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Trust primitives

A trust primitive answers one question an autonomous agent has right before it acts: "Should I trust the thing on the other side of this transaction?" Before Agent A pays, trades with, or delegates to Agent B, it needs B's trustworthiness — from real evidence, not a self-reported rating.

three.ws exposes this as a single paid endpoint that works on any counterparty, on any chain, regardless of which platform that counterparty was minted on.


Cross-chain Agent Reputation

GET /api/x402/agent-reputation?subject=<identifier> — $0.01 USDC per call (Base or Solana mainnet, via x402).

Pass any counterparty identifier. The type is auto-detected and scored from whatever real on-chain evidence exists for it:

You pass Detected as Scored from
A Solana wallet (base58) solana_wallet signature history, account age, SOL balance, denylist, and — if it's a known three.ws agent wallet — its settled agent-payment record
A pump.fun / SPL mint (base58) solana_mint the owning agent's settled payments + attestations (three.ws mints) or live DexScreener market signals (external mints)
An EVM address (0x…) evm_wallet transaction count (nonce), native-asset holdings priced to USD
An ERC-8004 agent id (42 or erc8004:8453:42) erc8004_agent the ERC-8004 reputation registry (feedback average × count) + the bound agent wallet's EVM activity/holdings
A three.ws agent_id (UUID) threews_agent the three.ws on-chain index: confirmed pump.fun agent-payments, distinct payers, failure rate, and signed Solana attestations

?chain=<id> sets the EVM chain for a bare EVM address or ERC-8004 id (default 8453 / Base). agent_id=<uuid> is still accepted as an alias for subject so existing callers don't break.

Response

{
  "subject": "FeMbDoX7R1Psc4GEcvJdsbNbZA3bfztcyDCatJVJpump",
  "subjectType": "solana_mint",
  "score": 71,
  "tier": "high",
  "signals": {
    "dimensions": {
      "activity":       { "available": true, "weight": 25, "norm": 0.62, "points": 16, "value": 124 },
      "age":            { "available": true, "weight": 15, "norm": 0.48, "points": 7,  "days": 176 },
      "counterparties": { "available": true, "weight": 15, "norm": 0.72, "points": 11, "value": 18 },
      "holdings":       { "available": true, "weight": 10, "norm": 1.0,  "points": 10, "usd": 412000 },
      "reliability":    { "available": true, "weight": 15, "norm": 0.98, "points": 15, "failure_rate": 0.02 },
      "attestations":   { "available": true, "weight": 20, "norm": 0.6,  "points": 12, "count": 6, "avg_feedback": null }
    },
    "weight_considered": 100
  },
  "evidence": [
    { "kind": "solana_token",  "ref": "https://solscan.io/token/FeMbDoX7R1Psc4GEcvJdsbNbZA3bfztcyDCatJVJpump" },
    { "kind": "threews_agent", "ref": "/agent/7b9a4f30-2d11-4e2d-9d12-1cdb1f6a3a55" }
  ],
  "caveats": [],
  "ts": "2026-07-07T00:00:00Z"
}
  • score — 0–100, or null when the subject can't be scored (see below).
  • tier — unknown · low · medium · high · elite.
  • signals.dimensions — the per-dimension breakdown, so the score is auditable, not a black box.
  • evidence — links you can follow to the raw on-chain source for each signal.
  • caveats — every dimension that couldn't be read for this subject, spelled out.

The score rule

The score is a deterministic, available-weighted average of six trust dimensions. Given the same signals it always returns the same score — the scoring function is pure and unit-tested (tests/subject-reputation.test.js); only the signal-gathering is live.

Dimension Weight Saturates at Real signal
activity 25 200 tx/payments transaction / confirmed-payment count
age 15 365 days account age (first on-chain activity)
counterparties 15 25 distinct payers / peers
holdings 10 $1,000 native + token value held on-chain (USD)
reliability 15 — 1 − settlement failure rate
attestations 20 10 signed Solana attestations / ERC-8004 feedback

Each dimension is normalized to 0..1 (value ÷ saturation cap, clamped). The score is:

score = round( 100 × Σ(weightᵢ × normᵢ) / Σ(weightᵢ) )      over available dimensions only

Only the dimensions that could actually be read are counted — in both the numerator and the denominator. A subject we can only read two dimensions for is scored fairly against its own evidence, not penalised for chains we couldn't reach. Every unread dimension becomes a caveat.

Two overrides:

  • ERC-8004 feedback quality — a net-negative feedback average scales the attestation contribution down (never up); neutral/positive feedback counts in full.
  • Denylist — a subject on the three.ws denylist is capped at score 10 regardless of any positive signal. A known-bad counterparty is never "medium trust" because it has volume.

Tier bands

Score Tier
null unknown
0–29 low
30–59 medium
60–84 high
≥ 85 elite

Never a fabricated score

  • Unknown / unscannable subject → HTTP 200 with score: null, tier: "unknown", and an explicit caveat. The endpoint never invents a number.
  • A data source is down → the score degrades to whatever is readable, and the missing source is named in caveats. The call never 500s.

Batch mode

POST /api/x402/agent-reputation with { "mode": "batch", "subjects": [...] } scores up to 25 arbitrary counterparties (any chain, auto-detected) in one paid call:

{ "mode": "batch", "subjects": ["<solana_wallet>", "0x<evm>", "42"], "chain": 8453 }

Returns { mode, count, scored_count, unknown_count, avg_score, subjects: [ …full result each… ] }.

The same POST route also serves three.ws-fleet monitoring over the platform's indexed active-agent set: mode: "sweep" (fleet average + flagged low-trust agents), mode: "leaderboard" (top N by score), and mode: "decay_report" (agents whose score dropped >10 points). See the x402 catalog.


Who uses this, and why us

A payments agent about to settle an invoice, a trading agent about to route an order to a market maker, or an orchestrator about to delegate a task all face the same decision: is this counterparty safe? Competing reputation endpoints only know agents minted on their own platform — useless the moment the counterparty is from somewhere else. This one reads Solana, every major EVM chain, the ERC-8004 registry, and the three.ws on-chain index behind a single call, so an agent can vet whoever it's about to transact with. That's why an outside agent has a reason to pay for it.


Cross-platform On-Chain Identity Verifier

Reputation answers "should I trust them?". Identity answers the question that comes first: "are they who they say they are?" Before Agent A pays a counterparty that claims "I am the deployer of contract X" or "I own wallet W / name N / agent id 42", it needs cryptographic proof the identity↔address link is real — not a self-report.

GET /api/x402/onchain-identity-verify?identity=<id>&address=<addr>&chain=<caip2> — $0.005 USDC per call (Base or Solana mainnet, via x402).

It verifies a claim that identity controls address, for any identity type, on any chain — regardless of the platform the counterparty came from:

identity you pass Detected as Verified from (real source)
An ENS name (vitalik.eth) ens ENS forward + reverse resolution (Ethereum RPC)
An SNS name (bonfida.sol) sns SNS resolution + favorite-domain reverse lookup (Solana RPC / Bonfida)
An EVM wallet (0x…) evm_address contract deploy tx + deployer (Etherscan V2) and/or the contract's owner() getter
A Solana wallet (base58) solana_address SPL mint authority, freeze authority, and Metaplex update authority of the claimed mint
An ERC-8004 id (eip155:8453:42 or 8453:42) erc8004 Identity Registry ownerOf(id) + getAgentWallet(id)
A three.ws agent_id (UUID) threews_agent_id the canonical meta.onchain deploy record: deploy tx, owner wallet, metadata URI

chain is an optional CAIP-2 hint (eip155:1, eip155:8453, solana:5eykt4Us…); it's inferred from the identity/address shape when omitted. The legacy agent_id + contract_or_mint params are still accepted as aliases so existing callers don't break.

Response

{
  "claim": { "identity": "vitalik.eth", "address": "0xd8dA6BF26964aF9D7eEd9e03E53415D37aA96045", "chain": "eip155:1" },
  "identity_type": "ens",
  "verified": true,
  "method": "ens-resolution",
  "evidence": [
    { "kind": "ens_forward_resolution", "ref": "vitalik.eth", "detail": "resolves to 0xd8da…6045" },
    { "kind": "ens_reverse_resolution", "ref": "0xd8dA…6045", "detail": "primary name vitalik.eth" }
  ],
  "caveats": [],
  "ts": "2026-07-07T00:00:00Z"
}

The evidence model

evidence[] is a list of { kind, ref, detail } — each ref is a concrete on-chain handle (a tx hash, a wallet, a registry entry, a resolved name) you can follow to the raw source. The verdict is never a bare boolean:

  • verified: true — concrete on-chain evidence links the identity to the address (the name resolves to it, the identity deployed / owns the contract, holds the mint authority, or is the registered ERC-8004 owner). Always accompanied by ≥1 evidence item.
  • verified: false — the authoritative source was read and links the address to someone else (or nobody). A disproof, backed by what was read.
  • verified: "unverifiable" — not enough could be read to decide: the name didn't resolve, the explorer key is absent, the RPC was down, or the address is an opaque EOA with nothing on-chain to compare. caveats[] names exactly what's missing. This is never a false positive — an undetermined claim is never reported as true.

Guarantees

  • No false positives. verified: true requires concrete on-chain evidence; every "true" branch attaches the evidence that proves it.
  • Degrade, never fail. A down explorer/RPC downgrades one evidence source to a caveat; bad input is a 400; the endpoint never 500s.
  • Two distinct EOAs can't be faked as linked. With no contract, mint, or name to compare, a wallet-vs-wallet claim returns unverifiable and asks for a name / ERC-8004 id instead — it won't guess.

Who uses this, and why us

A payments agent settling an invoice, a trading agent routing to a market maker, or an orchestrator delegating a task all hit the same pre-flight check: is this counterparty the entity it claims to be? Competing verifiers only know identities minted on their own platform. This one reads ENS, SNS, every major EVM chain's contract-creation + ownership, the ERC-8004 registry, and the three.ws on-chain index behind a single call — so an agent can verify whoever it's about to transact with. Pair it with Cross-chain Agent Reputation: verify who they are, then score whether to trust them.


See also: x402 paid endpoints · Agent Bouncer · ERC-8004 identity