Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
Security exceptions (accepted npm audit findings)
Durable, citable answers for advisories that npm audit at the repo root keeps reporting and that no dependency bump can close. Each entry names the advisory, the chain, why the vulnerable path is unreachable from three.ws code, and the date measured. Re-measure with npm audit --json before trusting an entry; delete the entry the day a patched release exists and is installed.
Scope: the ROOT node_modules tree only. Vendored worker dependencies are tracked by their own fix orders and must stay byte-identical across workers (npm run check:vendored).
Measured 2026-10-25
| Advisory | Package | Chain | Patched release | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
GHSA-3gc7-fjrx-p6mg (CVSS 7.5, buffer overflow in toBigIntLE / toBufferLE) |
[email protected] |
@solana/spl-token -> @solana/buffer-layout-utils -> bigint-buffer (also via @solana/spl-stake-pool under @kamino-finance/klend-sdk) |
None. 1.1.5 is the only and latest version. |
Accepted, unreachable |
GHSA-p6mc-m468-83gw (CVSS 7.4, prototype pollution in lodash.set) |
[email protected] |
@bnb-chain/[email protected] -> lodash.set |
None. 4.3.2 is the latest; the SDK is at its latest 2.2.2. |
Accepted, unreachable |
| GHSA-86w9-cpqp-85rv (CVSS 7.5, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification) | [email protected] |
[email protected] -> helia -> @ipshipyard/libp2p-auto-tls -> acme-client -> node-forge |
None. 1.4.0 is the registry latest. |
Accepted, unreachable |
bigint-buffer
Reachability: grep -rn "bigint-buffer\|toBigIntLE\|toBufferLE" api src scripts finds nothing. The function is only reached inside @solana/spl-token / @solana/buffer-layout-utils when they decode u64 / u128 fields of SPL account and mint layouts. Those layouts have fixed byte widths set by the library; no three.ws call site passes a caller-chosen length into them. Account data is read from our own RPC lanes, not from user-supplied buffers. Mitigation if this ever changes: validate the buffer length before any direct bigint-buffer call and never add one that takes request-derived input.
lodash.set
Reachability: @bnb-chain/greenfield-js-sdk is a live dependency (api/_lib/bnb/greenfield.js, greenfield-write.js, vault-store.js and the vault endpoints), so it is not dead code. lodash.set is called inside the SDK on SDK-owned object paths while building its own request structures. three.ws passes bucket names, object names and byte payloads, never an attacker-chosen property path, so no request field becomes a set key. Mitigation if this changes: never pass user-controlled strings as path arguments to SDK message builders, and allowlist keys.
node-forge
Reachability: grep -rn "agent0-sdk" api src scripts shows only api/agents/8004/agent.js and api/agents/8004/search.js, and both import only the constants DEFAULT_SUBGRAPH_URLS and DEFAULT_REGISTRIES. No Helia, libp2p node, or auto-TLS (ACME certificate ordering) is ever constructed, and grep -rn "helia\|auto-tls" api src scripts is empty. The vulnerable RSA signature verification therefore never runs. The same dormant chain accounts for the other helia / libp2p / @libp2p/kad-dht / @libp2p/peer-store findings in the audit. Mitigation if this changes: do not start a libp2p node inside a request handler.
@solana/pay stays on 0.2.6 at the root
The root pin ^0.2.6 is intentional. @solana/pay 1.x (used by multiplayer/ and character-studio/ at 1.0.16, registry latest 1.0.26) is a rewrite on @solana/kit: findReference takes a kit Rpc<GetSignaturesForAddressApi> and a kit Address, and validateTransfer takes Rpc<GetTransactionApi>, a kit Signature, and bigint-based TransferFields. The root call sites (api/_lib/purchase-confirm.js, api/_lib/subscription-checkout.js, api/marketplace/buy-asset.js, api/print/orders/[id]/confirm.js, api/_lib/circulation.js) pass a @solana/web3.js Connection, PublicKey and BigNumber, and findReference(conn, key, { finality }) uses an option name 1.x renamed to commitment. A bump swaps in an incompatible API on the payment-verification path. 0.2.6 is the last release of the web3.js API.
Migration, when taken, must move those five verifiers (and their RPC fallback wrapper) to kit together, behind the existing purchase and checkout tests. It is a payments-path rewrite, not a version bump, and is not required to close any advisory above.