Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
Security Remediation Plan — 2026-06-18
Historical record: the fix plan tracked against the 2026-06-18 audit. Preserved as written; for current infrastructure see docs/ops/gcp-production.md.
Ordered fix plan for the findings in SECURITY_AUDIT.md. Statuses are kept in sync as each item lands.
Order of work
- SSRF guards —
onchain.jsmanifest fetch (H1), card-model (M1), erc8004 register-confirm (M2). Single shared guard; highest unauthenticated impact. - Stored XSS — validator-report (H2), admin panel (H3/L1).
- Avatar IDOR — optimize + video-generate (H4).
- OAuth — atomic code consumption (H6), introspection auth (M8).
- Withdrawals — saved-wallet destination (H5).
- pump-fun-mcp — per-call settle, bearer scope, image SSRF, per-principal limit (H7, M6).
- Headers — frame-ancestors/X-Frame-Options (H11), Permissions-Policy (M14),
CSP trim/dedupe (H12), CORS audit (H13).
'unsafe-inline'came out on 2026-08-06 via per-response script hashes (server/csp-hashes.mjs);'unsafe-eval'scoping is the one piece still open, and SECURITY_AUDIT.md H12 records what has to move first. - Missing rate limits / auth — oracle/social (M3), ibm/attest (M4), persona (M5), forever/inscribe (M9), render endpoints (L10), misc Low.
- Payment concurrency — idempotency NX (M10), USD spend cap atomic (H9), permissions/redeem atomic (M7).
- Wallet key encryption — dedicated key + per-record salt + dual-read (H8).
- Recipient/decimals — pay-by-name binding (M11), spending-cap decimals (M12), skill spend cap (M13).
- CSRF on cookie mutations (M15), Solidity SafeERC20 (L2), remaining Low.
- Client secret exposure — VITE_PINATA + RPC keys (H10).
- Dependencies: remove the unused packages that carry the criticals, pin
the rest through root
overrides(C1); track what upstream has not fixed.
Migration notes
- H8 (wallet key encryption): must be dual-read. Existing ciphertext was
produced with the
JWT_SECRET-derived key + constant salt. New code reads a version tag: legacy records decrypt with the old derivation; new writes useWALLET_ENCRYPTION_KEY+ a random per-record salt embedded in the payload. No data migration required; records re-encrypt opportunistically on next write. - C1 (landed 2026-08-06): the breaking
@metaplex-foundation/jsbump was never needed. The package was declared by four workspaces and imported by none, so it was removed outright along with itsaptos/[email protected]/[email protected]subtree, and the last critical ([email protected]under the greenfield cosmos types) fell to a globalprotobufjs: ^7.6.5override. The production tree went from 3 critical / 41 high to 0 critical / 18 high.bigint-buffer,adm-zip,lodash.set,undici@5underhardhat, and@libp2p/kad-dhthave no non-breaking upstream fix and stay tracked.
Follow-on review (2026-06-24), closed 2026-08-06
The separate review of the net-new surface,
review-2026-06-24.md, had eight findings left open as
documented after its surgical pass: two Medium (M4 unverified settlement
signatures, M5 wallet-intent daily-cap TOCTOU) and six Low (L3 swarm CSRF and
rate limit, L4 unowned walk avatarId, L5 vault budget TOCTOU, L6 Agora post-cap
race, L7 paid-feed disclosure, L8 the copy-pasted cron gate). All eight are fixed;
that document carries the per-item remediation and the residuals worth knowing
about. Nothing from either review is open now except the dependency work in C1's
tracked set.