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// @ts-check
// POST /api/jobs/flush-usage-events: QStash webhook that drains the usage event
// buffer from Redis and batch-inserts into Neon Postgres.
//
// Triggered two ways:
// 1. QStash job published by recordEvent() when BUFFER_FLUSH_THRESHOLD is crossed.
// 2. api/cron/flush-usage-events.js (1-minute cron) as a safety net.
//
// This file handles the QStash path; the cron handler is separate so it can
// keep its import graph lean and skip the signature verification overhead.
//
// Security: every inbound POST must carry a valid Upstash-Signature header
// signed by QStash. Requests without it are rejected 401.
import { error, json, method, wrap, readBody } from '../_lib/http.js';
import { env } from '../_lib/env.js';
import { verifyQstashSignature } from '../_lib/qstash.js';
import { flushUsageBuffer } from '../_lib/usage.js';
import { flushAuditBuffer } from '../_lib/x402/audit-log.js';
const JOB_PATH = '/api/jobs/flush-usage-events';
/**
* The absolute URLs this delivery is allowed to have been signed for.
*
* QStash signs the exact URL it was told to POST to (the JWT `sub` claim), so
* verification only passes when we rebuild that same string. The publisher
* (api/_lib/usage.js triggerFlushJob) builds it from `env.APP_ORIGIN`, so that
* is the first and canonical candidate: reading `process.env.APP_ORIGIN`
* instead (a var nothing in this codebase sets) made every genuinely signed
* delivery compare against a bare path and 401, silently killing the
* threshold-triggered flush lane and leaving only the 1-minute cron.
*
* The forwarded-host candidate covers a deployment served on a hostname other
* than the configured origin (a preview revision, the raw Cloud Run URL). It
* cannot be abused to bypass the check: the path stays fixed to this endpoint
* and the HMAC still has to validate against our signing keys, so a spoofed
* Host only ever admits a token QStash minted for this same job on one of our
* own hostnames.
*
* @param {import('http').IncomingMessage} req
* @returns {string[]}
*/
function verificationUrls(req) {
const urls = [];
const configured = String(env.APP_ORIGIN || '').replace(/\/+$/, '');
if (configured) urls.push(`${configured}${JOB_PATH}`);
const host = String(req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] || req.headers.host || '').split(',')[0].trim();
if (host) {
const proto = String(req.headers['x-forwarded-proto'] || 'https').split(',')[0].trim();
const derived = `${proto}://${host}${JOB_PATH}`;
if (!urls.includes(derived)) urls.push(derived);
}
return urls;
}
export default wrap(async (req, res) => {
if (!method(req, res, ['POST'])) return;
// An unset signing key cannot be told apart from a forged request once we are
// inside the catch below, and "invalid qstash signature" sends the operator
// hunting an attacker instead of a missing secret. wrap() turns this exact
// message shape into a 503 not_configured plus one deduped alert naming the var.
if (!process.env.QSTASH_CURRENT_SIGNING_KEY) {
throw new Error('Missing required env var: QSTASH_CURRENT_SIGNING_KEY');
}
// Collect the raw body for signature verification. readBody prefers
// req.rawBody (captured pre-parse by the Cloud Run server's express.json()
// `verify` hook) so the QStash HMAC check below sees the exact signed bytes:
// re-reading the raw stream here hangs forever once Express has drained it.
const raw = (await readBody(req, 1_000_000)).toString('utf8');
const signature = req.headers['upstash-signature'];
let verified = false;
let reason = 'no candidate url';
for (const url of verificationUrls(req)) {
try {
await verifyQstashSignature({ signature, body: raw, url });
verified = true;
break;
} catch (err) {
reason = err?.message || String(err);
}
}
if (!verified) {
// The reason separates a forged/absent signature from a URL the publisher
// and this deployment disagree about, which are the same 401 to the caller
// and completely different fixes for us.
console.warn('[usage-flush-job] rejected delivery:', reason);
return error(res, 401, 'unauthorized', 'invalid qstash signature');
}
const [result, audit] = await Promise.all([
flushUsageBuffer({ limit: 500 }),
flushAuditBuffer({ limit: 1000 }),
]);
if (result.errors > 0) {
console.warn('[usage-flush-job] completed with errors', result);
}
if (audit.errors > 0) {
console.warn('[x402-audit-flush-job] completed with errors', audit);
}
return json(res, 200, { usage: result, audit });
});