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/**
* EVM keyless RPC endpoint hygiene.
*
* `CHAINS[].rpcUrls` is the last rung of the failover chain in
* api/_lib/evm/rpc.js. A dead entry there is not harmless: it is reached on
* every call that got that far, and a host that accepts the TCP connection and
* then stalls burns the caller's entire timeout budget rather than failing fast.
*
* That is not hypothetical. On 2026-07-29 `/api/v1/resolve` returned 503
* `ens_unavailable` for every `.eth` name in production. Each endpoint answered
* an ENS resolve in 229-816 ms on its own, but the chain as a whole took
* 1154-7066 ms because two rungs were dead — enough to blow the 8 s ENS budget.
* Two separate causes, both now pinned below:
*
* 1. Ankr moved its keyless public RPCs behind auth. Every `rpc.ankr.com/*`
* host we listed answers `-32000 Unauthorized` except celo.
* 2. Hosts that serve a cheap `eth_blockNumber` but time out on an
* `eth_call`-class read (eth.drpc.org, "Request timeout on the free plan")
* must not lead a chain.
*
* These are offline structural checks — they never hit the network, so they
* cannot flake. Re-probing liveness is a manual step documented on `CHAINS`.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { CHAINS } from '../api/_lib/erc8004-chains.js';
import { evmRpcEndpoints } from '../api/_lib/evm/rpc.js';
// Hosts proven dead from a datacenter IP. Re-probe with a HEAVY method before
// ever removing an entry from this list.
const DEAD = [
// Cloudflare bot-wall 403s server-side POSTs.
'eth.llamarpc.com',
// Endpoint sunset (-32046).
'cloudflare-eth.com',
];
// Ankr is dead keyless EXCEPT this one path, which still answered on 2026-07-29.
const ANKR_ALLOWED = ['https://rpc.ankr.com/celo'];
const allUrls = CHAINS.flatMap((c) => c.rpcUrls || []);
describe('keyless RPC endpoint list', () => {
it('lists no host known to reject or stall server-side POSTs', () => {
const offenders = allUrls.filter((u) => DEAD.some((h) => u.includes(h)));
expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
});
it('carries no Ankr public RPC beyond the one still answering', () => {
const ankr = allUrls.filter((u) => u.includes('rpc.ankr.com'));
expect(ankr).toEqual(ANKR_ALLOWED);
});
it('never leaves a chain depending on a single endpoint', () => {
// The platform rule: no external data source is a single point of failure.
const thin = CHAINS
.filter((c) => (c.rpcUrls || []).length < 2)
.map((c) => `${c.name} (${c.id}): ${JSON.stringify(c.rpcUrls)}`);
expect(thin).toEqual([]);
});
it('does not lead mainnet with the endpoint that times out on heavy reads', () => {
const eth = CHAINS.find((c) => c.id === 1);
// eth.drpc.org may stay in the list as a later rung; it must not be first.
expect(eth.rpcUrls[0]).not.toContain('drpc.org');
});
it('uses https for every endpoint and lists no duplicates', () => {
expect(allUrls.filter((u) => !u.startsWith('https://'))).toEqual([]);
for (const c of CHAINS) {
const urls = c.rpcUrls || [];
expect(new Set(urls).size, `${c.name} has duplicate rpcUrls`).toBe(urls.length);
}
});
});
describe('evmRpcEndpoints priority', () => {
it('pins an explicit primaryUrl ahead of the keyless list', () => {
const urls = evmRpcEndpoints(1, 'https://my-node.example/rpc');
expect(urls[0]).toBe('https://my-node.example/rpc');
});
it('de-duplicates a primaryUrl that also appears in the keyless list', () => {
const eth = CHAINS.find((c) => c.id === 1);
const dupe = eth.rpcUrls[0];
const urls = evmRpcEndpoints(1, dupe);
expect(urls.filter((u) => u === dupe)).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('still returns the keyless list when no override or key is configured', () => {
expect(evmRpcEndpoints(1).length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
});
});