Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
JavaScript 3d-generationai-agentsanimationavatardigital-humangenerative-aiglbgltfimage-to-3dllmmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolsolanatext-to-3dthreejsweb-componentswebglwebxrx402
// The x402 replay/idempotency cache must never hold spendable key material.
// Both vanity endpoints deliver a Solana secret exactly once in the live
// response; what they hand storeResponse() is a stripped copy. These pin that.
//
// The verifiable endpoint has a second, less obvious leak channel: its receipt
// is verifiable precisely BECAUSE serverSeed re-derives the key (masterSeed =
// HKDF(serverSeed || clientSeed || requestNonce), then candidate winningIndex).
// So serverSeed is key-equivalent and must be stripped even from a SEALED
// delivery, where the plaintext secret was never in the body to begin with.
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { cacheSafeBody as vanityCacheSafeBody } from '../api/x402/vanity.js';
import { cacheSafeBody as verifiableCacheSafeBody } from '../api/x402/vanity-verifiable.js';
const SECRET_B58 = '5JueXamPLEonLYnEvErAfUnDeDkEyMaTeRiAL111111111111111111111111111';
const SECRET_BYTES = Array.from({ length: 64 }, (_, i) => i);
const SERVER_SEED = 'a'.repeat(64);
function groundResult(extra = {}) {
return {
address: 'SoEXAMPLEdoNotUse1111111111111111111111111111',
prefix: 'So',
suffix: null,
ignoreCase: false,
format: 'keypair',
secretKeyBase58: SECRET_B58,
secretKey: SECRET_BYTES,
mnemonic: null,
attempts: 3042,
network: 'solana',
source: 'ground',
certificate: { certId: 'cert_1', signature: 'ed25519:…' },
...extra,
};
}
function receipt(extra = {}) {
return {
protocol: 'three-vanity/v1',
address: 'SoEXAMPLEdoNotUse1111111111111111111111111111',
commitment: 'b'.repeat(64),
serverSeed: SERVER_SEED,
clientSeed: 'c'.repeat(64),
requestNonce: 'd'.repeat(32),
winningIndex: 3041,
attempts: 3042,
sealed: false,
signature: 'e'.repeat(128),
servicePublicKey: 'SoServiceKey1111111111111111111111111111111',
secretKeyBase58: SECRET_B58,
secretKey: SECRET_BYTES,
seed: 'f'.repeat(64),
...extra,
};
}
describe('/api/x402/vanity cacheSafeBody', () => {
it('strips the plaintext secret from an unsealed result and marks it', () => {
const stored = JSON.parse(vanityCacheSafeBody(groundResult()));
expect(stored.secretKeyBase58).toBeUndefined();
expect(stored.secretKey).toBeUndefined();
expect(stored).not.toHaveProperty('mnemonic');
expect(stored.secret_omitted_from_cache).toBe(true);
expect(stored.note).toMatch(/never stored/i);
});
it('keeps the public metadata a replayed payment still needs', () => {
const stored = JSON.parse(vanityCacheSafeBody(groundResult()));
expect(stored.address).toBe('SoEXAMPLEdoNotUse1111111111111111111111111111');
expect(stored.attempts).toBe(3042);
expect(stored.certificate.certId).toBe('cert_1');
});
it('strips a mnemonic delivery too (the phrase is key material)', () => {
const stored = JSON.parse(
vanityCacheSafeBody(
groundResult({ format: 'mnemonic', mnemonic: 'legal winner thank year wave sausage worth useful legal winner thank yellow', wordCount: 12 }),
),
);
expect(stored.mnemonic).toBeUndefined();
expect(stored.wordCount).toBe(12);
});
it('caches a sealed delivery unchanged (ciphertext is safe at rest)', () => {
const sealed = {
address: 'SoEXAMPLEdoNotUse1111111111111111111111111111',
sealed: true,
sealedSecret: { scheme: 'x25519-hkdf-sha256-aes256gcm', ciphertext: 'AAAA', recipient: 'r' },
};
expect(JSON.parse(vanityCacheSafeBody(sealed))).toEqual(sealed);
});
it('never emits the secret in the serialized string', () => {
expect(vanityCacheSafeBody(groundResult())).not.toContain(SECRET_B58);
});
});
describe('/api/x402/vanity-verifiable cacheSafeBody', () => {
it('strips the plaintext secret and the key-equivalent serverSeed', () => {
const stored = JSON.parse(verifiableCacheSafeBody(receipt()));
expect(stored.secretKeyBase58).toBeUndefined();
expect(stored.secretKey).toBeUndefined();
expect(stored.seed).toBeUndefined();
expect(stored.serverSeed).toBeUndefined();
expect(stored.secret_omitted_from_cache).toBe(true);
});
it('strips serverSeed from a SEALED receipt as well', () => {
const sealedReceipt = receipt({
sealed: true,
sealedSecret: { scheme: 'x25519-hkdf-sha256-aes256gcm', ciphertext: 'AAAA', recipient: 'r' },
secretKeyBase58: undefined,
secretKey: undefined,
seed: undefined,
});
const stored = JSON.parse(verifiableCacheSafeBody(sealedReceipt));
expect(stored.serverSeed).toBeUndefined();
// The buyer's own ciphertext stays: only their X25519 key opens it.
expect(stored.sealedSecret.ciphertext).toBe('AAAA');
});
it('keeps the non-reconstructing receipt fields', () => {
const stored = JSON.parse(verifiableCacheSafeBody(receipt()));
expect(stored.commitment).toBe('b'.repeat(64));
expect(stored.winningIndex).toBe(3041);
expect(stored.signature).toBe('e'.repeat(128));
expect(stored.address).toBe('SoEXAMPLEdoNotUse1111111111111111111111111111');
});
it('never emits the secret or the serverSeed in the serialized string', () => {
const body = verifiableCacheSafeBody(receipt());
expect(body).not.toContain(SECRET_B58);
expect(body).not.toContain(SERVER_SEED);
});
});