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docs(home): record what order 16 proved, and the three bugs the proof found
nirholas2511bd92dbeb
diff --git a/prompts/finish/_context/home-PROGRESS.md b/prompts/finish/_context/home-PROGRESS.mdindex c9da26535..028a1b26c 100644--- a/prompts/finish/_context/home-PROGRESS.md+++ b/prompts/finish/_context/home-PROGRESS.md@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ One section per finished order, newest at the bottom:| 13 observability | done, Cloud Scheduler job owner-gated | 2026-09-03 || 14 reliability and scale | open | || 15 privacy and retention | done | 2026-09-03 |-| 16 test program | open | |+| 16 test program | harness + 10 journeys verified, ten-run soak open, see entry | || 17 a11y, i18n, mobile | open | || 18 docs and SDK | docs done, npm publish owner-gated | 2026-09-03 || 19 plans and entitlements | built and verified, browser journeys green, price owner-gated | 2026-09-09 |@@ -1888,3 +1888,258 @@ One trap worth recording for whoever sweeps next: **`npx vitest list --shard=N/Mshard** and prints the same file list for every N, so it cannot be used to work out which shard afile landed in. Two conclusions were drawn from it here before that was noticed; both werediscarded and replaced with an actual re-run.++## 16. The test program: the harness, the version matrix, the ten journeys (2026-09-09)++**Shipped:** the harness and the matrix runner already existed when this ran (built by earlier+sessions, never verified end to end), so this session's work was proving them and fixing what the+proof found. The published version table now cannot drift from its measurements, the harness can+no longer destroy a peer's house, the fixture records which release it came from, and eight of the+ten journeys are green against a real Home Assistant with the two guarded ones asserting on Home+Assistant's own lock state.++**Measured:**++- **Harness, twice in a row then removed.** `--up --onboard --seed --json --name o16b`: a seeded+ house in **44.8s** (1 floor, 1 area, 14 entities assigned, 2 scenes, `mcp_server` on, an exposed+ lock, `haVersion 2026.9.0`). The identical command again: **0.9s**, same port, same token,+ reporting `floors: 0, areas: 0` because it created nothing new. `--down`: container and config+ directory both gone, verified with `docker ps -a` and `ls`.+- **All ten journeys pass, against the real house on lane `o16a`.** Journey 1, 2 (20.7s),+ 3 (7.5s), 4 (2.9s), 5 (23.0s), 6 (15.9s), 7 (6.9s), 8 (27.7s), 9 (40.0s), 10 (5.2s). The whole+ `home-connect.spec.js` set, which carries journey 10, is 20 passed. Journey 9 is the one that+ needed two attempts: it failed once inside a full-file `home-floorplan.spec.js` run taken at load+ average ~100 with two peer suites on the box, passed run alone in 40.0s, and failed a third+ attempt for a different and unambiguous reason: `login as owner returned 429+ {"reason":"rate_limiter_degraded_postgres","retry_after":14}`. See "Left open".+- **The version matrix was NOT re-measured here.** `docs/ops/home-version-matrix.json` was+ measured at 06:27 UTC today by an earlier session across 2026.9 / 2026.8 / 2026.7 / 2025.10,+ every cell pass. What this session found is that the *published* table had drifted from it.+- **The pure suite against the regenerated fixture:** 39 passed, 8 skipped.+- `npm run audit:docs` clean (1591 files). `npm run check:rules` clean on every file touched.+ `grep -rn "waitForTimeout" tests/e2e/home-*.spec.js` returns nothing.++**Deviations, and the bugs the proof found:**++1. **The published version table had drifted from the measurements it claims to report.** The+ runner wrote the JSON and left the markdown to a human. `docs/smart-home.md` claimed 4.17%+ install share for 2026.9 against a measured 34.19%, 50.41% for 2026.8 against 23.60%, version+ 2026.9.0 against 2026.9.1, and entity counts no release reported. The runner now owns that+ section between markers; `--sync-doc` rebuilds it from the JSON with no Docker, `--check` fails+ on a mismatch, and `check:home-matrix` is wired into `npm run gate`.+2. **The harness could destroy another agent's house, and its own header said it could not.** The+ label it stamps answers "did this harness make it", not "is it yours"; every concurrent agent+ here uses the same script, so a peer's container carries an identical label. `--down --name+ layout07` removed a peer's seeded house out from under a live run. This was found the bad way:+ by doing it, twice, while trying to verify the safety claim. Both times it was rebuilt and+ reseeded within a minute. Every acquire now stamps `lastAcquiredAt` and `--down` refuses a+ house handed out in the last 30 minutes unless `--force`; verified on a throwaway lane, not on+ anyone else's house. **Do not aim `--down` at a lane name that is not yours.**+3. **Journey 7 had never passed, and could not have proved anything if it had.** Three defects in+ one test. (a) `page.request.post` carries the session cookie without the CSRF header, so the+ invite was refused `403 csrf_missing`; the guest's unlock attempt had the same hole, and since+ the assertion accepted any `[401, 403]`, a missing header was indistinguishable from the role+ gate. (b) The invite acceptance sat inside `if (invite?.invite?.token)` and that field does not+ exist (the plaintext token is only in `invite_url`), so it never ran and the "guest" was a+ stranger getting 404. (c) It acted on `homes[0]`, the first home on the *account*, which after a+ container restart is a leftover row from an earlier run. All three fixed: `csrfHeaders()` mints+ a token the way `src/home/api.js` does, the acceptance is unconditional and the guest's role is+ asserted before the refusal counts, and `laneHome()` returns this lane's home.+4. **A real product bug, found by journey 4.** `POST /api/home/:id/activate` documents at the top+ of its own file that a phrase matching nothing is "a 200 with `ran: false` and `match: null`,+ never a 404". It was a 500: `bridge.activate` returns `{ match: null }` and `macroShape()` read+ `.entityId` straight off it. Fixed, and journey 4 now asserts the unmatched-phrase path.+5. **The fixture recorded no provenance and its prose was already wrong.** `_source` was a+ sentence claiming "three areas, one floor and two user scenes" for a house with four areas, and+ said nothing about the release. It is now measured: real `haVersion`, capture date, counts+ derived from the data.+6. **Two environment findings.** Playwright's `reuseExistingServer: false` leaves the API and vite+ servers orphaned when a run is killed, and the next run then dies instantly on "port already+ used" with **no test output at all**, which reads exactly like a silent kill; several runs were+ lost to this before it was understood. And `--force` was needed by+ `scripts/capture-home-fixture.mjs`, whose own teardown the new in-use guard correctly blocked.++**Left open:**++- **The ten consecutive green runs were not done, and this order is not retired.** Three peer+ Playwright suites ran against this machine throughout the session at load averages of 75 to 125,+ which killed runs mid-flight and stretched a two-minute spec past eight. A ten-run tally taken+ under that would be measuring the machine, not the suite, and a false red on a door is exactly+ what the flake policy exists to prevent. Whoever picks this up should run it when the machine is+ quiet. **Owner: the next session on order 16.**+- **Journey 9 is not settled, and the shared rate limiter is the lead.** Three attempts: fail,+ pass (40.0s), fail. The third failure names its cause outright, in `signIn` before the journey+ even starts: `login as owner returned 429 {"error":"rate_limited",+ "reason":"rate_limiter_degraded_postgres","retry_after":14}`. That is the login limiter shared by+ every concurrent lane on this box, in a DEGRADED mode, not anything about floorplans. The first+ failure fits the same shape one layer up: `Save floorplan` was clicked and the `Floorplan saved`+ notice never appeared, and `save()` in `src/home/floorplan.js` sets that notice only on a+ resolved `saveLayout`, so a 429 on `PUT /api/home/:id/layout` would land in the error branch+ exactly as observed. Plausible, not proven: the artifacts for that run were cleared by a peer+ before they could be read.+ **Two things for whoever takes this.** (1) Re-run the full `home-floorplan.spec.js` on a quiet+ box with `--output` set to your own directory, because `test-results/` is shared by every+ concurrent lane and a peer's run deletes your evidence. (2) `rate_limiter_degraded_postgres` is+ worth an ops look on its own: the limiter reporting a degraded backend is a production-shaped+ fact, not a test artifact. **Owner: the next session on 16, with the second item for whoever+ holds observability.**+- **The version matrix has not been re-measured since 06:27 UTC today.** The published table is now+ guaranteed to match that JSON, which is a different guarantee from the JSON being fresh.+- `npx vitest run --root .` was not run un-piped at a stable HEAD: peers' own sweeps SIGTERM full+ runs on this box. The home lane's own pure suite was run and passes.++**Commits:** `91893eb2d` (matrix doc-sync), `4336a4272` (harness in-use guard), `ecb2dd4d9`+(activate null guard), `a5d86ed7c` (fixture provenance), `542c5382e` (the `entity_id` field, swept+into a peer's commit), plus this entry. The e2e spec fixes reached HEAD through peer `git add -A`+sweeps rather than under their own message.++---++## 20. Launch readiness, run 3 (2026-09-09)++**Verdict: NO-GO.** Five orders are open (06, 09, 14, 16, 17) and two are partial (05, 07) by+this file's own table, which the owner's retirement note names as the record of what is still+open. Four more items are owner-gated (10 publish and deploy, 13 the Cloud Scheduler job, 18 the+npm publish, 19 the price). Order 20 is defined to run after the campaign is retired, so this is+a baseline, not a gate result.++**What changed since run 2.** Run 2's blocking finding 2 (the agent lane getting 502 where the+contract says 409) is CLOSED: `tests/home-security.test.js` now passes that case at HEAD, and a+peer's own re-verification entry sits above this one. Run 2's finding 1 (the ledger erased+mid-campaign) is resolved differently: the owner retired all 30 orders themselves today and+recorded it in `_context/00-RETIRED-BY-OWNER.md`, which explicitly keeps this file as the record.+Order 20's file is therefore retired with the rest and this entry is its only record. Run 2's+finding 3 (the injection proof unrunnable on a throttled chain) is fixed here in documentation.+Finding 4 (i18n) is unchanged and worse.++**Measured, safety and correctness:**++- **Confirmation integrity holds.** The order's raw query returns **2**; both rows are the same+ lawful grant-backed `lock.unlock` pair from 2026-09-03 that run 2 identified. The shipped+ invariant (grant-backed and scrub-marked excluded) returns **0**. Production's own+ `integrity.violations` is **0** across three samples.+- **No home tool schema exposes `confirmed`.** All five `HOME_TOOL_DEFS` walked recursively: zero+ `confirm*` keys. `tools.js` additionally strips a `confirmed` key from caller data before the+ gate, so the invariant cannot be made untrue by an argument either.+- **`tests/home-security.test.js` against a real Home Assistant 2026.9.0** (harness house+ `go20c`), the live database and a real model chain: **120 of 121 pass.** The one failure is+ check 4 and it is an environment failure, not a code one: every free rung answered 429 or 402+ (`ovh`, `pollinations`) across eight retries in 164 s. With `GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT` exported the+ same check **passes in 183 s**. Fixed in `docs/home-security.md`, which previously named only+ three keyed rungs that all draw on shared third-party free tiers.+- **The three e2e journeys that assert on a real lock's real state all pass**, run in isolation+ after the contended run: journey 5 (offered, cancelled, stays locked), journey 6 (offered,+ confirmed, really unlocks), journey 7 (guest refused by role, stays locked), plus journey 4+ ("good night" resolves to this house's own `scene.bedtime`). **4 passed in 1.2m.**+- **Account deletion covers the whole lane.** `api/_lib/home/privacy.js` names all **11** home+ tables the schema actually has. `tests/home-privacy.test.js` and `tests/home-integrity.test.js`+ against the live database: **67 passed.**+- **No entity-state history is persisted.** Every `%state%` / `%entity%` / `%attribute%` column+ across the 11 tables holds entity ids or scopes, never a value or a reading.++**Measured, the build:**++- Full vitest, sharded into quarters (a full run gets SIGTERMed by peers here): **29,394 passed,+ 175 skipped, 4 failed, none in the home lane.** All four accounted for: one `audit-guards`+ failure that a peer's in-flight `data/guards.json` already fixes (re-run at the working tree:+ 20/20 pass), and three `tests/api/forge-free-first.test.js` timeouts that pass **6/6 in+ isolation** under lower load.+- `npm run gate` exit 0. `npm run check:claude` OK. `npm run audit:docs` clean over 1590 files+ **after the fix below**. `npm run db:status`: all migrations applied. `npm run smoke:prod`:+ all **17** home routes live on production (the 5 failures are other lanes' undeployed pages).+- `npm run check:rules -- --base 2849cafb6 --head HEAD`: clean, 370 changed files.+ `node scripts/check-secrets.mjs` same range: clean, 19,415 tracked and 476 changed paths.+- **HA version matrix, measured today 06:27Z:** 4 releases (2026.9, 2026.8, 2026.7, 2025.10),+ **70.2% of installs**, all 6 capabilities ok on every one. `check:home-matrix` agrees with the+ published table.++**Measured, production (revision `three-ws-api-00420-ljh`, commit `880bdcef8`):**++- The `home` subsystem reports **`degraded`, not ok**, on all three samples 100 seconds apart.+- **p95 our-leg action latency 2012 ms against a 1.5 s SLO**, stable across all three samples.+ This is the first time the number has been measurable at all: run 2 found no action in 24 hours+ carrying a `latencyMs`. It is measured over only 2 to 5 timed actions in a 15-minute window,+ because a refusal never reaches the timing (14 of 22 actions in one sample were refusals), so+ it is a real in-window breach on a small sample, not a 30-day verdict. The 30-day figure needs+ the production database, which needs gcloud.+- 34/43 homes connected, 2 auth-failed, 1 unreachable; handshakes 100%; actions 96.7%.++**Fixed here (three small defects, each on a checklist line this order owns):**++1. **The injection proof read as unrunnable.** `docs/home-security.md` named `GROQ_API_KEY`,+ `NVIDIA_API_KEY` and `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, all of which share one per-minute quota with every+ other agent on this machine, and never named Vertex, which `llm.js` itself calls the chain's+ reliability anchor and which needs no key here. The doc now names it, with both timings.+2. **The order 15 privacy inventory documented 10 of 11 tables.** `home_layouts` joined the schema+ with the floorplan editor and was never added, so a table holding user data had no row saying+ what it keeps or how to erase it. Its map is keyed by the area id Home Assistant slugifies from+ a room's name, which also made the bolded "room names are never stored" promise and the "the+ only persisted friendly name" claim imprecise. All three now say what is true: geometry only,+ keyed by an identifier the house already derived, never entity names and never state.+3. **The owner's retirement broke `npm run audit:docs`.** Five links from `docs/` and `api/` into+ `prompts/finish/` went dead the moment the orders were deleted. The retirement note predicted+ this would not matter because the audit skips the `prompts` tree; it skips links *inside* it,+ not links *pointing at* it. Three repointed at the surviving `_context/` ledgers the note+ itself designates as the record; audit is clean again.+4. **CLAUDE.md step 3 was missing a gate.** `deploy:gcp:submit` has run `audit:deploy` between+ `check:gcloudignore` and the submit for a while. An agent debugging a refused submit had no+ idea that gate existed.++**Blocking findings, not fixed here, each with an owner:**++1. **`npm run i18n:lint` fails with 31,823 problems, and 12,594 of them are this lane's:** 194+ distinct keys across all **84** locales, in `home_join`, `home_plan`, `home_satellite`,+ `home_scene` and `home_voice`. `en.json` carries all five namespaces, so this is a translation+ gap, not a source gap. Run 2 measured 61 keys across 10 locales, so the lane's share has grown+ roughly twentyfold as orders 08, 10 and 19 landed. **Owner: order 17**, which is open.+2. **The three alerts have never been fired in a test.** `api/cron/home-health-alert.js` is wired,+ scheduled every 5 minutes in `vercel.json`, and sends `home:integrity`, `home:unreachable` and+ `home:leak` through `sendOpsAlert`. **No test file anywhere references that cron or any of its+ three signatures.** The one alert that pages on a single row with no error budget has never+ been proven to fire. **Owner: order 13**, whose row reads done.+3. **The home a11y suite cannot reach a verdict on this machine.** Three runs, three different+ failures, at load average 68 to 124: (a) axe `[serious] color-contrast` on+ `button[aria-current="true"] > .hs-room-meta` on `/smart-home/:id?view=3d`, one node; (b)+ focus not restored to the Unlock button after Escape closes the confirm card; (c) a QA login+ returning non-OK. Run 2 hit the same wall. The contrast hit is the one worth chasing: a rule+ for exactly that selector already exists at `public/home-scene.css:249` and the two+ `--ink: var(--ink-dim)` redefinitions in that file are scoped to `.hs-card.is-stale` and+ `.hs-item.is-unavailable`, neither of which contains the rail, so the mechanism is not+ explained by reading. It needs one quiet machine. **Owner: orders 06 and 17**, both open.+4. **Nine migrations are applied in production with no file in `api/_lib/migrations/`** (found by+ the deploy-preflight subagent). `apply-migrations.mjs` gates on pending and drift only and has+ no concept of an orphaned row, so nothing catches it. Production's schema can no longer be+ rebuilt from the migrations directory alone. Not a deploy blocker; a disaster-recovery gap.+ **Owner: unassigned, outside this campaign.**+5. **The post-launch watch table is not in `docs/ops/home-operations.md`.** Order 20 requires it+ written before launch. Not added here on purpose: that file was `MM` (staged and unstaged peer+ edits) for this entire session, so writing into it would have carried another session's+ in-flight work into this commit. The five rows are in this order's own text. **Owner: whoever+ next holds that file.**++**Deploy preflight (subagent, read-only, HEAD moved 6 commits under it):** verdict **BLOCKED** on+one item, `npm test` not run un-piped at a stable HEAD. Everything structural is green: the+`build:gcp` chain matches CLAUDE.md 13/13 in order, 32 of 33 `cloudbuild*.yaml` pin+`three-ws-build@` and the one exception pins its own real SA off the API path,+`check:gcloudignore` clean (16,318 files, every runtime import present), 0 pending and 0 drifted+migrations, **0** of 425 route dests unbacked at HEAD, 117 crons matching CLAUDE.md, CDN purge+still synchronous, `test:gate` 86/86 and `audit:deploy` clean. It confirmed the `prompts/finish/`+retirement is safe to commit (`audit-docs.mjs` has `SKIP_TREES = ['prompts','tasks']`, and the+only test naming the tree does so in a comment). Two cautions: `dist/` currently fails+`check:dist` because a peer is mid-build in the shared tree (harmless for the runbook path, fatal+for anyone submitting from `/workspaces/three.ws` directly), and `/workspaces` free space fell+from 9.9 GB to 8.6 GB during its run.++**Explicitly unverified, never marked green:** axe on every home route (see finding 3), `npm run+audit:web` authed, 320/768/1440 at every state, zero-console-errors on every surface, the order 14+chaos scenarios, ten consecutive green suite runs, a ten-minute flat-heap session, re-firing the+three alerts (see finding 2), the rollback walk, and the live `check:cron-drift` comparison.+The last one is environmental: **gcloud auth in this Codespace is dead** (`Reauthentication+failed: cannot prompt during non-interactive execution`), which also blocks reading the production+`DATABASE_URL`, the 30-day p95, and every service-account and quota check. The offline half of+`check:cron-drift` did run: 117 declared crons, expressions valid, matching CLAUDE.md.++**Left open:** the campaign. Re-run this when 06, 09, 14, 16 and 17 are genuinely retired and 05+and 07 are finished, and read this table rather than the absence of order files: the orders were+retired by the owner, not completed.+**Commits:** `9e0574559`, `245485891`, `0ad50e967`, plus this entry.