Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
JavaScript 3d-generationai-agentsanimationavatardigital-humangenerative-aiglbgltfimage-to-3dllmmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolsolanatext-to-3dthreejsweb-componentswebglwebxrx402
// Guest-token signing/verification — the account proof for un-walleted players.
//
// The game profile account key (playerId) must never be taken from a raw client
// option: a `pid` set to a victim's wallet or guest id would load and control
// their saved profile (gold, bank, items) and grief them off their eviction
// channel. Wallet accounts are proven by a play pass (verifyPlayPass). Guests have
// no wallet to sign, so the SERVER mints them an identity instead: a random guest
// id sealed into an HMAC-signed token here. The client echoes the token back on
// reconnect; the room verifies it and binds the sealed guest id as the account,
// so a guest id can only ever be claimed by the socket that holds its signed
// token — another client can't guess or assert it.
//
// Format: base64url(JSON{ k:'guest', gid, iat, exp }) + '.' + base64url(HMAC-SHA256).
// Same construction + shared secret as play-pass.js / presence-token.js so the
// whole multiplayer trust layer keys off one secret.
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
// 90 days — long enough that a returning guest keeps their progression across
// sessions, short enough to bound an abandoned id. The client refreshes the token
// (re-issued on every join below) well before this, so an active guest never lapses.
const GUEST_TTL_S = 60 * 60 * 24 * 90;
function secret() {
return (
process.env.MULTIPLAYER_SHARED_SECRET ||
process.env.HOLDER_PASS_SECRET ||
'dev-insecure-multiplayer-secret'
);
}
function b64url(buf) {
return Buffer.from(buf).toString('base64').replace(/=+$/, '').replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_');
}
function hmac(body) {
return b64url(crypto.createHmac('sha256', secret()).update(body).digest());
}
function safeEqual(a, b) {
const ba = Buffer.from(a);
const bb = Buffer.from(b);
if (ba.length !== bb.length) return false;
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(ba, bb);
}
// Guest ids are server-minted with this prefix so they're visibly distinct from
// wallet accounts and from a client-supplied `g_…` localStorage id (which is no
// longer trusted as an account key).
const GUEST_PREFIX = 'gs_';
/**
* Mint a fresh, unguessable guest id.
* @returns {string}
*/
export function newGuestId() {
return GUEST_PREFIX + crypto.randomBytes(12).toString('hex');
}
/**
* Seal a guest id into a signed token the client stores and replays on reconnect.
* @param {string} gid
* @returns {string}
*/
export function signGuestToken(gid) {
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const body = b64url(JSON.stringify({ k: 'guest', gid, iat: now, exp: now + GUEST_TTL_S }));
return `${body}.${hmac(body)}`;
}
/**
* Verify a guest token and return its sealed guest id, or null when the token is
* missing, malformed, tampered with, or expired.
* @param {unknown} token
* @returns {string | null}
*/
export function verifyGuestToken(token) {
if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length < 16 || token.length > 4096) return null;
const dot = token.indexOf('.');
if (dot <= 0) return null;
const body = token.slice(0, dot);
const sig = token.slice(dot + 1);
if (!safeEqual(sig, hmac(body))) return null;
let payload;
try {
payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(body.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/'), 'base64').toString('utf8'));
} catch {
return null;
}
if (!payload || typeof payload !== 'object' || payload.k !== 'guest') return null;
if (typeof payload.exp !== 'number' || payload.exp * 1000 < Date.now()) return null;
const now = Date.now() / 1000;
if (typeof payload.iat !== 'number' || payload.iat > now + 60) return null;
// `gs_…` ids are server-minted. `guest-…` ids are the legacy client-minted
// localStorage ids: a bare one is never trusted, but once the room has sealed
// it into a signed token (the one-time migration in WalkRoom._resolveIdentity)
// the HMAC proves the server vouched for it, so honoring it here is what lets
// a pre-token guest keep their progression.
if (typeof payload.gid !== 'string') return null;
if (!payload.gid.startsWith(GUEST_PREFIX) && !payload.gid.startsWith('guest-')) return null;
return payload.gid;
}