one): it is somebody who registered the
// derivable placeholder to pre-claim this wallet. Never hand the wallet
// to it; mint the account under a fresh address it cannot hold.
if (existingUser?.password_hash) {
placeholderEmail = `sol-${addrHash.slice(0, 16)}.${randomToken(8).toLowerCase()}@wallet.local`;
existingUser = null;
}
if (existingUser) {
if (existingUser.deleted_at) {
return error(
res,
403,
'account_deleted',
'this wallet is linked to a deleted account',
);
}
userId = existingUser.id;
await sql`
insert into user_wallets (user_id, address, chain_type, is_primary)
values (${userId}, ${addr}, 'solana', true)
on conflict (address) do update
set last_used_at = now()
`;
} else {
const [user] = await sql`
insert into users (email, display_name)
values (${placeholderEmail}, ${shortAddr(addr)})
on conflict (email) do update set email = excluded.email
returning id, (xmax = 0) as inserted
`;
userId = user.id;
await sql`
insert into user_wallets (user_id, address, chain_type, is_primary)
values (${userId}, ${addr}, 'solana', true)
on conflict (address) do update
set last_used_at = now()
`;
if (user.inserted) {
// No welcome email here — placeholderEmail is a synthetic
// @wallet.local address and is not deliverable.
queueMicrotask(() => seedDefaultAgent(userId));
}
}
}
// Terms acceptance: first-party sign-in surfaces put the agreement in the
// signed SIWS statement and send tosAccepted alongside: record it for both
// brand-new and returning wallets so acceptance converges on every sign-in.
const tos = tosAcceptanceFromBody(raw);
if (tos) recordTosAcceptance({ userId, version: tos.version, context: 'siws', req });
// 8. Issue session.
await destroySession(req);
const token = await createSession({
userId,
userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'],
ip,
});
res.setHeader('set-cookie', sessionCookie(token));
const [userRow] = await sql`
select id, email, display_name, plan, avatar_url, created_at
from users where id = ${userId} limit 1
`;
return json(res, 200, {
user: userRow,
wallet: { address: addr, chain_type: 'solana', chain_id: fields.chainId || 'mainnet' },
});
}
function shortAddr(addr) {
return `${addr.slice(0, 4)}…${addr.slice(-4)}`;
}