Open-source platform for 3D AI agents. Turn text or a photo into a rigged, animated GLB avatar, give it an LLM brain, memory and a wallet, and embed it anywhere with one web component. Remote MCP server, x402 payments, Three.js, browser-native.
JavaScript 3d-generationai-agentsanimationavatardigital-humangenerative-aiglbgltfimage-to-3dllmmcpmcp-servermodel-context-protocolsolanatext-to-3dthreejsweb-componentswebglwebxrx402
docs(ops): correct the migrated-credential count so the totals reconcile
nirholas4c445cbb45a4
diff --git a/docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md b/docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.mdindex 22d370560..a80eef37d 100644--- a/docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md+++ b/docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md@@ -173,9 +173,10 @@ Read the current state at any time with `node scripts/migrate-plaintext-secrets.### The rest of the service went with itThe master key was not the only credential sitting in the config. The same sweep moved-**57 more**, in two updates (`three-ws-api-00406-nlg`, then `00407-m7c` for one that a-killed earlier run had left as a version-less secret shell). The service now carries **81-Secret Manager references and zero plaintext credentials**; `node+**58 more**, in two updates (`three-ws-api-00406-nlg`, then `00407-m7c` for one that a+killed earlier run had left as a version-less secret shell). The service now carries **81 Secret+Manager references (22 of them predating this work) and zero plaintext credentials**, with+126 of its 207 variables correctly still plaintext config; `nodescripts/migrate-plaintext-secrets.mjs --verify` reports `Verify: clean` and exits 0.Four vars were pointed at a secret that already existed rather than a fresh copy, becausediff --git a/prompts/finish/production-100-OWNER-ACTIONS.md b/prompts/finish/production-100-OWNER-ACTIONS.mdindex 61b05b24b..234fa1e06 100644--- a/prompts/finish/production-100-OWNER-ACTIONS.md+++ b/prompts/finish/production-100-OWNER-ACTIONS.md@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ on it; some resolve themselves as other work lands.| 1 | Approve the production deploy (or say "get production working", which is itself the approval). Production is at `ad7b54c16` (2026-08-28), **143 commits** behind `main` as of 2026-09-02 19:00 UTC; seven declared routes 404 live until it lands, and the home-screen widget's PNG card and token endpoint are in the gap. | one yes | Nearly everything user-visible in the map | [01-ship-readiness.md](production-100-01-ship-readiness.md) || 2 | Fund the settle sponsor wallet `WwwuGbqHrwF5RG89KhUbmRWEvjnRH9k5kVM5p7T3WwW`. Healthz reports `x402_settle` down with `cause: sponsor_floor` (settle 5.9%, 3 of 51 paid attempts over 3 hours, 329 `no_solana_accept`) and the sniper worker out of capital (0.2307 SOL to refill its wallets, funding master holds 0.0250 SOL); no config change moves either. Re-read 2026-09-02: the sponsor holds **0.001568 SOL**, so the Solana accept is withdrawn from every 402 challenge. | ~1 SOL | x402 settle recovery, backlog 01 retirement, sniper | [../backlog/PROGRESS.md](backlog-PROGRESS.md), 2026-08-02 and 2026-09-01 entries || 3 | Decide the stranded customer funds: customers hold about 0.35 SOL behind the retired encryption key and cannot withdraw. Credit (recommended), contact first, or write off. The brief now exists with the measurement, the impossibility argument, the cost of each option and the exact commands: **[docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md](../../docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md)**. Measured 2026-09-02 from production's own records: the platform side is exactly two bot wallets holding 0.142875505 SOL (the reclaim cron has failed on them ~35,700 times each, most recently today), and one customer agent is confirmed by a `wallet_key_retired` withdraw failure (`GemVS5fT958FKRe5fpgizohUYUKE8cUDueEdmB1bmXnm`, 0.250001 SOL). Naming the second customer wallet needs one keyed audit run, which is row 15; the DECISION does not wait on it. | decision | Closing the support obligation | [docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md](../../docs/ops/stranded-wallets.md), [../backlog/PROGRESS.md](backlog-PROGRESS.md) |-| 4 | Rotate or explicitly accept three credentials, now that the storage half is done. **The config work shipped 2026-09-02**: the economy master key and 57 other plaintext credentials are Secret Manager references on `three-ws-api-00407-m7c`, zero plaintext credentials remain, healthz verified no worse and the master's signing path verified live. What is left is a judgment only the owner can make. (a) The master key was readable in the service config for some window, so decide whether to rotate it or accept that exposure, knowing who held project viewer access in that period; the exact owner-gated commands are in the runbook. (b) `WALLET_ENCRYPTION_KEY` and `JWT_SECRET` hold the SAME value on production, which passes the dedicated-key guard in `secret-box.js` while defeating what it guards; changing it is a re-key with real stranding risk, so it is not an agent's call. (c) `X402_SEED_SOLANA_SECRET_BASE58` holds the same value as `LAUNCHER_MASTER_SECRET_KEY_B64` though `scripts/wire-master-wallet.mjs` assigns those slots to different wallets; decide which is correct. | decision (+ one fund move if rotating) | 03 is otherwise closed | [docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md](../../docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md), 2026-09-02 section |+| 4 | Rotate or explicitly accept three credentials, now that the storage half is done. **The config work shipped 2026-09-02**: the economy master key and 58 other plaintext credentials are Secret Manager references on `three-ws-api-00407-m7c`, zero plaintext credentials remain, healthz verified no worse and the master's signing path verified live. What is left is a judgment only the owner can make. (a) The master key was readable in the service config for some window, so decide whether to rotate it or accept that exposure, knowing who held project viewer access in that period; the exact owner-gated commands are in the runbook. (b) `WALLET_ENCRYPTION_KEY` and `JWT_SECRET` hold the SAME value on production, which passes the dedicated-key guard in `secret-box.js` while defeating what it guards; changing it is a re-key with real stranding risk, so it is not an agent's call. (c) `X402_SEED_SOLANA_SECRET_BASE58` holds the same value as `LAUNCHER_MASTER_SECRET_KEY_B64` though `scripts/wire-master-wallet.mjs` assigns those slots to different wallets; decide which is correct. | decision (+ one fund move if rotating) | 03 is otherwise closed | [docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md](../../docs/ops/wallet-key-migration.md), 2026-09-02 section || 5 | Accept the Anthropic terms in Vertex Model Garden for `aerial-vehicle-466722-p5`, then an agent flips `VERTEX_CLAUDE_ENABLED=1` after a live probe. | minutes | First-party Claude lane | `docs/ops/llm-lanes.md` || 6 | Either reactivate OpenAI billing or approve dropping the key; every OpenAI rung is a dead attempt in the chain. Also: OpenRouter fallback key #1 is revoked and still burns a rung; fund the OpenRouter platform key or stay `:free`-only. | minutes | LLM chain latency | `docs/ops/llm-lanes.md` || 7 | Mint an R2 "Admin Read and Write" token scoped to the storage bucket, put it in `.env.local`, so `scripts/set-r2-cors.mjs` can apply the CORS policy at the origin. | minutes | backlog 05 retirement, `ISSUES.md` item 9 | [../backlog/05-r2-bucket-cors.md](backlog-05-r2-bucket-cors.md) |diff --git a/prompts/finish/production-100-PROGRESS.md b/prompts/finish/production-100-PROGRESS.mdindex bf2714f82..d4419fc83 100644--- a/prompts/finish/production-100-PROGRESS.md+++ b/prompts/finish/production-100-PROGRESS.md@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ Measured: `gcloud` was dead on the first three calls of this sessionOWNER-ACTIONS row 15) and then started answering again a few minutes later with nointervention, so row 15's premise is intermittent, not standing. With it working:`ECONOMY_MASTER_SECRET_BASE58` was a plaintext `value:` on `three-ws-api` exactly as the-order described, and it was not alone: **57 more credential-bearing vars** were literals+order described, and it was not alone: **58 more credential-bearing vars** were literalstoo, including `DATABASE_URL`, `WALLET_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, `JWT_SECRET`, `CRON_SECRET`,`OPENAI_API_KEY`, four wallet secret keys and the `OFFER_RECEIPT_JWK` signing key. Anyprincipal with `run.services.get` on the project could read all of them out of the service@@ -294,7 +294,9 @@ instead of minting a copy, grants the runtime SA `secretAccessor` on that one seflips in one update, then re-reads the service and asserts the end state). Migrated themaster first and verified it alone, then swept the rest.-**End state: 81 Secret Manager references, ZERO plaintext credentials, 100% of traffic on+**End state: 59 credentials migrated (the master plus 58), 81 Secret Manager references in+all against the 22 that predated this, ZERO plaintext credentials, and 126 of the service's+207 variables correctly left as plaintext config. 100% of traffic on`three-ws-api-00407-m7c`.** `--verify` reports `Verify: clean` and exits 0.Two verifications, both read live rather than assumed: