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fix(contracts): harden GreenfieldVault, IdentityRegistry and the Uniswap launcher with matching Foundry tests
nirholas606ae23ab105
diff --git a/contracts/src/GreenfieldVault.sol b/contracts/src/GreenfieldVault.solindex c5ffe7d49..e9b519f58 100644--- a/contracts/src/GreenfieldVault.sol+++ b/contracts/src/GreenfieldVault.sol@@ -37,11 +37,16 @@ import {IApplication} from "./greenfield/IApplication.sol";* guard so the buyer could be resold access later. Grants are* otherwise permanent — there is no expiry.*+ * Escrow: the listed price stays in the vault from `buy()` until+ * Greenfield's ack settles. A confirmed grant credits the seller; a+ * failed one credits the buyer, so a seller who revokes the vault's+ * role after listing can never keep the price of an undelivered grant.+ ** Payment: native BNB. `buy()`/`revoke()` require enough `msg.value`* to cover both the listed price (buy only) and Greenfield's real* cross-chain relay fee (`ICrossChain.getRelayFees()`, queried live —* never hardcoded); any excess is refunded to the caller in the same- * transaction. Sale proceeds use a pull-payment pattern+ * transaction. Sale proceeds and refunds use a pull-payment pattern* (`pendingWithdrawals` + `withdraw()`) so a misbehaving seller* receive() can never block a buyer's purchase.*/@@ -71,7 +76,7 @@ contract GreenfieldVault is ReentrancyGuard, IApplication {/*----------------- types -----------------*/struct Listing {address seller;- uint256 price; // wei, exact amount credited to the seller per sale+ uint256 price; // wei, escrowed at buy() and credited to the seller on a confirmed grantbool active;}@@ -97,7 +102,7 @@ contract GreenfieldVault is ReentrancyGuard, IApplication {/// @dev objectId => buyer => saleId. 0 means "no open purchase" — cleared/// on Failed/Revoked so the pair can transact again.mapping(bytes32 => mapping(address => uint256)) public saleIdOf;- /// @dev Pull-payment balances credited to sellers on each sale.+ /// @dev Pull-payment balances: sellers on a confirmed grant, buyers on a failed one.mapping(address => uint256) public pendingWithdrawals;uint256 public nextSaleId = 1;@@ -201,6 +206,9 @@ contract GreenfieldVault is ReentrancyGuard, IApplication {if (!listing.active) revert NotListed();if (policyData.length == 0) revert EmptyPolicyData();if (saleIdOf[objectId][msg.sender] != 0) revert AlreadyPurchased();+ if (!objectAccessControl.hasRole(ROLE_CREATE, listing.seller, address(this))) {+ revert NotAuthorizedByObjectOwner();+ }(uint256 relayFee, uint256 minAckRelayFee) = crossChain.getRelayFees();uint256 requiredFee = relayFee + minAckRelayFee;@@ -217,7 +225,6 @@ contract GreenfieldVault is ReentrancyGuard, IApplication {status: SaleStatus.Pending});saleIdOf[objectId][msg.sender] = saleId;- pendingWithdrawals[listing.seller] += listing.price;IPermissionHub.ExtraData memory extraData = IPermissionHub.ExtraData({appAddress: address(this),@@ -261,13 +268,19 @@ contract GreenfieldVault is ReentrancyGuard, IApplication {uint256 saleId = abi.decode(callbackData, (uint256));Sale storage sale = sales[saleId];if (sale.buyer == address(0)) revert UnknownSale();+ if (sale.status != SaleStatus.Pending) return; // each sale settles exactly onceif (status == STATUS_SUCCESS) {sale.policyId = resourceId;sale.status = SaleStatus.Granted;+ // The price was escrowed by buy(); the seller earns it only now that+ // Greenfield confirmed the buyer's read grant.+ pendingWithdrawals[sale.seller] += sale.price;emit PolicyGranted(sale.objectId, sale.buyer, saleId, resourceId);} else {sale.status = SaleStatus.Failed;+ // No grant was minted, so the escrowed price goes back to the buyer.+ pendingWithdrawals[sale.buyer] += sale.price;saleIdOf[sale.objectId][sale.buyer] = 0; // let the buyer retryemit PolicyGrantFailed(sale.objectId, sale.buyer, saleId, status);}diff --git a/contracts/src/IdentityRegistry.sol b/contracts/src/IdentityRegistry.solindex 55c2597c9..439c4cc6b 100644--- a/contracts/src/IdentityRegistry.sol+++ b/contracts/src/IdentityRegistry.sol@@ -34,7 +34,12 @@ contract IdentityRegistry is ERC721Enumerable, EIP712, ReentrancyGuard {mapping(address => uint256) public nonces;// Max spend per on-chain agent ID per authorized spender (set by agent NFT owner)- mapping(uint256 => mapping(address => uint256)) public spendAllowance;+ // Keyed by an ownership epoch so every grant made by a previous owner is void+ // once the agent NFT changes hands; read it through spendAllowance().+ mapping(uint256 => mapping(uint256 => mapping(address => uint256))) private _spendAllowance;++ // Bumped on every ownership change of an agent NFT.+ mapping(uint256 => uint256) private _ownerEpoch;// Per-agent deposited ETH balance held by this contract. The sum of all// agentBalance entries equals the contract's spendable ETH; spend() may only@@ -91,6 +96,30 @@ contract IdentityRegistry is ERC721Enumerable, EIP712, ReentrancyGuard {constructor() ERC721("ERC-8004 Agent", "AGENT") EIP712("ERC8004-IdentityRegistry", "1") {}+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------+ // Ownership changes+ // ---------------------------------------------------------------------++ /// @dev A transfer must not carry the previous owner's delegations to the new+ /// owner: spend allowances are voided by advancing the agent's epoch and+ /// the delegated wallet binding is cleared.+ function _update(address to, uint256 tokenId, address auth)+ internal+ override+ returns (address from)+ {+ from = super._update(to, tokenId, auth);+ if (from != address(0) && from != to) {+ unchecked {+ _ownerEpoch[tokenId]++;+ }+ if (_agentWallet[tokenId] != address(0)) {+ delete _agentWallet[tokenId];+ emit WalletUnset(tokenId);+ }+ }+ }+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------// Registration// ---------------------------------------------------------------------@@ -257,10 +286,15 @@ contract IdentityRegistry is ERC721Enumerable, EIP712, ReentrancyGuard {external{if (ownerOf(agentId) != msg.sender) revert NotAgentOwner();- spendAllowance[agentId][spender] = maxWei;+ _spendAllowance[agentId][_ownerEpoch[agentId]][spender] = maxWei;emit SpendAllowanceSet(agentId, spender, maxWei);}+ /// @notice Remaining spend allowance of `spender` for the agent's current owner.+ function spendAllowance(uint256 agentId, address spender) public view returns (uint256) {+ return _spendAllowance[agentId][_ownerEpoch[agentId]][spender];+ }+/// @notice Spend ETH held by this contract on behalf of an agent./// Caller must have been granted allowance via setSpendAllowance,/// AND the spend is capped by the agent's own deposited balance so@@ -271,10 +305,11 @@ contract IdentityRegistry is ERC721Enumerable, EIP712, ReentrancyGuard {uint256 amountWei,string calldata memo) external nonReentrant {- require(spendAllowance[agentId][msg.sender] >= amountWei, "allowance exceeded");+ uint256 epoch = _ownerEpoch[agentId];+ require(_spendAllowance[agentId][epoch][msg.sender] >= amountWei, "allowance exceeded");if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroRecipient();if (agentBalance[agentId] < amountWei) revert InsufficientAgentBalance();- spendAllowance[agentId][msg.sender] -= amountWei;+ _spendAllowance[agentId][epoch][msg.sender] -= amountWei;agentBalance[agentId] -= amountWei;(bool ok, ) = recipient.call{value: amountWei}("");if (!ok) revert EthTransferFailed();diff --git a/contracts/src/ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.sol b/contracts/src/ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.solindex 80236f5b0..b9f5f625e 100644--- a/contracts/src/ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.sol+++ b/contracts/src/ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.sol@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ contract ThreeWsUniswapLauncher is IERC721Receiver, ReentrancyGuard {int24 spacing = _validate(p);if (msg.value != launchFeeWei) revert WrongLaunchFee();- token = address(new FixedSupplyToken(p.name, p.symbol, SUPPLY_WHOLE, address(this)));+ token = address(new FixedSupplyToken{salt: _salt(msg.sender, p)}(p.name, p.symbol, SUPPLY_WHOLE, address(this)));_launching = true;(pool, tokenId) = _seed(token, p, spacing);_launching = false;@@ -291,6 +291,24 @@ contract ThreeWsUniswapLauncher is IERC721Receiver, ReentrancyGuard {_register(token, pool, tokenId, p);}+ /// @notice Address the token of `launch(p)` will get when `launcher` sends it.+ /// @dev The token is deployed with CREATE2 and a salt that commits to the sender and every launch+ /// parameter, so its address is not a function of the launcher's nonce. Nobody can pre-create+ /// and poison the WETH pool of a token address before the launch parameters are known; changing+ /// any parameter (for example the deadline) yields a fresh address.+ /// @param launcher The account that will call `launch`.+ /// @param p Launch parameters exactly as they will be submitted.+ function predictTokenAddress(address launcher, LaunchParams calldata p) external view returns (address) {+ bytes32 initCodeHash = keccak256(+ abi.encodePacked(+ type(FixedSupplyToken).creationCode, abi.encode(p.name, p.symbol, SUPPLY_WHOLE, address(this))+ )+ );+ return address(+ uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), address(this), _salt(launcher, p), initCodeHash))))+ );+ }+/// @notice Collect accrued trading fees of a locked position and distribute them. Callable by anyone./// @dev The treasury receives `platformShareBps` of each token, the position's fee recipient the rest./// @param tokenId Locked position id.@@ -396,6 +414,10 @@ contract ThreeWsUniswapLauncher is IERC721Receiver, ReentrancyGuard {);}+ function _salt(address sender, LaunchParams calldata p) private pure returns (bytes32) {+ return keccak256(abi.encode(sender, p));+ }+function _validate(LaunchParams calldata p) private view returns (int24 spacing) {if (block.timestamp > p.deadline) revert DeadlinePassed();spacing = _tickSpacing(p.fee);diff --git a/contracts/test/GreenfieldVault.t.sol b/contracts/test/GreenfieldVault.t.solindex db5106408..9f54bec31 100644--- a/contracts/test/GreenfieldVault.t.sol+++ b/contracts/test/GreenfieldVault.t.sol@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ contract GreenfieldVaultTest is Test {uint256 saleId = vault.buy{value: TOTAL_REQUIRED}(OBJECT_ID, POLICY_DATA);assertEq(saleId, 1);- assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), PRICE);+ assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), 0);assertEq(vault.saleIdOf(OBJECT_ID, buyer), 1);(@@ -298,6 +298,8 @@ contract GreenfieldVaultTest is Test {uint256 saleId1 = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);uint256 saleId2 = _buy(buyer2, OBJECT_ID);assertTrue(saleId1 != saleId2);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId1, STATUS_SUCCESS);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId2, STATUS_SUCCESS);assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), PRICE * 2);}@@ -318,6 +320,65 @@ contract GreenfieldVaultTest is Test {assertTrue(saleId2 != saleId);}+ // ── GV-10: proceeds are escrowed until Greenfield confirms the grant ────++ function testSellerNotCreditedUntilGrantSettles() public {+ _list(seller, OBJECT_ID, PRICE);+ uint256 saleId = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), 0, "no credit while the ack is pending");++ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId, STATUS_SUCCESS);+ assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), PRICE, "credited on confirmed grant");+ }++ function testGrantFailureRefundsBuyerAndNeverPaysSeller() public {+ _list(seller, OBJECT_ID, PRICE);+ uint256 saleId = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);++ // The seller revokes the role the vault needs before Greenfield acks.+ bytes32 role = vault.ROLE_CREATE();+ vm.prank(seller);+ accessControl.revokeRole(role, address(vault));+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId, STATUS_FAILED);++ assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), 0, "seller earns nothing from a failed grant");+ assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(buyer), PRICE, "buyer's price is refundable");++ vm.prank(seller);+ vm.expectRevert(GreenfieldVault.NothingToWithdraw.selector);+ vault.withdraw();++ uint256 before = buyer.balance;+ vm.prank(buyer);+ vault.withdraw();+ assertEq(buyer.balance, before + PRICE);+ }++ function testRepeatedSettlementDoesNotDoubleCredit() public {+ _list(seller, OBJECT_ID, PRICE);+ uint256 saleId = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId, STATUS_SUCCESS);++ vm.prank(address(permissionHub));+ vault.greenfieldCall(STATUS_FAILED, 0x07, 2, 1, abi.encode(saleId));+ vm.prank(address(permissionHub));+ vault.greenfieldCall(STATUS_SUCCESS, 0x07, 2, 1, abi.encode(saleId));++ assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), PRICE);+ assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(buyer), 0);+ }++ function testBuyRevertsWhenSellerRevokedRoleAfterListing() public {+ _list(seller, OBJECT_ID, PRICE);+ bytes32 role = vault.ROLE_CREATE();+ vm.prank(seller);+ accessControl.revokeRole(role, address(vault));++ vm.prank(buyer);+ vm.expectRevert(GreenfieldVault.NotAuthorizedByObjectOwner.selector);+ vault.buy{value: TOTAL_REQUIRED}(OBJECT_ID, POLICY_DATA);+ }+// ── GV-6: greenfieldCall access control ────────────────────────────────/// GV-6 (negative half): only the PermissionHub contract may deliver an ack.@@ -372,6 +433,7 @@ contract GreenfieldVaultTest is Test {permissionHub.setRejectOnCreate(false);uint256 saleId = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);assertEq(vault.saleIdOf(OBJECT_ID, buyer), saleId);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId, STATUS_SUCCESS);assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), PRICE);}@@ -465,7 +527,8 @@ contract GreenfieldVaultTest is Test {function testWithdrawHappyPath() public {_list(seller, OBJECT_ID, PRICE);- _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ uint256 saleId = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId, STATUS_SUCCESS);uint256 before = seller.balance;vm.prank(seller);@@ -493,7 +556,8 @@ contract GreenfieldVaultTest is Test {accessControl.grantRole(role, address(vault), 0);badSeller.doList(vault, OBJECT_ID, PRICE);- _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ uint256 saleId = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId, STATUS_SUCCESS);assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(address(badSeller)), PRICE);vm.expectRevert(GreenfieldVault.TransferFailed.selector);@@ -545,9 +609,11 @@ contract GreenfieldVaultTest is Test {_list(seller, OBJECT_ID, PRICE);_list(seller, OBJECT_ID_2, 2 ether);- _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ uint256 s1 = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);vm.prank(buyer2);- vault.buy{value: 2 ether + TOTAL_FEE}(OBJECT_ID_2, POLICY_DATA);+ uint256 s2 = vault.buy{value: 2 ether + TOTAL_FEE}(OBJECT_ID_2, POLICY_DATA);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(s1, STATUS_SUCCESS);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(s2, STATUS_SUCCESS);assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), 3 ether);assertGe(address(vault).balance, vault.pendingWithdrawals(seller), "GV-5: held ETH must cover every credit");@@ -608,7 +674,8 @@ contract GreenfieldVaultTest is Test {accessControl.grantRole(role, address(vault), 0);attacker.doList(OBJECT_ID, PRICE);- _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ uint256 saleId = _buy(buyer, OBJECT_ID);+ permissionHub.settleCreatePolicy(saleId, STATUS_SUCCESS);assertEq(vault.pendingWithdrawals(address(attacker)), PRICE);attacker.arm(abi.encodeWithSelector(GreenfieldVault.withdraw.selector), 0);diff --git a/contracts/test/IdentityRegistry.t.sol b/contracts/test/IdentityRegistry.t.solindex a6e64f3d2..4b767a3b5 100644--- a/contracts/test/IdentityRegistry.t.sol+++ b/contracts/test/IdentityRegistry.t.sol@@ -301,6 +301,57 @@ contract IdentityRegistryTest is Test {assertEq(reg.getAgentWallet(id), bob, "ID-4: the fallback follows the current owner");}+ // ── ID-9: a transfer revokes the seller's spend rights and wallet binding ─++ function testTransferRevokesSellerSpendAllowance() public {+ vm.prank(alice);+ uint256 id = reg.register("ipfs://x");+ vm.prank(alice);+ reg.setSpendAllowance(id, spender, 5 ether);++ vm.prank(alice);+ reg.transferFrom(alice, bob, id);++ vm.prank(bob);+ reg.deposit{value: 3 ether}(id);++ assertEq(reg.spendAllowance(id, spender), 0, "allowance does not survive the sale");+ vm.prank(spender);+ vm.expectRevert(bytes("allowance exceeded"));+ reg.spend(id, payable(spender), 1 ether, "seller drain");+ assertEq(reg.agentBalance(id), 3 ether);+ }++ function testNewOwnerCanGrantAllowanceAfterTransfer() public {+ vm.prank(alice);+ uint256 id = reg.register("ipfs://x");+ vm.prank(alice);+ reg.transferFrom(alice, bob, id);+ vm.prank(bob);+ reg.deposit{value: 2 ether}(id);+ vm.prank(bob);+ reg.setSpendAllowance(id, spender, 1 ether);++ vm.prank(spender);+ reg.spend(id, payable(carol), 1 ether, "ok");+ assertEq(reg.agentBalance(id), 1 ether);+ }++ function testTransferClearsDelegatedWallet() public {+ vm.prank(alice);+ uint256 id = reg.register("ipfs://x");+ address delegate = address(0xDE1E6A7E);+ uint256 deadline = block.timestamp + 1 hours;+ bytes memory sig = _signSetWallet(alicePk, alice, id, delegate, deadline);+ reg.setAgentWallet(id, delegate, deadline, sig);+ assertEq(reg.getAgentWallet(id), delegate);++ vm.prank(alice);+ reg.transferFrom(alice, bob, id);++ assertEq(reg.getAgentWallet(id), bob, "the previous owner's delegate no longer represents the agent");+ }+// ── ID-5: ETH only enters through deposit ────────────────────────────────function testBareEthTransferReverts() public {diff --git a/contracts/test/ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.t.sol b/contracts/test/ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.t.solindex 494ad8924..288e8886e 100644--- a/contracts/test/ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.t.sol+++ b/contracts/test/ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.t.sol@@ -85,12 +85,18 @@ contract ThreeWsUniswapLauncherTest is Test {});}- /// Bump the launcher nonce until the next token address sorts on the requested side of WETH.- function _forceOrdering(ThreeWsUniswapLauncher l, bool tokenIsToken0) internal returns (address predicted) {+ /// Vary the deadline until the token address this launch will get sorts on the requested side of+ /// WETH. The address is a CREATE2 function of (sender, every launch parameter), so the deadline+ /// is the free knob.+ function _fitOrdering(ThreeWsUniswapLauncher l, ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.LaunchParams memory p, bool tokenIsToken0)+ internal+ view+ returns (address predicted)+ {for (uint256 i; i < 64; i++) {- predicted = vm.computeCreateAddress(address(l), vm.getNonce(address(l)));+ predicted = l.predictTokenAddress(address(this), p);if ((predicted < WETH) == tokenIsToken0) return predicted;- vm.setNonce(address(l), uint64(vm.getNonce(address(l)) + 1));+ p.deadline += 1;}revert("ordering not found");}@@ -99,7 +105,7 @@ contract ThreeWsUniswapLauncherTest is Test {internalreturns (address token, address pool, uint256 tokenId){- address predicted = _forceOrdering(l, tokenIsToken0);+ address predicted = _fitOrdering(l, p, tokenIsToken0);(token, pool, tokenId) = l.launch{value: l.launchFeeWei()}(p);assertEq(token, predicted, "token address prediction");}@@ -177,7 +183,7 @@ contract ThreeWsUniswapLauncherTest is Test {function test_mode0_emitsLaunched() public {ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.LaunchParams memory p = _params(0, 3000);- address token = _forceOrdering(plain, true);+ address token = _fitOrdering(plain, p, true);vm.recordLogs();plain.launch(p);Vm.Log[] memory logs = vm.getRecordedLogs();@@ -405,28 +411,55 @@ contract ThreeWsUniswapLauncherTest is Test {// ---------------------------------------------------------------- front-run- /// The token address is the launcher's next CREATE address, so an attacker can pre-create and- /// initialise the pool at a hostile price before the launch lands. The launch must revert.- function test_poolPriceMoved_whenPoolFrontRun() public {+ /// The token address is a CREATE2 function of the sender and every launch parameter, not of the+ /// launcher nonce. An attacker who poisons the pool of the address the old CREATE scheme would+ /// have produced gains nothing, and the launch still succeeds.+ function test_launchIgnoresPoolsPoisonedAtNonceAddress() public {for (uint256 i; i < 2; i++) {bool tokenIsToken0 = i == 0;- address token = _forceOrdering(plain, tokenIsToken0);- (address t0, address t1) = tokenIsToken0 ? (token, WETH) : (WETH, token);- uint160 hostile = TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(tokenIsToken0 ? int24(-100000) : int24(100000));- vm.prank(makeAddr("attacker"));- INonfungiblePositionManager(PM).createAndInitializePoolIfNecessary(t0, t1, 10000, hostile);-ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.LaunchParams memory p = _params(0, 10000);- vm.expectRevert(ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.PoolPriceMoved.selector);- plain.launch(p);+ address predicted = _fitOrdering(plain, p, tokenIsToken0);+ address nonceAddress = vm.computeCreateAddress(address(plain), vm.getNonce(address(plain)));+ assertTrue(nonceAddress != predicted, "token address is not the nonce address");++ (address t0, address t1) = nonceAddress < WETH ? (nonceAddress, WETH) : (WETH, nonceAddress);+ uint160 hostile = TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(nonceAddress < WETH ? int24(-100000) : int24(100000));+ for (uint256 f; f < 3; f++) {+ uint24 fee = f == 0 ? 500 : f == 1 ? 3000 : 10000;+ vm.prank(makeAddr("attacker"));+ INonfungiblePositionManager(PM).createAndInitializePoolIfNecessary(t0, t1, fee, hostile);+ }- // A different fee tier is unaffected by the poisoned tier.- p.fee = 3000;(address deployed,,) = plain.launch(p);- assertEq(deployed, token);+ assertEq(deployed, predicted, "CREATE2 address matches the prediction");}}+ function test_predictTokenAddressCommitsToSenderAndParams() public view {+ ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.LaunchParams memory p = _params(0, 10000);+ address base = plain.predictTokenAddress(address(this), p);+ assertTrue(base != plain.predictTokenAddress(stranger, p), "sender is committed");+ p.deadline += 1;+ assertTrue(base != plain.predictTokenAddress(address(this), p), "params are committed");+ }++ /// Backstop: if a pool does exist at the exact token address at a hostile price, the launch still+ /// reverts instead of seeding liquidity at the wrong price, and a changed parameter escapes it.+ function test_poolPriceMoved_whenPoolFrontRun() public {+ ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.LaunchParams memory p = _params(0, 10000);+ address token = _fitOrdering(plain, p, true);+ uint160 hostile = TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(int24(-100000));+ vm.prank(makeAddr("attacker"));+ INonfungiblePositionManager(PM).createAndInitializePoolIfNecessary(token, WETH, 10000, hostile);++ vm.expectRevert(ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.PoolPriceMoved.selector);+ plain.launch(p);++ p.deadline += 1;+ (address deployed,,) = plain.launch(p);+ assertTrue(deployed != token, "a changed parameter yields a fresh address");+ }+// ---------------------------------------------------------------- NFT custodyfunction test_rejectsStrayNFTs() public {@@ -446,14 +479,16 @@ contract ThreeWsUniswapLauncherTest is Test {// ---------------------------------------------------------------- gasfunction test_gas_mode0_and_mode1() public {- _forceOrdering(plain, true);+ ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.LaunchParams memory p0 = _params(0, 10000);+ _fitOrdering(plain, p0, true);uint256 g = gasleft();- plain.launch(_params(0, 10000));+ plain.launch(p0);emit log_named_uint("gas launch mode0", g - gasleft());- _forceOrdering(plain, true);+ ThreeWsUniswapLauncher.LaunchParams memory p1 = _params(1, 10000);+ _fitOrdering(plain, p1, true);g = gasleft();- plain.launch(_params(1, 10000));+ plain.launch(p1);emit log_named_uint("gas launch mode1", g - gasleft());}}