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security: harden post-Vercel credential handling (#233)

ni3a03ebb425ff72
diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index 0f03f576b..2517e7999 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# three.ws — backend environment
-# Copy to .env.local for local dev. In production, set these in Vercel.
+# Copy to .env.local for local dev. Production runs on Cloud Run; store secrets
+# in Google Secret Manager and attach them as Cloud Run secret references.
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Public site origin (no trailing slash)
@@ -9,7 +10,8 @@ PUBLIC_APP_ORIGIN=https://three.ws
# Postgres (Neon serverless driver — HTTPS connection string)
DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:[email protected]/neondb?sslmode=require
-# S3-compatible storage (AWS S3, Cloudflare R2, Backblaze B2, etc.)
+# S3-compatible storage (AWS S3, Cloudflare R2, Backblaze B2, etc.). Treat both
+# credential fields as secrets in production; see docs/ops/hosting-and-credentials.md.
S3_ENDPOINT=
S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
@@ -32,8 +34,9 @@ UPSTASH_REDIS_REST_TOKEN=
# agent lists, …) at a SECOND Upstash store stops large cache writes from contending
# with — and burning the command quota of — the limiter. That contention is what
# causes the redis SET timeouts on /api/galaxy/flows. Co-locate this store with your
-# prod Vercel region for low write latency. Unset = caches share the store above (no
-# behavior change). Vercel-KV second store prefixed `cache`: cache_KV_REST_API_*.
+# production Cloud Run region for low write latency. Unset = caches share the store
+# above (no behavior change). Legacy KV integrations may prefix the second store
+# with `cache`: cache_KV_REST_API_*.
UPSTASH_CACHE_REST_URL=
UPSTASH_CACHE_REST_TOKEN=
@@ -82,7 +85,8 @@ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=
CHAT_MODEL=claude-sonnet-5
CHAT_MAX_TOKENS=1024
-# Admin key for three.ws chat brand config. Set in Vercel, enter in chat settings to unlock branding panel.
+# Admin key for three.ws chat brand config. Store in Secret Manager and attach to
+# Cloud Run; enter it in chat settings to unlock the branding panel.
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
CHAT_ADMIN_KEY=
@@ -279,7 +283,8 @@ HF_RECONSTRUCT_API_NAME=generation_all
#
# Generate a fresh keypair with:
# node scripts/generate-persona-key.mjs
-# then paste the output here / into Vercel env.
+# then keep the private value local or add it to Google Secret Manager. Attach
+# the production secret to Cloud Run; never pass it in a command argument.
PERSONA_JWKS_KID=
PERSONA_JWKS_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM=
# Optional — auto-derived from the private key if omitted:
@@ -292,7 +297,8 @@ PERMISSIONS_RELAYER_ENABLED=false
# Hex private key of the relayer EOA that pays gas for redeemDelegations.
# This is NOT the user's key — only the agent's server-side relayer.
# Generate: node -e "const {Wallet} = require('ethers'); const w = Wallet.createRandom(); console.log(w.privateKey, w.address)"
-# NEVER commit a real value. Rotate via Vercel env vars.
+# NEVER commit a real value. Rotate through Google Secret Manager and update
+# the Cloud Run secret reference.
AGENT_RELAYER_KEY=0x...
# EIP-55 checksummed address derived from AGENT_RELAYER_KEY — fund with testnet ETH.
@@ -952,9 +958,9 @@ APP_ORIGIN=https://three.ws
# ── Cron protection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Shared secret expected as `Authorization: Bearer $CRON_SECRET` on calls to
-# /api/cron/*. Vercel cron requests bypass this check via the `x-vercel-cron`
-# header, so the secret only matters for manual / external invocation. Without
-# it, only the Vercel platform can fire cron jobs.
+# /api/cron/*. Google Cloud Scheduler supplies it to production jobs. The
+# `x-vercel-cron` header is compatibility behavior, not the production auth
+# path. Without CRON_SECRET, production scheduler calls fail closed.
# Generate: openssl rand -base64 32
CRON_SECRET=
@@ -1183,8 +1189,9 @@ AGENC_RPC_URL=
# ── Treasury + relayer signing keys ──────────────────────────────────────────
# DANGER: these wallets hold real funds. Never share, never commit. Rotate
-# via Vercel env vars only. Each is loaded on first use; missing keys cause
-# the relevant route to 500 with a clear "<KEY> not configured" message.
+# through Google Secret Manager and Cloud Run secret references only. Each is
+# loaded on first use; missing keys cause the relevant route to 500 with a clear
+# "<KEY> not configured" message.
# Solana platform treasury for cron buyback / distribution flows. Base58 or
# JSON-array encoded Keypair secret (api/_lib/evm-transfer.js + cron/[name].js).
diff --git a/api/_lib/scrub-secrets.js b/api/_lib/scrub-secrets.js
index 1e202bd3d..abc1ea5ee 100644
--- a/api/_lib/scrub-secrets.js
+++ b/api/_lib/scrub-secrets.js
@@ -66,6 +66,13 @@ const URL_QUERY_CREDENTIAL_RE = /([?&](?:api[-_]?key|access[-_]?token|token|secr
// `//user:` then anything up to the `@`. The username is kept (it is useful for
// debugging and is not the secret); only the password is masked.
const URL_USERINFO_RE = /(\/\/[^/@\s:]+:)[^/@\s]+@/g;
+// Provider tokens are sometimes pasted into a user-supplied message rather
+// than carried under a secret-shaped object key. Keep this list narrow to
+// self-identifying formats so ordinary hashes and transaction ids survive.
+const INLINE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_RE = /\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{60,}|cf(?:at|ut)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}|npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36})\b/g;
+// R2 S3 credentials do not have a unique prefix. Only redact their hex value
+// when a credential label makes the meaning unambiguous.
+const INLINE_R2_CREDENTIAL_RE = /((?:S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID|S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY|access\s+key\s+id|secret\s+access\s+key)\s*[:=]\s*)[a-f0-9]{32,64}\b/gi;
/**
* Mask credential VALUES embedded in a URL inside a free-form string (typically
@@ -81,5 +88,7 @@ const URL_USERINFO_RE = /(\/\/[^/@\s:]+:)[^/@\s]+@/g;
export function redactUrlSecrets(text) {
return String(text ?? '')
.replace(URL_QUERY_CREDENTIAL_RE, '$1REDACTED')
- .replace(URL_USERINFO_RE, '$1REDACTED@');
+ .replace(URL_USERINFO_RE, '$1REDACTED@')
+ .replace(INLINE_PROVIDER_CREDENTIAL_RE, 'REDACTED')
+ .replace(INLINE_R2_CREDENTIAL_RE, '$1REDACTED');
}
diff --git a/docs/ops/README.md b/docs/ops/README.md
index a6700049f..554497b85 100644
--- a/docs/ops/README.md
+++ b/docs/ops/README.md
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ Start with [gcp-production.md](gcp-production.md); it is the complete operationa
| Runbook | What it covers |
|---|---|
| [gcp-production.md](gcp-production.md) | The production platform end to end: Cloud Run services, LB/DNS/TLS, env, deploy, rollback, recovery. |
+| [hosting-and-credentials.md](hosting-and-credentials.md) | Hosting source of truth, Vercel GitHub App removal, GCP authentication, Secret Manager boundaries, R2 rotation, and exposed-credential response. |
| [gcp-credits-plan.md](gcp-credits-plan.md) | Standing map of the ~$100k GCP credit spend: fleet, quota, pre-approved scaling, what to do next without asking. |
| [gcp-credits.md](gcp-credits.md) | The Vertex AI and GCP footprint runbook backing the credits plan. |
| [gcp-model-workers.md](gcp-model-workers.md) | Self-hosted GPU generation lanes on Cloud Run: workers, weights, deploys. |
diff --git a/docs/ops/hosting-and-credentials.md b/docs/ops/hosting-and-credentials.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..062f24272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/ops/hosting-and-credentials.md
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+# Hosting and credential operations
+
+This is the operator record for three.ws hosting, repository integrations, and production
+credentials. It exists to prevent three recurring failures: treating `vercel.json` as proof that
+Vercel still hosts production, pasting a replacement credential into an issue or terminal command,
+and updating one Cloud Run variable in a way that erases the rest.
+
+## Hosting source of truth
+
+Production runs on Google Cloud Run in project `aerial-vehicle-466722-p5`, primarily in
+`us-central1`. The public site is served through the Google Cloud load balancer and CDN. Check the
+deployed revision at `GET https://three.ws/api/version` and the subsystem roll-up at
+`GET https://three.ws/api/healthz`.
+
+`vercel.json` remains a live compatibility manifest. The Cloud Run Express server reads its route,
+function, header, and cron declarations, and the scheduler tooling reads the same cron list. The
+file name is historical; deleting or casually renaming it breaks production routing and schedule
+drift checks. Its `git.deploymentEnabled: false` setting prevents Vercel Git deployments.
+
+The `Vercel - three.ws` check on GitHub pull requests is separate. It is emitted by the installed
+Vercel GitHub App even when deployments are disabled. Remove three.ws from that app at
+`https://github.com/settings/installations` under **Vercel > Configure**, or uninstall the app if it
+serves no repository. This is a GitHub account-administration action; repository push permission is
+not enough.
+
+## Authentication checks
+
+These commands print identity and configuration, never credential values:
+
+```sh
+gh auth status
+gcloud auth list --filter=status:ACTIVE --format='table(account,status)'
+gcloud config get-value project
+gcloud projects describe aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 --format='value(projectId)'
+```
+
+Use `gh auth login` for an interactive GitHub login. Do not put a personal access token in a command
+argument, issue, pull request, chat, shell history, or repository file. The repository-administration
+tasks in this runbook require an account with `admin` permission on `nirholas/three.ws`.
+
+## Credential boundary
+
+Production secrets belong in Google Secret Manager and reach Cloud Run through `valueFrom`
+references. Non-secret configuration may remain a literal Cloud Run environment variable. Inspect
+names and storage modes without reading values:
+
+```sh
+node scripts/read-service-env.mjs --names
+gcloud secrets list --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 --format='value(name)'
+```
+
+Never use `--set-env-vars` or `--set-secrets` for a single change; both can replace the complete
+configuration. Use `--update-env-vars` and `--update-secrets`.
+
+### R2 mapping
+
+The object-storage adapter uses S3-compatible names:
+
+| Variable | Secret? | Production source |
+|---|---|---|
+| `S3_ENDPOINT` | No | Cloud Run literal |
+| `S3_BUCKET` | No | Cloud Run literal |
+| `S3_PUBLIC_DOMAIN` | No | Cloud Run literal |
+| `S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID` | Yes | Secret Manager |
+| `S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` | Yes | Secret Manager |
+
+The long-lived R2 credential needs object read/write access only to the production bucket. Do not
+grant account administration or cross-bucket access to the application credential.
+
+### Safe R2 rotation
+
+Create the replacement in the provider console, then transfer each value from a private local file
+or standard input. Never paste it into the command itself. The examples below assume files outside
+the repository with mode `0600`:
+
+```sh
+gcloud secrets describe s3-access-key-id --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ gcloud secrets create s3-access-key-id --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 --replication-policy=automatic
+gcloud secrets describe s3-secret-access-key --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+ gcloud secrets create s3-secret-access-key --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 --replication-policy=automatic
+
+gcloud secrets versions add s3-access-key-id \
+ --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 --data-file=/private/path/r2-access-key-id
+gcloud secrets versions add s3-secret-access-key \
+ --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 --data-file=/private/path/r2-secret-access-key
+
+gcloud run services update three-ws-api \
+ --project aerial-vehicle-466722-p5 \
+ --region us-central1 \
+ --update-secrets S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID=s3-access-key-id:latest,S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=s3-secret-access-key:latest
+```
+
+Wait for the revision to become Ready, then verify the storage credential without uploading user
+data:
+
+```sh
+curl -fsS -X POST https://three.ws/api/forge-upload \
+ -H 'content-type: application/json' \
+ -H 'x-forge-client: ops-storage-check' \
+ --data '{"content_type":"image/png","size_bytes":1024}'
+```
+
+A healthy response is `200` with `method: "PUT"` and `expires_in`; do not print or share the signed
+`upload_url`. `503 storage_unavailable` means the bucket rejected the credential. Revert Cloud Run
+to the previous secret version before investigating scope, bucket, endpoint, or signature mismatch.
+Only revoke the old provider credential after the production check passes.
+
+## Exposed-credential incident
+
+A credential pasted into chat, an issue, a pull request, a terminal command, or a committed file is
+compromised even if the message is later deleted. The response is rotation, not concealment:
+
+1. Revoke the exposed credential at the provider.
+2. Create a least-privilege replacement through the provider's secure console.
+3. Add a new Secret Manager version without printing the value.
+4. update the Cloud Run secret reference and wait for a Ready revision;
+5. verify the exact dependent feature;
+6. revoke the prior production credential after verification;
+7. review provider audit logs for use after the exposure time;
+8. record names, timestamps, scope, and verification outcome, never values.
+
+For GitHub, revoke both classic and fine-grained personal access tokens from account settings. For
+Cloudflare, revoke the API token and the R2 S3 credential separately. For npm, revoke the automation
+token, create a scoped replacement with the narrowest required package permissions, and review the
+account's token activity.
+
+The pre-push guard at `scripts/check-secrets.mjs` rejects provider token formats and R2 credential
+pairs in added content. The runtime `redactUrlSecrets` guard also masks those formats when they
+arrive inside free-form text destined for structured logs. Both are defense in depth, not a
+substitute for rotation after disclosure.
+
+## Production verification after any credential change
+
+Run the narrow feature check first, then the platform sweep:
+
+```sh
+curl -fsS https://three.ws/api/version
+curl -fsS https://three.ws/api/healthz
+npm run triage:gcp -- --json --deep --since 1h
+```
+
+Interpret a mass page failure alongside reachability. If `/api/version`, `/api/healthz`, and the home
+page all answer immediately while a single deep sweep reports every page failed, repeat the pages
+probe before changing routes; a shared probe timeout is not hundreds of independent routing bugs.
+
+## Current incident record: 2026-09-15
+
+- GCP authentication succeeded for `aerial-vehicle-466722-p5`.
+- All 47 Cloud Run services reported Ready.
+- All 117 declared cron jobs matched Cloud Scheduler and loaded successfully.
+- The public health, version, and home endpoints returned `200` on independent probes.
+- The deep sweep's 822 page failures, version timeout, and TLS timeout shared one transient probe
+ window and were not reproduced independently.
+- During revision `three-ws-api-00430-bbn` rollout, `POST /api/forge-upload` returned
+ `503 storage_unavailable`. After the revision became Ready, the same storage preflight returned
+ `200` with a presigned `PUT` URL. No object or user data was uploaded. Treat the replacement R2
+ credential as operational, and revoke every credential exposed during the incident.
+- The x402 self-facilitator reported 2,011 `payer_fee_unfunded` verification rejects and 139
+ `fee_wallet_below_floor` settlement failures. Funding or moving on-chain value remains an
+ owner-confirmed action under the transaction confirmation policy.
+- GitHub pull requests still receive the obsolete Vercel App status. It did not prevent the approved
+ marketing pull request from merging, but the app should be removed to eliminate the false failure.
+
+No credential value belongs in this record.
diff --git a/scripts/check-secrets.mjs b/scripts/check-secrets.mjs
index 03685a33e..d8361eb25 100644
--- a/scripts/check-secrets.mjs
+++ b/scripts/check-secrets.mjs
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ const SKIP_CONTENT = [
// must hold synthetic examples of every shape they redact.
/^api\/_lib\/scrub-secrets\.js$/,
/^tests\/scrub-secrets\.test\.js$/,
+ /^tests\/check-secrets\.test\.js$/,
];
const skippedContent = (file) => SKIP_CONTENT.some((re) => re.test(file));
@@ -132,9 +133,23 @@ const CONTENT_RULES = [
// Each alternative is a format one vendor issues and nothing else
// produces. Lengths are the vendor minimums, so a truncated docs sample
// ("sk-ant-...") does not match.
- find: /(sk-ant-api[0-9]{2}-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}|sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48,}|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{60,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{20,}|hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{34,}|nvapi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}|r8_[A-Za-z0-9]{37,}|gsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{50,}|sk-or-v1-[a-f0-9]{60,}|SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}|npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|dckr_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|ya29\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{60,})/,
+ find: /(sk-ant-api[0-9]{2}-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}|sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{48,}|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{60,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{20,}|hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{34,}|nvapi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}|r8_[A-Za-z0-9]{37,}|gsk_[A-Za-z0-9]{50,}|sk-or-v1-[a-f0-9]{60,}|SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}|npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|dckr_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}|ya29\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{60,}|cf(?:at|ut)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,})/,
except: (value) => FAKE_VALUE.test(value),
},
+ {
+ id: 'r2-access-key',
+ what: 'an R2 S3-compatible access key identifier',
+ find: /(?:S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID|access\s+key\s+id)\W{0,8}([a-f0-9]{32})\b/i,
+ group: 1,
+ except: (value) => FAKE_VALUE.test(value) || new Set(value.toLowerCase()).size < 8,
+ },
+ {
+ id: 'r2-secret-key',
+ what: 'an R2 S3-compatible secret access key',
+ find: /(?:S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY|secret\s+access\s+key)\W{0,8}([a-f0-9]{64})\b/i,
+ group: 1,
+ except: (value) => FAKE_VALUE.test(value) || new Set(value.toLowerCase()).size < 8,
+ },
{
id: 'private-key-block',
what: 'a PEM private-key block',
diff --git a/tests/check-secrets.test.js b/tests/check-secrets.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..003cbbf35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/check-secrets.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { copyFileSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+
+const REPO = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..');
+
+function scannerRepo() {
+ const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'threews-secret-scan-'));
+ mkdirSync(join(root, 'scripts'));
+ copyFileSync(join(REPO, 'scripts', 'check-secrets.mjs'), join(root, 'scripts', 'check-secrets.mjs'));
+ writeFileSync(join(root, 'README.md'), '# scanner fixture\n');
+ execFileSync('git', ['init', '-q'], { cwd: root });
+ execFileSync('git', ['config', 'user.email', '[email protected]'], { cwd: root });
+ execFileSync('git', ['config', 'user.name', 'Scanner Test'], { cwd: root });
+ execFileSync('git', ['add', 'README.md', 'scripts/check-secrets.mjs'], { cwd: root });
+ execFileSync('git', ['commit', '-qm', 'fixture'], { cwd: root });
+ return root;
+}
+
+function scanAddedLine(line) {
+ const root = scannerRepo();
+ writeFileSync(join(root, 'leak.txt'), `${line}\n`);
+ return spawnSync('node', ['scripts/check-secrets.mjs'], {
+ cwd: root,
+ encoding: 'utf8',
+ });
+}
+
+describe('credential leak guard', () => {
+ it.each([
+ ['Cloudflare legacy token', `cfat_${'Ab7_'.repeat(12)}`, 'provider-api-key'],
+ ['Cloudflare current token', `cfut_${'Xy9_'.repeat(12)}`, 'provider-api-key'],
+ ['GitHub fine-grained token', `github_pat_${'Az7_'.repeat(18)}`, 'provider-api-key'],
+ ['npm automation token', `npm_${'Q7wE'.repeat(9)}`, 'provider-api-key'],
+ ['R2 access key id', `Access Key ID: ${'9f4e8d2c7b6a1053'.repeat(2)}`, 'r2-access-key'],
+ ['R2 secret access key', `Secret Access Key: ${'9f4e8d2c7b6a1053'.repeat(4)}`, 'r2-secret-key'],
+ ])('rejects a %s', (_label, line, finding) => {
+ const result = scanAddedLine(line);
+ expect(result.status).toBe(1);
+ expect(result.stderr).toContain(`[${finding}]`);
+ });
+
+ it('allows documented placeholders', () => {
+ const result = scanAddedLine('S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=YOUR_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY');
+ expect(result.status).toBe(0);
+ expect(result.stdout).toContain('OK');
+ });
+});
diff --git a/tests/scrub-secrets.test.js b/tests/scrub-secrets.test.js
index d2e08fb1c..285b1dfc5 100644
--- a/tests/scrub-secrets.test.js
+++ b/tests/scrub-secrets.test.js
@@ -100,6 +100,25 @@ describe('redactUrlSecrets', () => {
expect(redis).toContain('redis://default:[email protected]:6379');
});
+ it('masks provider tokens pasted into free-form text', () => {
+ const github = `github_pat_${'Az7_'.repeat(18)}`;
+ const cloudflare = `cfat_${'Kp9_'.repeat(12)}`;
+ const npm = `npm_${'Q7wE'.repeat(9)}`;
+ const out = redactUrlSecrets(`credentials: ${github} ${cloudflare} ${npm}`);
+ for (const leaked of [github, cloudflare, npm]) expect(out).not.toContain(leaked);
+ expect(out.match(/REDACTED/g)).toHaveLength(3);
+ });
+
+ it('masks labeled R2 access and secret keys in free-form text', () => {
+ const access = '9f4e8d2c7b6a1053'.repeat(2);
+ const secret = '9f4e8d2c7b6a1053'.repeat(4);
+ const out = redactUrlSecrets(`Access Key ID: ${access} Secret Access Key: ${secret}`);
+ expect(out).not.toContain(access);
+ expect(out).not.toContain(secret);
+ expect(out).toContain('Access Key ID: REDACTED');
+ expect(out).toContain('Secret Access Key: REDACTED');
+ });
+
it('keeps the username and host readable, masking only the password', () => {
// Redaction has to leave enough behind to debug with: which database, which
// host, which role. Only the secret goes.