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fix(auth): consume password-reset tokens atomically and bind GitHub connect to the browser that started it
nirholas19c149181385
diff --git a/api/auth/[action].js b/api/auth/[action].jsindex ccf9712fc..0330cac4b 100644--- a/api/auth/[action].js+++ b/api/auth/[action].js@@ -454,12 +454,24 @@ async function handleResetPassword(req, res) {if (!rl.success) return rateLimited(res, rl, 'too many attempts; try again later');const body = parse(resetSchema, await readJson(req));const tokenHash = await sha256(body.token);- const rows = await sql`select r.id, r.user_id from password_resets r join users u on u.id = r.user_id where r.token_hash = ${tokenHash} and r.consumed_at is null and r.expires_at > now() and u.deleted_at is null limit 1`;+ // Consume the token in the same statement that checks it, so two concurrent+ // resets with one link cannot both win (a read-then-write let them).+ const rows = await sql`+ update password_resets r set consumed_at = now()+ from users u+ where u.id = r.user_id and r.token_hash = ${tokenHash} and r.consumed_at is null+ and r.expires_at > now() and u.deleted_at is null+ returning r.id, r.user_id+ `;if (!rows[0]) return error(res, 400, 'invalid_token', 'reset link is invalid or has expired');+ const userId = rows[0].user_id;const hash = await hashPassword(body.password);- await sql`update users set password_hash = ${hash}, updated_at = now() where id = ${rows[0].user_id}`;- await sql`update password_resets set consumed_at = now() where id = ${rows[0].id}`;- await sql`update sessions set revoked_at = now() where user_id = ${rows[0].user_id} and revoked_at is null`;+ await sql`update users set password_hash = ${hash}, updated_at = now() where id = ${userId}`;+ // A reset is how an owner recovers a compromised account, so every credential+ // the attacker could still hold goes: browser sessions and OAuth refresh+ // tokens, exactly as logout-everywhere revokes them.+ await sql`update sessions set revoked_at = now() where user_id = ${userId} and revoked_at is null`;+ await sql`update oauth_refresh_tokens set revoked_at = now() where user_id = ${userId} and revoked_at is null`;return json(res, 200, { success: true });}diff --git a/api/auth/github/[action].js b/api/auth/github/[action].jsindex ff83324fe..0bd924134 100644--- a/api/auth/github/[action].js+++ b/api/auth/github/[action].js@@ -119,10 +119,18 @@ async function handleCallback(req, res) {return error(res, 400, 'state_expired', 'OAuth state has expired — please try again');}- // Session-bind: if a session is active it must match the state's userId so a- // state token can't be replayed by a different user in their browser session.+ // Session-bind, and require the session. The state is a signed token, not a+ // browser-bound one, so without this an attacker could start a connect on+ // their own account and hand the GitHub link to a signed-out victim who has+ // authorized the app before: GitHub redirects silently, and the victim's+ // token would land on the attacker's account. The flow starts from a signed-in+ // page and returns as a top-level GET, so the SameSite=Lax cookie is present+ // on every legitimate callback.const callbackSession = await getSessionUser(req).catch(() => null);- if (callbackSession && callbackSession.id !== stateData.userId) {+ if (!callbackSession) {+ return redirect(res, `${env.APP_ORIGIN}/settings?tab=connected-accounts&github=error`);+ }+ if (callbackSession.id !== stateData.userId) {return error(res, 403, 'session_mismatch', 'OAuth state does not match the current session');}diff --git a/src/privy-login.js b/src/privy-login.jsindex 84abf95be..51a6d79dc 100644--- a/src/privy-login.js+++ b/src/privy-login.js@@ -14,12 +14,18 @@ import {// looked for it, but nothing on this page loaded it, so the Solana button// answered "No Solana wallet detected" inside the app.import '../solana-mobile/src/index.js';+import { safeNext } from './safe-next.js';-const next =+// Every source here is something a link can set (`?next=` straight from the+// address bar), so it is reduced to a same-origin path before any+// `location.href = next`; an absolute or protocol-relative value would+// otherwise send a freshly signed-in visitor to another site.+const next = safeNext(window.__loginNext ||- new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('next') ||- sessionStorage.getItem('login_redirect') ||- '/dashboard';+ new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('next') ||+ sessionStorage.getItem('login_redirect') ||+ '/dashboard',+);sessionStorage.removeItem('login_redirect');// ── Bootstrap ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────diff --git a/tests/github-token-connect.test.js b/tests/github-token-connect.test.jsindex a32cdb0e4..f8255ca8c 100644--- a/tests/github-token-connect.test.js+++ b/tests/github-token-connect.test.js@@ -404,3 +404,41 @@ describe('POST /api/auth/github/disconnect', () => {expect(revokeGrantMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);});});++// ── OAuth callback: the state must come back to the browser that started it ──++describe('GET /api/auth/github/callback', () => {+ async function signedState(payload) {+ const { hmacSha256 } = await import('../api/_lib/crypto.js');+ const data = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url');+ return `${data}.${await hmacSha256(envMock.JWT_SECRET, data)}`;+ }++ async function callback(state) {+ envMock.GITHUB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID = 'client-id';+ envMock.GITHUB_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET = 'client-secret';+ const res = mkRes();+ const req = mkReq({ method: 'GET', action: 'callback' });+ req.url = `/api/auth/github/callback?action=callback&code=gh-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(state)}`;+ await handler(req, res);+ return res;+ }++ it("refuses a signed-out browser, so an attacker's state cannot bind a victim's GitHub", async () => {+ const fetchSpy = vi.spyOn(globalThis, 'fetch');+ getSessionUserMock.mockResolvedValue(null);+ const res = await callback(await signedState({ userId: USER, agentId: '', ts: Date.now() }));+ expect(res.statusCode).toBe(302);+ expect(res.headers.location).toContain('github=error');+ expect(fetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ expect(sqlMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ fetchSpy.mockRestore();+ });++ it('refuses a different signed-in account', async () => {+ getSessionUserMock.mockResolvedValue({ id: '66666666-6666-4666-8666-666666666666' });+ const res = await callback(await signedState({ userId: USER, agentId: '', ts: Date.now() }));+ expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);+ expect(sqlMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });+});