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Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.

docs(home): regenerate the page index for the relay threat model

nirholas17ac4d8d479e
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 53e53182f..b74e2c7b8 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Public history for [three.ws](https://three.ws), newest first. New pages come fr
- **Docs · Home households and roles** (`/docs/home-households`): Sharing a connected house without sharing a login: the five roles and what each one may do, per-member entity scopes that narrow the house a member can even see, how invitations are issued and accepted, what happens to somebody's access when they leave, and the rule everything hangs off, that a guest can never confirm an action that opens a building.
- **Docs · Home privacy and retention** (`/docs/home-privacy`): Everything three.ws stores about a home you connect, why, for how long, and what removes it: the full inventory, the promise that room names and device states are never persisted, the 90-day action-log window and the control that changes it, the export and deletion paths, the logging rules, and the disclosure text shown at connect and at the voice opt-in.
+- **Docs · Home relay threat model** (`/docs/home-relay-threat-model`): What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.
- **Docs · Home security** (`/docs/home-security`): The threat model for a connected house, written about a building rather than a database: what each actor can do and what stops them, why the confirmation gate is the load-bearing control and prompt filtering is depth, the eleven checks that run with every build, the SSRF guard every server-side dial goes through and why a hostname check is not one, the prompt-injection proof that ends by asking a real lock whether it opened, and the residuals accepted on purpose.
- **Docs · three.ws Drive** (`/docs/carplay`): How a three.ws agent rides in the car: the CarPlay entitlement categories measured, why Apple's voice-based conversational category is the one that fits and why it grants no drawing surface, the open-source in-car projects worth adopting and the copyleft ones that are not, and how the /drive surface, the native CarPlay scene, and an open head unit share one implementation.
- **Hands-free voice for your home** (`/voice/home`): Talk to your house without finding a phone: a wake word matched on your own device, real barge-in mid-sentence, and a spoken confirmation that a background yes can never satisfy.
diff --git a/public/changelog.json b/public/changelog.json
index 9ced7a932..33f017eb8 100644
--- a/public/changelog.json
+++ b/public/changelog.json
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
- "generated_at": "2026-09-03T03:59:18.737Z",
+ "generated_at": "2026-09-03T04:01:57.539Z",
"generated_by": "scripts/build-page-index.mjs from data/pages.json + data/changelog.json",
"site": {
"name": "three.ws",
@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@
"launch"
]
},
+ {
+ "date": "2026-09-03",
+ "type": "launch",
+ "title": "Docs · Home relay threat model",
+ "summary": "What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.",
+ "link": "/docs/home-relay-threat-model",
+ "tags": [
+ "launch"
+ ]
+ },
{
"date": "2026-09-03",
"type": "launch",
diff --git a/public/changelog.xml b/public/changelog.xml
index 6c2a3d5f4..c0c3c7b66 100644
--- a/public/changelog.xml
+++ b/public/changelog.xml
@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@
<category>launch</category>
<description>Everything three.ws stores about a home you connect, why, for how long, and what removes it: the full inventory, the promise that room names and device states are never persisted, the 90-day action-log window and the control that changes it, the export and deletion paths, the logging rules, and the disclosure text shown at connect and at the voice opt-in.</description>
</item>
+ <item>
+ <title>Docs · Home relay threat model</title>
+ <link>https://three.ws/docs/home-relay-threat-model</link>
+ <guid isPermaLink="false">2026-09-03:Docs · Home relay threat model</guid>
+ <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
+ <category>launch</category>
+ <description>What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.</description>
+ </item>
<item>
<title>Docs · Home security</title>
<link>https://three.ws/docs/home-security</link>
diff --git a/public/features.json b/public/features.json
index a1109a661..03b97750e 100644
--- a/public/features.json
+++ b/public/features.json
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
- "generated_at": "2026-09-03T03:59:18.663Z",
+ "generated_at": "2026-09-03T04:01:57.493Z",
"generated_by": "scripts/build-page-index.mjs from data/pages.json",
"site": {
"name": "three.ws",
@@ -3287,6 +3287,16 @@
"tags": [],
"showcase": false
},
+ {
+ "path": "/docs/home-relay-threat-model",
+ "title": "Docs · Home relay threat model",
+ "description": "What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.",
+ "added": "2026-09-03",
+ "auth": null,
+ "indexable": true,
+ "tags": [],
+ "showcase": false
+ },
{
"path": "/docs/home-privacy",
"title": "Docs · Home privacy and retention",
diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txt
index f0a93931f..74efdb1bd 100644
--- a/public/llms-full.txt
+++ b/public/llms-full.txt
@@ -2001,6 +2001,12 @@ URL: https://three.ws/docs/home-security
The threat model for a connected house, written about a building rather than a database: what each actor can do and what stops them, why the confirmation gate is the load-bearing control and prompt filtering is depth, the eleven checks that run with every build, the SSRF guard every server-side dial goes through and why a hostname check is not one, the prompt-injection proof that ends by asking a real lock whether it opened, and the residuals accepted on purpose.
+### Docs · Home relay threat model
+
+URL: https://three.ws/docs/home-relay-threat-model
+
+What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.
+
### Docs · Home privacy and retention
URL: https://three.ws/docs/home-privacy
diff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txt
index fcd0bde68..bb3ecff42 100644
--- a/public/llms.txt
+++ b/public/llms.txt
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ Docs, tutorials, and reference.
- [Docs · three.ws Home](https://three.ws/docs/smart-home): How a three.ws agent connects to a real house: the open-source smart-home landscape measured and shortlisted, why Home Assistant owns the device layer, the two channels the @three-ws/home-bridge package speaks, the physical-action gate that never lets an unlock through unasked, and the road from here to voice in every room.
- [Docs · Home households and roles](https://three.ws/docs/home-households): Sharing a connected house without sharing a login: the five roles and what each one may do, per-member entity scopes that narrow the house a member can even see, how invitations are issued and accepted, what happens to somebody's access when they leave, and the rule everything hangs off, that a guest can never confirm an action that opens a building.
- [Docs · Home security](https://three.ws/docs/home-security): The threat model for a connected house, written about a building rather than a database: what each actor can do and what stops them, why the confirmation gate is the load-bearing control and prompt filtering is depth, the eleven checks that run with every build, the SSRF guard every server-side dial goes through and why a hostname check is not one, the prompt-injection proof that ends by asking a real lock whether it opened, and the residuals accepted on purpose.
+- [Docs · Home relay threat model](https://three.ws/docs/home-relay-threat-model): What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.
- [Docs · Home privacy and retention](https://three.ws/docs/home-privacy): Everything three.ws stores about a home you connect, why, for how long, and what removes it: the full inventory, the promise that room names and device states are never persisted, the 90-day action-log window and the control that changes it, the export and deletion paths, the logging rules, and the disclosure text shown at connect and at the voice opt-in.
- [Docs · three.ws Drive](https://three.ws/docs/carplay): How a three.ws agent rides in the car: the CarPlay entitlement categories measured, why Apple's voice-based conversational category is the one that fits and why it grants no drawing surface, the open-source in-car projects worth adopting and the copyleft ones that are not, and how the /drive surface, the native CarPlay scene, and an open head unit share one implementation.
- [Docs · Terminal avatar](https://three.ws/docs/tty-avatar): The @three-ws/tty-avatar package: any three.ws avatar or agent body rendered live in a terminal by a software rasterizer (truecolor half-blocks, braille, or plain ASCII), procedural moods, and Claude Code hooks that turn it into your coding agent's face.
diff --git a/public/sitemap/index.html b/public/sitemap/index.html
index 22dc9b68b..38562c3e0 100644
--- a/public/sitemap/index.html
+++ b/public/sitemap/index.html
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
<main class="sm-wrap">
<div class="sm-hero">
<h1>Sitemap</h1>
- <p>All 896 pages on three.ws, grouped by purpose. Looking for the machine-readable versions?</p>
+ <p>All 897 pages on three.ws, grouped by purpose. Looking for the machine-readable versions?</p>
<div class="sm-formats">
<a href="/sitemap.xml"><code>sitemap.xml</code> · for search engines</a>
<a href="/llms.txt"><code>llms.txt</code> · for AI agents</a>
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
</div>
<div class="sm-filter">
<svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" aria-hidden="true"><circle cx="11" cy="11" r="7"/><path d="m21 21-4.3-4.3"/></svg>
- <input id="sm-filter-input" type="search" placeholder="Filter 896 pages by name, path, or description…" aria-label="Filter pages" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false" />
+ <input id="sm-filter-input" type="search" placeholder="Filter 897 pages by name, path, or description…" aria-label="Filter pages" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false" />
<kbd aria-hidden="true">/</kbd>
</div>
<p class="sm-filter-count" id="sm-filter-count" role="status" aria-live="polite"></p>
@@ -168,11 +168,11 @@
</a>
</li>
<li>
- <a href="/docs/home-privacy">
+ <a href="/docs/home-relay-threat-model">
<span class="sm-new-date">Sep 3, 2026</span>
- <span class="sm-title">Docs · Home privacy and retention</span>
- <span class="sm-path">/docs/home-privacy</span>
- <span class="sm-desc">Everything three.ws stores about a home you connect, why, for how long, and what removes it: the full inventory, the promise that room names and device states are never persisted, the 90-day action-log window and the control that changes it, the export and deletion paths, the logging rules, and the disclosure text shown at connect and at the voice opt-in.</span>
+ <span class="sm-title">Docs · Home relay threat model</span>
+ <span class="sm-path">/docs/home-relay-threat-model</span>
+ <span class="sm-desc">What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.</span>
</a>
</li>
</ul>
@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@
<section class="sm-section" id="learn">
<header>
- <h2>Learn<span class="sm-count" data-count>407</span></h2>
+ <h2>Learn<span class="sm-count" data-count>408</span></h2>
<p class="sm-section-desc">Docs, tutorials, and reference.</p>
</header>
<ul class="sm-list">
@@ -2511,6 +2511,13 @@
<span class="sm-desc">The threat model for a connected house, written about a building rather than a database: what each actor can do and what stops them, why the confirmation gate is the load-bearing control and prompt filtering is depth, the eleven checks that run with every build, the SSRF guard every server-side dial goes through and why a hostname check is not one, the prompt-injection proof that ends by asking a real lock whether it opened, and the residuals accepted on purpose.</span>
</a>
</li>
+ <li>
+ <a href="/docs/home-relay-threat-model">
+ <span class="sm-title">Docs · Home relay threat model</span>
+ <span class="sm-path">/docs/home-relay-threat-model</span>
+ <span class="sm-desc">What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.</span>
+ </a>
+ </li>
<li>
<a href="/docs/home-privacy">
<span class="sm-title">Docs · Home privacy and retention</span>