Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
JavaScript 3d-generationai-agentsanimationavatardigital-humangenerative-aiglbgltfimage-to-3dllmmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolsolanatext-to-3dthreejsweb-componentswebglwebxrx402
docs(home): regenerate the page index for the relay threat model
nirholas17ac4d8d479e
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex 53e53182f..b74e2c7b8 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Public history for [three.ws](https://three.ws), newest first. New pages come fr- **Docs · Home households and roles** (`/docs/home-households`): Sharing a connected house without sharing a login: the five roles and what each one may do, per-member entity scopes that narrow the house a member can even see, how invitations are issued and accepted, what happens to somebody's access when they leave, and the rule everything hangs off, that a guest can never confirm an action that opens a building.- **Docs · Home privacy and retention** (`/docs/home-privacy`): Everything three.ws stores about a home you connect, why, for how long, and what removes it: the full inventory, the promise that room names and device states are never persisted, the 90-day action-log window and the control that changes it, the export and deletion paths, the logging rules, and the disclosure text shown at connect and at the voice opt-in.+- **Docs · Home relay threat model** (`/docs/home-relay-threat-model`): What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.- **Docs · Home security** (`/docs/home-security`): The threat model for a connected house, written about a building rather than a database: what each actor can do and what stops them, why the confirmation gate is the load-bearing control and prompt filtering is depth, the eleven checks that run with every build, the SSRF guard every server-side dial goes through and why a hostname check is not one, the prompt-injection proof that ends by asking a real lock whether it opened, and the residuals accepted on purpose.- **Docs · three.ws Drive** (`/docs/carplay`): How a three.ws agent rides in the car: the CarPlay entitlement categories measured, why Apple's voice-based conversational category is the one that fits and why it grants no drawing surface, the open-source in-car projects worth adopting and the copyleft ones that are not, and how the /drive surface, the native CarPlay scene, and an open head unit share one implementation.- **Hands-free voice for your home** (`/voice/home`): Talk to your house without finding a phone: a wake word matched on your own device, real barge-in mid-sentence, and a spoken confirmation that a background yes can never satisfy.diff --git a/public/changelog.json b/public/changelog.jsonindex 9ced7a932..33f017eb8 100644--- a/public/changelog.json+++ b/public/changelog.json@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@{- "generated_at": "2026-09-03T03:59:18.737Z",+ "generated_at": "2026-09-03T04:01:57.539Z","generated_by": "scripts/build-page-index.mjs from data/pages.json + data/changelog.json","site": {"name": "three.ws",@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@"launch"]},+ {+ "date": "2026-09-03",+ "type": "launch",+ "title": "Docs · Home relay threat model",+ "summary": "What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.",+ "link": "/docs/home-relay-threat-model",+ "tags": [+ "launch"+ ]+ },{"date": "2026-09-03","type": "launch",diff --git a/public/changelog.xml b/public/changelog.xmlindex 6c2a3d5f4..c0c3c7b66 100644--- a/public/changelog.xml+++ b/public/changelog.xml@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@<category>launch</category><description>Everything three.ws stores about a home you connect, why, for how long, and what removes it: the full inventory, the promise that room names and device states are never persisted, the 90-day action-log window and the control that changes it, the export and deletion paths, the logging rules, and the disclosure text shown at connect and at the voice opt-in.</description></item>+ <item>+ <title>Docs · Home relay threat model</title>+ <link>https://three.ws/docs/home-relay-threat-model</link>+ <guid isPermaLink="false">2026-09-03:Docs · Home relay threat model</guid>+ <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate>+ <category>launch</category>+ <description>What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.</description>+ </item><item><title>Docs · Home security</title><link>https://three.ws/docs/home-security</link>diff --git a/public/features.json b/public/features.jsonindex a1109a661..03b97750e 100644--- a/public/features.json+++ b/public/features.json@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@{- "generated_at": "2026-09-03T03:59:18.663Z",+ "generated_at": "2026-09-03T04:01:57.493Z","generated_by": "scripts/build-page-index.mjs from data/pages.json","site": {"name": "three.ws",@@ -3287,6 +3287,16 @@"tags": [],"showcase": false},+ {+ "path": "/docs/home-relay-threat-model",+ "title": "Docs · Home relay threat model",+ "description": "What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.",+ "added": "2026-09-03",+ "auth": null,+ "indexable": true,+ "tags": [],+ "showcase": false+ },{"path": "/docs/home-privacy","title": "Docs · Home privacy and retention",diff --git a/public/llms-full.txt b/public/llms-full.txtindex f0a93931f..74efdb1bd 100644--- a/public/llms-full.txt+++ b/public/llms-full.txt@@ -2001,6 +2001,12 @@ URL: https://three.ws/docs/home-securityThe threat model for a connected house, written about a building rather than a database: what each actor can do and what stops them, why the confirmation gate is the load-bearing control and prompt filtering is depth, the eleven checks that run with every build, the SSRF guard every server-side dial goes through and why a hostname check is not one, the prompt-injection proof that ends by asking a real lock whether it opened, and the residuals accepted on purpose.+### Docs · Home relay threat model++URL: https://three.ws/docs/home-relay-threat-model++What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.+### Docs · Home privacy and retentionURL: https://three.ws/docs/home-privacydiff --git a/public/llms.txt b/public/llms.txtindex fcd0bde68..bb3ecff42 100644--- a/public/llms.txt+++ b/public/llms.txt@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ Docs, tutorials, and reference.- [Docs · three.ws Home](https://three.ws/docs/smart-home): How a three.ws agent connects to a real house: the open-source smart-home landscape measured and shortlisted, why Home Assistant owns the device layer, the two channels the @three-ws/home-bridge package speaks, the physical-action gate that never lets an unlock through unasked, and the road from here to voice in every room.- [Docs · Home households and roles](https://three.ws/docs/home-households): Sharing a connected house without sharing a login: the five roles and what each one may do, per-member entity scopes that narrow the house a member can even see, how invitations are issued and accepted, what happens to somebody's access when they leave, and the rule everything hangs off, that a guest can never confirm an action that opens a building.- [Docs · Home security](https://three.ws/docs/home-security): The threat model for a connected house, written about a building rather than a database: what each actor can do and what stops them, why the confirmation gate is the load-bearing control and prompt filtering is depth, the eleven checks that run with every build, the SSRF guard every server-side dial goes through and why a hostname check is not one, the prompt-injection proof that ends by asking a real lock whether it opened, and the residuals accepted on purpose.+- [Docs · Home relay threat model](https://three.ws/docs/home-relay-threat-model): What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.- [Docs · Home privacy and retention](https://three.ws/docs/home-privacy): Everything three.ws stores about a home you connect, why, for how long, and what removes it: the full inventory, the promise that room names and device states are never persisted, the 90-day action-log window and the control that changes it, the export and deletion paths, the logging rules, and the disclosure text shown at connect and at the voice opt-in.- [Docs · three.ws Drive](https://three.ws/docs/carplay): How a three.ws agent rides in the car: the CarPlay entitlement categories measured, why Apple's voice-based conversational category is the one that fits and why it grants no drawing surface, the open-source in-car projects worth adopting and the copyleft ones that are not, and how the /drive surface, the native CarPlay scene, and an open head unit share one implementation.- [Docs · Terminal avatar](https://three.ws/docs/tty-avatar): The @three-ws/tty-avatar package: any three.ws avatar or agent body rendered live in a terminal by a software rasterizer (truecolor half-blocks, braille, or plain ASCII), procedural moods, and Claude Code hooks that turn it into your coding agent's face.diff --git a/public/sitemap/index.html b/public/sitemap/index.htmlindex 22dc9b68b..38562c3e0 100644--- a/public/sitemap/index.html+++ b/public/sitemap/index.html@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@<main class="sm-wrap"><div class="sm-hero"><h1>Sitemap</h1>- <p>All 896 pages on three.ws, grouped by purpose. Looking for the machine-readable versions?</p>+ <p>All 897 pages on three.ws, grouped by purpose. Looking for the machine-readable versions?</p><div class="sm-formats"><a href="/sitemap.xml"><code>sitemap.xml</code> · for search engines</a><a href="/llms.txt"><code>llms.txt</code> · for AI agents</a>@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@</div><div class="sm-filter"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" aria-hidden="true"><circle cx="11" cy="11" r="7"/><path d="m21 21-4.3-4.3"/></svg>- <input id="sm-filter-input" type="search" placeholder="Filter 896 pages by name, path, or description…" aria-label="Filter pages" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false" />+ <input id="sm-filter-input" type="search" placeholder="Filter 897 pages by name, path, or description…" aria-label="Filter pages" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false" /><kbd aria-hidden="true">/</kbd></div><p class="sm-filter-count" id="sm-filter-count" role="status" aria-live="polite"></p>@@ -168,11 +168,11 @@</a></li><li>- <a href="/docs/home-privacy">+ <a href="/docs/home-relay-threat-model"><span class="sm-new-date">Sep 3, 2026</span>- <span class="sm-title">Docs · Home privacy and retention</span>- <span class="sm-path">/docs/home-privacy</span>- <span class="sm-desc">Everything three.ws stores about a home you connect, why, for how long, and what removes it: the full inventory, the promise that room names and device states are never persisted, the 90-day action-log window and the control that changes it, the export and deletion paths, the logging rules, and the disclosure text shown at connect and at the voice opt-in.</span>+ <span class="sm-title">Docs · Home relay threat model</span>+ <span class="sm-path">/docs/home-relay-threat-model</span>+ <span class="sm-desc">What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.</span></a></li></ul>@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@<section class="sm-section" id="learn"><header>- <h2>Learn<span class="sm-count" data-count>407</span></h2>+ <h2>Learn<span class="sm-count" data-count>408</span></h2><p class="sm-section-desc">Docs, tutorials, and reference.</p></header><ul class="sm-list">@@ -2511,6 +2511,13 @@<span class="sm-desc">The threat model for a connected house, written about a building rather than a database: what each actor can do and what stops them, why the confirmation gate is the load-bearing control and prompt filtering is depth, the eleven checks that run with every build, the SSRF guard every server-side dial goes through and why a hostname check is not one, the prompt-injection proof that ends by asking a real lock whether it opened, and the residuals accepted on purpose.</span></a></li>+ <li>+ <a href="/docs/home-relay-threat-model">+ <span class="sm-title">Docs · Home relay threat model</span>+ <span class="sm-path">/docs/home-relay-threat-model</span>+ <span class="sm-desc">What an attacker gets at every position around the socket a LAN-only house dials out through, and what stops them: why the relay carries a fixed list of message types instead of proxying HTTP into a home network, what a stolen install token is and is not worth, why the allowlist is enforced again inside the house so a compromised relay widens nothing, and the residuals accepted on purpose.</span>+ </a>+ </li><li><a href="/docs/home-privacy"><span class="sm-title">Docs · Home privacy and retention</span>