Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
The real-funds agreements
three.ws is experimental technology, and agent wallets are custodial software, not bank accounts. Before anyone uses real money on the platform, they sign three agreements in one step:
- the Terms of Service (version 3),
- the Risk Disclosure (version 2),
- the Agent Wallet Agreement (version 1).
Together they say: this is experimental software; anything deposited into, held in, or sent from an agent wallet can be lost completely for any reason (bugs, hacks, lost keys, autonomous agent decisions, third-party failures, the service shutting down); nothing is insured; withdrawal or recovery is never guaranteed; deposits by anyone are at the depositor's own risk; and three.ws is not responsible for any loss.
People review and sign at /legal/agreements, or in the dialog that opens the first time they reach a real-funds action.
What signing means
The dialog requires, before the Sign button enables:
- A checkbox for each document, each linking to its full text.
- An eligibility attestation (18 or older, not sanctioned, lawful where they live).
- A no-liability attestation (experimental technology, total loss possible, nothing insured, three.ws not responsible).
- A typed full name, which is the electronic signature.
Pressing Sign and continue posts the signature to POST /api/legal/risk-ack
and waits for it to be stored. If the write does not land, the dialog stays
open with an error and nothing proceeds: the servers enforce the signature, so
letting someone through on an unrecorded signature would only walk them into a
refusal.
Enforcement: the server, not the dialog
Every endpoint where the platform signs with a custodial key on a user's request calls one helper before any transaction is built:
import { requireRealFundsAgreement } from '../_lib/real-funds-agreement.js';
if (!(await requireRealFundsAgreement(req, res, { userId: auth.userId, network, context: 'withdraw' }))) return;
It resolves true when the account has a signature at or above the current
version, and otherwise sends the response and resolves false:
| Status | error |
When |
|---|---|---|
| 403 | risk_ack_required |
The account has not signed the current agreements |
| 401 | unauthorized |
No user resolved |
| 503 | agreement_check_unavailable |
The signature lookup failed; fails closed, nothing is sent |
A 403 body tells any client, including scripts and API-key callers, exactly
where to go:
{
"error": "risk_ack_required",
"error_description": "Sign the real-funds agreements (Terms of Service, Risk Disclosure, and Agent Wallet Agreement) before using real funds. Nothing was sent. Sign at https://three.ws/legal/agreements",
"context": "withdraw",
"version": 2,
"sign_url": "https://three.ws/legal/agreements",
"documents": [
{ "key": "tos", "title": "Terms of Service", "version": 3, "url": "https://three.ws/legal/tos" },
{ "key": "risk", "title": "Risk Disclosure", "version": 2, "url": "https://three.ws/legal/risk" },
{ "key": "agentWallet", "title": "Agent Wallet Agreement", "version": 1, "url": "https://three.ws/legal/agent-wallet" }
]
}
Rules the helper and its call sites follow:
- Session and API key alike. An API key acts for its owner's account, so an unsigned account's key is refused too. Sign in as the key's owner and sign once.
- Devnet is exempt. Pass the request's
network;'devnet'skips the check. - Previews, quotes, simulations, and dry runs are never gated. Nothing moves.
- Turning spending off is never gated. Disarming autopilot, a kill switch, or cancelling a strategy always works; only turning spending on is gated.
- Checked before CSRF where the handler allows it, so a refusal does not burn the caller's single-use CSRF token.
- Scheduled automation is not interrupted. Crons that act on strategies a user already armed keep running (stopping them could strand open positions); the gate sits at the moment spending is turned on.
- Self-custody signing is gated in the client only. Flows where the user signs in their own wallet (self-custody launches, swaps, token pay) are gated by the dialog; the platform never holds those keys.
Some money paths are gated on the server only, because they have no
single-click dialog of their own: opening, resuming, depositing into,
redeeming from, owner-trading and fee-claiming a USDC vault
(vault-open, vault-resume, vault-deposit, vault-redeem, vault-trade,
vault-claim-fees), creating or resuming a programmable order
(order-create, order-resume), and hiring another agent for a paid skill
(a2a-hire). The same gate also fronts the other agent money paths, each with
its own context slug: strategies and DCA (strategy, dca-create,
dca-resume), market-maker and oracle arming (market-maker-arm,
oracle-watch-arm), the labor board (labor-post, labor-award,
labor-settle), signal subscriptions, team trades, recurring payments, SNS
registration, and the Uniswap, Robinhood Chain (Pons) and paired-quote launches.
Pausing an order, like every other way of turning spending off, is not gated.
Self-funded inference moves USDC out of the agent wallet into model credits, so
it is gated at both ends: a credit top-up (inference-topup, POST /api/agents/:id/credits/topup), enabling the automatic top-up rule
(inference-auto-fund, PUT /api/agents/:id/credits/auto-fund), and funding a
new inference key (inference-provision, POST /api/me/inference/provision).
The credits panel opens the signing dialog before the first two; the CLI prints
the server's refusal with the signing link. Their previews, and switching the
automatic rule off, are not gated.
Positive lookups are cached in-process for 10 minutes (signatures are append-only and the required version only changes on deploy); negative results are never cached, so a fresh signature takes effect on the next request.
The coverage guard
tests/real-funds-agreement-coverage.test.js
scans every route under api/ (excluding api/_lib/ and api/cron/) that
decrypts a custodial key or imports a library that does. Each one must either
call requireRealFundsAgreement (or currentSignatureFor in MCP tool handlers
that have no HTTP response), delegate to an api/_lib service that does (the
perps tools), or appear in the test's exemption list with a written reason. A
new money endpoint that forgets the gate fails npm test.
The record
Signatures are stored append-only in legal_signatures
(migration):
| Column | Holds |
|---|---|
user_id |
The signed-in account, or null for an anonymous signature. No foreign key, so the record outlives account deletion |
bundle_version |
The agreement bundle version (RISK_ACK_VERSION) |
documents |
Per document: the version signed and the sha256 of that page's <main> text as served at signing time |
signature_name |
The typed name, NFKC-normalized |
attestations |
The attestations confirmed |
context, path |
Which feature and page prompted the signature |
ip, user_agent, created_at |
Where and when |
Each signature also writes a risk-ack-accept row to audit_log, which the
audit-log-cleanup cron exempts from retention.
The endpoint
GET /api/legal/risk-ack returns the caller's status:
{ "authenticated": true, "signed": true, "signedAt": "2026-09-17T18:04:11.000Z", "signatureName": "Ada Lovelace", "version": 2, "documents": [ ... ] }
Add ?history=1 (signed in) to include every past signature. POST records a
signature and answers 200 { ok: true, recorded: true, version }, 400 with
invalid_version, document_not_accepted, attestation_missing, or
invalid_signature when the body is not a complete signature, or 503 signature_not_recorded when the write did not land.
Anonymous signatures and deposits
Anyone can fund an agent, including visitors with no account, and anyone can send tokens to a public address without visiting three.ws at all. So:
- The Deposit tab in the agent wallet hub, and the deposit sheet on
/wallet, hide the address on mainnet until the visitor signs. A visitor with no session signs anonymously; the signature covers that browser. - Tips from a connected wallet (the tip modal) require a signature.
- The Agent Wallet Agreement states that every deposit, by anyone and by any means, is governed by it, and a notice under the deposit address says so.
For a signed-in visitor, the client never trusts a signature cached in this browser on its own: it confirms the account's server record once per page, so a signature left by an anonymous visit or another account does not stand in for this account's.
Client API
The canonical module is public/risk-ack.js, served
at /risk-ack.js, dependency-free so plain pages and third-party embeds can
import it. Bundled app code imports the wrapper
src/shared/risk-ack.js, which never rejects and
degrades to a native confirm() if the module fails to load.
import { ensureRiskAck, hasRiskAckVerified, fetchWithRiskAck } from './shared/risk-ack.js';
// Gate an action. Resolves false when the person declines: abort.
if (!(await ensureRiskAck({ context: 'trade' }))) return;
// Decide what to render without prompting (e.g. whether to show a deposit address).
const signed = await hasRiskAckVerified();
// Let a request re-prompt on the server's refusal and retry once after signing.
const res = await fetchWithRiskAck('/api/agents/abc/solana/withdraw', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
credentials: 'include',
body: JSON.stringify({ destination, amount, network: 'mainnet' }),
}, { context: 'withdraw' });
ensureRiskAck({ force: true }) ignores any cached signature and asks again;
fetchWithRiskAck uses it after a risk_ack_required response.
Changing a document
- Edit the page under
public/legal/and update its version and effective date. - Bump that document's
versioninAGREEMENT_DOCUMENTSand bumpRISK_ACK_VERSIONinpublic/risk-ack.js. - Deploy. Every signature below the new bundle version stops counting on the client and the server, and everyone signs again before their next real-funds action. People who do not accept can ask support to return their agent wallet balance (Agent Wallet Agreement, section 15).
Bumping TOS_VERSION in api/_lib/legal.js separately
keeps the sign-in clickwrap record in step with the Terms version.
Gated surfaces (client)
| Surface | Entry point | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Agent wallet: deposit address | src/agent-wallet-hub/tabs/deposit.js |
deposit |
| Agent wallet: trade | src/agent-wallet-hub/tabs/trade.js |
trade |
| Agent wallet: withdraw | src/agent-wallet-hub/tabs/withdraw.js |
withdraw |
| Agent wallet: give | src/agent-wallet-hub/tabs/give.js |
give |
| Agent wallet: arm sniper | src/agent-wallet-hub/tabs/snipe.js |
snipe |
| Agent wallet: arm autopilot | src/agent-wallet-hub/tabs/autopilot.js |
autopilot |
| Agent wallet: x402 pay | src/agent-wallet-hub/tabs/pay.js |
x402-pay |
| Agent inference credits: top up, arm auto-fund | src/inference-credits.js |
inference-topup, inference-auto-fund |
| Tip an agent from a connected wallet | src/shared/agent-tip-modal.js |
tip |
| Master wallet: deposit, send, fund agent | src/master-wallet.js |
deposit, master-send, fund-agent |
| Oracle arm (live mode only) | src/arm.js |
oracle-arm |
| Strategy panel: equip or run a strategy with a real-funds leg | src/shared/agent-strategy-panel.js |
strategy |
| Prediction markets | src/shared/predictions-core.js |
prediction |
| Jupiter swap modal | src/swap-jupiter.js |
swap |
| pump.fun token launch | src/pump/launch-token-modal.js |
launch |
The /launch launchpad: launch a coin, claim creator rewards |
src/launch/launch-page.js |
launch, claim |
| Robinhood Chain (Pons) launch | src/launch-robinhood/page.js |
pons-launch |
| Paired-quote launch | src/paired/launch.js |
paired-launch |
| Uniswap launch | src/uniswap-launch/page.js |
uniswap-launch |
| Agent-home pump.fun buy/sell | src/agent-home-pumpfun.js |
pump-trade |
| pump.fun x402 access payment | src/pump/pump-modals.js |
x402-pay |
| Skill purchase modal | src/payment-modal.js |
skill-purchase |
| $THREE token payments | src/token-pay.js |
token-pay |
| Forge pay-per-generation | src/forge-pay.js |
forge-pay |
| Add funds / Coinbase onramp | src/shared/add-funds.js |
onramp |
| Drop-in x402 modal (incl. merchant embeds) | public/x402.js |
x402-pay |
| Review and sign page | public/legal/agreements.js, loaded as a module by public/legal/agreements.html |
agreements-page |
If you add a surface, add its row here and its gate call in the code, and if it
signs with a custodial key, call requireRealFundsAgreement in its handler: all
in the same change.
Related
- Agent Wallet Agreement
- Risk Disclosure
- Terms of Service, section 8
- Custody you can verify: the spend limits and freezes that bound what agents can do after signing