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Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.

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Verifiable 3D provenance — content credentials for AI-generated models

Every model three.ws generates, and every GLB sold through the paid asset bazaar, carries a signed content credential by default (creator, prompt, model/provider, lineage, timestamp, and the GLB's content hash) with no action required and no spend. Anyone can verify a model's authenticity and detect tampering for free, no account and no crypto. A credential can also, separately, be anchored on Solana so its hash is independently checkable on-chain; that on-chain write stays the paid, Claude-track action, and is never required to get a verified result.

Signed by default

Generate a model through Forge (any lane) or buy one through the asset bazaar and the credential already exists by the time you have the file, nobody has to call a tool first. Signing is local (ed25519) and storage is a small JSON object in R2; there's no on-chain write and no spend on this path, so it's safe to run on every single asset. A paid asset-download response includes the hash and a ready-to-share verify link directly:

{ "ok": true, "slug": "pole-dancer-rumba", "downloadUrl": "…",
  "glbSha256": "e3b0c4…", "verifyUrl": "https://three.ws/api/provenance?hash=e3b0c4…" }

The owner can turn this off platform-wide with PROVENANCE_AUTO_DISABLE=true; there's no per-asset opt-out, and turning it off never touches verify_provenance, GET /api/provenance, or anchor_provenance, which keep working on whatever was already issued.

v2 credentials also carry a signed physics grade. Alongside authorship, a credential can assert what a rigid-body solver would make of the mesh: watertight or not, real meters or a generator's unit box, its exact volume and inertia tensor. An unsigned grade is a claim anyone can forge; this one is not. See Simulation readiness. Credentials signed under v1, before the field existed, keep verifying byte for byte, permanently.

Verify a model (free, public)

curl "https://three.ws/api/provenance?src=https://three.ws/avatars/default.glb"

The endpoint always hashes the bytes it fetched, so it answers for any model, anchored or not. The stock avatar has never been anchored, so it comes back unknown with a real hash:

{
  "status": "unknown",
  "reason": "no provenance credential is on record for this asset",
  "badge": "Unverified",
  "glbSha256": "1ec0913a5093301a69a6c1f29e8ff9bed10d9e39708126e2ca2c9a4d3d7df35c",
  "credential": null,
  "issuer": null,
  "anchor": null
}

Point it at a model that has been anchored and the credential and its on-chain anchor come back with it:

{
  "status": "verified",              // verified | tampered | unknown
  "reason": "the model matches its signed credential",
  "badge": "Verified · three.ws",
  "glbSha256": "…",
  "credential": { "creator": "…", "prompt": "…", "model": "TRELLIS", "createdAt": "…" },
  "issuer": "<issuer pubkey>",
  "anchor": { "tx": "…", "cluster": "devnet", "explorerUrl": "https://explorer.solana.com/tx/…", "confirmed": true }
}

Agents get the same verdict from the verify_provenance tool on the 3D Studio MCP server. Pass glb_url or a known hash.

Verdicts:

  • verified — the signature checks out and the model bytes match the signed hash.
  • tampered — a credential exists but the bytes changed (even one byte) or the credential was altered.
  • unknown — no credential is on record for this model.

The 3D viewer (/viewer?src=…) and every model page (/m/:id) show the result as a badge: ✓ Verified · three.ws (links to the anchor), ⚠ Tampered, or Unverified.

Anchor a credential (paid, Claude track)

The anchor_provenance tool signs a credential with the three.ws issuer key, writes its hash into a Solana Memo transaction, and stores the full credential for public verification:

// tools/call → anchor_provenance
{ "glb_url": "https://three.ws/avatars/default.glb",
  "creator": "alice", "prompt": "a friendly robot", "model": "TRELLIS", "provider": "nvidia",
  "network": "devnet" }
// → { status: "anchored", glbSha256, credentialHash, issuer, anchor: { tx, cluster, explorerUrl } }

Real hashing, real ed25519 signature, real on-chain write. Requires the issuer key (ATTEST_AGENT_SECRET_KEY) and a funded issuer wallet on the target cluster; absent either, it returns a clear error rather than a fake transaction.

Why it's trustworthy

  • Tamper-evident: the credential is signed over a canonical (key-sorted) form, and it commits to the sha256 of the GLB bytes. One changed byte or one altered field flips the verdict to tampered.
  • Independently checkable: the credential hash is on Solana; the explorer link is in every verified response.
  • Coin-clean verify: the free verify path and its response carry no payment, wallet, or token fields — safe to ship in any store.

Related

  • Spatial MCP — the lineage field ties to conversational-refinement lineage
  • AR exports — provenance travels with the model into AR